

HISTORY OF ENGLAND

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BOOK XX.

WILLIAM III AND PARLIAMENT DURING THE WAR
WITH FRANCE. 1690—1697.

RANKE, VOL. V. 711. B

THE wish to throw the resources of England into the balance against the overwhelming power of Louis XIV was undoubtedly the original cause of the attack which William of Orange made on the throne of James. Resistance to Louis XIV had now become a European necessity; but it never could have been successful without the adhesion of Great Britain. The English gentry and people chafed under the intimate connexion between James II and France; they were, above all, eager to secure their Protestant and Parliamentary constitution against the assaults of a prince who deemed his prerogative to be above all laws, civil or ecclesiastical. But these motives, closely connected before, were fused in one when James II fled to France and accepted her support. All that William and the Parliament carried out in Great Britain—the change of government, the overthrow of their opponents—alike expressed hostility to France. The wish to stem the tide of foreign influences, on which it principally depended, became still more general; for it produced a more sharp-cut antagonism between the Catholic monarchy, to which Louis XIV had given unparalleled unity and energy, and the Protestant and Parliamentary constitution of England, the most powerful of the Germanic kingdoms, which obtained a wider development in a new career. Matters had now gone so far that she could take an important part in the great European struggle. The clash of discordant and destructive elements, contending for the mastery at home and abroad, has more than once threatened ruin to the national life of England. But her safety lay in the fact that the mighty foe, attacked by a great coalition, never in the whole course of the struggle had leisure to bring his full power to bear on her.

We now come back to the origin and causes of the general war.

CHAPTER I.

FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE. BEGINNING AND CHARACTER OF THE WAR.

WHEN William III came to England, he was leagued with the States-General and some few German princes for this one object ; but in order to give the undertaking the desired direction, and to turn it against the preponderance of France, a far more comprehensive union had to be arranged.

And now again came up that condition of international policy which during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had especially ruled the course of politics—namely, the connexion between Spain and the Indies with the Netherlands on the one hand, and with South Italy and also Milan on the other. Since the time that the Spanish monarchy had ceased to menace the liberties of Europe, men had become familiar with this connexion. And now more than ever Spain, incessantly pressed by the ever-growing preponderance of France, saw that her safety lay in a close union with Holland and England, of old her stoutest enemies. The two representatives of the Spanish monarchy, Gastanaga, Governor of Brussels, and the envoy Ronquillo in London, welcomed with glad approval a proposal of which the effect would be the ruin of French influence in England. We have already mentioned the visits which Ronquillo, under cover of the utmost secrecy, paid to the Prince on his arrival at St. James's. In these visits the chief talk was of a great war with France. When the Brandenburg general Spaen arrived, people reckoned up the troops to be opposed to the French in the Netherlands. William, moreover, indicated that the participation of Spain

was the indispensable condition of any undertaking¹. He said he was as heartily Spanish as if he had been a Castilian ; that he would ask no more from the Spanish crown than it could bear ; but that its help they could not forego, considering the weight it would give to the affair. At the court of Madrid, in the midst of those manifold party movements which marked the days of Charles II, a man of spirit and determination, Count Oropesa, had become the leader in public affairs, and had abandoned those French sympathies, which had for some time prevailed, for a more friendly feeling towards the German line of the Austrian house, and towards the opponents of France. Would he then openly recognise an undertaking such as this of William III—an undertaking which attacked a legitimate sovereign, and one too who was a great champion of Catholicism? Would he be ready to make common cause with the King of England? Louis XIV still counted on the neutrality of the Spanish court, and even made proposals in that belief. But in the great crises of European history theological sympathies have generally but little weight, if they are opposed to interests. And so the Spaniards hit on the weak expedient of instructing their envoy to agree to nothing that would lead directly to the exclusion or overthrow of King James, while they still recognised William as King of England. But with such a neutrality as this Louis would have nothing to do. He had now declared war against Holland ; but the advantages he hoped to win from the Dutch could only be fought for in the Spanish Netherlands. His determination to declare war was probably hastened by the fall of the French party in Spain ; and this was again connected with unfortunate events (such as the death of the Queen Maria Louisa) which concerned him very closely. In April 1689 he declared war against Spain².

¹ Ronquillo, Jan. 25, 1689: 'Ponderando en sus pocas palabras, quanto importaria, que V. M. hiziese algo, aunque fuesse poco, pues qualquier cossa daria pesso a la confederación, como lo, que dexase de hazer, la destruyria; y que el havia prevenido el suplir nuestra falta, haziendo un mismo cuerpo de les fuerzas de V. M. y de las del señor Empeador, porque esto muava tambien a la union de toda la augustissima casa.'

² Déclaration de guerre de Louis XIV, Roi de France, contre les Espagnols, du 15 Avril, 1689. Dumont vii. 2, p. 221.

This was just such a state of things as had prevailed in the later years of the previous war ; and this it was that principally affected the court of Vienna.

The Emperor had indignantly rejected the overtures for peace made him by Louis XIV after the fall of Philipsburg. But yet the court of Vienna felt many a scruple as to an alliance with William III, in spite of the friendly relations already subsisting between them. They found fault with him for not showing sufficient respect to the supreme head of the Empire in his dealings with the German princes. James II reminded the Emperor that his cause was the cause of all crowned heads. Above all, religious partisanship was aroused in behalf of the English Catholics. But all this clamour was silenced in the presence of political necessities. The war with the Turk was still in full course ; and while this was going on, a stop could only be put to French aggrandisement by the help of Holland and England. The court of Vienna had ever deplored the preference for France shown by the Stuarts : it was impossible not to welcome with joy the change which put the helm of English power into the hands of a prince of opposite opinions. And now too the great question of the future came up above the horizon. Louis XIV upheld the pretensions of his Queen to the Spanish crown, in spite of her renunciation, which was still to all appearance valid ; he even tried, through his influence with the German princes, to obtain for the Dauphin, for whom he upheld these pretensions, the dignity of King of the Romans. Had he succeeded, the house of Austria would, at one blow, have lost both the Empire and the Spanish throne. But, as experience showed, no combination save one based on the firm establishment of William on the English throne could defeat this design. Burgomaine, the Spanish ambassador, whom the Emperor Leopold I trusted more than he did his own ministers, declared that the English Revolution would produce a union between England and Holland, and that this must needs turn out to the advantage of the house of Austria. The Emperor would need subsidies for the war : these Holland could not provide ; but he might certainly count on them from England, which for a long time past had suffered

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no exhaustion from war¹. Hope, the Dutch ambassador, who was charged with the conduct of the negotiations at Vienna, undertook, as the conditions of the proposed alliance, to support an archduke as successor to the Empire, and to maintain the Austrian claim to the Spanish throne. But this would have been of small importance had nothing but the help of Holland been hereby secured: the fact that the Statholder of the Republic was also King of England first gave to this agreement a real value and a well-founded chance of success in the future. It was well understood that, unless the Emperor joined them, the sea-powers might carry on the war to a successful issue without troubling themselves about the interests of the house of Austria.

Thus through this question came together those two powers in the political world which were in themselves most utterly opposed. Resistance to the preponderance of France was their inner impulse towards union. William III was so deeply impressed with the need of an alliance with the Emperor that he advised the ambassadors to withdraw the demand for a certain number of troops to be equipped by Austria, if the court of Vienna hesitated to grant them. He desired to press the Emperor as little as the King of Spain: the consideration that both he and his affairs would gain from an alliance with these two courts, so ancient, so respected, and so legitimate, would by itself be of the greatest value to him. A treaty of alliance between the Emperor and the Republic was signed on the 12th of May, 1689. Before being accepted by the Republic it was sent over to England. William III assented to the treaty altogether as soon as the document, in which the Emperor recognised him as King of England, had been received. It might be inferred from this that a fresh alliance between England and Holland must have preceded it: but it was not so; in fact it came later, and was not even then carried through without difficulty. The old engagement that Holland, if attacked as she now was, might demand the help of English troops now no longer sufficed; the impending war

¹ Extract from the Hope Despatches, Feb. 1689. *Lexington Papers*, pp. 341 sqq.

made a much closer union in policy and arms necessary. The Dutch thought they might herewith get some commercial advantage—some relaxation perhaps of the Navigation Act. But how hopelessly did they misunderstand the position of William in England if they thought to accomplish this through him! His kingship was not one which would enable him to force that nation to a concession it disliked: he laughed at the Dutch deputies when they spoke to him about it. It had already been seen that a remission of harbour-dues, which he had granted to certain Dutch ships, had been worthless; for the harbour-officials had declared that the King had no right to make any such arrangement. The dubious position of his throne, in the midst of great party struggles, imposed on him the duty of avoiding whatever might possibly strengthen the already existing, and indeed the almost natural, suspicion in English breasts that he was too partial to his countrymen. And so he was obliged, as King of England, to agree to the stipulation that the command of the combined fleet, which was to be in the proportion of fifty English to thirty Dutch ships, should always be given to an English admiral. Most reluctantly did the Dutch deputies, one of whom was the burgomaster Witsen, agree to the condition that neither power should make peace or truce with France without the consent of the other. They thought that William wished to secure their co-operation so long as Louis XIV supported his rival, King James, and that this would destroy all their independence. Through Witsen's letters runs an unexpected strain of bitterness against the new King. He signed the alliance, as he tells us himself, with a trembling hand: he regarded it as ruinous. He said he cursed the hour in which he set foot in England, and yet more that hour in which the proposed undertaking against James was first mentioned to him: had he known nothing of it, he had felt more at peace¹.

Is it not as if these men had a presentiment of what was

¹ There are three extracts from Witsen's original papers; one in Wagenaar, a second, connected with it, but with some special points of its own, in Grovestins; and a third, the one used in the text, in Scheltema. The original documents, as written by Witsen, deserved to have been given in full.

coming? While the Republic of the Netherlands carried out the greatest political act that it had ever undertaken, by taking decisive part in the English Revolution, she also founded a new state of things, by which her free and independent action was to be limited for ever. For so it was. Pitiless are the great powers which fight for possession of the world! Had the Dutch not stood out as enemies to Louis and James, they must have fallen under the sway of the monarchical and Catholic principle. In helping to evoke and develope fully the Parliamentary power of England, they forced themselves to bow before the general preponderance in the world which fell to the lot of that power. William's strength came from this—that he made himself, as it were, a personal exponent of the necessity of things. He was ever resisted in the United Netherlands: especially in Amsterdam men felt most acutely their growing dependence upon him; but it was impossible for them to shake themselves clear of him without disowning the political principles they had professed, and ever must profess.

Still even there he found, first in Gaspar Fagel, and after Fagel's death in Antony Heinsius, a fellow-worker of the highest capacity, fully and completely attached to him.

And how remarkable were the dealings of the great men of this age with one another!

Accustomed to negotiation at home and abroad, and up to this time by no means always an adherent to the Statholder, Heinsius was elected Grand Pensionary of Holland: he accepted office provisionally. The new-made King, with whom in this capacity he corresponded, especially as to the agreement with the Emperor then under discussion, called on him to accept the office definitely, and promised him, from his side, all possible support. Heinsius still hesitated. Thereon the King assured him that no man was so fitted for the post; that he was bound in conscience to accept it; that no one, be he a ruler, or only a private person, might decline to do such service as he could render to the state; and least of all under such circumstances as the present¹. Then, for the first

¹ 'Ende mien ick, dat een goed regent, jae selfs een particuliere ingeseten sigh niet magh ontrekken den dienst te doen, die in syn maght is, an den staet.'

time, Heinsius determined to accept the office; the King assured him of his gratitude, and that he would take every opportunity of showing it.

Hence sprang one of the most remarkable series of letters that has ever seen the light, between the Prince and the statesman, who, though not strictly his minister, still held in fact an analogous position. How was the King, in the press of the weighty and entangled affairs of his island kingdom, to get a clear understanding of continental relations and their perpetual changes? Here Heinsius came to his help. At the Hague were gathered together all intelligence, proposals, answers, of the continental courts; these Heinsius announced, week by week, to the King, who replied in his own decided way: the Pensionary is circumstantial, detailed, diffuse; the King brief and solid. Between the two there exists an agreement in general views, as well as in individual convictions, which in each case leads to a conclusion, wherein each supplies the deficiencies of the other. As a rule, William concurred in the views set forth by Heinsius; from time to time he even asked him his opinion. Not unfrequently, however, the King took the initiative in both reflections and decisions.

Through the harmonious co-operation of these two able men, the alliance was agreed to and achieved. Northern affairs, from the very outset, had more part in this than might have been expected.

It would have been easy enough to draw Denmark into the alliance. In the spring of 1689, the Danish envoy, Lente, had declared in Holland that his King, Christian V, was ready to make an indissoluble alliance with Holland and England; if only good conditions were granted him, he would put on a war footing 20,000 men and forty ships of war—a force surely not to be despised. At this time the compact between the King of Denmark and France had all but expired. If, instead of renewing it, Christian V were on the contrary to throw his weight into the opposite scale, his justification for that course would lie in this, that William's enterprise having been successful, and a close alliance having thence arisen between the two sea-powers, France could now no longer

defend him against them. And again, had he broken with Sweden, as at one time seemed likely, over the Holstein-Gottorp question, the sea-powers would have come to the help of Sweden: Heinsius had definitely said so to the envoy¹. Moreover, the majority of the German princes went with Sweden and Holstein. But it was impossible for William and Heinsius to close with the Danish offer, however desirable in itself the additional strength thence arising might be. To do so would be to alienate Sweden, and probably to throw her into the arms of France; and this, considering the extent and position of the Swedish possessions in Germany, must have drawn after it most ruinous consequences. The endeavours of William and Heinsius were directed far more towards bringing about some agreement on the points at issue, and this to the advantage of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Heinsius told the ambassadors plainly that since their King had made up his mind to act as judge and executive in his own cause, and as he had used violence, there remained no way of stopping the outbreak of war, except that of the restitution of the confiscated possessions, and a new recognition of the Duke's sovereignty. After some resistance, Denmark bowed to what was inevitable. The sea-powers and the German princes acted together in the treaty of Altona, which had been drafted by Paul Fuchs, a Brandenburg statesman, and approved by William, before it was laid before the court of Copenhagen. A personal relationship of William helped much to carry it through. He agreed to pay Prince George of Denmark, husband of his sister-in-law, the Princess Anne, the money due to him as his Danish apanage. Now Christian had granted the Prince some Gottorp dominions as his apanage; but as these must now be given back, the course of the peace-making was naturally greatly smoothed by having the payment of these apanages secured elsewhere. King William found the stipulation rather burdensome, and resisted at first; but the pacification of the North was so all-important in the present crisis of affairs, that

¹ They must 'reflexie nemen up den Koning van Sweden, als synde onse geallieerte.'

he would not delay it for the sake of a money payment¹. On this agreement depended the attachment to him of those Danish troops which, under the Prince of Wurtemberg, had played so great a part in the pacification of Ireland. But it was still more important that his German allies were now no longer obliged to direct their troops against Denmark, but could bring them into the field against France. The Celle regiments, which hitherto had watched Denmark, were now able to enter the Dutch service. Brandenburg, helped by Spanish subsidies, could push an army of 20,000 men forwards to defend the Spanish Netherlands.

The part which, for some years past, Russia as well as Poland had played in the German wars against the Turks, fell in with all these combinations. Though the Emperor, with his hands full in the East, could not throw all his strength into the Western wars, yet the loss to William would be fully made up by the political relations which sprang out of the 'Holy League' (as it was once more called) against the Moslem. The fighting power of the North was not at that time needed for the struggle with France: enough now, if no reaction in favour of Louis began from thence. Lastly, the subjugation of Hungary by Austria, which accompanied her victories over the Turk, tended, in so far as the Hungarians had been wont to sympathise with France, to give stability to the combined political system.

Within the German Empire, as things now stood, France could find no friends: even in Italy the Imperial position helped to extend the general alliance. Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy, attached to France by the closest family ties, still depended on the Emperor, whose vassal he was. It was a high aim of his ambition to be treated by the court of Vienna as one of the brotherhood of crowned heads; and, besides this, he was deeply interested in the transfer of the Imperial authority over a number of fiefs of the Empire, which lay

¹ William often declared emphatically that an outbreak of war in the North would be 'teggewordig an't gemeene wesen seer prejudiciable': he declared in August that he was sending the ratification of peace to Denmark: 'en't geld daertoe noedig; het syn swaere conditien, die ick heb moeten ingaen alleen om het gemeene best.'

within the limits of his territories. Long negotiations had been going on about this. Piedmontese nobles, of the party hostile to France, came back from the Hungarian war, won the Duke's confidence, and led him to think well of an alliance with the Emperor. But the most important matter was in fact the peculiar geographical position of Savoy. Through the French garrisons in Pinerolo and Casale, on the two frontiers of his territory, the Duke was held in leading-strings by France: on the most trivial occasions he felt the restraint, and saw himself treated as a kind of subject¹. The formation of an opposition-party in Europe heralded his coming liberation, and he welcomed it with joy. On the other hand, it opened up to William III a new and wide prospect: what might not happen if the ancient guardian of the portals of the Alps were detached from France and won over to his side? It had been suggested to him that he ought far rather to support Genoa against Savoy; but as early as September 1689, we find in one of his letters a statement that he even hoped to bring over the Duke to himself. The possible re-establishment hereby of the Piedmontese Waldenses in their ancient valleys, and their deliverance from the terrible consequences sure to follow the success of the French schemes, were deemed by William matters of great and special interest: moreover, England ever cherished a warm interest in them. William hoped to employ them against Louis—perhaps even to raise the Protestants of southern France, who had not emigrated, and had been forced to embrace the Catholic faith. The manifesto issued by Louis XIV shows that he felt this to be the most critical matter of all, and that it determined him to secure his strongholds by military occupation, before the Duke fell away from him. He summoned him to give up Verona and the citadel of Turin. Victor Amadeus was naturally masterful, energetic, suspicious, hasty; to pass from one side to the other, the moment it seemed his interest to do so, caused him no scruple; sudden and unlooked-for resolves almost seemed necessary for the tranquillity of his self-esteem. He now promised to deliver

¹ See Rousset's communications in Louvois, t. iv. c. 8.

the citadel into the hands of Catinat, the French general; at the self-same instant he took all requisite measures for its defence against him. it was under pressure of this demand of Louis that he concluded an alliance with Austria and Spain. It was agreed to try and wrest Pinerolo and Casale from the French; the first of them at least was to fall to him: his wishes as to the Imperial fiefs were to be satisfied by a money-payment. If the royal dignity were secured to him, he promised he would show himself a true and loyal prince of the Empire. England and Holland, to the actual forces promised by the two Catholic powers, added the promise of help in the form of a subsidy. The Duke revoked the edicts he had issued against the Waldenses, and restored them to their old possessions: back they came in crowds to their homes. With them appeared a body of French refugees, equipped by England and Holland: the Duke undertook to bestow part of the subsidies on these Waldenses and refugees¹. The combinations of the Empire and the Protestant powers here joined hands at the foot of the Alps, and thus completed the whole circuit of Europe.

We can trace, in the formation of this great league, the expansion of Sir William Temple's idea: he had wished to shape the Triple Alliance into a great federation of European states, for the maintenance of peace against the first beginnings of the grasping ambition of Louis XIV. The Stuarts were far too dependent on the French King to undertake this: one real cause of their downfall was their want of inclination and capacity for it. For no one goes unpunished who stands aside in moments when the duty of action is laid imperatively on all. Borne on the tide of this necessity, William III was carried into their place; his accession was gladly welcomed by a great league, which at once gathered round him: Europe had need of him.

France had begun the war by a strong offensive movement which answered perfectly: with one swoop she seized on the four Rhine Electorates. But she became aware at once that

¹ Articles secrets concernant les Vaudois, and other documents in Dumont vii. p. 383. Cp General State of Europe i. 670 sqq., a cotemporary compilation worthy of attention.

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she could not defend the whole breadth of the annexed districts; and so, in order to maintain at least the great fortresses, she hit on a ghastly plan, one quite in harmony with her way of making war; for in France all thought of humanity vanished before reasons of strategy; and just as, not long before, she had laid waste the Piedmontese valleys; just as, not long after, she proposed to destroy Dublin, in order to save Ireland; so now she adopted the proposal to raze the smaller places, which she would neither occupy nor allow to fall into the hands of the advancing Germans: as Oppenheim, Spiers, and Worms might help the Germans to recover Mainz, they must be levelled to the ground¹. But after all, the French missed their aim. The Germans, more united than of old, combined to recover the two most important places, Mainz and Bonn: such an onslaught, such peril were needed before the German nation would awake to a consciousness of its common interest. Now might be seen the Elector of Brandenburg with a portion of his forces joining the Imperial army under the walls of Mainz, in the conviction that the Empire would in turn support him before Bonn, as in fact it did. The French were forced to relinquish both fortresses, and with them the chief advantage of their first campaign.

William hailed the taking of Mainz as a fortunate occurrence of high importance²: on the other hand, it showed Louvois that a severe struggle was coming; and from that moment we can trace the effect of this feeling in the French way of carrying on the war. Louis XIV arranged France for this purpose as if she had been a huge fortress in the heart of Europe, as a base for operations and a reserve, if the state of affairs made it desirable for him to take the offensive in any direction, and at the same time as a refuge for the defensive, in case the foes she stirred up might either drive her in,

¹ This idea, as we see from the correspondence in Rousset, originated with the army, but was at once adopted by the ministry.

² 'Van grooter consequentie als men sigh can inbeelden.' (September 13/23, 1689, to Heinsius.) Louvois, September 14/24, writes: 'La reddition de Mayence change fort la face des affaires: il y a apparence que l'année prochaine ne sera pas meilleure que celle-ci.'

or even in their turn invade her. To the East a line of fortresses shut out the Empire, and rendered impossible such an attack as had been attempted in former centuries. Many sagacious students in the art of war thought them almost too numerous, and advised the dismantling of the less important fortresses, in order that the more important ones might be more securely defended. The army would then suffice for this purpose ; it could not be increased for lack of funds, and must therefore be husbanded as the nerve and sinew of the power of France. Its forward movements would be furthered by the proximity of the fortresses, which would be great magazines and store-depots ; the ease and suddenness of the army's movements depended on them. But for campaigns at long distances it was neither suited nor intended ; its main duty lay in repelling the enemy from the neighbourhood of the frontiers, in the collection of contributions within its own domains, and especially in the extension and fulfilment of the system of frontier defences, still far from complete, by taking from time to time one or another of the fortresses which bordered on the kingdom¹. To this system the French now once more returned.

Catinat, soon after the war broke out in Piedmont, had won a brilliant victory over Victor Amadeus at Staffarda : yet he had no thoughts of pushing on to Milan, though people all talked about it ; he contented himself with occupying the Alpine fortress of Susa. In connexion with this, the French at once seized on Savoy : after a time Montmelian also fell into their hands. In March 1691 Catinat took the town and castle of Nice with but trifling loss : even at that time the inhabitants had already declared their desire to be united to France.

There is one invariable law in the military policy of France, depending on her geographical position : every stronghold that she occupies must secure her own frontier and lay bare that of her enemy.

¹ Lilheroth, the Swedish envoy, who came to the Hague from France, affirms this positively : Louis XIV is 'avers jemens ten oorlog' ; the army will 'meest defensieve ageren' ;—but that this demanded a good combination, 'dewyl niet en hof in de werelt was, daar (Frankrijk) niet opentlyk ofte bedecktylk machineerde om die in her party te krygen, dewyl that point her fort was.'

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And thus, on the Pyrenean slopes, first Campredon, and then—a far more important affair—Seu d'Urgel, were taken by surprise. Then French columns streamed through Catalonia, as well as through Piedmont and the Palatinate. On all their frontiers the French were lords and masters.

On the same principle war was now carried on in the Netherlands also. It was but a very slight deflection from the plan of a defensive war, when, in summer-time of 1690, Louvois urged rather than allowed Marshal Luxembourg to grapple with the Prince of Waldeck before the advancing Brandenburgers could come up to join him. Waldeck, at the wish of King William, had taken the command in the Netherlands. Luxembourg surprised him at Fleurus, and drove him from his position. But he was only languidly followed up, and could boast that in a few days he had once more as strong a force as ever with which to face the French. Louis XIV would have no more battles; he strengthened the army of the Rhine, which the Dauphin accompanied, with troops drawn from the Netherlands; he was anxious that that army should be secure against mishaps.

On the other hand, it was arranged that early next spring, before any one could possibly expect it, an important stronghold in the Netherlands should be surprised after the old fashion. With this view winter quarters were selected, the Governors of Flanders and Artois were instructed to pay great attention to the commissariat; everything was so prepared beforehand, as to allow a splendid army, horse and foot, to assemble in March 1691, and to attack the town of Mons, a stronghold of the utmost importance for both the Spanish and the United Netherlands—a place regarded by them as their chief bulwark, and one which, if taken, must enormously strengthen the geographical and military position of France. It was a great question whether, after its defeat at Fleurus, the allied army would be able to hinder the fall of the place, and to withstand a fresh attack. All eyes looked to the King of England, who had just won fresh glory at the battle of the Boyne. And all depended on the answer to this question—Would the Houses of Parliament put him in a position to develop the force required for this purpose?

CHAPTER II.

WILLIAM III IN 1691. REDUCTION OF IRELAND.

WHEN, on his return from that Irish campaign which the votes of Parliament had rendered possible for him, William opened its second session¹, he spoke so forcibly as to the danger the country was still in, and the need of fresh war-like preparations, and fresh money-votes, that he gave some offence to the Houses; for he seemed thus almost to preclude anything like free discussion of the subject. But as to the fact, no contradiction was now possible. The French fleet, which just before had threatened the English coast, had roused all the national feeling against France. The members could not have ventured to go home to their shires had they refused to vote the grants needed to secure the safety of the realm. And popular feeling was almost equally eager and excited in its wish to see completed that conquest of Ireland, which had already advanced so far, and to become absolute master of that restless people.

The news of Marlborough's success against Cork and Kinsale, which came in at this moment, was all the more favourably received, because it was an Englishman who won the chief glory there; it also strengthened the popular confidence in the successful issue of the undertaking. In its answer to the speech from the throne, the House of Commons declared its conviction that the Protestant interests and the safety and liberties of Europe were bound up with the King's person, and

¹ As to this session, Macaulay, *History of England*, ch. 16 (iii 711, ed 1855) says: 'No report of the debates has been preserved.' It is fortunate that we can to some extent fill up the gaps by means of Bonnet's reports.

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promised to support him to the utmost of its power against all his foes.

The King asked for £4,425,000; and it was quite clear that very little reduction could be made in the amount, if the wars which the country was waging, in Ireland, at sea, and on the continent—wars which in fact were all parts of one whole—were to be carried through. Consequently, no serious difference of opinion arose on the subject; nor was there any till they began to consider how the required amount should be raised.

It was seriously proposed to turn into coin all the silver plate belonging to private persons, and to lend it to government with interest on it guaranteed, and with a promise to repay the capital in happier times. This shows what straits the nation had come to, and the extraordinary character of the situation. Against this scheme it was urged that the silver which could thus be drawn from the great families was a private heirloom, which ought not to be touched; also that tradesmen must keep a stock of silver in hand, in order to strengthen their credit; even if they were willing to part with it, they would actually thereby destroy the credit of the nation: it would be considered a proof of exhaustion, and men would thence conclude that the war could not be carried on another year.

Another expedient was suggested, one which certainly could not be adopted, but yet, in later days, had far-reaching consequences for King William's government. It was proposed to sell in advance the increasing confiscations in Ireland, and to apply the proceeds to the purposes of the war; these in the next year would certainly amount to a million of money. It was a popular and all but republican proposal, one which reminds us of the days of the Long Parliament. But it was not now adopted; for above all things, the rights of the old proprietors must be re-established: it was also doubtful whether fresh hands could so soon be found to till the soil. But though the plan thus fell through, the principle that in future the confiscated lands should be employed for war-purposes was affirmed. The crown had always claimed the right of disposing of confiscated property; even William III

had done so. But the House of Commons refused to recognise it as one of his rights: he was obliged to promise not to dispose of forfeited lands in England or Ireland, until some decision of Parliament had been come to respecting them¹. This was the special position of this House of Commons. In the matter of its rights it would not yield a foot; on the contrary, it missed no opportunity of enlarging and strengthening them, and often made use of things done in the Great Rebellion as precedents; the King could not oppose them directly without imperilling the money-votes, which he absolutely needed: on the other hand, if he gave way, supplies would be conceded liberally, and no hesitation would be felt about authorising even very burdensome grants.

The most prominent impost was the land-tax, in the form of an assessment divided out over the counties, as first introduced during the days of civic disturbance, and reimposed under Charles II. It caught the class that possessed property, while others were taxed by means of other duties. The bread-tax was doubled, import duties increased. The strongest objections were made to both; as to the latter, the city-merchants declared that if the war was thus to bring commerce to the ground, it would be better to give themselves up beforehand, bound hand and foot, to the French King; that they could not endure such a burden long. But in spite of all, the greatness of the material interests involved carried the government through all these difficulties. The King gave his constitutional consent in the matter of the confiscated lands: the votes passed; the new taxes became law.

But at first so lively an opposition burst forth, that the eager adherents of James II ventured to build on it a scheme for the restoration of that monarch.

The leaders of that party were not Catholics, but such Episcopalians as disliked the combination of moderate Tories with Presbyterians, who both desired to make the new throne and government secure: these men now hoped that James might be brought to the point of adopting the ideas

¹ 'L'article étoit comme stipulé. Il a fallu leur promettre (aux communes) qu'on ne disposeroit point de ces confiscations, pour les obliger d'achever l'acte pour les subsides.' Bonnet. (The passage occurs in the closing speech)

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from which they had originally started. Such were Viscount Preston and Lord Dartmouth, the last Protestant minister and the last Protestant seaman trusted by King James before his flight, and the friends of Lambeth, such as Lord Clarendon and Turner, Bishop of Ely, men of spirit and influence. These were the heads of the party. Their chief agent was an old private-secretary to the late Queen, Ashton, also no Catholic, but a man steeped in Episcopalian loyalism. Their idea was that even though James might wish to remain Catholic in his own person, still, as King, he would be obliged to express himself favourable to the maintenance of Protestantism, to uphold parliamentary government, and to put an end to all fears lest the support he had from France should be used to destroy England. They agreed with him that he could not be brought back except by French help ; but they stipulated that he should bring over with him only so many troops as might be absolutely necessary for his security, and should promise to send these back as soon as the foreign oppressors of the rights and liberties of the realm were cast out. They thought that the nation would gladly shake off William's continental allies ; but that this was the only advantage that Louis XIV must expect : he must content himself with the neutrality of England in continental contests. Thus now ran the ideas of the old opposition, not one of whom had ever in past days thought that King James would have lost his crown by their action : and they still thought they could turn back the stream of time, so as thereby to attain their original object. William was just about taking ship to Holland, when Preston and Ashton, who were on their way to France to communicate with the others, were taken on the passage, and their papers seized by government. These contained rather an exhortation to James and Louis XIV to change their line of policy, than any actual agreement or understanding. But they also undoubtedly did contain an invitation to them to overthrow the existing government, and the offer of a helping hand in so doing. Preston and Ashton were brought to trial, and made but a poor defence : as high treason had been defined by Parliament, they were clearly guilty of it ¹.

¹ Heads of declaration, Ralph 255. State Trials.

No one could tell how far the conspiracy ramified. William III rejoiced that it had been detected before his departure. He said he would not for a hundred thousand pounds have let the affair remain undiscovered; he now could go to Holland with less anxiety about England.

At the Hague he was welcomed with old-fashioned state and warmth as 'saviour of the Netherlands, and liberator of England¹.' It is worthy of note, as he remarked, that at the meeting of the States on the 7th of February, he again took his old accustomed seat at the head of the table. He also apologised for having accepted the crown that had been offered him: he had done so from no ill-regulated lust of power, but first to defend the faith and welfare of the three kingdoms, and next to get the means of supporting with a strong arm the Republic and her allies. This, he said, was now for the first time possible; he was come to take counsel with the allies, and to attend to his duties as Captain-General of the Republic.

It was principally at William's desire that a congress of the allies had met at the Hague, and held regular sittings; how otherwise could the common measures needful to carry on the war have been concerted². It was very fully attended: the Elector of Brandenburg even was there. After William's arrival they busied themselves still more actively in the definite arrangements for the co-operation of their forces and as to the contingent each ally should provide. The King took counsel with the Elector as to what the latter should contribute. A paper was circulated at the time to the effect that the congress had flattered itself that it could invade France with an overwhelming force, overthrow the monarchy, and, among

¹ From the inscription on a triumphal arch erected in the Buitenhof, at the Hague, a structure 'of curious Italian architecture of the Doric order.' *European Mercury*, 1691, p. 115.

² In a letter to Heinsius, 20/30 August, 1689, we read, 'De continuele deconcerten tuschen den geallieerden is een bedroefte ende pernicieuse saak; soude dienstigh syn dat tegens Oct of Nov een Congress in den Haag wierde gehouden van ministers van alle de geallieerdens' He refused to accept Angsburg, which was first suggested as the place of meeting. The first congress was held (according to the 'General State of Europe') on February 16, 1690

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other things, re-establish the States-General there. These were but dreams fostered by the French refugees, and not unlikely to lead to an enthusiasm for war; at the time, however, things of this kind lay in the dimness of the far distance: for the present their thoughts must be directed, not to attack, but to defence against the overwhelming power of the great enemy.

A little before this time William had sent a trusted statesman to Brussels to invite the government of the Spanish Netherlands to take measures of precaution against the menacing attack of the French; yet even he had not thought the danger so near and pressing as in fact it was. Directly he reached Loo, where he had meant to rest, he had news of the advance of the French upon Mons. He wasted not a moment in putting himself into a state of defence against them. All the Dutch and allied troops within reach were summoned to meet at Hall; but while they gathered, the storm broke in all its violence. Louis XIV, sure of the result, appeared in person. William was fully aware of the risk he ran if he attacked him; but, considering the disastrous effects the fall of Mons would have both on the affairs of Holland and on the politics of Europe, he made up his mind to run that risk¹.

At this very point, then, he was determined to resume the war—at the point at which he had been forced to give it up in the days of the Peace of Nimuegen. He cried aloud that, God helping, he would carry it through. But the preparations were slovenly; above all, the foresight needful beforehand for the commissariat was wanting. It was impossible for the King to move before the 10th of April; and on the 8th Mons had been compelled to yield. Louis returned in triumph to Versailles.

It was 'an indescribable loss,' as William calls it in one of his letters: 'the still-wavering allies will leave us; the northern crowns will dictate their own terms.' Indeed negotiations for peace were at that time proposed by the northern

¹ 'Alhoewel d'onderneming om te Stadt te secourir en seer hazardeus soude syn': still he hoped, God helping, to succeed. Letter from the camp at Hall, April 7. Vauban was then wrong in denying that William had such an intention, or that there was more than a mere possibility of it, and the King was not to blame for hurrying up his cavalry.

powers; but William rejected all thought of it with vehemence. 'No honourable man,' he said, 'would think of such a thing¹: the conditions which France would now offer or accept would be nothing less than the subjugation of Europe.'

He was quite decided in his own mind to stick to his point without wavering, doubtful though his affairs might seem to be. The great antagonist with whom he had now once more undertaken to grapple had seized a stronghold which must be wrested from him. He had gained a growing preponderance, not only on land, but actually at sea, where he had won the last advantage. The alliance against him had not yet by any means reached its full activity, and was weakened by northern influences, or by the secondary effects of the Turkish war. At the same time the Irish Jacobites held a large territory in which James II was still recognised as the true king. The same was the case in the Highlands. In England, not only was there a strong legitimist party, but there were actually a number of bishops who did their best to cherish and extend these opinions among the people.

William III was compelled to face all ways in order to break the power of his antagonists. We shall accompany him on his journeys and in his operations undertaken with this view.

When the French had gone into cantonments after taking Mons, it became possible for him to return to England for a time—for home difficulties must be settled before anything else could be done.

It did not at all suit his plans to follow any farther the traces of Preston's plot; rather he opposed any such attempt, for it must have carried in its train most reactionary results: it was enough for him to punish one guilty person. Ashton, socially the least important of the conspirators, had already been executed, after he had testified once more, just before his end, that his intentions had been right loyal. Preston was pardoned; William Penn, who this time was also implicated, was let off. In a short time we find him at his possessions across

¹ 'Want et kan in geen redelyke menschen kommen, dat Frankryk tegenwoordig redelyke van vrede to bringen soude syn.'

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the seas¹. On the other hand, the King deemed that the time was come for him to set Church matters straight. Hitherto he had not thought it prudent to execute the sentences passed on the nonjuring bishops; they still held their palaces and revenues. He did not wish to strengthen their influence over the people by making martyrs of them; but now that it appeared, from the papers discovered, that they had been in communication with King James against the existing government, and that Sancroft might also be regarded as an accomplice, he thought no further consideration need be shown them. He had already settled what clergymen he would promote to the places which would be left vacant, and had made sure that they would be willing to accept preferment: the *congés d'elire* were made out in the usual form; the elections took place as he desired. A legal ejectionment was ordered against the nonjuring bishops, who let matters,—or rather were glad to see them,—come to such a pass; for they denied the competence of Parliament in the case. Not till then did Sancroft withdraw from Lambeth: he died not long after.

The most distinguished of the new bishops was Sancroft's successor, John Tillotson, who was entirely absorbed in the idea of a reconciliation between the two Protestant parties. Yet even he did not think it could be altogether accomplished. He writes to Frederick Spanheim at Leyden, who had himself published a treatise on the subject, that this could only be achieved if the brave King were still more favoured by fortune, and if the times should become quieter.

Surely it was of the highest importance that men of this way of thinking had now attained to the chief seats in the English hierarchy. They were indeed far from reaching the end they set before themselves; still at the time they were most useful in contributing very largely to induce men to submit to the new government, more especially as that government was just now in the hands of the moderate Tories.

King William was still very busy with the necessary pre-

¹ Cp his letter to Henry Sidney, Lord Romney, in Janney 368, from the Archives of Pennsylvania.

parations for continuing the war in Ireland ; yet he was not able to superintend it himself, for as early as the beginning of May we find him in Holland again, where his presence could no longer be spared. For the fall of Mons had made the deepest impression on the Dutch ; they almost thought that there had been foul play between Spaniards and French. Hence arose the idea of a barrier—that is, of their own right to garrison the most important frontier fortresses. In the first place the return and the energy of their Captain-General, who gathered an army superior to that of the enemy, restored their sense of security. The French attempted Liège, but were successfully repulsed. All the glory Marshal Luxembourg could win was that of simply having held unassailed the extensive position he had taken up.

These warlike affairs on the Continent shall not detain us : for it was in Great Britain that the important movements of the year took place.

There the struggle between the natives of Ireland and the English had to be brought to an end. The Irish had a French general, St. Ruth, who had won himself a name in the war with the Protestants ; and it was thought he would maintain an unity of action in spite of the divisions among the Irish. They had also some other French officers, but no other foreign help. In the English army were to be seen once more the German regiments, which had heretofore been so helpful in the great crises of war, and that not in England and Scotland only, but also in Ireland herself.

William was at first doubtful whether he should or should not give the chief command in the new expedition to Count Meinhard Schomberg, who had dealt the decisive blow at the battle of the Boyne, and was deemed the most versatile and accomplished general in the army. But Schomberg was harsh, self-willed, and reckless in command. Finally Baron Ginkel, who was actually in possession, who knew the country, and, above all, knew how to stand well with other generals of high birth, such as Prince Ferdinand William of Würtemberg, was preferred to Schomberg. Active co-operation between all was in fact almost the most important thing. King William had this also in view in several other changes which

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he made among the other generals. Any officers who were out of harmony were removed to a distance and replaced by others, amongst whom was General Mackay, who appeared to have completed his task in Scotland. He assures us that this object was fully attained, and the army, composed of soldiers from four or five different nations, brought into complete harmony : at the council-board there were of course frequent differences of opinion ; but, when once a decision had been come to, all did their best to carry it out successfully.

The whole army came together before Athlone, the most central fortified town in Ireland, of which it has been well said that it ought to have been the capital. The English half of the city, on the Leinster side, fell at once into their hands ; but the attack of the other half, defended by the river Shannon, was no such easy matter. St. Ruth with all the Irish forces was hard by, to hinder the English from crossing, and to co-operate in the defence of the fort. The English generals sometimes thought they had undertaken too much ; they shuddered at the thought of the bad impression a failure would have on Ireland and England, and indeed on all Europe. German accounts say that the Prince of Wurtemberg discovered a ford which made the passage possible ; they add that he was carried over on the shoulders of two grenadiers, and then, sword in hand, led the storm of the place¹. This time it was successful. The raw Irishmen, who had been posted here as their first experience, in order that they might grow accustomed to be under fire, did not make so vigorous a resistance as the old troops had done the year before at Limerick. The town fell, June 30, 1691.

It is not hard to see that, after this experience, St. Ruth would not again willingly risk his reputation in the defence of insufficient fortifications ; he determined instead to await the enemy, who was now advancing along the Galway road, and to meet him in the field. He had taken up a position near Castle Agrim, defended by morasses and defiles. Here Ginkel attacked him (July 12) with an army superior to his

¹ This is from personal details subjoined to the funeral oration pronounced over the Prince, and very kindly communicated to me by Stålm.

in artillery and even in infantry. At first he pushed forwards too hotly, and was repulsed by St. Ruth's dragoons and musqueteers, who moved lightly between the hedges and ditches, till he was driven back within range of his own batteries, which then suspended fire, for fear of hitting friends and foes alike. Castle Agrim held out stoutly; the battle was still far from decided, when a cannon-ball killed St. Ruth¹. This deprived the Irish, who had once more been fighting well, of a firm guiding hand, and damped their courage: when Ginkel renewed the attack they broke in wild confusion. General Mackay, who perhaps had contributed most to the success of the day, attributes it to the direct action of Providence.

After St. Ruth's death no Irish army could be kept in the field. Even the levies which had gathered round Baldearg O'Donnell, to whom they looked for the re-establishment of Irish independence, dispersed.

In St. Patrick's Cathedral at Dublin there lies on Schomberg's monument the ball which killed St. Ruth; and thus are united memorials of the two battles which won Ireland back to England and Protestant government. The anniversaries of these decisive days, the 1st and 12th of July, still stir the hostile emotions of Irish party-spirit.

But the sword could not, once and for all, decide the struggle in Ireland. The Irish national feeling, which, as we have already said, had tried to form a kind of military organisation of the Irish, was now overthrown. In the first declaration published in Ireland by William he had announced that he would wage incessant war against the leaders of the insurrection, and against the heads of the septs; and on the other hand, he proclaimed a full pardon to the common soldiers, country-folk, and citizens, if they would lay down arms and submit to his government. This has certainly been one of the most effective means by which to break up a clan system. But there was another tie which held together the resistance of the Irish, and that was their religion. The King, who had taken under his protection the Episcopalians in Scotland

¹ In the French despatch we read '*nous eûmes toujours une espèce d'avantage.*' Mackay makes St Ruth fall almost at the beginning of the engagement, which was about mid day; according to the French account he was killed about 7 p.m.

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and the Presbyterians in England, determined to lend a friendly hand also to the Catholics in Ireland. And so the announcement of a general amnesty for all who submitted was now coupled with a promise that the Catholics should not be persecuted in the exercise of their religion. Government pledged itself to see that this promise should be confirmed by Parliament, to be convoked as soon as possible.

Ginkel, who after the victory of Castle Agrim had advanced on Galway, sent a trumpeter to the garrison with this proclamation; and the effect of it was exactly what had been intended. The governor agreed to a capitulation, in which these promises were renewed to both garrison and citizens in the plainest language. He gives, as the grounds of this course, the bad state of the fortifications, the ill-will of the citizens, many of whom were Protestants, and, above all, the unwillingness of the soldiers to defend themselves with vigour¹.

The forward movement of conquest now met the full tide of resistance once more near Limerick; but the occurrences, which had caused the reduction of Connaught also, produced a great change of opinion. Officers, who one day had sworn never to submit to William of Orange, were next day heard to say that a reconciliation was inevitable. It was not an uncommon thing for Englishmen to think that the sword alone could settle the difficulty, and that no conditions ought to be granted. But government was not of that way of thinking; and indeed such views were not to be encouraged in the face of the misery of the wasted country and the situation of European affairs. King William's representatives, above all, wished the settlement to take place before the bad season²; they certainly did not want to wait till French support should once more renew and rouse the spirit of the Irish.

The progress of the siege was regular but slow. The works Ireton had thrown up were again used. Ginkel, vigorously supported by the Prince of Wurtemberg and by the confidence the troops had in him, performed the critical

¹ 'Le peu de disposition, qu'il voyoit dans les troupes, de faire une bonne défense, les mauvaises intentions des bourgeois.'

² Letter of Coningsby in W. Harris, *History of the Reign of William Henry*, &c. p. 336.

operation of the siege, the passage of the Shannon, in face of the enemy. Still the Irish, led by one of St. Ruth's officers, General D'Usson, made a good stand, though the defence was troubled by incessant dissensions. The more the French insisted on continuing the war, the more did the Irish hang back. A paper was circulated which was called the last will and testament of Tyrconnel, who died about this time. It denounced as a mere chimaera the trust of the Irish in French help. If, when his affairs prospered, the French King had given them so little aid, how could they now beguile themselves into expecting efficient support from him when nearly all was lost and the need extreme? Louis XIV wished only to lengthen out the affair for a time in his own interest; in the end they would be compelled to surrender at discretion¹. And so, when Ginkel had taken up a commanding position, whence he could cut off the communications of the besieged with their cavalry, the Irish leaders hesitated no longer, but opened negotiations without D'Usson's knowledge. Sarsfield, the man who had first held the opinion that Ireland could defend herself, was again the first to declare that a capitulation was desirable, so long as it did not involve a complete disarming. A truce was agreed on, hostages exchanged, negotiations opened; its importance lay in the fact that not merely the town and citadel of Limerick, but the whole Irish people also, were included in the discussion. At first the Irish demanded free exercise of their religion and equal rights for both communions. This they certainly could not even hope to get. Ginkel could only treat with them on the basis of the government proclamation, which he had let them see; but he stretched its offers as widely as he could. The Irish Catholics got the concession of those rights compatible with the laws of Ireland which they had enjoyed under Charles II. And it is certain that at that time they would have to take no oath opposed to their faith; even now they were only to take the oath of allegiance, not that of supremacy. The upshot of the whole struggle was this: the Irish and Catholics must renounce

¹ 'Écrit que les malintentionnés ont publié sous le titre de testament du Milord Tyrconnel.' In the French papers of September 1691.

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all thought of acquiring independence, for which they had taken up arms ; on the other hand, Protestantism could not have that exclusive mastery which many desired. What was naturally right received strong and positive support from the fact that the surrender of the last strongholds was connected with conditions favourable to the Irish.

The capitulation gave those who, even under these circumstances, were unwilling to stay in Ireland, permission to retire into France. There were about 12,000 of these, who were all formed into regiments of horse and foot. When they reached France, James II came out to meet them, reviewed them, and took part in their manœuvres. Among them was Sarsfield, who, though he had recommended submission in the absolute hopelessness of their cause, yet was unwilling to break his personal allegiance to his hereditary sovereign.

CHAPTER III.

PARLIAMENTARY GRANTS. GLENCOE.

GREAT BRITAIN and Ireland were now once more one kingdom, like other kingdoms. The new government ruled it in its integrity, and could now throw all its strength into the general war.

The King, Parliament, the city, and the great majority of the nation, were equally ready. When King William opened Parliament, October 22, 1691, he passed in silence over the prosperous end of the Irish expedition, and simply remarked that he regarded it as the earnest of future successes, if only Parliament would promise him its support without delay. For the coming campaign he asked for a fleet as strong as last year's, and for a still stronger land-force: not merely defence, but attack must be prepared for. The speech was interrupted from time to time by loud applause. It may be seen from the addresses of the capital and the Commons that the general opinion coincided with the King's wishes.

But co-operation had also its conditions.

The Stuarts, as far as possible, had avoided all foreign complications; for they dreaded lest Parliament should demand, in return for the necessary grants, constitutional concessions, which might turn out to be very inconvenient for them. William III could harbour no such thoughts. For his first undertaking had depended on his drawing Parliament into a participation in the European war with which he was occupied. Parliament saw that its own interests were also involved. But this did not hinder Parliament from always taking into consideration the extension of its rights or their establishment in accordance with the ideas now prevalent.

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In every session we find acts of parliamentary independence, which have their own especial constitutional importance.

In the session of 1691 came up once more the old idea that the power of England rests on her fleet alone, and that she ought, as far as possible, to withdraw from all share in continental warfare. Clarges was ready to give up the Spanish as well as the United Netherlands, if only the command of the sea were secured to England. But things were not at this moment in such a position as to allow this view to enjoy much support. Treby remarked that the Dutch navy would fall into the hands of the French with the Dutch provinces; then how would the English navy be able to make head against the Dutch and French united? The members for the western counties, which were more particularly threatened by the French war-ships, declared with great energy against any change of England's policy. They called loudly for a division. The Speaker hesitated a moment, but yielded to the vehemence of their demand. It was agreed that an army of 64,924 men, the exact number government had asked for, should be raised for the coming year, to assure the peace of the country and to carry on effectual war against France. And, to put an end to an uncertainty which arose hereon, a second resolution was passed, declaring that these figures included none but the private soldiers. An especial grant was voted for officers, including under that name sergeants, corporals, and even drummers and farriers, and the number of these for the army of the Netherlands amounted to 8000 men¹. Even the attempt to limit the sum to be granted for pay to foreign troops in the English service was defeated. The belief that the plan thus determined on for the security and influence of England was the best possible, and that this country must support the Netherlands and the coalition, still prevailed in Parliament.

But there was attached to these liberal votes of supply a most important addition to the privileges of Parliament. A

¹ 'On regarde cette resolution des communes comme la marque la plus indubitable de leurs bonnes intentions pour la cause publique.' Bonnet, 1/11 Dec. 1691.

claim was made, and successfully, to a right of examining the government estimates for the next year's service, and of limiting them at the discretion of Parliament. But for the help of Parliament the King, with his very limited income, could never have moved a step: he was more dependent on the Houses than any previous sovereign had ever been. Parliament did not like grants made in the lump; it liked to test all claims and requirements in each separate branch of the administration: it even voted the supplies for the army in this way, with separate grants for each part of the service: even at this very moment it had considerably diminished the sums demanded for the forces by sea and land. It is true that the old feeling of comradeship between King and Parliament had sprung up again; but times were changed, and the change took the form of increased claims and encroachments on the part of Parliament. The principle on which it went was, that the Lower House represents the people, and must see that the people's money be not squandered.

The control also exercised by the House of Commons over the expenditure of the money voted, though by no means identical with these claims, was still very closely connected with them. Once already, under Charles II, in the first Dutch war, this control had been attempted, and a great minister who fell out with Parliament on the point owed his downfall to his refusal to submit to this claim: now the privilege was secured. A commission of enquiry into the accounts was appointed, and it sat in judgment on the income and expenditure of several years, finding therein grounds for some very bitter remarks. The accounts were full of gaps; the vouchers put in insufficient. Then they passed from the points of form to those of substance, and took special offence at the secret-service money, which had been misapplied and used to bribe members of Parliament. Ministers were in a very difficult position about it. Among other things there was a sharp debate between John Lowther, the Secretary of State, who objected to the commission on the ground that it was throwing dust into the people's eyes, and one of the members of the commission: it came at last to a kind of

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challenge¹. Lowther, who attended to his duties with the utmost zeal, boasted that the King, the fountain of all authority in the state, was content with him, and would not let him be roughly handled by people whose hatred pursued all who were entrusted with the executive power

This however was now the position of ministers : the King invested them with their official authority ; but they must account for their stewardship to a popular and factious Parliament

And in fact the House of Commons took these new privileges exclusively into its own possession. The Lords thought that they had at least a right of co-operating in the formation of the commission ; but the Commons tacked the nomination of its members to a money-bill, which was absolutely necessary to raise the sums voted, and the Lords did not dare to throw it out. The taxes now imposed were again very heavy, but in spite of every outcry the land-tax was once more voted. Though there were manifold objections to the course, the excise duties were raised anew. And as these two taxes together did not produce the sum voted, the Commons did violence to their own feelings, and established that most onerous of all direct imposts, a poll-tax. It was to be collected four times a year, on a graduated scale, according to a classification of society ; its produce was estimated at £1,300,000. It was to this bill that a clause as to the permanence of the commission, then sitting to audit accounts, was tacked ; it would otherwise have been inevitably thrown out by the Lords ; as it was it was vehemently opposed. People were afraid there must be a short prorogation ; but this would have led to no change in the strength of parties. The Lords made up their minds to give in, considering, as they said, the imminent peril that England and a great part of Christendom would run if either the passing of the subsidies or his Majesty's journey to the Continent were delayed². On February 23 this was agreed

¹ Bonnet says ' le dialogue ne finit que par une espèce de défi.' Macaulay (*History of England*, ch. 18, iv 121, note) quotes a characteristic passage from a paper by Lowther. But do not the words in Grey's Debates (ix. 129), ' was ready to faint away,' refer with far more probability to an accident which happened to Thomson, mentioned at that place ?

² Journals of Lords xv 90.

to; the bill passed without amendment. Next day the King came down to the House, and gave his assent to the bill in the usual form. 'The King and Queen,' cried the clerk, in the old French formula, 'thank their subjects, accept their benevolence, and will it so.' But Parliament was not only engaged on discussions and votes as to the present need of supplies; it also went on with other resolutions by which the King's prerogatives would be limited in other directions. They came back to the assignment of the Irish confiscated lands to the purposes of the war; proposals for limiting certain military privileges which the King and his officers enjoyed were laid before them. Of these the most important was a bill by which (according to a scheme which had been included in the settlement of 1688, but had been suppressed) the judicial bench was to be made independent of the administration, and, particularly, the salaries were to be paid quarterly without a royal order. This bill had already passed both Houses, and only awaited the royal assent. It was the first bill which the King was determined not to assent to. To escape the excitement which must ensue, and at the same time to avoid any debate, he closed the session, and so got out of the difficulty. In the Commons this had not been expected as yet; they were surprised and not a little displeased at it.

Hence we may see how far King and Parliament were from a complete understanding: parties and leading men were in perpetual agitation one against another: out of the attack on Russell's administration of naval affairs during the last few years, sprang up at once two new parties, that of Caermarthen (from the title which Osborne at that time bore), and that of Russell, which acquired no solidity; as to the main point, which affected the fortunes of all the world, all were agreed. The amounts required for a vigorous war by sea and land flowed in; the subsidies, destined to establish an active coalition in Germany and Italy, were properly paid.

Of the troops which had been engaged in Ireland, by far the chief part, eighteen regiments of infantry, eleven of horse, three of dragoons, and the Danish auxiliaries, were shipped over to the Low Countries. Among those left behind, no Irishmen might be enrolled. All not included in the Articles

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of Galway or Limerick were summoned, if they wished to take advantage of the peace, to give up their arms to the sheriffs. The Freebooters, those Rapparees who had made themselves formidable in the war, and since then had taken refuge in the bogs or hills, determined for the most part to avail themselves of the proclamation, and to accept the amnesty offered them¹. By degrees government again became master of that country.

The attention of government now turned to the pacification of Scotland; and here there were two matters to be considered, the religious differences, and the national antipathies which raged in the Highlands.

In the Scottish Parliament of 1690 the Presbyterians had quite got the upper hand; the constitution of the national Assembly had been restored. It was the reaction from a religious civil war. Of the clergy who had been ejected from their benefices at the Restoration, sixty were still living; these were not only replaced, but became the leaders in all ecclesiastical affairs. On the other hand, the Episcopalians, who hitherto had been supreme, were persecuted: they were even to be shut out from all public appointments. The King, however, did not here go with them. He did not regard the Presbyterian as the only true constitution of the Church: he only wished to recognise it as by law established, just like Episcopacy in England. This being his point of view, he rejected the proposal that an examination into a man's religious belief should always precede his appointment to any office, and that Episcopalians should be excluded; it was enough for him if a simple engagement of submission to the established government and church was at such times offered and accepted². And now he forthwith fell into the old dispute which former governments had kept up with the national Assembly. The King claimed for the crown the right of prorogation and dissolution, and this the Assembly denied; and at their very first meeting, in November 1690, it happened that he had to

¹ 'Under penalty to be persecuted with the utmost severity' W Harris, *Life and Reign of William Henry*, etc., p. 355. From the *Gazette*

² His Majesty's remarks upon the Act for settling church-government in Scotland. Melville Papers 436.

give effect to that claim. The Episcopalians offered to take the oath of allegiance (if they were treated gently) very much in the terms required by the King; but this could not be agreed to in Parliament. Melville could never have proposed it seriously; he would have been afraid of alienating his supporters. The King had no course open save that of giving to some man who firmly embraced his opinions the authority to exercise the highest power. And such a man was John Dalrymple, whom he selected. Hereon the Episcopalians broke off their connexion with James II: for they had no hesitation in submitting to a moderate Protestant government in Scotland.

It was a wholesome and unavoidable practical expedient, but one which openly contradicted the resolutions passed by Parliament, just as the toleration shown to Ireland went beyond them, and as the appointment of the latitudinarian bishops in England involved an exercise of the royal supremacy which did not at all harmonise with the creed of the High Church party. Still, at the time, no one resisted. In the presence of a mighty, enterprising and ceaselessly active enemy, all were filled with a sense of the imperative necessity of avoiding any open indications of antagonism which might invite an attack.

And this was one cause among many which combined to bring on an affair much misjudged by the King's contemporaries, and made a ground for the bitter reproaches of posterity.

The Highlanders had been and were still staunch supporters of King James: yet they now let him know that unless he sent them help they would be obliged to submit. In 1691 it was once more possible for James to send them a ship well found with provisions from Nantes, in which all who could not bring themselves to submit to the enemy might embark: at the same time he told them he would not think evil of any who under external compulsion submitted and stayed behind; for he was 'perfectly assured of their hearts in all times, and doubted not of their hands too, when the condition of their affairs should require, then to appear for him'¹: the day

¹ From a letter. Clarke's Life of James II, ii. 469.

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would come when the most Christian King would be able to let his ships sail on so distant an expedition, and he would be sure to send them timely intelligence as to what ought then to be done. In consequence of this the clans soon after closed with the offer made them by government. Like barbarians, as they were, they showed themselves very eager for the money offered them. William III issued a proclamation that every one who should agree before January 1, 1692, to take the oath of allegiance to him, should be pardoned all past offences. It was not by any means the worst among them who hesitated to avail themselves of the permission allowed them by their lawful sovereign, King James, and to submit to a prince whom they regarded as an usurper: but the ceaseless partisan-war they carried on in the Highlands, which kept up a general agitation, and fanned the hopes cherished by King James as to their rising in his behalf, was no longer to be endured¹. Under these circumstances William III gave orders that McJan Macdonald of Glencoe, the most stubborn, perverse, and persistent of his foes, should, if he could be separated from the others, be forthwith utterly extirpated with all his clan: as he said, in order to vindicate the open course of justice, and, as Dalrymple, Secretary for Scotland, who enjoyed the King's full confidence, added, to make righteous retaliation, and an example. The excuse that the King signed the order without reading it is but a poor one, and indeed is something like another form of accusation against him, for the matter was so important that he was bound to acquaint himself fully with it. And the supporters of government were even glad that Macdonald at any rate did not strictly observe the terms of submission; for he had reported himself at the latest possible minute to the military commandant, and not (as he should have done) to the sheriff, to whom he did not go till some days later. The Scottish government thus retained the formal right of treating the men of Glencoe as open enemies: it entrusted the duty of execution

¹ Propositions for a landing in Scotland, end of December 1691, or beginning of January 1692: 'The Highlanders should be warned to be in readiness to take arms on the first notice.' Macpherson's Original Papers i. 395.

to the Campbells of Argyll's regiment, Macdonald's hereditary foemen. The most frightful massacre ensued. The troops were received as friends ; their general, in some way connected with Macdonald, accepted his hospitality one evening : the next morning the chieftain was shot dead as he was preparing to receive an officer who was arriving. The massacre spread through all the neighbouring settlements : families were shot at as they sat by their firesides ; natural barbarism and clan-feud sated the vengeance of the state, that is, of the victorious party in the state. The upland valleys of Glencoe, whose gloomy grandeur awes the traveller, hand on from generation to generation the tradition of this tragedy.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WAR IN 1692, 1693. BATTLE OF LA HOGUE.

AFFAIRS in Great Britain stood thus :—the great parties on which James might have reckoned had, one way or other, been everywhere crushed, the Parliamentary grants for the prosecution of the war had been voted, the condition of the existing armies maintained, new and large levies begun. This was the moment when France determined on a serious attempt to restore the fugitive King.

To this determination two reasons led the French. First, they saw that they would never gain their point—namely, such a peace as would secure the reunited districts—by a war confined to the mainland. One of the King's and the ministers' trusted advisers, Chamlay, alluding one day to the old saying, that 'the Romans can be conquered only at Rome,' added that the opposite of this was now true of Germany; that Holland and England must first be brought to terms by a resolute attack by sea, and that after that Emperor and empire would also become tractable¹. With this view the attack must be more especially directed against England, which would have to bear the chief brunt of the war. The French fleet was still regarded as stronger than any other; might not such an undertaking succeed with it as had succeeded a quarter of a century back with the Dutch fleet under Cornelius de Witt? That expedition drove England to peace—so might this also.

The second reason was the state of England herself. At

¹ Chamlay : 'On mettra les Allemands plus aisément à la raison par l'Angleterre et par là Hollande que dans l'Empire. Le roi ne sauroit trop faire entreprendre par sa flotte contre ces deux nations pour les obliger à demander la paix' In Rousset iv. 419.

this moment dissension had broken out among King William's friends, and had opened new and promising chances for an attack. Not Catholics only and old Jacobites, not High Churchmen and Nonjurors, but even men who had played a conspicuous part in the Revolution, and who, above all others, had carried it through, men like Admiral Russell and Lord Marlborough, were now endeavouring to connect themselves with King James.

Russell could not brook the preponderance of the Tories in the administration and in Parliament; he was a personal sufferer by it. He was by no means content with the King's constitutional position, which did not suit his Whiggish ideas. And, as he never forgot his own private interests, so he did not conceal his belief that they also gave him grounds for dissatisfaction. For all his services the King had not shown either to him, to his family, or to his friends that gratitude on which they certainly might have reckoned; King James had in reality treated them better.

Marlborough's chief motive for going into opposition was the preference shown in the matter of military commands to foreigners like Ginkel or the younger Schomberg; next he felt that he did not receive even such outward honours as he deserved. He stirred up in his own behalf the natural antipathies of the English against the foreign officers; he seems to have even directly encouraged them in mutinous conduct towards foreign generals¹. His differences with King William were also aggravated by the disagreement which now sprang up between the Princess Anne and the Queen. The Princess also had expected for herself and her consort more consideration than she received. Between the two sisters the most unpleasant disputes had broken out on this subject. The King, with very good cause, attributed the Princess's conduct to Marlborough and his wife, who had the greatest influence over her; and at the same time he had been informed that Marlborough had declared he would have challenged the King had he been a private citizen. He therefore determined

¹ 'De se lier ensemble et de refuser de leur obéir.' So says Bonnet, February 8, 1692, N.S.

to deprive him suddenly of all his offices · the Princess even was summoned to dismiss Lady Marlborough from her service. Then it came to an open breach the Princess maintained that no one had any right to demand this of her ; she would leave the palace in which she was living rather than submit ¹.

It was well known that nothing had contributed so much to the success of the Revolution as the close union of the two daughters of King James II, and the adhesion of the Princess Anne and Marlborough to William III's party. One can quite understand how much the division that now rent these circles raised the Jacobite hopes. Among the scanty remains of their correspondence at this time there is still a letter of Melfort's in which he openly avows the hope that there might be a good catch of fish in these troubled waters ².

The Princess Anne even went so far as to write to her father, asking forgiveness ; nay, she even seems to have had some thoughts about a reconciliation with her stepmother, whom she hated. Marlborough also made overtures to James, who replied that, though guiltiest of all men, he should still be pardoned if he would deserve it by faithful service.

King James had always declared that the time would come when William III would no longer be able to satisfy and to keep on friendly terms with the powerful noblemen who had joined him. He knew their pretensions and their irritability. It was the best proof of the soundness of his view that the admiral of the fleet and the most distinguished general had both returned to their old allegiance.

But, beside all this, he might reckon on a crowd of supporters who had never left him. After he had sailed from Ireland, a committee had been formed of those whom he had himself named as the most trustworthy ; and these had succeeded, even at that time, in keeping up unbroken communications with him, and in watching over his interests. Some of these were men, like Lord Brudenell, who had promised to provide considerable sums of money for this purpose. Others undertook to get for men of the party such places in the army, and

¹ Coxe, Marlborough i 46, 47, and Lady Sarah's own memoirs.

² In the Stuart Papers at Windsor.

even in the administration, as would give them power and influence. In London itself they said they could reckon on about 8000 veterans ready at any moment to flock to King James' standard¹. In the provinces legitimist convictions joined with Catholic and Nonjuring hatred against the new order of things. Moreover, James was also in connexion with the more strongly marked sects. He let it be announced to them that he held fast to the Indulgence he had granted them, and, if he returned, would be of no party, but would 'be a common father to all'².

And so, when, some time in December 1691, Louis XIV asked James what he really expected from an attempt on England, he replied with the utmost confidence that, if it were done at once, he expected his restoration to the throne; that the English government looked outwardly strong, but was weak within, and would be unable to maintain itself at home against the attack of the legitimate sovereign. 'Let me but once set foot on the soil of England,' he cried, 'and the superiority of my friends over the followers of the usurper will soon be apparent.' He also remarked that this was the true path by which France might conquer in her great struggle: for it was English gold alone that enabled the allies to carry on the war; and this England herself did not feel much burdened by; a successful stroke aimed at her would break up the alliance.

The French had also tried to get independent information from England. The questions they addressed to friends well informed as to the state of affairs deserve to be recorded, as they bear on the true condition of the power which was to be attacked. Is it true that Parliament has voted large supplies? Is the amount of such votes coming in? If not, will the army any longer endure the delay in its pay? Where does the army lie? How far is it composed of Englishmen or of foreigners? What do the people think about peace or war? Will they not be driven into discontent by the burdens of taxation? Again, among other questions, Is there not a strong

¹ Sir John Fenwick's Confession, 1696.

² Instruction to Mr. Ferguson, in Macpherson, Original Papers i 392

party among the Presbyterians, which desires a republic, and which, failing that, will join King James, if for no other reason, at least because he is the weaker party? Lastly, What are the numbers of ships, of sailors, of marines? Is there no difficulty in getting men? Would not men's anxiety about a landing hinder the equipment and sailing of the fleet? Above all, when would that fleet be ready for sea¹?

The latest news was that the fleet would not be ready to put to sea before June; and that the whole land-force was in Flanders, so that there were very few troops in England. The actual answers to these detailed questions are not extant; but they were undoubtedly of such a tenor as to confirm the French in their foregone conclusions. Louis acceded to King James's wishes, for they coincided with his own predilections. A force amounting to about 30,000 men (King James had asked for that number) was told off for the undertaking, and prepared to make a descent on England under Marshal Bellefonds.

The instructions given to the Marshal are remarkable for the confidence they breathe. Surely, they say, all kings are bound to support King James, and yet the King of France alone has obeyed the call; he has not delayed to give England the chance of declaring for the legitimate line; now that Louis was certain that England was ready to return to her allegiance and to punish the usurper², he had determined to support King James with such forces, by sea and land, as that Prince had asked for.

But Bellefonds was not only appointed commander of the forces; so confident were the French of success, that Louis had actually named him by anticipation his ambassador at the court of King James! He charged him, especially at that time, to be careful not to show too much open favour to Catholics³. At the same time there was also given for the

¹ In a *Mémoire concernant l'entreprise contre la flotte ennemie* (Janvier, 1692), in the Archives des affaires étrangères at Paris.

² *Mémoire du roi pour le Maréchal de Bellefonds*: 'La bonne disposition des Anglois à reconnoître leur faute et à se joindre à lui pour chastier l'usurpateur et jouir sous son gouvernement [de Jacques II] d'un bonheur parfait.'

³ *Instruction du roi au Maréchal de Bellefonds*, Mai 1692: 'D'oster aux peuples

Marshal, and for any future ambassadors, a sketch of a treaty of commerce to be concluded between France and England after the accomplishment of the great task.

In April and May the shores of northern France resounded with preparations for war. Bellefonds reports his infantry in excellent condition, full of zeal; his cavalry perhaps even better; he had Irish, enough and to spare; the officers especially were active and very capable. Above all he praises Berwick for showing sound sense and industry; Sarsfield too, who sought no personal aggrandisement; some others also enjoy his approbation. Beaten at home, the Irish burned to recover their reputation on the English soil. James II had established religious missions among them; the French thought the example worth following, and tried on their side during the embarkation to keep at a distance whatever might be injurious to morals.

While, day by day, they kept hoping to see the great fleet come in from Brest to escort the transports, they meanwhile began the embarkation at Havre and La Hogue. 'How happy shall I be,' writes M. de Tessé¹, one of the colonels, 'when I can date my first letter from on board ship; the next will perhaps follow, dated from the English shore; a third, please God, from London!' It was the general opinion that a great body of people in England was ready to rally to the King the moment he appeared: the whole nation would then follow the example; and a new Revolution be effected as promptly as that of 1688, only this time in favour of the legitimate King. James II pictured to himself a deputation from the city of London coming to him, after he had won his first success, to invite him to resume his throne.

In England no one had as yet any idea how near a successful issue this enterprise had actually come, till a bark was accidentally stranded on the Kentish coast, and on board her was found a correspondence between Admiral Tourville

l'apprehension, que leur maître ne voudra faire régner la religion Catholique et donner à ceux qui en font profession les principales charges et emplois du royaume'

¹ A paper belonging to the military administration in the French War-Archives

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and an old English seaman, which made the matter clear enough Nottingham, Secretary of State, sent it at once to the King, who was already in the Netherlands¹. On the margin of the original letter there is a pencil note in which War-Secretary Blaithwaite records the King's instant resolution. It is to the effect that the regiments ready to embark for the Continent must stay at home—even the Scottish ones; the English fleet must be gathered at once; the Dutch fleet is to return. The English Privy Council, before which Nottingham had laid the correspondence, had already made the same arrangements. The transport of the troops told off for embarkation was stopped: the regiments were now assembled at Portsmouth, where a hostile descent was chiefly expected. In all the counties on the coast the local militia were got ready to meet the foe on the first alarm. Care was taken to disarm Papists, and all who had refused to take the oath of allegiance. In London hands were laid on the most important of those who were thought ill-affected and discontented; Marlborough and Lord Huntingdon were sent to the Tower². The necessary instructions were forwarded to all stations of the fleet, and it accordingly assembled on the 10th May at the Isle of Wight. Tidings soon came that the Dutch fleet also was at sea, and would presently effect a junction with the English.

The French had reckoned on finding the English coast bare of troops, and undefended by a fleet. Thanks to the sudden and energetic precautions of the English government, the attempt was already rendered almost impossible. On the first tidings of the junction of the fleets, the English on board the Jacobite ships remarked that at all events the expedition must be deferred till Tourville had been successful in meeting and beating the enemy³. Louis XIV had ordered the Toulon

¹ Nottingham to the King, April 21. 'These [letters] with the advices by other ways are very strong evidences of the French preparations of a descent, and most probably in England.' This correspondence is in Sir Thomas Phillipps' Library at Cheltenham.

² Warre to Colt, May 6; in Tindal, *History of England* iii. 200.

³ Fumeron: 'Tout le monde ne compte plus ici, que cette entreprise puisse s'exécuter plutôt que vers l'automne, que les vaisseaux des ennemis se seront

fleet to convoy the transports over to the English coast ; but it had been detained by contrary winds, and had not yet reached Brest. Tourville, who was next instructed to sweep the enemy from the sea, had already once appeared off the English coast · he had been sighted from Plymouth, where it had been noticed that there were no transports with him. He now received orders to engage the enemy, were he in force or not, wherever he might find him.

At the same time Louis XIV had undertaken the siege of Namur :—what a splendid success, if he could at the same moment take the fortress and win a great naval victory ! Still the King would scarcely have issued an order so much opposed to his usual caution, had not further delay in the expedition so well prepared been equivalent to the abandonment of it ;—had he not also thought that the combined fleets would fight no better now than they had at the battle of Beachy Head. The animosity between the English and Dutch had gone on growing since that time ; why should they now be more united than then ? And besides, he counted on the understanding between James II and Russell, who once more appeared as admiral of the fleet.

Russell's position was surely most extraordinary. The fleet he commanded was one of the very strongest that had ever been seen in the Channel : there were sixty-three English and thirty-six Dutch ships of the line, and each power had also gathered together a corresponding number of smaller vessels. Russell's position, and the command he had undertaken, bound him to seek and engage the enemy with this imposing force. On the other hand he was still always in connexion with James II ; the zealous Whig believed he might expect a greater development of popular liberties from him than he seemed likely to get from William. Thus internally at strife with himself, he let James know that ' the method he proposed to serve the King was by going out of the way with the English fleet, to give the King an opportunity of landing ¹ ' : but that

retirés, à moins que Mr. de Tourville ne les batte auparavant de manière que ce qu'il en restera ne soit plus en état de tenir la mer.' French Archives de Guerre.

¹ Clarke's Life of James II 490.

if it came to an engagement, he would have no consideration for even the King himself, if by chance he were aboard the hostile fleet. He was quite ready to give free course to an attempt to shake the throne of William; but in the actual fighting, which might have to settle the question as to the relation between the naval strength of England and France, he could not possibly neglect his duty. And in truth he could not have done so had he wished it. The commanding officers in the fleet under him had been appointed not by him, but by the Admiralty Commission. The Queen addressed them in a declaration breathing the fullest confidence; and they had replied by an address, in which they expressed in the warmest terms their determination to fight for her and for the existing order of things. The sailors would have thrown any one overboard who had ventured to do otherwise.

A strange spectacle indeed! Here is a distinguished captain, who under force of circumstances is compelled to defend with all his might a great interest which he had himself helped to create, but which he now no longer recognises as his own, and from which he desires to cut himself free.

Government had originally made known its wish that a separate squadron should proceed to Normandy to hold the transports in check. But the council of war of the combined fleets had rejected this course, with Russell's approval, though he had at first recommended it. They were unwilling to weaken themselves, or to undertake the uncertain search after the enemy; it was agreed that they should sail towards Cape La Hogue: for there the enemy's transports were gathered, and the ships of war would be also certain to go there, in order to convoy them to England. With this aim the fleet weighed anchor on May 18/28 from St. Helen's, and early on the 19th sighted the heights of Barfleur.

But at this very moment Tourville also arrived at La Hogue from the other side, above all desiring at least to protect the transports. And thus the meeting of the fleets became inevitable.

The weather was foggy and calm. Tourville could not see how much the enemies' fleets overmatched him; the calmness of the day rather gave him hopes that they would

not be able to render one another much assistance : he therefore determined to risk a battle. Russell had just formed in line, when Tourville also gave the signal for battle, and himself bore down on the English flagship. It came to a kind of duel between the 'Soleil Royal' (an oft-recurring name in the French navy), Tourville's flagship, and the 'Britannia,' on which Russell was aboard. Coolly and quietly Russell let his adversary come within three-quarters' musket-shot, and then gave the command to fire. The 'Britannia' had a hundred guns, the 'Soleil Royal' a hundred and four : the French were confident that theirs was the better artillery. But it soon became clear that the English guns were served faster and better aimed : a fact which gave the greatest satisfaction even to Russell himself. After an hour and a half's cannonade the fire of the 'Soleil Royal' decidedly slackened : sails, yards, and tackling were destroyed. It was noticed on board the 'Britannia' that no one tried to repair them : about two o'clock in the afternoon some French ships of the line came up, and under their shelter the 'Soleil Royal' was towed off by a couple of boats. And thus was the rivalry between the artillery and the ship-building skill of the two nations decided ; but not so as yet the battle. Now, however, a light east wind sprang up, enabling the English and Dutch still further to develop their superiority. They succeeded in striking and breaking through the French line of battle ; many French ships were attacked by two or three of the enemy at once ; they defended themselves very bravely ; but when victory was seen to be impossible, they made ready to retreat. A thick fog, which with some slight lifts lasted through the night, now came to their advantage. It was not till next morning that Russell broke up his line and started in pursuit. A considerable portion of the French fleet escaped to St. Malo through the Race of Blanchard, into which the English pilots, who did not know it well, were afraid to venture. Most of the disabled ships reached the French coast, but in such a state as to make it impossible to save them. The 'Soleil Royal' and some other ships were burnt at Cherbourg by the English, after their crews had abandoned them on an agreement. King James met Bellefonds and Bonrepaus at La

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Hogue, and wished to organise a further resistance; but this was impossible: there was nothing for it but to run the ships ashore, in order to save crews, war-munitions, and materials. Some English frigates and long-boats succeeded in running in between the reefs on the coast, and setting the ships on fire, half one evening and half the next. It was the fate of King James to see the very ships, on which he was to have been transported to England, burnt before his eyes, and the French shores illumined by the reflection of the rising flames. As he saw it, he was overcome by the feeling that his star was an unlucky one—one which brought ill-luck not only to himself but to all his allies. He besought the French King to abandon him, and leave him and his affairs to their fate. Louis replied that that should never happen¹.

This unsuccessful attempt to land an invading army on the English shores, reminds us of the Spanish Armada in 1588. Philip II equipped it to avenge the death of Mary Stuart: Louis XIV wished to restore to the English throne James Stuart, the great-grandson of Queen Mary. The internal state of England, against which Louis XIV directed his attack, seems like a direct development of those opinions which had begun to take shape in opposition to the pretensions of Mary Stuart. What Spain then aimed at—the advance of Catholicism through the establishment of a Catholic dynasty—was

¹ A short despatch by Russell (early on the 21st) is universally known. Far more instructive is Russell's detailed account, which he sent with no great pleasure as a report to Nottingham (Portsmouth, June 2), and which was first made known to me in a French translation. Perhaps Burchett knew of it; otherwise I do not find that it has been made use of or even mentioned by either English or French historians. Eugene Sue has given us the French official account, which seems to have remained unknown in England: it is not therefore astonishing that the two views differ. The French despatch, which traces all to the superiority of the English force, is the basis of Guérin's account (*Histoire Maritime de France* ii. 54). Lord Russell certainly had another opinion. He notices the superiority of the allies, and adds that the French were not more than fifty ships of the line strong; but '*la résolution, avec laquelle ils vinrent sur nous, me fait croire que nous ne tirâmes aucun avantage de cette supériorité. Ils ont été battu par un nombre considérablement moindre que le leur; le calme et le brouillard n'ayant permis qu'à un fort petit nombre des Hollandais et de l'escadre bleue de se battre.*' The official report of Intendant Foucault (in *Capefigue's Louis XIV.* iii. 245, ed. 1837) is welcome, as confirming some of the notices to be found in Clarke's '*Life of James.*'

the very thing towards which the views of France were also directed. Then as now, England and Holland were united; then as now, the Teutonic naval power defeated that of the Romance nations, and preserved those ideas as to self-government in Church and State which had developed themselves among the Germanic peoples. But Philip II, far more than Louis, had strained all his forces for the attainment of his great object, which also included in itself the restoration of his territorial authority over the northern Netherland provinces: but this was not so much the heart's desire of Louis XIV; for in his eyes the defeat of the combined sea-powers was rather a means than an end.

He had already, as we have seen, set himself to attack Namur, with a view (as was stated officially) either to force the enemy to peace, or at any rate to make the war as burdensome as possible to him. He had left Versailles May 1/11, 1692; on the 11/21st he had held a great review at the camp of Givry near Mons; on the 16/26th he appeared before Namur, and from a height which commanded the place had arranged the plan of attack, in concert with Vauban. On the very afternoon which saw the decisive action off La Hogue, the trenches before Namur were reported ready; and next night fire was opened. In his camp the King heard the roar of the cannon with which the garrison celebrated the news of the naval victory of La Hogue. He was very quiet about it—this burning of a few French ships over there was not worth making so much noise about. Some days later Namur town fell; on the 30th June the citadel also yielded. It was counted one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, and not long before had been put into good order by Coehorn, Vauban's rival in engineering, who was actually present, and had been wounded in the defence. Louis XIV deemed the taking of this great bulwark of Brabant and Liège to be almost his most brilliant military exploit: his personal glory was even heightened by the naval mishap.

On the other hand, William III was at a disadvantage in all his undertakings throughout this campaign. At the head of an army which was quite a match for the enemy, he had marched up to relieve Namur: his letters express a strong confidence as

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to success—for there is not a trace of truth in the French statement that he dreaded a collision with King Louis; but before he could come up, the city was already lost: he describes its capitulation as infamous. He hoped at least to save the citadel; but Marshal Luxembourg was so well posted, that the assembled council of war declared his position to be unassailable. An attempt to counterbalance the loss of Namur by an attack on Mons was defeated by a masterly manœuvre of the French. Lastly at Steinkirke (24th July / 3rd August) William found the enemy so posted that he might well have hoped to overwhelm him at one point, and then to annihilate him. The first attack succeeded, according to his expectations; the French lines were broken through, and a battery taken; but then unexpected difficulties in the nature of the ground, of which Luxembourg knew well how to make the greatest use, showed themselves; an obstinate struggle ensued, in which the English regiments suffered great loss: once more the King was forced to give way before the Marshal.

This continued ill fortune also affected the war by sea.

Roused by the news of the victory off La Hogue, the English again took up the original plan of a landing very warmly; and with a view to this Schomberg, now Duke of Leinster, who was in command of the troops at Portsmouth, and Ruvigny, now Earl of Galway, were to co-operate with Russell. The French refugees in the English service, who were appointed for this purpose, were however discontented, because they had been passed over in the distribution of a gratuity. Ruvigny collected them on the shore, and told them the present expedition was destined for France, but that any one unwilling to take part in it might stay behind. They threw up their hats, and showed a lively wish to go. Ruvigny called on them to sing a psalm. Seventeen battalions in all had embarked at Portsmouth by the end of July: Schomberg thought he would need a small squadron of cavalry as well. Still the point to be attacked had not yet been fixed on. They did not give up the idea of landing at St. Malo or Brest; but Le Havre, where a landing would be easy, and La Rochelle, were also much talked about. Russell, who had got into a way of contradicting the ministers

from the point of view of his profession, which surely he must best understand, objected that with such great ships of the line he could not venture so near in as to run the risk of being driven on the reefs by a storm : whereas if he stayed outside, as far off as prudence required, he could be no protection to the vessels engaged in the landing. In order to come to some conclusion the leading members of the ministry, Caermarthen, Nottingham, Devonshire, and Dorset, went down to St. Helen's where the fleet lay¹. But at this very time there not only came in the news of Steinkirke, which filled every one with anxiety, but one of the King's adjutants also appeared with instructions to the fleet to be in readiness to help him in the Netherlands, if required.

Hereon the undertaking against France was abandoned. Russell, after giving a great entertainment on board the fleet, went ashore, declaring that he could undertake nothing with it which could be adequate to his high position. The squadron destined to effect the descent sailed for Ostend, whence the troops advanced by land, and threatened Dunkirk; but the only result was that the French on the spot also made ready to defend themselves.

An undertaking on the Piedmontese side, closely connected with the English plan of operations, advanced somewhat farther towards accomplishment. So fine an army had been collected under Duke Victor Amadeus, who held the title of Generalissimo of the allies, that while constantly threatening Pinerolo and Casale, it also pushed three army-corps into Dauphiné. No one was more eager to advance here than Charles, Marshal Schomberg's second son, in whose breast all the old refugee-impulses still burned : he himself, at the head of the Waldenses and the French refugees, took part in this expedition. In a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants he promised, in the name of the actual King of England, William III, the restitution of the Edict of Nantes, which had originally been guaranteed by the English crown. A few old Huguenots joined him, and declared their return to their old faith; but in the main there was little enthusiasm. The

¹ I take these details chiefly from Bonnet.

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expedition itself inspired no confidence. Embrun was taken ; Gap blockaded and burnt. But Catinat, who lay hard by, and the barricades with which the peasants blockaded the chief passes, stopped their farther onward movement : then Victor 'the Generalissimo' fell ill, and the army had to fall back. It had not even fulfilled Prince Eugene's hope at the outset : it had not succeeded in taking a single strong position likely to be useful in the future. The result was simply this—that Louis XIV was warned to put these districts into better defence : for this purpose he set Vauban to work¹.

Thus stood the two great powers over against one another, and neither of them could exert any influence on the inner condition of its antagonist. In vain did each strive to arouse in the other elements of discord answering to those harboured in its own bosom.

James II kept up communications with England even after the battle of La Hogue ; but at first he did not allow himself to think of another enterprise. In the summer of 1693 it was rumoured in England that Schomberg and Ruvigny would effect that landing in France which in former years had only been talked about ; even the English and Irish regiments were named which were to be employed on this expedition. The Imperial court seems to have reckoned on the division of French forces which would thus be caused, as a help towards the conduct of the war in Italy and Germany. But the experience of previous like attempts forbad their serious repetition.

It was the peculiar characteristic of the campaign of 1693, that the forces of France on the one side, and those of the allies on the other, preserved an absolute equilibrium whenever they came into collision with one another.

In Piedmont Catinat avenged the Duke's attack on Pinerolo by beating the allies at Marsaglia : but the two armies were so severely handled in the battle, that they were obliged to

¹ In Sir Thomas Phillipps' Library, No. 8642, is a collection of letters, chiefly addressed to Blaithwaite, in 1692, 1693, which throw light, not indeed on the campaign, but on the condition of Piedmont at this time. Carutti's *Vittorio Amadeo II*, 126, gives us nothing but what was known before.

lie over against one another without attempting any movement.

Louis himself met with a serious check in the Netherlands, where hitherto his undertakings had ever been successful. In 1693 he again took the field in person, hoping that as last year Namur, so now this year Liège would fall before the sudden concentration of superior forces, and that this would force the Dutch to make peace; the number of the troops under William III had also not increased: but he had taken up so good a position that it was scarcely possible to beleague the city without first giving battle; and the French King hesitated to attack, so strong were the allies posted. So this time he returned to Versailles without winning any laurels. Nor was it of much importance that the French took Huy; it had before been often taken and lost; nor was it a serious matter that at Neerwinden William III was once more compelled by Marshal Luxembourg to withdraw (July 29). He was soon quite fit again to keep the field, and full of confidence. He thanked God that he had been able happily to hold his own through a great crisis.

Though moreover the Anglo-Dutch navies had had the best of it in 1692, next year there occurred a circumstance which made them aware that they were by no means yet masters of the seas. In Portsmouth lay a fleet of merchantmen, larger than had ever before been seen in those waters, waiting for an escort to the Mediterranean. And after the disaster that had befallen the French navy every one thought that this would be easily managed. Russell's rival, the best of the Tory sailors, Killigrew, was appointed to the command of the combined fleets, and put to sea in June, in order to keep the supremacy at least of the home-waters. Thinking that the French fleet lay at Brest, he anchored off that place, ten leagues north-west of Ushant: for if he went farther off, he thought that Tourville might easily attack the English shores behind his back. The actual convoying of the merchantmen was entrusted to a division of the fleet under George Rooke, strong enough to resist a division of the French fleet like that lying at Toulon, the only one with which, as was supposed, it was likely to fall in.

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But meanwhile the great French fleet, which had been refitted with that speed which Frenchmen only can achieve, had already left Brest, and was cruising along the Portuguese coast, looking out for the merchant-fleet, whose escort, it was conjectured, would not be very strong. And so Rooke, running from Cape St. Vincent for Cadiz, most unexpectedly fell in with the great fleet which Tourville brought out of Lagos Bay to meet him. He, for his part, forthwith determined to await him and to accept the unequal conflict; and nothing but the opposition of the two vice-admirals, the English and the Dutch, hindered him from doing so. He retreated, but in so doing left the merchantmen to fall into Tourville's hands, who wreaked on them his vengeance for La Hogue: he burnt five and forty, and seventeen he took as prizes.

The English had hoped for great profits out of this fleet: they were therefore profoundly affected by the mishap. When the great English fleet returned to its quarters, and the land forces, which had been put aboard against all contingencies, landed, they were received with derisive laughter by the mob. The French corsairs also had some northern successes, severely felt by the English, and thus added their share to the severe blow which had been inflicted in the south.

CHAPTER V.

TORIES AND WHIGS IN THE SESSIONS OF 1692 AND 1693.

THUS the great powers struggled with one another, and neither could get the upper hand. France, inherently the weaker by sea, had yet once more succeeded in dealing a sharp blow at England which was naturally the stronger on that element. On the other side, the power which, by reason of its experience and organisation was the stronger on land, nevertheless at a decisive moment was forced to give way before the other party which had hitherto been the weaker. Still no peace was possible between them. Their antagonism had in it something that was of import for all times.

The one of these two great political bodies represented the combined Germanic and Romance monarchy in its fullest unity of development. In the provinces of the French kingdom the old institutions of the estates were not absolutely destroyed, but had been made subservient to the crown. Religion and culture, war and state, external and internal affairs, alike showed a unity in which one will was dominant—a will which at the same time was in harmony with the ideas of the nation. In this absolute subordination of all lay the unity and strength of the French monarchy. It was a despotism willingly obeyed.

In England, on the contrary, the authority of the highest power was closely attached to the will of Parliament, without which it would not have been obeyed, and which was also only carried on by means of continual opposition and party strife.

In the session of 1692 complaints as to the shortcomings in the conduct of the war were loudly expressed: such was the

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account of Count Solm's hostile conduct towards the English at Steinkirke ; such the reproaches levelled even at the King for his neglect of English officers, none of whom had been promoted according to their dues ; such, above all, were the general criticisms and censures on the Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the measures of government with respect to naval affairs¹. Though government was still in the hands of the Tories, the Whigs were already feeling their strength again. Their attack was specially directed against Nottingham, who with Caermarthen played the chief part in the government, and at that time was the only active Secretary of State.

In the debates on naval affairs in the past year, a warm dispute arose between Russell and Nottingham. The minister produced the correspondence which had passed between him and the Admiral, showing that he had done all in his power to forward the undertakings, while all the opposition had come from the Admiral. Besides this, the French report of the battle of La Hogue gave grounds for a charge against Russell of neglect in following up the enemy with vigour. Nottingham went so far as to say that the Admiral had not done his duty before, during, or after the action. But in saying this, he said that for which he had no sufficient grounds. Russell himself spoke in the Commons, and was able to justify his conduct at every moment ; and in fact, so far as it was known, it had been blameless. The Commons, in good humour at the brilliant victory achieved, were prevailed on to pass a resolution to the effect that the Admiral's conduct of the fleet during the past summer had shown loyalty, courage, and skill : no further discussion would they brook. It was hereon expected that the King would relieve Nottingham of office : it is even said that the minister asked leave to resign. But the constitutional system under which the King changes his ministers on a Parliamentary defeat was not yet developed. And in fact the very contrary occurred ; for Russell lost his post as Admiral, while

¹ According to Bonnet's account the reports of Lord Colchester, Colonel Earle, and Colonel Godfrey, who sat in the House, especially aroused general indignation against Solms : 'Tous les gens de guerre jurèrent qu'ils ne lui obéiroient jamais.'

Nottingham was treated with more regard than ever¹, and was able to fill all the most important places in the fleet with his Tory friends.

But this attack of the Whigs on government had in the end no important consequences.

The question as to a Cabinet now first came up: it was composed of those ministers who had been joined with the Queen during his Majesty's absence, and had had the care of public business. It was remarked in Parliament that the Privy Council ranked next after Parliament itself as the constitutional adviser of the crown, but that it would be thrown out of all active work by the creation of a Cabinet; for this brought all its measures ready-made into the Privy Council, and gave that body nothing but the bare power of accepting them. The Cabinet was described as a kind of cabal in which one man's ruinous personal influence would often make itself felt. Remarks were heard which have often been levelled even against Cabinets which have existed under other and more stable forms. But these had no great effect; for men remembered, on the other side, that the necessity for secrecy had already made it impossible to lay matters of great importance before the Privy Council, a body of about forty members: the very fact that he admitted so few into his secrets gave the French King his superiority, and furthered the success of his designs². It was moreover a telling charge against Nottingham that he recognised William III as King 'de facto,' but not 'de jure':—how then could he be really zealous in the defence of his interests? To dislodge him and his friends the Whigs proposed a statute declaring it high treason to deny the lawful authority of the King. The undisguised object was to compel the holders of high offices to take an Oath of Abjuration, which they could not do without being unfaithful to their opinions. But the House of Commons could not be brought to pass it, and refused to introduce into England a sort of state-inquisition, under which a pair

¹ Bonnet, January 3/13, 1693 'Le roi luy fait meilleur visage que jamais'

² Reflexion of Richard Temple, a member of the Privy Council, in the sitting of November 26. In Bonnet.

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of false witnesses could destroy any man. Even the proposal to refer the draft to a committee for amendment found no favour: the bill was summarily thrown out¹.

The Tories did the King good service in this session also. When, in his speech from the throne, he asked the two Houses to give him their advice, it was proposed to name a joint commission to draw up the same; but the King was frightened at this; for he could with difficulty have ventured to refuse advice authorised by the weight of both Houses: and he was very thankful when the Tories wrecked the proposal.

In the world-wide historical struggle now going on, it was a very important point that the English government, in spite of its internal quarrels, maintained itself in its own constitutional structure. The moderate Tories were once more in the ascendant, in both the administration and Parliament. And in itself it could not be a bad thing that the leaders at home and in the field should be subjected to a criticism of their conduct by the hostile party over against them. The King always supported them, so long as they maintained their usefulness and influence. The votes of Parliament in this session also went with the government. The exclusive authority of the Lower House in matters of finance conduced to the unity and energy of the administration: at any rate it was known who was to be looked to. In the session of 1692 this privilege was again confirmed. When in that session the land-tax of a shilling in the pound was being extended to personal property (including also pensions and allowances)², the Upper House demanded that some peers should be put on the Treasury Commission, and they accordingly added their names to the draft of the bill. But the Commons saw in this an infringement of their privileges, which included the

¹ The Journals of the Commons, December 14, only mention the bill. 'Quantité de personnes très zélées pour la conservation de Ll. Maj. et du gouvernement y firent de très fortes objections' Bonnet.

² According to the estimates made before, a shilling produced £500,000; according to Davenant, in his Discourses of the Public Revenue, four shillings ought to bring in £2,088,836. Two millions were reckoned on, though not quite so great an amount came in

ways and means of levying taxes; and this would have thrown a doubt on a fundamental article of the constitution. And on this question government, afraid of seeing new difficulties and hindrances constantly springing out of the double procedure, was with the Commons. Between Caermarthen and the leaders of the House, who reproached one another with their past actions, the fiercest debates arose on this point¹. Eventually a majority of twenty threw out the Lords' amendment, though it had already passed all the previous stages. This, however, is only one side of the proceedings: the combined action of the two Houses in those matters which affected the stability and efficiency of government did not hinder the old antagonism from presently coming to an outbreak; and this too on one of the most important constitutional questions that could arise—namely, the duration of Parliament and the presence of officials within its walls.

It fell out, in opposition to the Tory ministry, that a bill was brought in by which any member of Parliament who accepted any civil or military post under the crown was declared to be 'civilly dead' (as ran the rough original phrase), and another election had to be made to fill up his vacant seat. But this principle was at once pushed still further. In order to cut away the influence that ministers might especially exert over members of Parliament, it was proposed in the place-bill to exclude all public servants from Parliament. Parliament and the administration would thus stand out against one another as two distinct bodies.

The strongest argument for it was that the character of a representative system of government required the exclusion of all public servants from the Lower House. Lord Mulgrave was understood to say that no one could, more readily than he, concede to government the right to summon and dismiss Parliament. But he affirmed with all respect that the King was bound to leave to the nation free power of choosing its own representatives; that it was in fact his true interest to do so, so as to avoid the chance of some day putting the nation

¹ One member of the opposition declared he would rather own property in Turkey than in England.

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into an awkward position, out of which, as experience had shown, it might have to get as best it could.

But the opinion that the Lower House specially represents the people, though often expressed, was not yet universally acknowledged. Men were unwilling to let the existing combined action of the powers in the state be turned into a fundamental opposition between them. And as everything is usually looked at from a personal point of view, King William's adherents would not let the power of rewarding his Parliamentary supporters be taken from him.

The arguments and the interests bound up with them were pretty evenly balanced: the result was very doubtful, when early in January 1693 (the bill having already passed the Commons) the Lords came to a decisive vote. The little tricks by which some supporters of the bill were kept from appearing in the House are well known. It was thrown out (it is believed) by the narrow majority of only two votes. So near it came to passing an innovation of the greatest importance, and one which many regarded as the first step towards a Republic.

In the other question the Lords actually took the initiative. They were irritated by the relations between the ministers and the majority in the Commons, which had been prejudicial to them during the debates on the taxes on personal property; and, in order to break up this connexion, the most distinguished of the Whigs introduced into the House of Lords a bill to limit the duration of Parliament. They wished that the then sitting House of Commons should be shortly dissolved, and at the same time hoped to carry a principle which had been discussed at the first settlement of the government, but had been deferred for future consideration. The one design supported the other: after the proposal had been discussed in committee, the Upper House passed both the main principles of the new Act, namely, that Parliament should meet yearly, and that there should be triennial elections¹. January 1693/1694 was fixed as the time for the first fresh election.

¹ Journals of Lords, January 16, xv. 185.

When this bill went down to the Commons, a great stir broke out at once. Many even regarded it as an act of vengeance for what had occurred when the taxation had been arranged : because the Commons had done what need dictated, they were to be brought into discredit with the people, and to be dissolved at a very bad moment ; the scheme was to use the unpopularity arising out of the oppressive but inevitable taxation to alienate the people from the House of Commons and the Throne, and to bring them back to the old dependence on the Lords. It was noticed that there was involved in the bill an attack on the royal prerogatives ; and these had never before been so hotly defended as then. Edward Seymour declared that he was no lover of prerogative, and would never defend it against the law ; but that if the right of summoning and dismissing Parliament were taken from the crown, all government would be rendered impossible. He added that he thought prerogative as much the right of the crown as liberty was the right of the people ; that the crown was just then embarrassed by the difficulties of a position into which they themselves had brought it ; would it be fair for them to take advantage of this, and rob it of its rights ?

People seem to have thought that these counter-arguments would determine the Commons in a matter touching their own most immediate interests. But there were some reasons in its favour which made a great impression even on the Lower House. Harley, who first brought himself into notice in this debate, drew from his pocket a copy of the Prince of Orange's declaration, and read aloud the passage in which frequent Parliaments were promised ; he then reminded them that more than once already, even on the last occasion under Charles II, triennial Parliaments had been agreed on : he added that experience showed how Parliaments of longer standing were liable to corruption, and no longer represented the people. Enthusiasm for a popular constitution sprang up in the breasts of even such staunch old Tories as Clarges : he declared the bill one of the best ever brought in : to pass it would be an act of self-sacrifice ; but it must be done, if they would retain the confidence of the people. These convictions carried the day : on a division the bill was passed by

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a majority of thirty. London once more expressed her approval : there were bonfires that night in town.

And thus the Tory majority in the Commons accepted the gift of the Danai, and adopted the proposals which the Whig lords had intended for their destruction, and which harmonised with the popular principles from which men had started in establishing the new government. Jacobites and advanced Whigs worked together¹; the parties devoted to government were puzzled, and gave in : the King found himself suddenly alone.

In this there was no pressing danger. Though William had not assented to the measures of last session touching the independence of the judges, still he had suffered no extraordinary inconveniences in consequence. He now resolved all the more firmly to follow the same course of procedure, because the points just agreed on as to Parliament affected the personal relationship between the ministers and the House of Commons, and on this again depended the regular progress of public business : were he to assent to the bill, it would provoke immediate agitation. But though, on this ground, the King upheld the combined interests of the Tories and the administration, still it is undeniable that the vote caused him no small embarrassment. In such a situation as this a king whose title to the succession was ancient and established could perhaps have held out ; not so a prince whose position was justified only by the votes of Parliament. With a doubtful majority William could not govern. That on a great constitutional question the Whigs should have carried the Lords and Commons away with them, made it necessary for him once more to take them into consideration. When he prorogued Parliament he was already thinking of making some change in their favour in the composition of his councils.

Still he would never have prevailed on himself at that time to change his ministers at the bidding of Parliament ; but he was easily persuaded to call men into his council, who

¹ Bonnet, from whom these proceedings are taken, names among the supporters of the Bill even 'le petit escadron malin des Jacobites.'

might be supposed likely to have a desirable influence on Parliament in the present agitated state of parties, he was aware of the change in opinion, and wished to anticipate it, so as not hereafter to be obliged to follow it against his will.

At this time Nottingham actually even asked for a colleague to share with him the odium which the administration was drawing on itself. His proposal seems to indicate that he thought of a colleague of his own opinions and party. But William gave him a declared Whig, Trenchard, who had once made himself a name as an adherent of Shaftesbury and Monmouth. The banishment inflicted on him for that affair now turned out to his advantage, in so far as it had given him an opportunity of learning foreign languages, and of becoming acquainted with foreign affairs. William, in appointing him Secretary of State, reckoned on his influence in the House of Commons, of which he was one of the most active and considerable members. Besides, he was no longer inflexible in his party-feelings, and knew how to get on in life; it was expected that he would manage to work well with the members of the Cabinet¹, though some of them were the keenest of Tories. These were Pembroke, Caermarthen, Nottingham, Rochester, Lowther, and Seymour. The Great Seal, the highest legal office, of which the administration up to this time had left so much to be desired that many actually wished the energetic Jeffreys back again, was now given to Somers, a discerning and moderate man, but at the same time a declared Whig, whose excellence all lay in his own department, the law.

The administration could gain no strength by thus connecting a few Whigs with a majority of Tories; and for the party, as such, it was actually a disadvantage: but it suffered a still more severe blow from the ill results of naval affairs in the summer of 1693.

For the nomination of Killigrew and Delaval as the two admirals was a result of party strife: they were both of them Tories; their defeats were laid to the door of the whole party. The merchants of the Turkish Company, which had met with

¹ Bonnet: 'Il a un grand crédit dans la chambre basse, où il est des plus distingués par sa capacité. Il est accommodant et adroit.'

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a fearful disaster, accused them not of neglect only, but of treason. And if there was one thing more than another that gave force to their complaints, it was the delight the Jacobites had expressed ; for it looked as if the Tories had been playing into their hands.

This frame of mind was necessarily helpful to the Whigs, whom no one would suspect of any wish to be reconciled with James II : anti-Jacobite principles were aroused in the nation. The mercantile interests, which had been attacked by the French fleet under the late King's name, and had suffered very heavy losses, now sought support from the government established by the Revolution ; the popularity of the government was doubled. Queen Mary, who visited the city to negotiate a loan, at once promised a strict enquiry, to be followed by the punishment of the guilty. The city replied with a devoted address, presented by a civic deputation, and fortified by many warm assurances¹. In bringing about this approximation of parties the new Keeper of the Seals displayed peculiar dexterity.

It was considered to be all the more to the King's credit that on his side he had made a campaign which, in spite of circumstances the most trying, was still not without results. Never before had he been so warmly welcomed on his return from Holland. The crowd with joyful acclamations accompanied the carriage in which he and his consort, who had gone down to meet him, passed through town to Kensington. Woe to any one who took no part in that night's illuminations ! He was treated as a Jacobite in disguise.

At Kensington it was observed that the great nobles showed unusual eagerness in displaying loyal devotion². The Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the city of London did not fail to welcome his Majesty : he told them how much he regretted last summer's mishaps, and thanked them for their behaviour : but in the coming year, he added, all the more exertions would be needed to make up for the failures of the

¹ Bonnet : ' Ils furent menés à la cave du roi, où ils firent encore les mêmes protestations, le verre à la main (18/28 Août). '

² Bonnet : ' Le concours de gens de qualité a été très grand hier et aujourd'hui à Kensington et jusqu'aux duchesses catholiques de Richmond et de Northumberland s'y sont trouvées pour avoir l'honneur de recevoir un baiser du roi. '

past ; he hoped they would give him the means of doing it. Then came the episcopal clergy, headed by the Bishop of London, to congratulate the King on his happy return : this time the Presbyterians did not come with the Bishop, as in 1688, but by themselves ; the King at once granted them audience. It was noticed that the Episcopalian clergy knelt to kiss the King's hand, while the Presbyterians on the contrary only bowed : the popular spirit of the eighteenth century was already showing itself in them.

The King did but follow the impulse of public opinion in depriving Killigrew and Delaval of their posts at the Admiralty and in the fleet. It had also considerable effect on his position that he allowed the seals of office to be taken from Secretary Nottingham, who had brought over to him the more moderate Tories and Episcopalians. Nottingham was accused of having failed to make a proper use of the secret-service money entrusted to him to get good intelligence as to Tourville's movements. The King had wished him to resign : but he could not be got to do so, for that would have been to plead guilty to a charge of which he knew himself to be innocent¹.

He found no support in Parliament, though it was still chiefly composed of Tories. The Lower House expressed its opinion that treasonable misconduct had certainly taken place. The word 'treasonable' aroused offence ; a vote was taken on it in due form ; it passed by 140 votes against 103. Later on, the Admiral and the administration were, no doubt, at different periods of the enquiry, declared free from all blame ; but the general current of opinion, as is usually the case, proved irresistible.

The King would have liked nothing so well as to put Shrewsbury into Nottingham's place. He had spoken to him about it, and had also opened a negotiation with him, carried on chiefly through certain court-ladies who enjoyed general confidence. He let it be understood that he was willing to take him at the value the world put on him :

¹ Bonnet adds : ' Il témoigne partout, qu'il n'en sera pas moins bon serviteur de LL MM

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Shrewsbury was deservedly popular, and therefore all the less could he refuse the King and nation his services. King William declared very positively that he would at once carry out such measures of public business as might be agreeable to Shrewsbury¹. At first these negotiations failed. The public learnt nothing about it, although some little suspicion was aroused; for Russell was again named as admiral, and Wharton once more taken into confidence. People conjectured that the King was first going to see whether the Whigs were devoted and powerful enough to be able to give him effectual support: if he were sure of that, he would break with the Tories, and give the Whigs their way².

This independent position between the somewhat dejected Tories and the once more aspiring Whigs, and above all the feeling that it was necessary to meet the foe in full force, gave the King a quieter session than had been expected. At first the Commons thought of attaching its grants to the Triennial Parliaments' Bill and the Place Bill, which had been laid aside, but in the course of debate the idea was abandoned.

The Triennial Parliaments' Bill was once more carried through the Lords; but the Commons thought that, considering the general position of affairs, all serious variance with the crown ought to be avoided; the eyes of all Europe were fixed on this subject; if they at once shelved the bill, the spirit of their enemies would be damped.

The Place Bill was this time passed with some new provisions, which are singular enough. One was an article by which, on the appointment of a member of Parliament to any fresh office, re-election was necessary³; the bill was also made less severe than that of last year. It made a great com-

¹ Letters between M^{rs} Villiers, M^{rs}. Lundee, Wharton, and Shrewsbury, in Coxe's Correspondence of Shrewsbury, p. 23.

² Bonnet: 'On ne se pressera pas, jusques à ce que l'on voye, si les défiances du parti Whig venant de cesser, il sera assez zélé pour soutenir le gouvernement, et assez puissant pour le faire afin que si cela venoit à manquer on puisse se rapprocher à l'autre parti.'

³ I find the following only in Bonnet. 'Que ceux mêmes, dont l'élection venoit à estre déclarée nulle, pour en avoir accepté quelqu'une [une charge], pourraient estre choisis pour le même, pour remplir la place, qu'ils venoient de perdre si leurs premiers deputants le jugeaient à propos'

motion when William again rejected it in the very middle of the session (January 1693/1694). People discussed the state of the nation, and even attacked the King's right of veto in legislative matters. The bitterest complaints were uttered against William, as if he had disappointed all the hopes conceived of him ; it was finally determined to address him a request that he would follow the counsels of his Parliament rather than the advice of others, who perhaps had personal interests to serve. The King replied that he would count that man his enemy who gave him any advice which might weaken the mutual confidence between him and the nation. The answer, the manner of which reminds us of Charles II, aroused fresh dissensions ; most people deemed it unmeaning and unsatisfactory ; others, especially the leading Whigs, Russell and Wharton, attributed to it a distinct constitutional meaning. Thomas Littleton remarked that he knew people who were but too well pleased with this falling-out of friends : he had noticed them at the doors—as for himself he meant always to vote against whatever their enemies outside desired. At last the House came unanimously to his opinion. They would not give the Jacobites the satisfaction of seeing King and Parliament quarrelling. The proposal to wait on the King again was thrown out by a large majority. It was in fact the latest advantages of the French, and the hopes the Jacobites drew from them, that led the Commons of both parties to agree in setting aside this constitutional struggle, in order to unite as vigorously as possible with the King.

The preparations for the coming campaign were very readily consented to by them.

The King asked for £2,300,000 for the fleet. They struck off a certain amount, for some estimates seemed too high ; but, on the other hand, they added still more than they took off, to cover the arrears due to the sailors. As to the strength of the fleet there was no difference of opinion.

The King's second demand was for an increase of about 30,000 men in the land-forces, so that they might not this year again be always too weak when they met the enemy ; but here he met with a greater opposition, especially on the

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ground that England, compared with the other allies, would be too heavily burdened, while her own interest in the continental war was very limited. Still the separation of these interests found no favour ; every one saw that it would be a very serious matter for the navy, if, for example, Nieuport and Ostend fell into the hands of the French ; and that this could not be avoided if the war in the Netherlands were neglected. But the other view had made so great an impression that Parliament refused to augment the forces up to the full extent demanded. When a motion to accept the demand was proposed, it seemed as if it was insidiously intended to provoke a defeat. But no division was actually taken ; the general question ‘ that an augmentation of the forces was necessary ’ was first put. Not till after this did the debate on the amount begin.

The House did not vote the full number of 30,000 men, but 20,000, a very respectable addition to the strength of the army ; with this William declared himself satisfied, in order to put an end to all speech-making for and against.

For the land-forces somewhat over two millions and a half were voted ; and £147,000 besides for subsidies to foreign powers ; the amount for the two services came to five millions, a very burdensome sum-total for those days, and all the harder to raise because the receipts of last year’s revenue had proved far smaller than they had been estimated.

No illusions on this subject were allowed ; it was said in the debate that an expenditure hitherto unheard of and very oppressive for the country was necessary ; but that to give the half of one’s goods, in order to save the other half, was better than risking nothing and losing all. But then, what were the financial measures contemplated ?

CHAPTER VI.

NATIONAL DEBT, AND BANK OF ENGLAND. CAMPAIGN OF 1694.

SOME time before this, when the resources of France still seemed inexhaustible, and people hesitated to begin a war of which the duration could not be foreseen, William III had stated his conviction to the Elector of Brandenburg, that France would not be able to carry on the war more than two years longer; could they but hold out so long, she would be obliged to think of peace.

In considering the antagonism of the two great powers now struggling for the mastery of the world, it is not enough to remember the skill and strength of the armies in the field; it is also a rivalry between the general internal powers of the two parties, and their capability for development and action. France had shown herself stronger than the Spanish monarchy; would she prove stronger than England, whose power had to a great extent given the impulse to her allies? This was the question now to be decided.

But as everything depended on the armies in the field, and the fleets at sea, this question resolves itself above all into the financial one, and one of practical statesmanship.

Colbert, with harsh but well-calculated severity, had taken the revenues of France out of the hands of private persons; and had thereby, to a certain extent, freed Louis XIV, so that he could grapple at will with European affairs; but as the results of the system had not only their definite limits, but were based on flourishing manufactures and the growth of trade, wars of long continuance had to be avoided. The War of Devolution, and that against Holland in 1672, and even the

attack on Germany in 1688, were all of them calculated with a view to a speedy end. The long continuance of the Dutch war, even in Colbert's lifetime, had thrown the system into disorder. The ministers had fallen back on the fiscal measures long abandoned by him, and had been obliged to contract loans at high rates. Since then the receipts of the most considerable tax, the 'taille,' had been lessened by the violence of the troops as they traversed the country; the persecution and ejection of Protestants had inflicted the heaviest blows on trade and industry. The hostile powers now excluded French products; the naval war brought with it countless unforeseen losses. Well-informed of the deficit resulting from these causes, William III might well hazard his assertion that, if they could hold out a couple of years, the power of France would be shaken to its base. The conduct of the war itself was guided and limited by financial considerations; even so, the sources of revenue were not sufficient for the need. Moreover, there was in France no prospect of extending the taxation fairly over the nation. The noblesse enjoyed its old exemptions; the provincial estates, clergy, cities, thought they had done all that could be expected of them if they agreed to make some grants of money. The evil of the sale of offices, in itself a tax on the people, could not be got rid of: from sheer necessity it had even to be increased. The Rentes of the Hotel de Ville diminished perceptibly; the taxes, on which they wished to base new loans, could not be got in, consequently the loans could not be negotiated¹. It followed that the troops were no longer regularly paid. Towards the end of 1693 we hear the army of Piedmont complaining that for six months it had been obliged to borrow all it required.

If we would compare the financial state of England with that of France, we must first notice that Parliament, which had the power of fixing the amount of money to be levied, was more absolute than the absolute King of France. It has hitherto been almost overlooked, but it is a fact of high importance, that the English clergy had given up its right of taxing itself. This was done in 1665, in the days of the first

¹ Cp. my French History, vol. iv. (Werke, xl. 51, ed. 1869).

Dutch war. A verbal agreement between Archbishop Sheldon and Lord Clarendon had begun the change; in the Act of Parliament relating to it, the right of the clergy is still recognised; but no one ever tried to assert it again. It has been rightly noticed that this was the greatest constitutional change ever effected without an express law¹. Thus was the idea of the Reformation fully carried out for the first time. Parliament also had no privileged nobility to consider. It could fix the burdens of taxation according to what was actually needed (and this was another reason why the discussion of the estimates was of real importance); it need not take the amount that people could bear for the limit of their capacity of taxation.

Here too entered in a consideration of great importance. No one ventured to oppose the decisions of Parliament; but it was necessary to avoid awakening antipathies in the taxpayers which might have aroused internal troubles. The ever-growing pressure which overwhelmed the population was one of the best arguments the adherents of James II had against William III.

And surely it would have been impossible in the long run to have covered the whole requirements of the war by direct taxes. As early as 1690 it was felt that loans must be contracted. It was necessary for this that a portion of the allowance made to William for his civil list should be guaranteed only for a term of years. This was set apart as a basis for a loan which would be all the better placed if its holders could look forward to its repayment in a few years.

In 1692 they went a step farther². As in such matters they specially looked to the example of Holland, they now took steps towards establishing a bank for life annuities, from which they expected to obtain a million of money for the public service. For its basis a new tax on beer and other liquors was voted; its produce to be laid aside by the tax-gatherers, paid weekly into the Treasury, and there treated as an independent account. It was so arranged that its

¹ A note of Onslow's in his ed. of Burnet iv. 521.

² Robert Hamilton among others records the amount of each separate loan in his Enquiry Concerning the Rise, Progress, &c., of the National Debt, p. 11 sect. 1.

security could not be endangered by any new downfall of the government.

But the loan was by no means fully taken up; a fact which partly caused such a large amount of arrears. But in 1693 a still wider deficiency had to be filled up. The land-tax, at four shillings in the pound, was reimposed, and government tried to secure its proceeds unimpaired by imposing on the Commissioners of the Treasury a new oath, pledging them not to be guilty of favouritism of any kind—a proceeding justified by the last year's experience. In other imposts a still greater falling off was to be apprehended. More and more were men led to conclude that they must leave off trying to find out some direct way of raising the money wanted; they felt that they must have recourse to new loans, which ought to be made to bring in over two millions.

How to discover taxes on which to secure the regular payment of the interest was a matter of much discussion. Every step which brought men nearer to a universal excise-duty was dreaded: such a tax was at this time a cause of loud complaints in Holland. A couple of taxes were now proposed, taxes which would hit the manufacturers very hard; one on leather, another on soap. In order that the debate on these taxes might have the benefit of every one's knowledge, the members accidentally absent were summoned, and, with but few exceptions (and those on urgent grounds), appeared. After long debates, in which Edward Seymour distinguished himself by a very pathetic speech in defence of the old English freedom against the pressure of taxation, the proposed duties were thrown out.

Once more a lottery to raise a million was agreed on; and a tax on salt proposed as a basis for it: this was so moderate and so easy to bear that it passed. But it was far from enough. £120,000 were wanted as a base for the loans still inevitable for government purposes. Many schemes were suggested: a new wine duty, or the reimposition of the hearth and chimney tax, abolished by William III: but people dreaded popular discontent. At last a stamp duty, and a tax on hackney coaches were agreed to; these would fall on the wealthy only,

and only under certain circumstances: the bulk of the population would not be touched.

It was, above all, a matter of care to provide, according to ancient usage, some special fund to guarantee the interest of each loan, which was also fixed at a very high rate—usually up to eight per cent.; and though there was plenty of money in wealthy England, still it was no easy matter to get hold of it.

The first loans under William III had at the outset but poor success. In London the magistrates had at any rate taken up a portion, rather as a matter of honour than from choice. But when they brought their paper, which bore on its face a promise to repay, to the Exchange, then it appeared how little confidence government still inspired. It could scarcely be negotiated at half its nominal value.

The French refugees have ever claimed the credit of having been the first to inspire confidence in these loans. Their whole existence and hopes depended on the maintenance of the English state as established by William III¹, and moreover they had money which they wanted to put out: both these things worked together. It was now possible to get as much as sixteen per cent., for the loans were quoted at £50, and sometimes even at £45. They bought the receipts offered at this price, and at any rate awakened a certain demand for them among the English.

And indeed it is noticeable that the vigorous movement which sprang out of religious antagonism, and the hatred of the refugees for Louis XIV, also affected these financial measures. In the same way, some years before, the funds the refugees brought with them had given a remarkable stimulus to the money-market in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

On similar grounds, as we have said, it was necessary for England to pay the war-charges in part by loans, and to base these on the least oppressive taxes; for a heavy and direct

¹ 'Ils se disaient les uns aux autres, que leur salut et leur bien-être dépendent uniquement de la fortune de ce prince, et que s'il avoit le malheur d'être chassé d'Angleterre, ils seroient tous perdus.' From a memoir, 'sur les fonds publics et la banque de l'Angleterre,' the author of which had got his information from old 'Hugenots' of this time.

pressure would have given the Jacobites and Catholics an excuse for exercising an unfavourable influence on the nation.

But there were still difficulties in the way of these loans, and these must be removed in quite another manner.

The heavy private losses resulting from the closing of the Treasury by Charles II were by no means forgotten: the capital then lost was never repaid. We find that the more the goldsmiths, the bankers of that day, dealt with government, the less credit they had elsewhere. The public did not trust their money with them, unless they were certain that they had nothing to do with government. Their business was so great that they could pay six per cent. on capital left in their hands for more than a year. The public also liked this way of investing their money better than the state-loans, because every one could get his money back from the goldsmiths when he wanted it, whereas the state reserved to itself the power of paying it back within a certain number of years, or even at its own pleasure.

The establishment of the Bank of England sprang out of the wish to cover a state-loan of £1,200,000, which had already been planned, and at the same time to satisfy the public in its private trade. A company was formed to take up the loans; in return it got the privilege of establishing a bank for the transaction of private business.

There had long been talk as to the want of a bank for English commerce, just as such an establishment on the Venetian model was already in active work at Amsterdam. The Dutch had been heard to say that, so long as England did not set up such a bank—and in her present confusions she was not likely to do so—Dutch commerce would keep ahead of English. Among those who had plans for such an English bank, William Paterson, a Scot, made himself specially conspicuous: he had seen much of the world, and had many a far-reaching scheme for new commercial undertakings in his head. On this occasion he followed the pattern not of Amsterdam or Venice but of the Bank of St. George at Genoa, which, unlike the others, relieved the money traffic by circulating bills up to the amount of its deposited capital. The Bank—or rather the Office—of St. George was in the highest

repute, thanks to its wealth and property; it also managed the income and outgoings of the republic. But the English bank was not allowed so much. People were not so much afraid of the bank's failing to establish itself as of its becoming too powerful and influential. Government had had Paterson's scheme before it some years back, and had shown a great wish to take it up; but Parliament refused to give it the means of getting the whole wealth of the country into its hands. And, on the other side, government hesitated to let an institution so important to the state be established, unless it could be kept dependent on itself. Within the walls of Parliament the interests of landed property, which was Tory, were opposed to those of commerce, which was Whig: and neither would let the other get such an increase of power as the new bank would give. The affairs of the East India Company also affected it: Paterson was one of the Company's most active opponents; the monied merchants with whom he was connected were looked on as its rivals¹.

But what other way was there of raising that £1,200,000, so much needed for the defence of the country? Before the exigencies of the times party considerations all but disappeared².

A committee, with Thomas Littleton as chairman, drew the bill: it granted an increase of tonnage-money, and other taxes, as a base for a loan to be raised by subscription; the subscribers to be made a corporation under the title of The Bank of England. There was henceforward to be no arbitrary repayment of the capital: it was settled that it should not be repaid till 1705; and if then, the Company must at the same time be dissolved. It pledged itself to undertake no loans, except such as were guaranteed on Parliamentary revenues.

This bill was much helped through Parliament by Charles Montague, who had formerly been Sir Isaac Newton's pupil,

¹ Bonnet: 'Sans le temps, qui pressoit, on ne croit pas que le bill eût passé dans la chambre basse, s'y étant fait de fortes oppositions jusques au dernier moment, dont une des principales étoit, que ce sera une banque dans l'état, sans être entre les mains du gouvernement.'

² The bill describes the loan as 'a farther supply of the extraordinary occasions for and towards the necessary defence of their realms'

then his patron and admirer; a man whose abilities, early formed by the study of literature and science, were now quickly ripening in a career of legislative and administrative duties. After many amendments, inserted even at the last moment, the bill passed the Commons, April 18th, 1694; and this day may be regarded as the true foundation-day of the Bank of England.

But there were still risks before it in the Lords. Rochester, Halifax, and Nottingham, met the bill with a well-considered opposition. They argued that the establishment of the bank would tend neither to the advantage of government, on grounds already mentioned, nor to that of commerce, for that people would let their money lie safely in the bank rather than risk it in commercial adventures; also that it was against the interests of the landed gentry. For the ease with which money could be taken to the bank and drawn out again, would add greatly to the difficulty of negotiating mortgages: and this would make land unsaleable. Ministers had but few arguments to urge against these considerations—indeed, men like Caermarthen were more likely than not to agree with them:—they only reminded the House that government must have a loan, that the war could not otherwise be carried on with vigour: they refused to listen to adjournment, for the King's journey to Holland could not be put off: government whipped up all its friends for the division. On April 23 the bill passed the Lords by a majority of twelve¹.

And thus, in the clash of party strife and various interests, under pressure of circumstances, was founded an institution which had still to stand many a sharp year of trial, but which was destined to become at length the very heart of the business of London, of England, perhaps of the world. It had been thought that banks on a great scale were possible only in republics. But it appeared that the parliamentary type of constitution from which the Bank of England had sprung, with which also it was expressly connected, its operations being limited to funds under parliamentary control, was just

¹ Bonnet, here as elsewhere an unprejudiced witness, says 'Ce fut par le nombre des voix, et non des raisons, que l'on emporta.'

as secure. On the other side, the bank was very welcome to the administration; for from the very beginning, and still more in later times, it made the money voted immediately available at the moment of need. Even had government had the power, it surely would not have had the inclination, to dissolve the Bank Company. On the contrary, the bank became chief broker to government in the matter of taxes and loans¹. And, besides, it was noticed directly how much a very general and wider-spread participation in the loans served to strengthen the order of things brought in by the Revolution: each holder of funds became an adherent of government: the believers in the existing system of the state were now induced by personal interest to uphold it; a revolution would have affected themselves first of all.

The two other loans agreed on at that time had the same characteristics: £1,000,000 was to be raised by annuities in the form of a lottery; and £300,000 by life annuities. The new bank took up £1,200,000, in return for which £100,000 a year was voted them out of the proceeds of the new taxes: £96,000 of this being for interest at eight per cent. The original plan was to begin operations with £200,000, to be paid up by the subscribers to the loan: the rest was to be made up in bills, which could be floated as currency, and should run at six per cent². It was reckoned that if the bank set its funds in circulation, leaving not more than one fourth part in reserve, it would bring £900,000 to the nation; this, it was thought, would be of incalculable benefit to credit and trade. Subscriptions, and then payment of the subscribed capital, followed at once.

And the aim of these financial preparations was that of

¹ In a cotemporary pamphlet on the 'utility of the country banks' we find this phrase:—'the Bank of England not only acts as an ordinary bank, but it must be viewed as a great engine of state.' Cp. H. Thornton's *Enquiry into the nature and effects of Credit in England*, 1802, p. 63.

² In the Record Office may be seen a proposal, dated 29th January 1693/4: '100,000 pound yearly to be settled on trustees, who are at first to bring in 200 m. to circulate the rest, for which 8 p. c. is to be paid, and 8 p. c. for the million; the trustees to have $\frac{1}{2}$ p. c. for their conduct and care and $1\frac{1}{2}$ p. c. for procuration, and those that advance the money or take the bills to have a current interest p. 6 p. c. only' Cp. the account in Bannister's *Life of Paterson*, p. 80.

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allowing the war to be pushed on with some vigour and results.

The King was now in a position to keep an army afoot in the Netherlands stronger than any had hitherto been. It was reckoned at 31,800 horse, including a corps of dragoons, and 58,000 foot; so great a force had never been seen within the memory of man. All the best-known generals, who had hitherto taken part in the wars of western Europe, were gathered round him with their troops. The French army, with which the Dauphin, but not the King, was present, was not much smaller; it was once more led by Marshal Luxembourg.

These two hosts lay over against one another in their camps for a couple of months; neither offered battle to the other. The French maxim, 'a battle lost loses more than a gained battle gains,' was now adopted by the English also: the English ministers reminded the King of it. This campaign is notable in the annals of the art of war for the skill with which each force pursued or evaded the other; but the results were limited to the recovery by the allies of that unimportant place, Huy. William had thought himself fortunate in having come out of the previous campaign without disaster: in this campaign the French were proud to have held their lines in presence of a superior force.

On the coast also the French were successful in repelling a most vehement and perilous attack. They had been warned that the English were going to fall on Brest, and Vauban was sent down there in haste, to organise the defence; and in this he was thoroughly successful. When the English landed on the coast in Camaret Bay (for the fort of that name had first to be taken) they were saluted by two batteries, which they had never detected, and which were so well placed that every shot told, and the grape-shot wounded almost every man who had ventured ashore.

The gallant General, Talmash, was also hit, and ere long died of his wounds. The English fleet, which had come to bombard Brest, was itself bombarded from the walls.

But though this great effort failed, the English fleet still held the mastery of the Channel: it also blockaded the

northern coast of France. After Brest it attacked Dieppe, laying it almost entirely in ashes; thence it sailed to Havre, and St. Malo, to Calais, and Dunkirk. This was of great use in the conduct of the war. King William observes that had not the coasts been kept in a state of alarm, all the forces detained there for defensive purposes would have been thrown on the Netherlands¹. On this ground he held that the ships should accordingly always carry troops on board, ready for a descent.

But the most important result of the maritime war lay on another side.

In May 1694, Noailles pushed into Catalonia, supported by Tourville, who lay at anchor with the fleet in the Bay of Rosas; at the passage of the Ter he struck a blow at the Spaniards which quite disabled them from keeping the field; nay, they were actually unable even to defend their strongholds. First Palamos, then soon after it Girona, a fortress hitherto deemed virgin, fell into the hands of the French. Spain now clearly saw what the Netherlands had long seen; namely, that her great monarchy could no longer defend itself without foreign help. It was of incalculable importance to Spain to be in alliance with the maritime powers. Strengthened by a Dutch fleet and some Spanish ships, Admiral Russell now appeared in the Mediterranean. He secured Barcelona from the French, who would never have been kept out of the city by the Spaniards alone. The approach of the English fleet had at this time the greatest influence in keeping the Duke of Savoy staunch to the confederation.

In Germany the rise of the house of Hanover to the Electoral dignity had now caused most unpleasant complications. A shoal of German princes, headed by the King of Denmark, as a Prince of the Empire, and offended by the preference shown to Hanover, inclined, if not to alliance with France, at least to neutrality; and the French consequently were in hopes that they might make such a peace as they

¹ 'Dit is het eenighste oogmerk, die ick daerin heb, want sy hebben geen land-militie genoeg om yets groots te kunnen ondernemen.' (To Heinsius, July 8, 1694).

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desired. We can have no conception, and in this place we cannot possibly investigate, with what unbroken watchfulness King William, supported by Heinsius, looked after the German and the Northern courts, so as to keep their irritation from reacting on the course of the great war. Even the General of the German contingent, the Margrave Ludwig of Baden, was one of the malcontents. But after all, the great interests of the Empire, for which all still had a lively care, once more worked for the Emperor and the maritime powers. The Duke of Wolfenbuttel, one of the strongest malcontents, was nevertheless induced to let his troops join those of the Prince of Baden. It was of high importance that Saxony also came in to the great alliance, and let her troops enter the upper Rhineland. When the French, in June, 1694, crossed the Rhine, meaning, as they boasted with true Gallic arrogance, soon to dip their swords in the Danube, they found the Prince of Baden so well prepared, and posted so strongly near Wisloch, that they did not venture to attack him. They were not so well commanded as of old; nor was their condition so good as it had been. It was also noticed now that their finances had begun to fail. Discipline soon goes when the soldier's pay falls into arrear.

The general result is this: neither side was as yet really superior to the other; but the French power was everywhere checked and held within bounds by the arms and influence of William III.

CHAPTER VII.

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS IN THE SESSION OF
1694, 1695. DEATH OF QUEEN MARY.

THIS state of things led King William, after his return to England, to open the new session of Parliament with the remark, that an honourable peace must not be expected unless all would still continue their former efforts with unflagging energy.

Shrewsbury had now been for some time Secretary of State; Montague, the founder of the Bank, had been made Chancellor of the Exchequer; with Somers, they added much to the strength of the Whig party in the administration, though that interest was still far from being dominant. Such men as Caermarthen and Godolphin held the great posts of President of the Council and First Lord of the Treasury. On the coalition of the two parties in the highest offices, and on their united influence in Parliament depended the tranquil advance and success of government.

Opposition was not lacking. in the very first debates the state of the nation, with reference even to the results of the last year, was declared to be pitiable. This, however, could now call forth nothing more than an ironical smile. The House of Commons replied to the speech from the throne with a resolution to the effect that the war with France must be carried on vigorously; it invited government to lay before the House the next year's estimates, and with some slight reductions adopted them. The estimate for the land forces was so full that it would have taken a long time to test in detail the amounts and calculations. One of the most prominent of the Whigs, a man of wealth, asked the members

of government who were present, whether they would be satisfied with a round sum of two millions and a half for the land forces. They replied that the proposal showed so excellent a spirit that they were fain to accept it on their side¹. In spite of some demurs the proposal was adopted by the House.

Even in his speech from the throne the King had mentioned a subject on which he felt very warmly—the renewal of the tonnage and poundage money, which was attached to the crown, and would terminate on December 24, 1694. The thing itself met with no difficulties in the prevailing temper ; but it is to be noted how jealously Parliament guarded the rights it had won. In order that its right to dispose of these sources of income might again be recognised, it was determined that a certain interval should elapse between the expiration of the old and beginning of the new votes. It was in fact proposed to make it three months ; but this was impossible ; how much untaxed merchandise would be imported in that time ! Still they would show every one that the Houses held firmly to the principle. The interval was limited to a single day, December 25. The new grant was to date from December 26, and to run for five years.

The King also on his side decided on making a great concession. The Bill for Triennial Parliaments, now once more fully debated in and passed by both Houses, he at last accepted. His right of dissolving Parliament was not touched by this, but the old custom of letting Parliament sit so long as it showed itself subservient was abolished. Not a very important matter ; for the intimate connexion of the government with Parliament which this measure had formerly been meant to loosen, existed no longer in its ancient combination. The antagonism of parties was but little disturbed by it ; for the Whigs had proposed it, and the Commons had accepted it by an overwhelming Tory vote. It was thought that Parliament would now be more independent, and less corruptible ; and therefore men had doubted whether the King would pass it ; when he spoke the word, they broke out into applause and clapping.

¹ 'Disant, qu'ils en agissaient si galamment, qu'on acceptoit leur proposition.' Bonnet.

In this state of things, in which party rivalry was by no means quenched, but only repressed, a misfortune befell the King which shook his very life to its foundations, and threatened to tear his kingdom limb from limb :—Queen Mary died.

We know her and her position ;—how her marriage with William of Orange had been the work of an anti-French and Protestant combination, into which she threw herself heart and soul in the Netherlands, while in England her father daily sank deeper and deeper into French and Catholic combinations : the world's great debate sundered father and daughter, until at last it reached such a pitch that the father was deposed, and the daughter with her husband ascended his vacant throne. And yet she had ever kept up great outward respect for her father, never allowing any one to speak slightly of him ; great statesmen fell under her displeasure for doing so. In indirect ways at least¹, she had even let him know that she was still devoted to him, and had taken no part in bringing about his misfortune. This brought the blood into King James' cheeks. 'Were that so,' cried he, 'she ought never to have accepted my crown.' But this was the very point on which she was quite clear—that the good of the world demanded her father's perpetual exclusion from the English throne ; she set herself with unreserved zeal, religious and political, to oppose all endeavours to restore him. Sundered from her father, hating her stepmother, persuaded readily enough that that stepmother's son was not her own brother, quarrelling often with her sister, childless herself, she lavished the whole full affection of which a woman is capable on her husband. All who saw them together were amazed at the contrast in appearance between them ; he so haggard, sickly, taciturn, inaccessible ; she so vigorous, stately in gesture, excitable, communicative. There ran a saying about them : 'The King thinks all, the Queen says all, the Parliament does all.' What first struck people in her was her naive benevolence, cheerful temper, freedom from pretension. She loved to make her little purchases herself ; every moment

¹ Though Sophia, Electress of Hanover, and Elizabeth Charlotte, Duchess of Orleans : the latter gives us an account of this in one of her letters.

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that she could call her own she was busy with her needlework. But she also had depth of character and spirit. We learn from one of her confessors that she knew the need and blessedness of earnest prayer, which opened to her the mysteries of things divine, and indeed what else, if she still really had any of the feelings of a daughter, could ever have quieted her soul, save this communion with higher things? The inmost soul of man is surely truthful when it deals with great inward determinations. Sure of her God, Queen Mary took an active part in all that happened and must happen in the carrying out of a great thought once determined on. She had the very highest opinion—her correspondence shows it—of her consort's destiny and gifts; she ranked herself far below him. If he was absent, she carried on the work of government, which then devolved on her, with fearlessness and ability. The management of Church matters was chiefly left in her hands, even when the King was in England. What William did not suffer to be imposed on him as a political duty, he did out of consideration for her personal character and natural position. The Episcopalians and Tories regarded Mary as their queen: Whigs only and Presbyterians deemed William their king by the will of the people.

The people felt sure she would outlive the King, and would then carry on the government in the old English way; but suddenly, in the end of 1694, a rumour spread that she was ill and her life in danger.

Smallpox was then prevalent in London. One day, as the Queen drove from Kensington to St. James', she saw a boy in the road with his face red and swollen with fresh eruption: she called the attention of the lady with her in the carriage to a tree hard by, so that she might not catch sight of the lad, for her companion was very susceptible to impressions of the kind; but she may well have herself unconsciously received a very deep shock; or perhaps she had already caught the infection. That night she fell ill; at first the small-pox could not be recognised, but it presently came out in a most malignant form: her state was immediately seen to be most critical. The King was terribly alarmed. He had a camp-bed put up for

himself in the royal bedchamber; he wished to be always by her when she took her medicine. The Queen did not think death so near; for she felt the vital forces moving in all her veins: but in a few days the enemy overpowered her. The King mastered his emotions, and was present when, on the 28th December, 1694, she breathed her last. ^{he} was led off, half fainting, to his chamber. At first they were anxious for his life also; but not till his cough, after a whole day's cessation, returned, did they feel he was saved; he was allowed to be carried into the garden.

Not only had he lost his wife, whom he loved with a reciprocal and life-long affection—he had ever worn a lock of her hair on his arm—but the whole state of things under which he had come to England, and had received the crown, also received a great shock. Like an experienced seaman, he must have seen at once the dangers of the new storm which threatened him.

One of the first visits he received was from the Princess Anne. The Queen, with whom, as we have seen, she was not on good terms, had sent her a message from her sick bed to the effect that she had in her heart no feeling against her. Now as the Princess stepped out of her chair into the King's antechamber he came out of the inner room to meet her. She wished to kiss his hand, but he offered her his cheek: they remained alone together half an hour, and came to an understanding. The Queen's death had cost the Princess no tears; she was now fully reconciled with the King; she removed from about her those lords who were regarded as outspoken opponents of government, even her uncle Lord Clarendon; her personal friends again drew closer to the King.

The contingency, which then seemed so unlikely to happen, of the Queen's dying before the King, had been prudently provided for in the settlement of the crown; the sole possession of the throne had been, in that case, secured to William. As to this there was no room for doubt. But another constitutional question arose: namely, as the writs of Parliament had run in the names of the King and Queen alike, was not Parliament, ipso facto, dissolved by the demise of the Queen? Even before the Queen's death the

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question had been debated in the Privy Council. The foremost servants of the crown and of the household, as well as the heads of the legal profession had been called in to take part in the discussion¹. They concluded that the King, whose name had always stood first, being still alive, there could be no doubt that Parliament would continue legally to exist.

And Parliament continuing, its sympathies with the King seemed to be all the more aroused by the affliction that had befallen him. The Commons received the news in dead silence: they only begged the King not to abandon himself utterly to his grief, his life being priceless for England and Europe. On their part they assured him of their determined support against all foes at home or abroad. The Lords expressed themselves in terms almost identical: they assured him of their most loyal service. The only outward change that took place was the disappearance of the Queen's name from the Great Seal; the years of the King's reign were still reckoned from 1689².

At first the different views of the two parties showed themselves by a single word. Wherever the King's 'heirs and successors' were mentioned in any engagement attached to bills at that time before Parliament, the Tories wished to strike out the word 'heirs'. The point had no great practical importance; for it was scarcely possible to imagine that the King would marry again and have children. The Princess Anne, the person who would have been most affected, was so clear on this point that she attached no importance to the omission of the word. And the Whigs stood by it: they desired to maintain the actual language of the settlement, which recognised this possibility; they wished to uphold King William's personal rights.

But it appeared only too soon that the charm, as we may

¹ Letter by Bonnet: 'Tous les grands Officiers du Royaume et de la Maison du Roy y assistèrent, et outre ceux l'on y avoit appelé le Procureur et l'Advocat Général, le Chef de Justice, et d'autres gens de robe, qui conclurent tous, que cette Mort n'apporteroit aucun changement et que le Parlement ne laisseroit pas de subsister comme auparavant.'

² In the Journals the year 1694 (from December 28) appears as Annus VII Wilhelmi III.

call it, which had bound the two parties together, had been broken by the Queen's death : the hottest strife as to principles, men, and measures, broke out at once.

For since, at the first establishment of the government, there had been a pledge that the right of succession should be firmly vested in King James' daughter, and since the Queen had then made it her own particular business to support and lead the English Church according to ancient use, her death necessarily shook, if it did not even break up, the combination of Tories and Episcopalians with government ; especially as William III, even in her days, had given the Whigs once more a considerable share in public affairs.

Lord Nottingham, whose deeply-founded and far-reaching influence at the time of the formation of the new government we have already noticed, sounded the first note of war : for a time he had been obliged to stand aside : but the death of the Queen, in whose household Lady Nottingham had held a distinguished position¹, snapped the last tie which bound him to court. He now made a comprehensive attack on the general policy of government in home and foreign affairs. He objected to the expedition of the English fleet into the Mediterranean as endangering the security of the British Isles ; and to the establishment of the bank as ruinous to the interests of landowners, even of traders ; for it drew into its coffers all the circulation of the country, and made a kind of monopoly of the management of it². He was supported by Rochester, Torrington, and Halifax. When Godolphin, who especially undertook the defence of government, rejoined, in the bank's behalf, that it was a support to government, the phrase provoked the keen-tongued Halifax into a bitter reply. Things being in this state, it was a great point for the King that he had won over the Princess Anne. Lord Marlborough, who had a finger in every profitable money-

¹ Note in Bonnet : 'Sa femme a 800*l.* par an comme dame d'honneur de la reine.'

² In a letter sent to France, Feb 2 (Archives de Paris), we read . 'Que la banque engloutissoit tout ce qu'il y avoit de trésor dans le royaume, par l'empressement qu'ont les personnes les plus pécunieuses de profiter d'un aussi grand intérêt que celui de 8 p.c.'

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business, among other things, in the bank, also defended it. Above all, the party made a great blunder in setting itself in opposition to what was indispensable for the maintenance of the high position of the country. An article, too, appeared in the *Gazette of France* speaking of their opposition to King William as very favourable towards France: it was passed from hand to hand in the House of Lords, and damaged them very much.

The Whigs met the Tory assault with a complaint, far better founded, against their antagonists. They showed that Speaker Trevor, whom they had accepted very unwillingly, had taken bribes for advancing matters of business in his power: the Speaker had to undergo the disgrace of being obliged in person to declare that the House had passed a resolution censuring him. But this affair was not at all to the mind of government, as appeared when the House of Commons, without pausing to let the government take the initiative, elected as Speaker the wealthy Presbyterian, Paul Foley, a member of the opposition, and an emphatic advocate of economy. The Whigs, who, in so far as the King now leaned more than ever on them, had gained strength by the Queen's death, came back to their old plan of entirely ejecting the Tories from the administration. They directed their attack more particularly against that powerful nobleman who had so long used his influence against them—Danby, Marquis of Caermarthen, who had lately taken the title of Duke of Leeds. They accused him of having been bought, for a very considerable sum of money, by the East India Company. Some years later, when parties had formed fresh combinations, he was acquitted: now the charge remained hanging over him: the Whigs succeeded in stopping him from ever again venturing to take part in the government ¹.

But it became quite clear that the old composition of government could hold no longer. Divided by the Whig interest,

¹ Bonnet: 'Mais le parti whig, dont le grand but est de l'éloigner du ministère et principalement de la régence en l'absence du Roy, s'y seroit opposé encore plus, qu'il n'a fait, si le dessein que S. M. a de partir incessamment ne paroissoit suffire pour renvoyer ce jugement à une autre session'

which had forced its way in, and opposed by the Tories, it could no longer withstand the attacks made on it from either hand. The King chose but one Tory to sit among the Lord Justices who should administer the kingdom during his absence. He had already made up his mind to allow, as soon as possible, fresh elections to take place, and a thorough change of ministers to follow.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1695. PARLIAMENT OF 1695, 1696.

HIGH as the waves of party feeling at that time rolled, the action of the State was not affected by them. The estimates for the coming year were voted at once, and the imposts settled on which the requisite loans were to be based. It was no easy matter, as Parliament could not reconcile itself to any kind of excise-duty. Among other things the very singular expedient was adopted of subjecting marriages, births, burials, as well as bachelors and widows to a new tax. The feeling was that everything must be done to enable the King to carry on the French war with due vigour.

France too had made extraordinary efforts, in order to raise the sums required as means of war for the coming campaign. Louis XIV had imposed a poll-tax, a most comprehensive source of income; the clergy had supported his demand with the declaration that the King would make a holy use of the money; every one, with royalist and Catholic enthusiasm, had done his duty as a patriot with all his might.

All eyes were directed towards the opening of the campaign from which something decisive, if not an immediate and great battle, was expected. Every one felt sure that England, under the growing alienation of the Tories from the King, would never again agree to so heavy a taxation; and if the English subsidies failed the allies must soon fall asunder. On the other hand, were Louis XIV to suffer a disaster, he would decide on making peace, as to which, indeed, there had already been secret overtures and negotiations.

But this did not depend on the progress of the war in Catalonia, Piedmont, or the Upper Rhine, where fortresses

were besieged without being taken, and sudden advances were followed by equally sudden retreats: all depended on the collision of the two great armies in the Netherlands.

On the French side Luxembourg, that genial marshal, was much missed. But Marshals Villeroy and Boufflers, to whom Louis XIV entrusted the army of the Netherlands, men whose reputation was made, seemed to him very well fitted—and this was the thing chiefly aimed at—to defend the conquered district, and those strong lines which had been drawn up with so much exactitude and swiftness. William III, who advanced up to the lines of Ypres, met with a resistance which he was not sure that he could overcome. He says, in a letter dated June 27, that he found the foe there with all his force drawn together, posted so admirably that he would find it hard to accomplish anything against him: he adds that he was determined to attack Namur, and, if anyhow possible, to besiege it in form; that he would set out the very next day, and prayed God to enable him to carry out his great enterprise to its end¹. We will accompany him once more through an important military operation in the Netherlands' war.

The capture of Namur was the French King's greatest claim to military glory, and the heaviest blow that had been dealt the allies in these years of the war. But to wrest it again from the French was a still harder task than its capture had been. For its works, begun by Coehorn, had been meanwhile reconstructed by Vauban, strengthened, and increased by new buildings. Yet even now the town held out no long time. Coehorn's method of crushing strong places by a concentric fire was here brought into practice under his own eyes. On the 3rd of August the town capitulated.

But this was not very much gained. Boufflers, the commandant, withdrew into the citadel; Villeroy, who meanwhile had carried on his part in the war with considerable success—having, among other operations, bombarded Brussels with red-hot shot—now marched on Namur to relieve Boufflers. William III deemed it prudent to leave the blockade in the

¹ These letters are in Sypesteijn's *Geschiedkundige Bijdragen* iii. p. 50; a pamphlet which contains good and original information respecting this siege.

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hands of the Elector of Bavaria and Coehorn, while he himself marched out to meet the approach of the enemy, just as, at a later day, Frederick the Great acted at Pirna and Prague. One of William's letters is dated from Waterloo; the world at that time expected a great engagement to take place in that neighbourhood! With troops whose main strength was composed of infantry from Lüneburg and Hesse, and cavalry from Brandenburg, he took up a position behind the forest of St. Denys, which the enemy would have to pass if he wished to attack him. Three different roads led through the wood: the King closed each of them with an abatis, defended excellently with men and guns. Villeroy, who made a reconnoissance on the spot, observed that all combinations of the attacking army would also be prevented by swamps and ditches which had been dug. In his survey he was accompanied by the princes present and by his best generals: they all came back under the conviction that if they attempted to close with the enemy there the army would be utterly destroyed. The French could not make up their minds to hazard so perilous an enterprise¹; the relief of Namur was not important enough to make it worth their while to risk their whole force.

And yet this shrinking from a decisive engagement was in itself conclusive.

Meanwhile Coehorn had drawn two strong parallels before the line which bore Vauban's name, and before the fort still called by his own name, in order that all the works might be attacked at once. On the 21st of August a hundred and twenty cannon, together with forty-four mortars, opened fire: it went on without ceasing day and night—'a hellish fire,' says an eye-witness, 'which shook the very ground.' When the King returned he made the great engineer retain the command in his own hands². The French defended themselves with much personal bravery; but their fire was weak by day, somewhat stronger at night: their artillery was

¹ Cp. Quncy, *Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV*, iii. 146.

² Meijers to Prince Henry Casimir, in *Sypestejn* 237: 'Quand il demande quelque chose au roi, il n'a d'autre réplique que: Mr. Coehorn, c'est votre affaire; faites comme vous jugez à propos.'

clearly no match for so powerful an attack. On the 5th of September the citadel was compelled to surrender. In order to make the French release a body of troops they had taken, William kept the French general for a few days as a kind of prisoner. He asked, 'Why not hold an equal number of men as hostages?' to which the King replied, 'Because I like the commander better.' And this brought the two warriors into generally friendly relations.

For this campaign William had reckoned on the effect that would follow the simultaneous attack of his fleets on the French coasts. The Mediterranean fleet supported the Spanish attack on Palamos; but it led to no results: Marseilles and Toulon were scarcely even threatened. On the other side St. Malo and Dunkirk were hotly attacked and much damaged, though neither taken nor laid in ashes.

Even the King did not feel in a position to undertake anything decisive in the field. The actual strength of the French army was unbroken, and he was warned from England that he must not stake his fortunes on the field of battle. Of far more importance for all parties was the parliamentary campaign, which was now being prepared for against the winter.

The impression it made in the King's favour in England was wellnigh the most important result of the fall of Namur. His friends begged him to return as soon as possible, while every mouth was full of his praise, and to let a fresh election take place under these favourable auspices. The King would have been glad could Parliament have been dissolved in his absence. But his representatives, the Lords Justices, held that the legality of it would be doubtful, and that it would surely not in itself be wise. It was sufficient for them to be certain of the matter beforehand, so that they might take their measures accordingly. As soon, therefore, as the King got back from Holland—and he came unusually early—it was agreed to issue a proclamation for a dissolution of Parliament. This was on October 11, the very evening after his return: it was published at once¹. There was still a week or two before

¹ Bonnet: 'L'on a tenu conseil à son arrivée, mais il a esté court, parcequ'il ne s'y agissoit que de résoudre une Proclamation pour la dissolution du Pailament, laquelle on publiera dès demain, s'il se peut.'

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the new Parliament could sit. William took advantage of this to make a progress through the country, visiting and conferring with the nobility and gentry. Lord Sunderland, formerly the confidential minister of James II, till he had been dismissed by him and compelled by public odium to fly the country, had been back in England some time; the hatred of the people having blown over. At Althorp, his fine country-seat, fresh furnished in the newest taste, William made the longest stay. Sunderland had never been a friend to the Episcopalian and Tory system: the idea of freeing the King's authority from their preponderant influence is the clue that had guided him through life. To his house flocked the great Whigs, Shrewsbury, Sidney, Macclesfield, and their friends. William saw others at Nottingham when out hunting, or at Newmarket races, for which at this time he gave a prize. It was not in his nature to enter into friendly communications with all who drew towards him or attached themselves to him; but now he made an effort, and forced himself to try and secure them by the graciousness of his personal intercourse with them.

The taking of Namur had made the King more popular than ever. People felt confidence in him, and believed that he would push to a successful issue the war he had undertaken against France, especially as Louvois and Luxembourg, the two best men of that nation in the council-chamber and the field, were now dead. Would it not be scandalous for England now to draw back without winning in the field such a peace as she desired?

These motives worked together at the elections. With difficulty could zealous Tories like Musgrave and Seymour be carried at obscure village-boroughs; others lost their seats. Some Whigs, too, who opposed government, were not re-elected. One of these, a grandson of John Hampden, who had led the opposition to the ship-money, took it so much to heart that in a moment of deep despondency he put an end to his life.

Never before had so many new names appeared among the successful candidates; it was not known to which party they would attach themselves; even government had lost many of

its supporters, though in the main the elections were favourable to it: in many counties the members were specially instructed to support the King in his war against France. In his speech from the throne the King expressed his satisfaction at the result of the elections; praised the bravery of the English in the last campaign, as worthy of ancient days, and touched on the happy results that had followed from it; but at the same time he asked as large subsidies for next year as for the last, in order to push on the war by sea and land. Forthwith the Commons declared themselves determined to support the King and his government vigorously against all foes at home and abroad, above all in the prosecution of the present war. Some difficulties, however, arose over the discussion of the estimates; in particular the sum asked for the maintenance of the whole land force, which amounted, officers included, to about eighty-eight thousand men, gave rise to great opposition. Musgrave and Seymour had agreed with Finch and How to try and carry a reduction of five-and-twenty thousand men. Once more their chief argument was that none of the allied powers provided proportionate help, and that England was sinking under so heavy a burden. These men were the best speakers in the House, and as they avoided making any direct attack on the court, and restricted themselves closely to the subject in hand, they this time also produced a visible effect; just for a moment the supporters of government became anxious¹. But they too had their strong arguments: on a division in committee the motion that the King's list be adopted was carried by the large majority of 243 against 135. Musgrave was himself the first to propose thereon that the same sum as was granted last year should this year be voted for the land forces. The committee accepted the motion; the House confirmed it. The votes for the two branches of the service amounted to something over five millions.

But now arose a great difficulty;—how should this sum be raised? every one busied himself over it: this difficulty was caused by the depreciation of the English silver coin.

¹ Bonnet: 'Ils ont attiré beaucoup de membres dans leur sentiment et formoient un parti, qui a fait trembler.'

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It is among the good deeds of Queen Elizabeth that she succeeded in putting an end to the fluctuations of the circulating medium which had crept in before her day, and in establishing a standard of value as fine as that of her ancestors, and based on the then prevailing relation between gold and silver. She deemed that by so doing she had overcome a monster which was destroying her subjects. But this had not been achieved for ever. In the years just before and just after the Revolution, most part of the silver in circulation had been so clipped and filed that it was very far from corresponding to the value it ought to bear. Intolerable confusion arose therefrom; and that not only at home: the Bank of Amsterdam at one time absolutely prohibited the circulation of English silver. It was reckoned that there were perhaps five millions and a half of silver coin in circulation at that time, and that of this four millions had been clipped or filed, and to such an extent that a hundred pounds sterling in silver, which ought to weigh over thirty-two pounds, only weighed about sixteen, and was thus reduced to about half its value. Unclipped coin was hoarded. Gold rose to an extravagant price, the guinea selling for thirty shillings.

This disordered state of finance had already been discussed in the previous session, when, after the Queen's death, the Tory opposition was being formed against government. Among the grievances brought forward by the Earl of Nottingham, one of the most considerable and best founded was the reproach that government had failed to remedy this great evil, and that no one could get silver without a loss, or gold except at an extravagant price. The King alluded to the matter in his speech from the throne, but left it entirely to the consideration of the two Houses.

The Lords took the initiative, but, as was thought at least, with intentions not altogether friendly to government. They asked the King to fix a day after which no clipped coin should be legal tender; the day to be agreed on, in concert with the House of Commons, to which they communicated their proposal.

It is not difficult to see what an universal commotion this caused. For all the coin in circulation had been clipped.

What confusion must arise if at some future day it were to be all thrown out of currency! What a disaster for rich and poor alike, if they had themselves to bear the loss of the difference between the nominal and the real values! The rich might have more of it on hand; but the poor would be quite as severely injured: for the less a man has the more he values it.

The Lords' proposal stood to come on for debate in the Commons on December 6th; but it was already late when it was even mentioned, and there was a desire to adjourn the matter to a later day. But, one of the members remarked, they were not at all sure of being in a position to discuss it the next day; they ran a risk of being attacked by the mob if they adjourned without having come to some decision on the point¹. The sitting was continued, and the conclusion came to that the House should go into Committee on the question of the coinage. But surely this too would only have appeared to be a subterfuge, and would not have stilled the impatient mob. The question was, on whom shall the burden of loss fall, on the state or on individuals? There was an intimation in the King's speech that he desired the former; and in that way the Commons decided; the House laid it down as an instruction to the committee forthwith to consider of a fund which might be charged with the compensation for the loss arising from the condition of the clipped money². On that very evening and next day further deliberations on the matter took place.

But this alone was far from solving all the difficulties of the question before them. In the committee it was moved that the state ought to consider only such a loss as was fair and moderate, that it ought to undertake only part, at most two-thirds, of the expense that would be incurred. If the state were to bear the loss, it would absolutely contradict the theory that the society was based on the indi-

¹ Bonnet. 'Parceque toute la ville étoit en émotion de voir qu'on les tient si long tems en doute sans décider, sur qui la perte retombera.'

² Journal of Commons xi. 356: 'That they have power to consider of a fund, to make good the deficiency of the clipped money'

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vidual. Locke appeared in the lists with two short pamphlets on the question; they form an epoch in the history of the theory of currency; he was against the proposal, because the burden imposed must, after all, be borne by individuals, and in fact would fall on those who, without any fault of their own, would be sure to be hit very hard by the means adopted to abate the evil¹. But the universal excitement, and the hopes built on it by the opponents of the existing order of things, made it indispensable for those who had formed or who supported it to make some tranquillising announcement. It was decided that the clipped money should be recoinced, and the loss borne by the state. In another matter the theory of the philosopher coincided with the most pressing practical necessity. There were some distinguished members of Parliament who desired a slight alteration in quality and weight to be made in the forthcoming new coinage, in order that no loss might take place in the course of exchanges in the foreign money markets, and that the inducements to export English money in hope of gain might be removed. And perhaps it might have been desirable in the interests of commerce. But those whose income came from rents, or who had debts to get in, became mightily agitated². They wished, according to Locke's view, to be paid with the same quantity of silver that they had originally bargained for. The liveliest debate arose out of the difference of opinion in committee. Now might be seen members of Parliament uttering their opinions without any regard to their party politics or their relation to government. The majority, however, was of Locke's opinion. A division took place: 225 against 114 voted that the new coinage should be unchanged, following the established standard of value.

The expense of the restoration of the coinage to its old condition was reckoned at £1,200,000; there was a discussion

¹ Further considerations concerning raising the value of money; Locke, Works v 201: 'A tax, given to make good the defect of silver in clipped money, will be paid by particulars.' Macaulay (Hist of England ch. xxi) declares against Locke on this point.

² Bonnet: 'Ils disaient qu'il y avoit de l'injustice à payer les créanciers en autre monnaie que celle en laquelle on avoit contracté.' His is the only information we have as to the proceedings of this committee.

whether the hearth-tax, which had been abolished under William III, should not be re-imposed to meet the outlay. But the proposal was thrown out; for in the very name an old claim of the crown was involved, and people did not wish to revive it¹; a window-tax was imposed instead: this could awaken no such memories, and would distribute the burden over the different classes of society in a fairer relation to their power to pay, which was duly represented by the size of their houses.

Consider the various perplexities which resulted from carrying out these decisions, well-weighed as they were. They form one element in the complicated state of affairs which now followed. The first object was to stay the popular ferment which would certainly have had most disastrous effects on the raising of the means required for the war. The crown itself got more loss than profit from it. The re-coinage of the currency, which the kings had hitherto eagerly clung to as their right, was given up by William. But this was, as a rule, the tendency of things. The votes of Parliament were not directly attached to conditions; but, in the nature of things, they led to an extension of the rights of that body. In this session the King was destined to find it the case more than once.

William III had granted large crown-domains in Wales to his intimate friend, William Bentinck, Earl of Portland: this greatly disgusted the gentry of those parts, who objected that such an act would swallow up the revenues on which the government of the country depended. The matter now came before the Commons: the House spoke out emphatically against it:—such grants would sever the connexion between king and subjects; the crown would be the loser, if it transferred to private persons rights like these, which were of wide extent. The King in fact found himself compelled by their opposition to recall his grant: he said he had not thought his gift would have offended the House. The House did not affirm that he had no right at all to alienate crown property; but it carried

¹ Bonnet. 'Cette taxe devant durer plusieurs années, et l'impôt sur les cheminées ayant été héréditaire à la couronne, l'on a voulu éviter jusqu'à l'ombre du nom.'

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the principle that there are grants for which the approval of Parliament is necessary. And even in his relations with Scotland William was at this time obliged to satisfy the demands of the English Parliament.

On the proposal of that same Paterson, to whom the first scheme of the Bank was due, the Scots had taken up the idea of founding a colony at the Isthmus of Panama in Darien, and expected that it would enable them to concentrate all the world's traffic in their hands. From that point they would become the channel of the direct commerce between the West and Eastern Asia. They desired to give the scheme a completely cosmopolitan character; and proposed that it should embrace men of all nations and all creeds, Jews as well as Christians¹. Paterson affirmed that the chief of that district, whom he described as an independent prince, honouring him with the title of Emperor, was ready to evacuate the tract of country selected for the settlement; and that he had succeeded in forming a company in London, which had bound itself to apply its resources in great part to this object. The scheme was to be floated under the protection of the crown and the Scottish Parliament². In 1695 it received the approval of the Scottish Parliament, and was sanctioned by the Royal Commissioner on the ground of the King's promise to favour Scottish commerce, and even to support its settlements in foreign parts.

But this now aroused the jealousy of the English merchants, who feared this colony as a formidable rival in their commercial enterprises. They made merry over this so-called Emperor, who was in fact a needy Cacique, a dependent of Spain: the project would arouse ill-will between England and Spain, with which country an alliance had just been concluded. Both Houses of the English Parliament upbraided the King for entering into a project opposed to English interests, and indeed hostile to his own. For surely it was possible that hereafter the European world would prefer to get the products of the East from Scotland rather than from England or Holland, where trade was burdened with heavy taxation;

¹ Chambers, *Domestic Annals of Scotland* iii. 124.

² Ralph, *History of England* ii. 577, 578.

the loss in import-duties alone would be a serious misfortune to the King. It was true that Scotland formed an independent kingdom ; she was connected with England by a personal union only, which gave England no kind of right over her ; but surely the position of the Prince, in whose person the two crowns were united, obliged him to pay infinitely more heed to the English Parliament, which voted him the sinews of war, than to the Scottish. It is not certain whether the King had personal knowledge of the articles sanctioned by his commissioner¹. Here also William determined to give way. He removed the Scottish ministers, on whose shoulders fell the blame of having adopted the project, and against whom he had other grounds of complaint as well. So far he indirectly recognised the supremacy of the English Parliament ; that which, as King of Scotland, he had allowed to be granted in due legal form, he withdrew as King of England, under the influence of his Whig Parliament.

As a direct result of this disagreement with Scotland, Parliament determined to establish a Board of Trade, for the better securing the trade of the nation. Accordingly, the King at once named its members, some of them high statesmen, others private persons skilled in these matters, among these John Locke the philosopher. But Parliament did not choose that its determination should be carried out thus. In January 1695/6 a resolution was passed that the right of naming members of the Board ought to belong to Parliament. Some proposals, aiming at a still further limitation of this right, were rejected, though by a small majority, after long debate.

But just as in this affair the interests of the crown suffered by coming into collision with those of the Commons, so also in the question of trial for high treason the crown was the loser in a struggle with the Lords. In regard to this bill the difficulty was that the Lords claimed to be tried before the whole body of their peers alone, and not by a commission of their House named by the government, and often composed of peers hostile to the accused ; from this they were very anxious to free themselves. The provision that two

¹ In Bonnet, Dec. 10/20, 1695, he is represented as denying any knowledge of them.

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witnesses should always be required in evidence as to the charge was also adopted; clearly much in the interests of justice, as might be seen from the latest trials under Charles II, such, for instance, as that of Sidney, but it also distinctly tended to shelter men who had been really guilty of a treasonable attempt, and was a disadvantage to the Prince, who had to defend himself against such attacks. William's friends expected that the first proposal, against which in old days men would have eagerly argued that it tended to make the aristocracy still more independent of government, would at that time also have made the same impression on the Commons, and would have hindered them from passing the bill. But the desire to limit the government was now stronger than social antagonisms: the bill was carried. And the King too was not now in a position to refuse his assent. He had formerly been able to reckon on the support of Tory sympathies in behalf of the crown and its power; but now that the government had fallen into the hands of their opponents, they had no inducement to uphold the royal authority.

We may regard the freedom of the Press as a product of these conditions. The Act which subjected printed publications to a censorship had lately been suspended, though but for a short time, and that time had now elapsed. Through the caprice of the censors, who belonged now to one, now to the other side, the censorship had become odious to both parties. But now the question as to the renewal of this Act came up; a committee of the Commons proposed it, and would have preferred to retain the old limitations. For it was considered by the government as a grievance that, by the side of the Official Gazette, a couple of Journals appeared, which provided the public with unauthorised and false intelligence. But the general opinion of the House was against it: people would not let themselves again be limited to such information as the Secretary of State might see fit to vouchsafe them¹. Not

¹ Bonnet, March 20/30, 1696: 'De plusieurs lois expirées, qu'un comité étoit d'avis qu'on renouvellast, les communes ont précisément rejeté celle qui paroisoit la plus nécessaire et qui étoit pour empêcher qu'on ne pût rien imprimer sans la permission des personnes députées pour cet effet par les secrétaires d'état. Le motif, qu'ils ont eu, a été pour conserver deux gazettes sans aveu, qui paraissent

only was the committee's proposal thrown out, but the Act was allowed to drop altogether: by not being re-established, the censorship was quietly abolished. The reasons against the renewal of the Act then brought forward are now of but secondary importance. But the closest and most effective ground—that the public, in the matter of news as to daily affairs, ought to be independent of the guardianship of a changeable government—had great political importance. Severe repressive laws were still in full activity, but preventive measures could never again be in harmony with the conditions of English society. This change belongs generally to that system of thoughts, views, and institutions, which were now opening out new paths for the world.

In the parliamentary history of England the session of 1695, 1696 is, as one sees, of high importance.

The King did not count it prudent to interfere in the choice of a Speaker, or to insist on the old rights of the crown as to the regulation of the coin of the realm. In every way prerogative bowed before the claims of Parliament: in matters of justice, commerce, the press, the King submitted the exercise of his royal grace in England, and even his grants of privilege in Scotland, almost entirely to parliamentary superintendence. All this was very hard to him, and his antagonists reckoned on discord inevitably arising between him and his Whig friends. But William III would have no conflict with the power which voted him the means for that war, on the prosecution of which his whole soul was set. So long as the Whigs supported him herein with their influence, without interfering too much in the conduct of the war or the administration of foreign affairs, they were indispensable to him.

3 fois la semaine ou tous les jours de poste pour l'Angleterre, et dont les auteurs disent à tort et à travers tout ce qui vient à leur connaissance, au lieu que le gazetier, qui travaille sous le secrétaire d'état, est plus réservé. Ils se défient qu'on ne leur cache des nouvelles ou qu'on n'en exténue ou exagère d'autres.' Bonnet has also previously mentioned the wonderful Blount. For Bohun and Blount we must refer the reader to Macaulay, *History of England*, vol. iv. pp 350 sqq

CHAPTER IX.

FRENCH AND JACOBITE SCHEMES OF INVASION. THE PLOT OF 1696.

THE formation of such a constitutional and Protestant power as this in Great Britain, and the fact that it not merely supported, but actually led the attempt to drive back and repress the dominant European power,—this it is that has given their special character to modern times.

At the very centre of the Catholic world, men oppressed by the ecclesiastical and temporal pretensions of Louis XIV welcomed at first with satisfaction the rise of William III. The Spanish-Imperial party in the Roman Curia only expressed its regret that the Pope did not enter into closer relations with him. People were amazed to see how he never abandoned his aim, but when driven back always pressed forward again, and so reached his goal: after the taking of Namur he was regarded as the great man of the century, before whom the glory of Louis XIV was destined to pale; a hero whose like could only be found in the records of antiquity¹. Yet at this very moment the fear of him had sprung up—a fear directly connected with the idea that Louis XIV would have to make up his mind to a peace, in which he must abandon the cause of James II. Innocent XII protested that he would never acknowledge such a peace, yet that he would scarcely be able to prevent it; that no Catholic power would listen to him, Pope though he was; that the Prince of Orange was the arbiter, lord, and master of

¹ From a letter of Lord Peith from Rome, 27th September, 1695, in Macpherson, *Original Papers* i. 538.

Europe ; that the Imperialists and Spaniards were not merely his subjects, they were his slaves, and ever afraid of offending him. 'If God help not,' he cried, striking the table with his hand, 'we are undone!' On the other side the Jacobite narrator goes on to say that the Emperor's people and the Spaniards also begin to be anxious : that they see the Prince of Orange master in the Spanish Netherlands as well as in Holland ; that they fear that, as soon as the Spanish King dies, he will dispose of the succession, strengthen the German Protestants, and compel the Emperor to do whatever pleases him. He adds that 'they pray God heartily that he were knocked on the head.'

So runs the wheel of the world's fortunes ! Woe to the man who does not stand firm on his own feet : where yesterday he looked for his salvation, to-day he finds his peril !

Still things had not yet got so far as to make people look for the removal of William from the scene only by supernatural interposition or unnatural violence.

The legitimists had all this time a great following in England ; there were many who still wished for no more than a compact with James II, if he would but agree to give a promise that he would secure to them their religion and the constitution. Even as far back as in the attempt of 1692 James had published a declaration, in which this very promise was given, though in a way that satisfied no one. For the critical point of all, namely, the recognition of the Protestant oath established by Parliament for this very purpose, the refusal of which had aroused all the disturbances, and had even been the cause of King James' exile—was not even touched on in the declaration. His return was impossible so long as he refused to concede this point. The royalists, as far back as in 1693, had let him know as much : they laid before him a list of stipulations which he must accept, if he hoped ever to return. The chief of these was that he must promise not to violate or dispense with the Test Oath ; then followed others of much importance. James must recognise all the laws passed under the new government, if laid before him by Parliament, and these too with certain extensions against which William III had struggled ; he must

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even re-establish the partition of land made in Ireland by Charles II. If England were secured in possession of her Protestant constitution and legislation, she would be ready once more to recognise and obey her legitimate prince. Commissioned by certain distinguished lords and other important persons, who were called compounders, Lord Middleton, a Scot, in whose favourable views unlimited confidence was placed, crossed over to St. Germain, in order to carry through the compact. James II laid the stipulations before the French court and ministry; every one advised him to close with them; he says that, had he wished to refuse them, he must have felt afraid of being driven out of France as a bigot, who would not even do what was indispensable for his restoration and who was a mere burden to the French nation¹.

In the little court of St. Germain there was even an opposition-party which thought that these conditions went too far: this was headed by Melfort, who, though desirous of an agreement with the Protestants, did not wish for such decided engagements. But Middleton got the upper hand over him; by degrees he obtained sole possession of the ministry of St. Germain. And then he stuck very firmly to the new declaration, in which the points set out by him had been adopted; he declared that they were as binding as any other treaty; for that on the basis of them only would the legitimists again recognise King James².

Queen Mary's death swelled their ranks: chiefly because she had appeared to be the true possessor of the right of inheritance; and besides the consequent preponderance of Whigs in the government had a further effect in strengthening the party which would gladly have seen King James' return, if it were under conditions that secured them.

It is amazing to find from documents of the time how widespread was this feeling. Renaudot, the editor of the *Gazette de France*, the medium of intercourse between Middleton and the French ministers, has left us a list of the most important

¹ From his own *Memoirs* Clarke, *Life of James ii.* 505.

² 'The whole people of England having an interest in what he had engaged to do, his Majesty was under an obligation of keeping his promise to them.' Clarke, *Life of James ii.* 534.

and trustworthy adherents of James II, gathered from the intelligence he received from England : in this document appear many distinguished names ; at the head of the list stand the Duke of Beaufort and his son the Earl of Worcester, then come the Earl of Lindsey, Viscount Weymouth, Lords Aylesbury, Huntingdon, Chesterfield, who are all said to have great influence in the provinces ; then came not only Clarendon, but also Rochester, Halifax, Brudenell, Fanshaw ; of the Bishops we find first Bath and Wells, then Norwich, St. David's, Peterborough. Renaudot thinks that James might count on the gentry of Somerset and Devon, and on Exeter ; in Lancashire and Cheshire there were crowds of men fit to bear arms, and used to them, in the service of the landed gentry, who waited only for the call to rise ; in Cornwall the whole of the miners were ready to come out the moment officers were sent to them ; Bristol had been won, and was safe, London was full of retired officers, and of old servants of the court who could be trusted.

In this there may be much that was uncertain—still it shows how the French court, touched by the unsatisfactory result of the last campaign, and probably at the same time not free from anxieties as to how matters were viewed at Rome, could throw itself into the scheme, and once more support an attempt to restore King James.

By far the largest part of William's land forces was now in the Low Countries ; there was only a very moderate number of regular troops in England. The fleet now just back from the Mediterranean was laid up in harbour, and it was thought quite possible that a body of troops might be thrown into England from Dunkirk, Brest, or St. Malo, without being at all hindered by it. Such a force would give support and backbone to the expected Jacobite rising. There is extant a memorial, the author of which maintains that it clearly did not signify whether two or four days were taken in crossing the Channel, if only the mastery of the sea were once won ; he mentions Newcastle as the best point for landing, that place being ill-fortified and easy to take. By this means the coal-supply, without which existence in London was impossible, would fall into their hands ; they could easily get what

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horses they needed in the neighbourhood—above all, in the northern counties the adherents of James II were very numerous and ready to rise¹.

Without at once attempting this or any such particular scheme, the French busied themselves at this time very seriously with a project for landing in England. Eighteen regiments of foot, five of horse, were told off under the Marquis of Harcourt for this purpose; about five hundred transports had been got ready for the purpose. Active as the preparations were, they were still kept secret. King James pawned some of the jewels saved in the flight of his consort; the French court provided him with considerable sums of money; on the 1st of March he went to Calais, where were collected the sea forces, which were to accompany him.

A fierce storm was gathering over William's head, and seemed likely to discharge itself forthwith on him. But who could have believed it! At the very moment that the lengthy preparations were all but completed, James II repented of the religious and political concessions which he had announced in his second declaration, and issued a new document from which the special assurances as to the inviolability of the Test Oath were left out. Never did prince so stiffly cling to his religious sympathies and antipathies! The priests about him gave him this advice; it was quite impossible for him to make a stand against them². I do not find that any one has elsewhere noticed this change; it had, so far as one can see, no influence on events.

On the other hand, a difficulty made by the French King had very great influence. His proclamation runs thus:—that ever ready to carry out the restoration of the King of England (James II) if occasion offered, he had at his request collected troops on the coast who should follow him, but only in case a rising in England confirmed the reports given him as to the

¹ Memorial, Jan. 8, 1696. Macpherson, Original Papers i. 541, 542.

² Renaudot, who was directly engaged in these affairs, expressly assures us of this when he mentions the Declaration: 'On a jugé à propos,' he says, 'de n'y parler du test, à cause des difficultés de conscience qu'on a fait au roi d'Angleterre sur ce sujet.'

eagerness of the English for his restoration¹. He added a condition that King James' adherents must get hold of a harbour, or at least of some strong position, which they might defend till the arrival of the French fleet, and that this must be done before the fleet would set sail. To undertake so great an expedition without having certain assurances that it could be actually carried through in the country, was a thing for which the French had no mind. To advance matters on the other side of the Channel, Berwick, a natural son of King James, and a young man of enterprise and military capacity, crossed over to England. He was fortunate enough to get over unrecognised.

A number of exiles, too, fired with eagerness to return home, and whose wish to escape from the subordinate position they held in France was combined with their desire to do their King a service, got over the Channel in one way or another. Their business was to be at hand at the moment of the uprising, in order to guide it. King James had issued a commission authorising all his faithful subjects, and not merely allowing but ordering them to rise in arms against the usurper of the throne, William of Orange, and to begin open war on him².

But it became clear at once that even the staunchest adherents of James II were probably not able, certainly not willing, to attempt a rising before that prince actually appeared on the coast. They were afraid of being crushed before the French fleet got over, and then all further undertakings would be impossible. This they notified to King James, who at first misunderstood them; and even when it was made clear to him he did not deem it prudent to let Louis XIV know anything about it. Berwick found it impossible to get what he wanted from those he visited; on the contrary, he even allowed that their objections were reasonable.

Thus then the enterprise was really wrecked even before

¹ 'Avancer à sa prière sur les costes de la mer des troupes prestes à s'embarquer et à suivre ce prince en Angleterre, en cas que quelque soulèvement dans ce royaume confirme les avis qu'on reçoit de la fidélité de plusieurs de ses sujets.'

² Commission of December 27, 1695; Claike, *Life of James II.* 547.

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an attempt had been made to carry it out. So mighty, so terrible was the English government, without being armed or even suspecting the danger, that each of the two confederates, the Jacobites and French, on whom James II relied, waited for the other to take the initiative, and each refused to take it.

And even while the great powers were thus hesitating, there once more came up, in those circles in which blind religious and political passions were dominant, the idea of preparing the way for the enterprise by an attempt on the person of William III. Such plans had often been cherished, such attempts had already been made. At moments when ideas which are equally powerful come into collision, when great issues depend on this or that life, such things seem almost inevitable. They arise in the hidden shallows of some mind, where, once adopted, they rule with irresistible violence. One such man, who in the Oxford reaction had gone over to Rome, Robert Charnock, even persuaded himself that this was his path of duty. For surely, by the laws of human society, men are bound to come to the rescue of their prince against the usurpers of his throne. He derides the fiction that James II had abdicated, and calls it a combination of treason and madness: to overthrow or set aside the usurper seems to him to be a glorious undertaking. 'They tell me,' he says, 'that the King (James II) will land with 10,000 men, and on arriving will be met by 2000 horse; I was convinced that his Majesty was risking too much by coming into England with so small a force, especially as the risings are in themselves uncertain, and can be easily dispersed by regular troops: on these grounds I came to the conclusion that, to make the King's landing safe and effectual, there was no better way than to seize and secure the Prince of Orange¹.' Charnock expresses his opinion that this would altogether be the best thing for England: for then so many millions would not be sent off to Holland, nor so much blood be shed in the service of a man who, under show of moderation, thought to make himself lord and master of all, through the alliances which he concluded without consulting any one.

¹ Charnock's letter to a friend after his condemnation; in the Record Office, London, March 1696.

What strengthened him and others in this design was the above-mentioned commission issued by King James, authorising open war against William of Orange. One of the men who had come over from France, Barclay, a Scot, was for proving that the language of the commission justified an attempt on William, provided he were surrounded by his guard, and that the guard was attacked as well as he: for then it might be regarded as a military operation.

And without doubt this supposed authorisation had a very great effect in stifling in these men the moral sense which naturally opposes such proceedings¹. The men were, first some old soldiers, and with them the Oxford scholar and some Scottish noblemen—Major Lowick, who had formerly borne arms for King James in Ireland, as Barclay had in Scotland, Colonel Freind, Captains Porter, Knightley, Fisher; they could count on a number of trusty persons who had formerly been in the King's body-guard. They would never have allowed that they were bent on assassination. They wished to track the enemy of their King to his winter quarters; they desired (as they then expressed themselves in the military language of the day) to 'lay an ambuscade' for him on his way to Richmond, whither he went every Saturday to hunt. When with his guard, about twenty-five men, he reached Turnham Green, the point on the road which seemed to them the most convenient, they proposed to fall on him from every side with a superior force. They only told the men they enlisted that they were to strike a brave stroke for King James. Charnock, Porter, Barclay, were to take part in it in person: Barclay seems to have undertaken the special task of attempting the King's life. After carrying out the deed,

¹ This can be seen from the examinations, as given in Burnet's account: 'None of them (the accused) denied really what Porter had deposed, which was, that Charnock told him that there was a commission come from King James for attacking the Prince of Orange's guards. They only denied that there was a commission for assassinating him.' Howell's *State Trials*, vol. xiii. p. 754. A passage to be found in Charnock's letter agrees with this: 'Nobody can doubt that by virtue of H. M.'s commission to levy war against the Prince of Orange and his adherents, the sitting (?) up his person is justifiable.' He propounded his own explanation of the commission as the true sense of it.

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or, as presently they did not hesitate to say, after the King's murder, they were to escape on horses standing ready saddled for them at their place of ambush, and to lie hid, if they could, till King James had got over with the French fleet; he then would be really welcomed by 2000 horse, and a general insurrection would follow.

Now did the two Kings who were planning their common attack on William III know beforehand of this conspiracy? had they perhaps even excited it? All direct evidence is against it. To reject all proposals for assassination was a principle to which Louis XIV held firmly, and for this James II also, in this case, takes credit to himself. But he was weak and not hard to sway. The very extraordinary authorisation already mentioned certainly was laid before him, with the view of rendering such an application of it possible. Had he then no suspicions on the matter? No express instructions were required for such cases. The tools, hurried on by their own fanatic zeal, offered themselves spontaneously for the purpose.

Berwick got information as to the plot, and hastened back to France, both to avoid being a sufferer from the consequences, if it miscarried, and also to give the two Kings intelligence of it: for, if successful, what incalculable advantages might it not bring with it!

Both of them would have been very ready to pluck the fruit. King James awaited the result at Calais. The French ships were to lie in the harbour till tidings should come as to how the attempt had fared¹; they were doubtless content not to have it on their consciences.

But they were soon to learn that it had miscarried, or rather that it had been discovered the very moment before it was to have been attempted. As in the plot itself the wild religious passions of an earlier age revived, so the dawn of the milder tendencies of the period helped to cause its failure.

Late in the evening before the day fixed for the attempt—the 15th of February—an Irishman, by name Pendergrass,

¹ Berwick, *Mémoires du Maréchal de Berwick*, i, in Petitot's Collection, lxx. 394.

who had been chosen as an accomplice, gave so clear an account of the project to Bentinck, Earl of Portland, the King's personal friend, that it could not be neglected: to a previous warning the King had paid no attention, thinking it too indefinite; he thought their plan was to agitate him with false terrors. But Pendergrass gave a circumstantial and exact account, though without naming the conspirators. He was an Irishman and a Catholic; but, as he said, it was against his principles that the Church should be charged with favouring the assassination of princes hostile to her. He prayed Portland to be careful to keep the King from going to hunt next day; if he went he would most certainly be murdered. Portland thereon hastened to Kensington, where orders had already been given for the hunting party next day; the King was prevailed on, though with great difficulty, to put it off.

At first sight people have been inclined to think it of importance that William III had treated the Catholics, and specially in Ireland, with gentleness: and that by this means he had softened the impulses of religious hatred, which would otherwise have been directed against him¹. I do not profess to decide whether or not this was a conscious motive in Pendergrass' case: a secret connexion between them there undoubtedly was.

But the bare intelligence was not enough for the King. As it stood he could not openly speak of the detection of the plot; no one would have believed him; the conspirators, had their names remained concealed, would have plucked up courage for another attempt. William therefore determined to have a personal interview with Pendergrass and another person, of the name of De la Rue, who had meanwhile come forward with similar but equally obscure information; by this means he hoped he would force them to mention names. He put it to them that not only did the treason remain unpunished

¹ In the little work, *Histoire de la dernière conspiration d'Angleterre, 1696*, the affair is regarded from this point of view: 'Il a paru que Dieu approuvoit la conduite douce et modérée que le roi a tenue à l'égard des Catholiques en général et des Irlandois en particulier, lorsqu'il s'est servi d'un homme qui étoit Irlandois et Catholique pour sauver la vie à ce prince' (155). We find here a very authentic account, as it seems, of the discovery of this plot.

but that no one would believe in it, people would think he had invented it if he could not prove his assertion; his life would be none the safer. In a word, he over-persuaded them: two witnesses were present at his interview with each of them; the names of the conspirators were given up and written down in their presence¹.

At this moment Schmettau, the Prince of Wurtemberg's adjutant, came over to inform the King as to the preparations of the French, and the presence of James II at Calais. Not a moment was to be lost. The commander of the guards sent his most trusty men to hunt up and arrest the conspirators whose names were known. A Cabinet-Council was summoned at once, and a well-authenticated account of the combined plans for an attempt on the King's life, and an invasion from abroad, was laid before it. In a sitting of the Privy Council, in which some distinguished lawyers were also present, a proclamation was agreed on, in which the arrest of the conspirators was authorised; they had already laid hands on all of them except Barclay.

At the same moment measures were taken to defend the country. The Warden of the Cinque-Ports hurried down to Dover to quicken the vigilance of the coast-guard; Admiral Russell hastened to the Downs, in order to get to sea as quickly as possible with the fleet. The Prince of Wurtemberg came over of his own accord from the Low Countries with a considerable body of troops, that he might be at hand with help in case of a landing; he was welcomed very gratefully by William².

But the danger was already passed. The French expedition, which had reckoned on the outbreak of a rising in England, could not now take place, seeing that the disturbances had been nipped in the bud. The French ministers countermanded the troops; King James returned to St. Germain.

¹ Bonnet attaches the highest importance to this. He thinks it probable that 'sans l'avis si à propos, qu'il donna des préparatifs pour une invasion, on auroit négligé la decouverte d'une conjuration, n'étant pas chose rare, qu'on découvre des complots qui se vont en fumée.'

² Letter of March 4, N.S.: 'De goede God will geven, dat het een tweede werk van la Hogue magh syn en uytvallen.'

The conspirators who had hoped to restore him to his throne, could not escape their fate: at the same time, one of them was found, Captain Porter, who sought to save himself by turning king's evidence; Charnock was the only one of them all who showed spirit and consistency.

All these plans and plots were scattered like a morning mist; yet they had a very considerable, if indirect, effect in England.

CHAPTER X.

ASSOCIATION. THE TWO BANKS. VICTORY OF THE WHIGS.

WILLIAM III, still under the excitement of the first rumours, anxieties, and precautionary measures, came down to the Houses on the 24th of February to request their co-operation for the common safety. His frank address, heightened by the cheerfulness of his countenance, was accompanied by murmurs of applause, and was at once replied to by a sympathetic resolution. For if there was anything in the world that could bring Lords and Commons to the consciousness that their interests were the same with the King's, it surely was an attempt on his life, which all felt to be priceless, and at the moment indispensable for the country. Both Houses not only assured him that they were determined to defend him and his government against all foes at home and abroad, and specially against James II, but they also pledged themselves, almost in the very words once before used in an address to Queen Elizabeth, that were the King to perish by a violent death, they would avenge him on his foes and their adherents¹.

Far as this declaration goes, it was clearly a kind of necessity ; and this one can understand, when an association for the purpose was proposed, such as that one which marked the landing of the Prince of Orange in England. For no doubt

These last words were added by the Commons to the original address of the Upper House and adopted by the Lords. Journals of Commons xi. 466.

was to be left in the minds of the Jacobite party that, even supposing an attempt on William's life to succeed, their own ruin would be the immediate consequence. The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, and the stringent anti-Catholic laws revived ; for people were determined to have their weapons ready to strike at any moment. The attempt had aimed at the overthrow of all the order of things introduced by the Revolution ; its defeat could scarcely fail to bring with it the firmer establishment of that order of things. People pledged themselves afresh to uphold the arrangement as to the succession to the throne named in the settlement. In order that the French-Jacobite party should conceive no hopes as to any possibility of a parliamentary change ensuing on the King's death, it was definitely settled that in case of his demise the existing Parliament should remain in permanent session till dissolved by the legally-appointed successor to the throne ; even the contingency of an abdication was not forgotten. The peril now run by the head of the state gave Parliament the opportunity of standing forward still more definitely to show that in it resided the unbroken continuity of the state.

The common feeling of state-life, as it then existed, is clearly marked in all these proceedings. But they could not fail also to have some influence on the state of parties. To the Tories especially nothing could have been so ruinous as the outbreak of Jacobite troubles ; for their principles had a certain relationship to those of the Jacobites. Whig principles, on the contrary, were fundamentally opposed to them ; a French-Jacobite enterprise, like this, which endangered the existence of the state, must turn to their advantage. The Whigs now proposed, and the Commons, under the influence of the dominant impulse, at once agreed, that there should be embodied in the obligations of the association the recognition of King William as right and lawful King of England. The constitutional questions, which had ever remained as matters of contention between the two parties, were at the same time settled once for all in favour of the Whigs. Musgrave, the leader of the Tories, remarked that the adoption of this form of words would contradict the earlier resolutions by which the abjuration of James II had been re-

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fused ; for the formula implicitly carried with it the principle of an abjuration ¹.

Among the four hundred members (or thereabouts) who were present in the House, there were eighty-nine who refused to subscribe to it, chiefly on the grounds urged by Musgrave. In the Lords, where Monmouth moved that the formula should be subscribed, it met with still stronger opposition. They were not minded to question the King's right, so far as it was settled by Parliament ; but they hesitated about the ancient formula for an undisputed succession being used, as if the accession of William III had been a matter of ancient hereditary descent. And now that King James' daughter, the Queen, was dead, it seemed all the more unseasonable. The Lords thought to express themselves more cautiously by adopting the proposal of the Duke of Leeds, that the King had by law a right, and that an exclusive right, to the throne ; and that neither James II, nor the so-called Prince of Wales, nor any one else possessed such a right. This form, which was not vigorously opposed by government, was carried by 60 to 33. It was approved of neither by zealous Tories nor by zealous Whigs ; but it satisfied moderate men of both parties, and on their union the new order of things was fundamentally based ; it expressed the idea which gave the true measure of their combination.

The clergy accepted the Lords' formula with a slight alteration : that of the Commons, which expressed the Whig idea in its completeness, was approved by the capital and the other corporations ². An anti-Jacobite impulse passed through the land. In Bristol, where formerly there had been strong Jacobite movements, the old representatives of the city in

¹ Bonnet. ' Musgrave a dit, qu'il n'y avoit personne au monde, qui put plus zélé que luy pour le gouvernement,—mais qu'elle [la formule d'association] étoit contraire aux résolutions prises plus d'une fois et tout nouvellement dans la chambre, qu'on ne feroit abjuration de personne, au lieu que la formule en contenoit une implicite.'

² The Commons' formula is : ' That his present Majesty is rightful and lawful King of these realms ' ; that of the Lords ; ' that his present Majesty King William hath right by law to the crown of these realms.' Bonnet says : ' Ils conçurent que les expressions " rightful and lawful " signifient que S.M. présent soit venu par un droit de succession et conformément aux lois établies du royaume.'

Parliament, who had expressed themselves warmly against William III, were now thrown into prison. People wore orange ribands, on which were written in letters of gold the words 'National Association for King William.'

Some weeks later, April 4th, the Commons handed over their document of association, to be kept among the Records in the Tower. The King replied that he took the opportunity of himself joining the association, which had the common safety for its aim; he would at all times venture his life against such as wished to overthrow the established religion, laws, and liberties of England. His words were received with enthusiastic applause.

The Commons ordained that no one who refused to subscribe the association should be eligible for public office; that whoever declared it illegal should be treated as a foe to the liberties of the country, and a promoter of the plans and undertakings of King James II. They also framed a political confession of faith, to be an indispensable test before admission to public office. The penalties of recusancy were to be inflicted on all who refused to take this oath¹.

It is obvious that there must have been, and would still be, many such; and among them even officials, such as Deputy Lord Lieutenants of counties and Justices of the Peace; the King was unwilling to take steps against these men, for he did not wish to swell the number of political recusants and to arouse their hostility.

But meantime another battle, on entirely different grounds, was now fought out between Tories and Whigs. The Tories, who in large part were landed proprietors, affected by the preponderance which the Bank of England had given to the monied interest, now hit on the idea of setting up against this institution a similar one to be based on the ownership of the land itself. They also thought they had a tenable theory for themselves: they not only succeeded in forming a company to establish a National Land-Bank, but actually got Parliament to resolve that the loans required for the next year, and amounting to two millions and a half,

¹ Resolution of April 2. Journals of Commons xi. 543.

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should be transferred to the new bank under certain conditions.

Thus far, under Harley's leading, the Tories had got. But now the bank-partners, whose credit would be shaken by this resolution, and above all the Whigs under Montague, opposed them, and so far modified the later votes that they became very unfavourable for their opponents. The National Land-Bank might take up no money except on mortgage of landed property, must make its payment only to the Treasury, which actually reserved to itself the right of issuing current notes to the amount of a million, these notes the new company must take up, if fully established and in a position to do so, by the 12th of August: if not, then it must forfeit its concession. It is plain that these resolutions at once raised the depressed Bank of England shares again, and almost disheartened the promoters of the Land-Bank¹. The rivalry of the two hostile banks was also an antagonism between the two political parties. Besides, the regulations as to money matters had at this time undergone so many changes that a universal confusion now followed. The forging and clipping of coin still continued; the daily traffic of the country-districts could only be carried on with a pair of money-scales in hand; the coin of full weight which had been brought out at the Mint disappeared again as quickly as it had been issued: the established relation between gold and silver could not be sustained; no one was willing to rob himself by parting with it at that price. Even the King had been forced, on going to Holland, to pay a higher price for gold; otherwise he would have had no ready money with him. For in the monetary world there are conditions which are independent of all influences, be they government instructions or parliamentary resolutions. Payments in paper, which had already been brought into currency on a level with cash, were suddenly refused altogether. Montague says that 'whereas formerly the paper money was more than all the cash in England, at present no bill or note will pass in

¹ A letter of Montague says: 'the cry of setting up a new bank has broken the old one: the faction and party, which was unavoidable in such a struggle.'

payment, so that our silver is melting, our gold kept up or exported, and our paper cried down¹.

No one suffered so much as the King from this condition of things: he meanwhile had gone back to the Low Countries.

The menaces of the French were answered by the bombardment of some of their seaside places, and destruction of their magazines; still when the time came for the opening of the campaign, they were the first in the field, and took up excellent positions, Villeroi between the Scheldt and the Lys, Boufflers on the right bank of the Sambre. This would have embarrassed the allies and rendered their junction difficult; but the chief hindrance to every movement or enterprise was the fact that there was no money for the troops. The King's letters breathe a kind of despair on this point: if the Treasury sent him no money he could not act, he could undertake nothing against an enemy stronger than himself:—nay, he could not even keep his army together. He dreads mutiny and general desertion. 'If you cannot devise expedients,' he writes, 'to send contributions or procure credit, all is lost, and I must go to the Indies.'

The posture of affairs was made still more threatening by the fact that the French fleet had come from Toulon to Brest without being met by the English; and this the King attributed to the negligence of the Admiralty; but for this something decisive would have been achieved against them: the French corsairs had also struck some very successful blows at the Dutch merchantmen. On the back of this came also intelligence as to the dubious position of the Duke of Savoy; and then, very shortly after, tidings that he had deserted the alliance; this we shall presently have to refer to again. After so long a struggle it almost seemed as if the grand matter that had been taken in hand was likely to be ruined. This fear even appears in a letter of Shrewsbury, who was at the head of the government; if he clings to the hope that things may not go so far wrong, it is, he says, more because he trusts in fortune than from any solid grounds.

Though the upshot of the war certainly did not depend

¹ Letters of Montague in Sir T. Phillipps' Library, 29 May.

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simply and solely on the overcoming of financial difficulties, still it clearly was a matter of the highest importance for both military and political movements.

The capitalists of England, the old goldsmiths, thought that the only path of safety was the speedy summoning of Parliament, in order to recall the latest regulations and to give the debased money free currency: then would money once more flow freely. This was also pretty much the view of the new Land-Bank Company. In order to provide the payments due, it asked for powers to carry on its money-business with the debased coin. But the Treasury refused to receive payment in this money without leave from government; and the legal advisers of government denied that it had any right to give such permission. The King, if left to himself, would have been moved to accept the proposals; since it was all-important for him to get money, even with some drawback: a worse drawback than all would be the ruin which might otherwise be dreaded: the King would have even sanctioned a meeting of Parliament, if there were no other remedy¹. But his ministers resisted: they remarked that if people foresaw a change, the money would only disappear all the more quickly. Montague considered that the only remedy was the overthrow of the Land-Bank, which had aroused and fomented these expectations: if that project failed, money would soon come to the surface again.

They had found means to send the King £100,000, no very important sum, indeed, though under present circumstances a very welcome one; but it was far from being enough, and difficulties increased so fast that the King determined to send Bentinck to England to raise at least £200,000, which he needed absolutely to satisfy his troops.

The Earl of Portland first turned to the promoters of the Land-Bank, and they thought they could raise the sum without much trouble. But it soon appeared that they had much overrated their resources: they then had recourse to a

¹ 'I flatter myself, you will do everything that is possible to assemble the Parliament in June for the purpose of remedying this great evil (4 June, 1696).' Coxe, Shrewsbury Correspondence 118.

subscription, in which some great Jewish houses, such as that of Acosta, took part; but with all this the bank could raise the King no more than some £40,000. Or was it that the managers had no real wish to raise it? They felt no special eagerness to help the Whig government out of its perplexities. For government was, on its side, very unwilling to grant the bank the least favour or request: they did not like the Tories to have so much money at command.

Thence the Earl of Portland betook himself to the Whig institution, the royalist bank; but here too he must have expected to meet with obstacles. For they were offended at the favour shown to the Land-Bank, and were not altogether in flourishing circumstances: just lately they had been obliged to call up twenty per cent. from their shareholders. But the Directors considered how deeply their own interests were involved; the general interests of the party worked in with their own, and made them willing to help. A general meeting of the shareholders was called: after some hesitation they voted, by a majority of three to one, to undertake the task. The chief inducement was the promise on the part of the Treasury to make partial repayment in the first new-coined money to be issued: also they wished, under all circumstances, to secure the friendship of government.

Montague in his reports to the King cannot speak too highly of this decision of the bank: in spite of the many obstacles it had to meet, it had ventured all for the government: but, as he added, it expected that government would do as much for it in its difficulties as it had done for the state in its embarrassments. The King agreed. He thanked the bank for the great service it had done him, and declared himself disposed to return it.

And now how closely intertwined are the diverse elements of social and political life! Political ideas, with the regulation of the coin of the realm; the position of parties, with the money-market; and these again with the course of the war, and the situation of the European powers! As the Whigs drove their rivals the Tories out of the field, they at the same moment entered on a still closer community of interests with the King.

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But at this very moment they were unexpectedly attacked, thanks to the condition of things resulting from the conspiracy-trials. Let us give some attention to this affair; for never had the hostility of the two parties shown itself more bitter than on this occasion.

Among the Jacobites arrested in consequence of the conspiracy was a man closely connected with the English aristocracy, Sir John Fenwick. His wife was daughter of the first Earl of Carlisle, of the house of Howard. Better informed than others he determined to turn his defence into an attack on the now dominant party. Through the Earl of Devon he gave the King notice of the secret dealings which Shrewsbury and Russell, as well as Marlborough and Godolphin, had had with King James: they appeared to be to the full as guilty as he confessed himself to be.

The King was not altogether ignorant of these matters; but he had never wished to drag them fully into the light, and as soon as the traces of a conspiracy led into those regions he had hesitated to follow them farther. What struck him in the communication he now received was not so much the facts stated therein, as the men named—for it mentioned no names except those of men who stood near the throne: there was no mention of the Jacobites with whom Fenwick had lived, and whom he must have known¹. Little desirous of punishing the unfaithfulness of past years, and ever busy only with overcoming present difficulties, the King regarded the communication (which certainly came originally from France) as primarily an attempt to break up his government. Without investigating the charges, he showed the paper to Shrewsbury, whom it chiefly concerned, and assured him of his abiding and steadfast confidence.

Yet for all this Shrewsbury felt himself rudely shaken: he was afraid lest his enemies should base on it a parliamentary impeachment; and at once begged to be allowed to retire. The King on his return to open Parliament (October 20, 1696)

¹ William III to Shrewsbury, September 10, 1696: 'You will observe the sincerity of this honest man, who only accuses those in my service and not one of his own party.' Coxe, Shrewsbury Correspondence 145.

deemed it all-important to deal at once with this affair. On no account could he alienate from himself the party with which he governed.

Fenwick offered to make further disclosures to the King. This William could not refuse; but he deemed it not well to hear him without witnesses: otherwise, all who were conscious in their hearts of any past wrong-dealing would fancy themselves the subjects of the conversation, and might, with a view to their own safety, be easily induced to go into opposition. Only in the presence of the Archbishop, of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord-Keeper Somers, and some others, would William listen to the accused. But in this company Fenwick would make no disclosures, and insisted that he could only speak with the King in private; this the King absolutely refused. Then Fenwick retired, with a fearless confident bearing¹.

But just then his friends found a plan by which they hoped to save him. They persuaded one of the two witnesses who had appeared against him to go into hiding; so that, under the statute lately passed, no lawfully valid proof could be made out against him.

But if the Tories sought to save him the Whigs were as determined to destroy him. And as now he could not be touched by legal means, they made use of an extraordinary process—they brought to bear on him that parliamentary engine, a bill of attainder. In spite of the most vigorous Tory resistance—they called it a crying injustice—it was carried through. A new accusation, arising out of the late events—namely, that Fenwick had endeavoured to undermine the government—was added to the old charge of participation in the conspiracy. This was declared to be so serious a matter that it could not be left unpunished, even if complete information might chance to be missing: that in England there was no torture, no magistracy above the law, like the state-inquisition in Venice; but that this authority belonged here to the legislative power.

¹ Lord-Keeper Somers to the Duke of Shrewsbury: 'He refused to say anything, even so much as to explain or make certain his papers, or to tell what he reserved for the King, unless it might be allowed to tell it to the King himself. This the King absolutely refused.' Coxe, Shrewsbury Correspondence, part iii, ch. 2, p. 421.

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Bishop Burnet specially fought the Whig battle with these arguments; Parliament, the source of law, seemed to him above the forms of law. And so this form of procedure was adopted. The Commons were convinced that Fenwick's disclosures had been invented to throw the state into disorder: he was condemned by a large majority. In the Lords, where the connexion of things was better known, the minority was larger. This however could not save him: on the 22nd of January, 1696/7, Fenwick perished on the scaffold¹.

Shrewsbury henceforth withdrew from public business. Monmouth, who with good right had stood by the accused in order to strengthen his declaration, was sent to the Tower. The Whig scheme of government was not shaken by this event.

And a part of that scheme was the resumption of the war with all possible energy, even if it were in the end nothing but a step towards peace. For, as William III said, one must treat with France sword in hand. In his speech from the throne he also referred to the most pressing needs of state-economy: the completion of the change in the coinage, the restoration of credit, the making up of the deficit in last year's money-votes. He specially remarked that the honour of Parliament was deeply pledged to this last.

The two Houses replied in the key struck by the King, and adopted corresponding resolutions. The Commons voted the money which the King asked for the coming year, without making any reduction; but this time they would not raise it by loans as in the previous year. For loans, in the existing condition of finance, must have caused fresh embarrassments; it was agreed they should impose such taxes as would bring in the whole amount required within the twelvemonth.

To set the money market right, and to stay the confusion in the coinage, was of all matters the most pressing. And this was accomplished by a very simple expedient. The order was issued that the price of coin should depend on its weight; but that, for ordinary traffic, this price should be fixed at a

¹ Burnet, *Own Times* ii. 182, very fully given. It may be seen from his remarks and in Ralph how much opposition he met with.

level lower than that which the Treasury would pay, were the clipped money taken to it to be recoinced. The difference amounted to ten per cent.; so great a premium that coin actually began to be paid in in great quantities. Even zealous members of the opposition like Seymour appeared; he tendered £10,000 for recoinage. A similar bonus was also voted for the delivery of silver coin at the Mint, and stimulated the flow. And now, for the first time, the business of recoining the currency was carried on so successfully that enough was done to supply the needs of commerce.

To cover the grants voted to the King the year before, it was agreed to continue a number of taxes, which had been voted only for a term of years, so long as might be necessary for this purpose. The two millions and a half originally undertaken by the Land Bank must be raised some other way.

Just at this moment a proposal was made to enable the Royal Bank to raise the money by prolonging its patent and allowing it to invite new subscriptions.

The Bank did not make this proposal itself; it was suggested to it by the House of Commons, after it had procured authentic information, by an examination of the books, as to the position of its debtor and creditor account. The shareholders met, and professed themselves ready to undertake whatever was desirable for the public interest, provided it were not prejudicial to themselves. They then made their demands, which were examined by the House of Commons, and accepted with a few modifications. These were, in short:—the Bank to exist till 1710, and after that date not to be abolished without a year's notice; no rival bank to be allowed; its capital to be raised by new subscriptions from three millions to five; four-fifths of this sum to be paid in Exchequer bills, and the remainder in notes.

Exchequer bills, for the secure realisation of which some fresh measures were farther adopted, once more rose in credit through this transaction. This intimate connexion with the Treasury evidently gave its position to the Royal Bank, which was now revived, and for the first time firmly established. No more was said about the Land Bank. The financial aims of the Whigs were now entirely dominant.

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And to this end the goodwill of the nation also helped; the people readily submitted to the burdens needful for the coming year, as prescribed by the House of Commons: these were a poll-tax, which varied in different classes, and an income-tax, which, under certain circumstances, rose to fifteen per cent. The Whig policy at this moment was also the policy of the nation.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PEACE OF RYSWICK.

WHILE England was working her way through these crises of party-strife and of the money-market to a thorough readiness for war, she had suffered a heavy loss in one of her allies, as we have already said. The French King had the good fortune to detach from the Alliance one of its most important members. While Victor Amadeus had been taking part in the renewed alliance of the summer of 1695, he had already become secretly faithless to it: during a pilgrimage to Loretto the next spring (in fulfilment of a vow made at Embrun in his illness) the foundations of his alliance with France were laid through mediation of the Pope: it was definitely carried into effect at Turin in August 1696.

The confusion and difficulties through which England was passing had contributed to the result, in so far as they had caused the withdrawal of the Mediterranean fleet; the feeling common to the Catholic world—the sense of oppression under the predominance of Protestantism—may have also been a motive. But the main cause certainly was the determination of Louis XIV to grant the Duke those concessions which he demanded, and to free him from the restraint of the occupation of Pinerolo and Casale, a pair of handcuffs which the Duke found almost unendurable. In 1695, in order to avoid being overwhelmed in his lines in the Low Countries, the King put Casale into Victor's hands, after a pretended siege, in which they did not hesitate to shed blood, rather than let the Allies suspect any preconcerted arrangement. In 1696 the plan became more comprehensive; Italy was to be neutralised: the King desired to be safe against any communication

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between Waldenses, refugees, and the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts of France; he wanted to be relieved from all anxiety on that side. For this purpose he yielded so far as to give up to the Duke not only all the districts and places torn from him during the war, but even the fortress of Pinerolo, which two generations before Richelieu had won for Louis XIII, in order that he might for ever subjugate Upper Italy to France. This treaty may be regarded as the foundation of the independence of Piedmont: it was one of the most remarkable results of the great Alliance against France, which now felt itself obliged to abandon one of its great positions. For the Alliance itself however and its other objects the defection of Savoy was most ruinous. The neutrality of Italy, after the sudden transference of the Duke from the one camp to the other, was inevitable: Louis XIV could now draft 30,000 of his best troops from Italy into the Low Countries, and bring them into the field against the Allies.

This agreement with Savoy did not enable him to indulge in the hope of attaining his original aims, as against Great Britain and Germany; still it became quite clear in consequence that the Allies must at once abandon all hope of overcoming him. Both sides were now bound to think more seriously than ever about peace.

In the earliest years of the war, when France was preponderant, William had refused all negotiation. In the next years, 1693, 1694, proposals for negotiation were exchanged in profound secrecy through trusty emissaries; but had ended in the French declaring their conviction that William wanted no peace. 'Certainly no,' he replied, 'in your way; but certainly yes, on good and acceptable conditions.'—But then what could these be?

The great Alliance aimed at restoring the ecclesiastical and political state of Europe to the conditions fixed at the Peace of Westphalia and at that of the Pyrenees; and this, too, according to the interpretation insisted on by the Germans and Spaniards. All the encroachments of that development of power which characterised the government of Louis XIV must be given up, and the claims of the house of Austria to the Spanish succession sustained.

One cannot positively assert that, considering the original strength of the allied powers and the King, these objects were unattainable: even in England there still existed a widespread conviction that affairs abroad must be restored to what they had been forty years before; but a long and perilous war must have preceded the restoration, and many changes must have been inevitable. The defection of Savoy made the plan as good as impossible: and it would be absolutely so, were other allies also to follow this example.

Hereon arose in the minds of King William and the Whig statesmen around him a feeling that they must reduce their demands on Louis XIV to a far more moderate compass. The first opening of negotiations on this footing dates from the time when financial difficulties, working in with great party-antagonisms, made peace doubly desirable for England. A letter of Shrewsbury, dated July 1696, tells us that were it possible shortly to restore the former state of Europe, England ought certainly to be ready to stake much for such an object; but that this did not depend on winning a town or two more or less; that it required consideration 'whether any less design be worth the hazarding all'¹.

King William replied in the same strain, simply expressing his fear lest the allies might not consent to such conditions as France offered. One can see how the main lines of a change in England's political position are sketched out in this interchange of ideas. Peace with France seemed necessary, and a lowering of the original demands inevitable, if peace was to be had at all; but England was far indeed from wishing to abandon the allies on this ground. The King said it might, to be sure, be declared to them that England would support them no longer, if they rejected the offers made; but that this would endanger the whole alliance, which England again could not do without. Shrewsbury stated his opinion that concessions not altogether satisfactory to them would bind them the more effectually to England, as they would consequently all the more require her support.

The chief efforts of England were now directed to try and

¹ Shrewsbury to the King, July 21/31, 1696; in Coxe, *Shrewsbury Correspondence*, 129.

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compel the French to make such concessions as the Emperor and the Empire might be persuaded to accept. With the Emperor's knowledge, but not with his participation, the secret negotiations between the plenipotentiaries were resumed. And when we consider the origin of the war, we must deem it a great result that the French declared themselves ready to give back the annexations they had made since the Peace of Nimuegen, 'Reunions' which they had wished to attach for ever to their kingdom: they included therein even Straszburg. Even Luxemburg they were willing to abandon, and Lorraine they would restore, though with a certain reservation. They did not refuse to return to the basis of the Peace of Westphalia; still the declaration which had been made at Nimuegen concerning its stipulations was to hold good, and both taken together were to form the basis for a new settlement. Callières, the French plenipotentiary, came to an understanding on these points with the Dutch negotiators, Dijkvelt, who was also William's commissioner, and Boreel. It was agreed, with the Emperor's approval, that farther definite negotiations should be undertaken openly, under the mediation of Sweden. The Swedish ambassador, Lilieroth, had already arrived at the Hague for this purpose.

But in all this there was, however, one condition presupposed: the great interests of England herself must above all be watched over: but then of these the most important clearly was the recognition of the king she had chosen for herself. Every one was convinced that, after all that had happened, Louis XIV would at length concede this point. Even James II himself, who had attached himself to the La Trappe community, had declared that while William lived he would make no fresh attempt to recover the throne of England. How indeed could peace otherwise have been concluded at all? But, according to the views held by Louis XIV, this recognition of William was just the price to be paid for the peace now actually coming into existence: he held back from giving his consent to it.

The Dutch had heard that the French envoy in Sweden had not hesitated to speak of William as king, and expressed

their astonishment that Callières still steadily withheld the title. Nay, he even made some difficulty about declaring before the mediating envoy that this recognition should take place if the peace were concluded: for he felt, rightly enough, that in the use of this title was involved a kind of recognition by his master, which once given could not well be recalled again. Dijkvelt and Boreel told him the Republic must insist on this; for it concerned their chief ally, and they could tolerate no uncertainty in the matter: they let fall the remark that all the remaining points depended on it. In the embarrassment which rose from the fact that the declaration of the Republic could not be refused, and yet would not, under the circumstances, be granted in binding form, the following procedure, highly characteristic of the age, was hit on.

The 10th of February, 1697, was the day on which the preliminaries were to be communicated to the mediating power. Callières, who had come for this purpose to the Hague, drove with Dijkvelt to the lodgings of Lilieroth, the ambassador of Sweden, the mediating power: Lilieroth laid his authorisation before him. Then Callières dictated to him the points in the preliminaries on which all were agreed, with special omission of the clause as to the eventual recognition of William III; Lilieroth wrote them down; then, with paper in hand, all three went on to Boreel, who was in bed with the gout. Boreel remembered that he missed one article agreed on, namely, that William III should be recognised as King of Great Britain directly peace was concluded, without limitation or condition. This Callières admitted; and it might have seemed enough that the point was agreed to orally. But this even was not enough for the caution of the French at that time. When Lilieroth asked for pen and ink, to insert the remaining article, Callières rose, said that his work was done, and went out¹. Orders to this effect had been sent him from Versailles. They would not let Callières repeat to the Swedish envoy the

¹ Report of Feb. 10: 'Je me suis levé et j'ai dit que ma fonction étoit finie, et je m'en retournerois chez moi.' The sight of the French reports on this Congress has been of the highest value to me. On them, and on some passages in the Correspondence between William and Heinsius depends all that I can now add to a previous account given in my French History, vol. iv.

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declaration he had made to the Dutch plenipotentiaries; he was only allowed to say that it had been made: far from giving it in writing or even from dictating it, he was not even to be present when it was put on paper. From among the gradations of phraseology they chose the weakest that could be found.

Thus, with much hesitation and intentional looseness, the representative of hereditary and absolute monarchy in the world began to recognise the new kingdom of England, which rested not on hereditary right, but on the choice of Parliament. But what a struggle still lay before these two forms of political life! At this time they entered into the conditions of a first approximation.

William III now became doubly anxious for a general congress, with a view to a definite peace. But this was no easy matter. The Emperor would not consent to it till William assured him that if there were a longer delay such steps would be taken by the two sea-powers as might be still less satisfactory to him.

The Congress of Ryswick opened May 9, 1697, with the subtly devised though in the long run tedious and bizarre formalities of the seventeenth century.

But from the very first declarations of the Imperialists and French the whole extent of the difference between them came to light.

Emperor and Empire were not willing to allow that the Peace of Westphalia, together with the points farther settled at Nimuegen, and understood as the French took them, should be laid down as the basis; they claimed that it should be entirely refashioned, and drawn out in accordance with the execution-law agreed on at Nuremberg; they also demanded the complete restoration of Alsace, and in particular of the ten cities which had been Austrian of old; also the re-establishment of Lorraine in its past integrity: they even claimed compensation for damage incurred in the late war¹.

We must not forget that the German soldiery had certainly played the best part throughout the whole of the long war.

¹ Actes de la paix de Ryswick ii. 34.

They had been the chief helpers in the emancipation of Great Britain from her subservience to France: they formed the bulk of the troops which withstood the great French armies in the campaigns of the Low Countries; they had saved the Upper Rhine; and had had the chief hand in keeping straight the affairs of Piedmont. It was a sense of the undoubted service they had rendered to the common cause that now made them claim the restoration of their ancient Western frontier.

If, on the other hand, one observes how strong the French, who refused to listen to a word on this subject, still seemed in the field;—that, beside the two Netherland armies, they had a third under Catinat, and were in a position to undertake a siege which William III and the allies could not hinder;—one sees clearly how very far from an agreement the parties still were.

In vain did the Dutch propose an armistice: the French plenipotentiaries had previously hinted that it was possible, but now they would not listen to it. They declared they could make no armistice unless they were previously sure of peace¹. They even hesitated about signing a preliminary proposal for a Peace, which the Dutch thought might be communicated to the two armies, and prevent any further shedding of blood; they gave it as their ground for this, that in this document the recognition of the King of England was contained, and that this recognition was in fact the price at which peace would have to be bought.

But as to this point, which roused the strongest resistance in the different negotiations which went on secretly at the Hague parallel with the open discussions at Ryswick, no understanding had as yet been come to. Great as was still the importance of the recognition, yet neither William nor the English people were satisfied merely with the simple expression of it.

In spite of all their mishaps the Jacobites were still very

¹ 'Ils vient, qu'au lieu qu'ils ne pensoient à assurer la trêve, sans assurer la paix, nous n'admettions point de parti, qu'on d'abord n'assurast entièrement la paix.'
(French despatch, June 29)

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strong in England. The enquiries arising out of the late attempt had led to no important result; no trial of any Jacobite leader ensued, not even of those who were connected with Melfort: of those arrested and accused some really knew very little; the most dangerous men had been helped to escape; Fenwick, who perhaps could have told them something had been silenced in death; the Melfort party existed as before. Still less were the compounders affected by the confessions made, or shaken in their position. Their numbers and importance had been great enough to give the French court sufficient ground for making its last attempt at invasion. A declaration in the terms originally agreed on, running in the name of King James or his son, could still provoke great excitement in England, and, under different circumstances, might tend to produce even more serious results¹.

One of the foremost motives towards peace on the side of King William and his friends was the fact that they tried by an agreement with the French king to overcome this danger; for, though they did not know individually the persons implicated, still they felt the general effects every hour, and in England itself were powerless to remove it. Without French help the Jacobites were harmless; they could get fresh energy only from France.

It is not directly stated in connexion with this subject that William had been induced to wish for peace through his fears lest another attempt like that from which he had so lately and so narrowly escaped should be made on him; but the general organisation of the country and its home-tranquillity were endangered by these relations between French and Jacobites, with which the conspiracy had also been connected: he must put an end to all this.

But a bare recognition would not be enough for this purpose. In the secret conferences William's representatives

¹ In a paper, '*Estat de l'Angleterre, 1696*,' written some months after the plot, we find it positively stated that the party hostile to the King had somewhat increased. On June 17 the French plenipotentiaries report that they have been summoned '*de nous desister de la difficulté, que nous avons formée de l'expression du roi Jacques nommément dans la renonciation générale, à pouvoir assister contre le Prince d'Orange aucun de ses ennemis.*'

pressed for more definite promises. The French were willing to accept the formula usual between contracting princes—that neither potentate should support the enemies of the other: but this did not satisfy William: he insisted on an express engagement that Louis XIV would not support King James, directly or indirectly.

But when the French refused this King William became very anxious and uneasy¹. He thought he discerned that the more he drew towards them the more they drew off; their design apparently was to await the results of the campaign, which, in the state of the contending parties, might well turn out to their advantage; they might then perhaps altogether back out of the preliminaries; and he would find himself deluded. He was determined not to let the matter come to this point; if nothing else would serve, he would once more resolutely and promptly resume the war.

So also did his friends and the home-government feel; and this was generally the prevalent opinion in the nation. No one desired a peace which would leave to the Jacobite party the means of carrying on a secret war; and Louis XIV was therefore pressed for a precise declaration that he would support no such proceedings. If negotiations were finally broken off on this point, William III could reckon with certainty on the complete and energetic support of England; and this had already become possible, thanks to the solution of his most serious financial embarrassments in 1697. He declared at the Hague that he could not make peace without this promise; he broke off the secret conferences. In order to see how he stood, he determined to enter on a more direct negotiation, which should also have in it a threatening look; this he opened from the camp, whither Heinsius came to visit him. Thus far things were in his favour, that the Emperor and the Empire had not yet agreed to the preliminaries. It was possible, though it might be difficult, to begin again with those great plans which had specially guided the war in its beginnings.

¹ To Heinsius, 11/21 May, 1697: 'Het is my leet, dat de Fianse to geen still-stand van wapenen wellen koomen.' 30 May: 'Ik sie dat de Franse tegenwoedig geen vrede en begeren.'

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So affairs stood when a meeting at the advanced posts of the two armies was arranged between Bentinck, Earl of Portland, who still had the King's full confidence, and the French marshal Boufflers, who was on most friendly terms with him. This took place on July 8, 1697, in an orchard at Brockem, near Hall.

Bentinck repeated William's assertion, that he would stand firmly by the preliminaries, on condition that justice were done him in the matter of his private demands. The chief of these was the acceptance of the proposed article, that Louis XIV would not support King James directly or indirectly; that he would rather even banish that Prince from his territories, seeing that his presence there seemed to foster conspiracy. But hereby not only was the demand made by Louis XIV that the Jacobite refugees should be allowed to return to England refused, but, on the contrary, it was proposed that hereafter French Protestants should be allowed to reside in the Principality of Orange, which was to be restored to William III. He made Bentinck demand a definite declaration on this point: nay, he said he would decide by the result whether he should accept peace or carry on determined war: he would bear with no lengthy negotiations¹.

In great negotiations, be they ever so comprehensive, there is always some one point on which all the rest depend. Thus, in this case, the reply Louis XIV might give as to the first of the demands laid before him was to be decisive as between peace and war. If negative, William would once more have taken up arms; he must have done so, for England would not have been satisfied with any settlement which did not include a definite security on this point. But if it were affirmative, Louis XIV might then reckon on being able to carry his points at the Congress of Ryswick. William had taken care to let him be assured that he would induce the Emperor and the Empire as well as the Spaniards to accept the preliminaries; and that, failing that, he would renounce all connexion with them.

¹ So Louis XIV tells the plenipotentiaries: '*Bentinck s'est expliqué que son maître attend l'éclaircissement de mes intentions sur ces trois articles, pour conclure la paix, ou pour rompre les conférences*' (11th July).

We know the reasons which made peace desirable, nay even indispensable, for Louis XIV also. The answer he sent was in the main very conciliatory, though it also contained a certain element of hesitation.

In talking with Bentinck, Boufflers had touched on the question of the dismissal of James II from France, and the matter had been discussed on both sides¹; but the King absolutely rejected the demand. For surely it must have wounded his pride to learn that they expected him to forbid a Prince, who had sought asylum with him, to sojourn in his country. He even refused to promise to withhold his support direct or indirect that could not be reconciled with his honour; the honour of a king could not endure even the slightest stain. Still, on the other hand, he acknowledged that William must be secured against Jacobite plottings; and offered to strengthen his promise not to support the enemies of William by the additional words 'without any exception': so that James II, though not expressly named, should in fact be unmistakeably included. He also added that he would abet no rebellion in England, nor any factions nor cabals in that country².

This overture, which Boufflers at a second meeting communicated to William's plenipotentiaries, did in fact bring about the peace. It was not in exact form what had been demanded, but in substance it was enough. It was noticed that the phrase 'without any exception' was even preferable to the actual naming of King James, as it also included the Prince of Wales. Even Shrewsbury did not stand out for the actual mention of the name, if the article were so drawn

¹ We first learn from Bentinck's despatches about a later talk with Boufflers, and his first audience with Louis XIV, that the Marshal asked 'where did the English wish James II to be sent to?' and that Bentinck replied 'to Rome or Modena.' and that then Boufflers asked whether Avignon would not do just as well. Grimblot, *Letters of William III*, etc. i. 164, 169, 170

² I may here complete the quotations in 'Grimblot's Letters from the originals. According to a letter dated July 15, and addressed to the Plenipotentiaries at the Hague, Louis XIV expressed himself thus to Boufflers. 'de promettre, que je n'assisterais directement ny indirectement les ennemis du prince d'Orange sans aucune exception, et d'adjuster, comme le Sr. Bentinck l'a demandé, que je m'engage à ne favoriser en quelque manière que ce soit, les cabales, intrigues secrètes, factions et rebellions, qui pourroient survenir en Angleterre.'

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as to make all escape from it impossible. And this in fact was done. One grand result, which went far beyond the bare recognition of William III, was this, that the hostility of the French crown towards him, which had hitherto been the very breath of life to his antagonists, was now to be abandoned, under very solemn and binding expressions. The two Princes exchanged friendly declarations:—and yet with a difference—Louis XIV only expressed his ‘high respect’; William his ‘admiration and veneration.’

And now it became possible to come to an understanding on both the other points. The demand for a general amnesty, under the terms of which the adherents of James II might have been restored to their possessions, was dropped by Louis XIV, when William represented to him that such a stipulation would infringe the rights of Parliament: and certainly an almost unendurable agitation would have sprung up in England, had so many adversaries of the crown come back in consequence of an agreement with a foreign power. And now, as Louis XIV gave up this point, the previous stipulation became doubly valuable; but he had also a farther condition to arrange, and William in turn could not refuse to consider his convenience.

If the French refugees had originally hoped to get back to their own country through the peace, the upshot of the appeal to arms had not been such as to render it possible for this claim even to be put forward. All they now looked for was to find a refuge in the Principality of Orange, which was once more to be made completely independent. But this Louis XIV was not minded to concede: for the adjoining French provinces, in which Protestantism had once struck root, would be disturbed by it, and could no longer be governed in the manner now established. So he made it a condition in the restoration of the Principality to William as Prince and King, that he should allow no Frenchman to take up his abode there except with the foreknowledge and approval of the French government. William III had in reality agreed to this, without the knowledge of any one except Portland¹.

¹ Instruction of Louis XIV to Tallard: ‘Le maréchal de Boufflers et le Cte. de Portland convinrent que le Prince d’Orange donneroit sa parole secrète à S. M. de

We can see how the two powers came forward to meet each other; and how each respected the position of the other. Louis XIV desists from trying to restore to England the adherents of James II, in whose name he had more than once taken up arms; and thereupon William III agrees not to allow the French refugees, who had helped to win him his throne, to settle down again, though it were but on the hem of ancient France. England, Protestant and parliamentary, France, Catholic and monarchical, having once for all settled matters together in fair fight, now agreed to do nothing to endanger the domestic stability of each other.

This understanding come to, William III, in accordance with his promise, turned all his attention to the task of persuading the rest of the Allies to accept the preliminaries.

How could the Spaniards have resisted, seeing that at this moment they became more than ever aware of their enemy's superiority! One of their most important stations for trade in America had been taken by the French; in the peninsula itself Barcelona, one of their chief cities, which once before had been saved by the English, had fallen into the hands of their enemies, who were both better armed, and better acquainted with the art of war.

Emperor and Empire both hesitated to give way. but affairs so stood that they fell into irrevocable loss even by their delay. The preliminaries had given them a choice between the restoration of Straszburg, or an indemnification for the loss of it by an equivalent. But Louis XIV had declared he would no longer be bound by this offer, if the preliminaries agreed on between him, William, and the Dutch, were not accepted by them within a definite time. There was not a soul in the whole Empire but would have preferred Straszburg to any equivalent; but when the ultimatum was being drawn up they could not make up their minds to abandon the rest of Alsace; while they of course accepted Straszburg, they also at the same moment claimed the restoration of the ten cities to the position they had held in the

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year 1673. It was a thing clearly much to be desired for the Empire, and thoroughly well grounded in right, but at the time absolutely unattainable. The French were prepared beforehand for it; they hastened, as Straszburg was all-important for them also, to declare the conditional acceptance to be a refusal of the alternative, and announced in their King's name that he himself was no longer bound by the alternative; that he would give, nay even augment, the equivalent, but that he would hold Straszburg henceforth and for ever¹. This the mediator certainly had not expected; he showed that he was both astonished and distressed at it; above all, William III was most deeply affected by the arbitrary temper it revealed. For the preliminaries gave the French no right of receding at pleasure from the alternatives agreed on. William had always promised the German princes that he would restore Straszburg. He lost no time in remonstrating: Bentinck held another conference with Boufflers on the subject; when it led to nothing, the King even thought of recommencing hostilities on that account². But first, he could scarcely have been able to reckon on the warm co-operation of the English nation on this point³, and, next in importance, the Dutch, and specially Amsterdam, were decidedly against it. Not only was the need of peace much felt there, but people were also influenced by the advantages which a commercial treaty, secretly offered by the French, was likely to produce. Official notice was given to the Pensionary, to the effect that he would be going against the mind of the worshipful the Burgomasters of Amsterdam, if arms (which the French also threatened to take up) were again resorted to for this point: it seemed to them inevitable; Straszburg must be left in the French King's hands⁴.

¹ Déclaration, etc. Actes de la paix de Ryswick iii. 48.

² William III to the Earl of Portland, Loo, Sept. 2, 1697, 8 o'clock in the evening. Grumblot, Lettres 103

³ Calhères says — He would not venture to return to England 'avec la résolution de continuer la guerre pour une affaire qui les touche aussi peu.'

⁴ Heinsius to King William, 4, Sept. 'Bays, qui s'en alarma, vint me trouver pour me dire que si la continuation de la guerre paraissait être probable, cela s'écartait des vues des Messieurs les bourgmestres d'Amsterdam, qui pour ne pas

The German plenipotentiaries were grievously perturbed: no one pronounced so fiercely against it as Schmettau the Brandenburger. But with Savoy gone, Spain forced to yield, England satisfied in her particular demands, and now even Holland forbidding it, it was impossible to resume the war; King William remarked that it would put the Empire into a hopeless position¹; he even advised them to accept the equivalent. After the sea powers and Spain had signed the Peace, Emperor and Empire could not hesitate long about joining in, under existing conditions. But even when they did this (October 31, 1697) another new difference came up after all, and seemed likely to spoil everything. It aroused all the passions of Protestantism to find that the Emperor and the French King had agreed that, in all the districts to be restored to the Empire, the Catholic religion should be left in possession of all privileges and advantages it had enjoyed under French rule. The sympathy of the English Parliament, which the imperial interests would never have aroused, would perhaps have been enlisted in this more religious question. But William III remembered that this must lead to a religious war, which they would scarcely be able to face with success. Austria and France would hold together here; Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Saxony, would go with either France or Austria; Holland would stand aloof as a neutral. Under these conditions the Protestants would but damage themselves by making further objections: he even, as a member of the German Bund, did not venture to mix himself up with this new quarrel.

And so this Peace was made.

But its stipulations fell far below the expectations which the conclusion and renewal of the alliances had naturally encouraged in the Emperor and the Empire. The true cause of this was the fact that the interest of the maritime powers, which had been bound up with their own by the

courir de chances croyaient indispensable qu'on acceptait l'équivalent offert en compensation de Strassbourg.' *Sintema de Grovestin, Histoire des luttes, etc* 620

¹ October 27, to Heinsius 'Is het klaer te sien, in what confuse en desolate staet het ryck sal werden gebiaht, 'twelck my niet weynigh chagrineet'

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war, was separated from theirs by the peace. The English got the recognition of their crown as it now stood under their altered constitution; the Dutch likewise obtained an advantageous treaty of commerce from France, and this too at a time when that power might at any moment have recovered its ascendancy in the field: not till Holland had secured this did she seriously think of peace. William III would certainly have been glad enough at least to have given the refugees an asylum at Orange; and it had been a point of honour with him to restore Straszburg to the Empire. But his first duty was to secure his own crown and country; and that he might achieve this, his main point, he gave up all secondary aims. Withal it must be remembered that the alliance with William III had been of infinite value to the Empire. Louis XIV, far from forcing them to resign their claims on the 'Reunions' (the districts occupied by him since the Peace of Nimuegen), as he had wished, was obliged to make up his mind to restore by far the greatest part of them. It was the first permanent step towards the restoration of the integrity and security of the Empire, which had suffered so much in the course of the century. Although the Protestant interest in Germany itself was a loser, still, through the secure settlement of the Protestant monarchy in England, a powerful check was given to the forward movement of Catholicism, and to the dangers which, but a few years before, had everywhere threatened the Reformed confession. The firm opposition offered by the English monarchy to the predominance of France stood like an immoveable bulwark between that power and Germany.

The Prince of Orange, who was formerly spoken of contemptuously as the little Lord of Breda, had won himself a position, in the presence of which the mightiest monarch the Western world had seen for many a century was compelled to give way.

The audience given by William III to the French plenipotentiaries on November 9, 1697, before they left the Hague, and after the peace had been signed, is significant as showing the relation—and this relation at that time decided the fate of Europe—in which the two powers stood towards one another.

They had been reminded that in Holland the King was

not lord and master, and did not wish to seem to be so: they drove as plainly as possible to his quarters, but with three carriages; they entered together; he received them bare-headed. Harlay, the chief among them, saluted him with an address, in which he combined the praise of William with the most respectful reverence for Louis XIV, whose name he always mentioned first: he considered he said all that William could desire, when he assured him that he had won the high esteem and good-will of his master—the former by his conduct of the war, the latter by the part he had taken in the pacification of Christendom. William listened attentively, then expressed his gratification that peace had been made between the two crowns—he chose this expression so as not to be obliged to name either before the other—and that he had come to a good understanding with King Louis.

He allowed himself to drop into a more detailed conversation with Callières, who had been longest engaged in the negotiations, and who did not deny that his opinion had been that the King had no wish for peace, but would have liked war far better. William remarked that he had fought in longer wars, but none so bloody as this had been; such large armies had never before been seen opposed in the field: the army which the great Condé commanded at Senef would in this war have only formed a division. Callières said the late war had shown what strength France, under such a King as Louis XIV, could set on foot. William replied that he had learnt that but too well: he wished now, with advancing years, for nothing but the continuance of peace, which was necessary for the world, above all for the land of his birth, which had suffered untold evils, and towards which he was under the greatest obligations. That he had become a foe to Louis XIV was, he declared, the sport of destiny: he felt that he had never been wanting in personal respect towards him¹; he now

¹ 'En parlant des engagements où il s'était trouvé contre V M., il les attribue toujours à son sort et à sa destinée, comme s'il eut voulu s'en excuser, et il ajouta, qu'au moins dans ce qui étoit personnel à un si grand roi il n'avoit jamais manqué à rien' So runs the common memoir of 'Mss les plénipotentiaires,' Harlay, Callières and Crecy, 12 Nov. There is also a welcome confidential letter by Callières in the Library at the Arsenal, addressed to the Marquise d'Uxelle, 12 Nov., 1697, which has been translated by Gimblot, Letters i. 134.

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asked for his friendship, and wished to deserve it. It made some impression on the plenipotentiaries that William did not appear even to notice the eulogy they had pronounced on him. They also found that he spoke well, always choosing the simplest words, and saying neither too much nor too little. When they returned to the antechamber, which had meanwhile filled with people, they were astonished to see none of the splendour answering to the wealth of the country and the court of a mighty prince.

BOOK XXI.

THE LATER YEARS OF WILLIAM III. A.D. 1697-1702.



WE can, in a general way, draw a distinction between two different kinds of Treaties of Peace.

There are but few of them that for any length of time have modified the leading subjects of contention. Such have been in the sixteenth century the religious Peace of Augsburg, and the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis between Spain and France; in the seventeenth the corresponding Peace of Westphalia, and that of the Pyrenees (for although a new and important subject of contention sprung out of the latter, still it was in reality a new difficulty, and one which depended on a very distant eventuality); in the eighteenth the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris, and even those of Hubertsburg and Kainardji; in the nineteenth the Acts of the Congress of Vienna, and what directly preceded it.

In the crises which ended with these Treaties of Peace, the contending powers had once more strained their strength to the uttermost: consequently the settlements which followed always brought after them a long time of quiet, and contained the germs of new developments.

Among great pacifications of this kind we must not count the Peace of Ryswick. It is one of those treaties which mark the completion of a considerable stage in the onward progress of affairs, but do not indicate their full end. As the treaties of Aachen and Nimuegen correspond to the development of the power of Louis XIV at the very epoch of its rise, so at Ryswick we see the first clear appearance of the resistance it encountered. We must not treat these conventions of the second class as mere truces; rather, the contracting parties are quite in earnest in securing themselves in the position which the treaties give them; they do their utmost to develop still more their home and foreign affairs from the point they have reached; until at last it becomes plainly impossible for them to rest satisfied with their position: then the unsettled questions come once more to the front, and destroy the connexions lately formed.

CHAPTER I.

RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND AFTER THE PEACE. THE PARTITION TREATIES.

THE Peace of Ryswick had one direct result of the utmost importance. England now stood by the side of France, as independent, and as legitimate a power as her neighbour. The further combinations in the development of European relations would depend on the attitude which the two powers—the two princes—henceforth might assume towards one another; and whether they came to any fresh understandings or not.

Over all public affairs at this time there brooded the forecast of a coming commotion. Charles II of Spain could not live much longer: he had no offspring; and consequently the succession to the greatest inheritance the West had ever seen must soon be vacant. The two powers which claimed it showed plainly enough that they clung to their respective pretensions. In his treaty with Victor Amadeus Louis XIV had originally inserted an article in which the idea of bartering Savoy for Milan (which would in that case fall in to him) appears: this was an object of French politics in old and later times alike. In the negotiations with the maritime powers he expressed his willingness to hand over the Spanish Netherlands to the Elector of Bavaria, so as to guarantee the security of the United Provinces; speaking just as if his right of inheritance were indubitable. But, on the other side, the Emperor had brought up that stipulation in the great Alliance, in which the rights of the house of Austria to the succession were solemnly recognised: thereon he based the proposal that the younger Archduke, to whom it would fall, should be escorted

to Spain by the maritime powers, in order to uphold his rights. King William told the imperial envoys that the vacancy had not yet occurred ; and that, as things stood between the powers a war to maintain the Austrian claims could not be thought of. He also made haste in consequence to conclude peace, for fear the King of Spain should suddenly die and make the settlement impossible.

It was likewise a piece of good fortune that the powers laid down their arms before this event again aroused the antagonism between their great interests. It was at any rate possible to attempt to prevent a universal conflagration by an agreement which all might be willing to tolerate. We may conclude, from the position taken up by William III, that this was his idea.

And even before this he would certainly have been glad to smooth over another difference, which was less prominent, but was of all the greater importance in that it affected England and himself as well.

Louis XIV had recognised Prince William of Orange as King of England, but not the succession as it had been, or might be, settled in England. He had promised not to support William's foes, either secretly or openly, and was doubtless willing to keep his word : but he did not think fit on this ground to break off his friendship with the Stuarts ; their claim to the throne he had not given up for ever. He treated their adherents with his wonted favour and graciousness.

We soon see how great still was the gulf between the two courts, when diplomatic relations were again resumed, and Bentinck, Earl of Portland, the man who had been most active in the Peace negotiations, was accredited as the English Ambassador to the French court. He says that his blood boiled in his veins when he found at that court men whom the English government knew to be its bitterest foes—men like Middleton, and even Berwick, whom every one regarded as one of the authors of the late plot. In conversation with Boufflers, he reminded him that he might have hoped, from their first interview, to find King James dismissed from St. Germain's ; that even now this was still necessary, else every one would believe that Louis XIV was going to support him in future also. How

was friendship possible between the two Kings, if the one tolerated men near him, and even in his service, who had tried to assassinate the other? He was so full of the grievance, that, in a preliminary audience granted him by Louis XIV, he mooted both points. But he could not carry even the smaller of them. As to the conspiracy, Louis XIV replied that he surely would not be asked to trouble himself about the English trials, in which the names of the accomplices in the plots had been mentioned : that would be utterly unworthy of a sovereign. Berwick—whose name had been specially brought up—had been sent to England under his commission to make preparations for a recognised operation in war. As to the demand for the removal of King James, he even expressed his amazement at it; for he had certainly already declared that he would not do it: they must be content with his word of honour, which he had given, to the effect that he would not support him; but eject from his realm a prince who had sought asylum at his court—never. With this he dismissed Bentinck with marked coldness. William III did not think well to press a point not stipulated for in the Treaty of Peace: he instructed Bentinck in future only to mention the subject if an occasion came up¹.

Hereon Bentinck made his state-entry into Paris on the 9th of March, 1698. People were amazed to think that this was indeed the ambassador of that very prince whose effigy but two years before had been dragged through the streets, and publicly burned on the Pont-Neuf. Bentinck tells us he had actually heard such remarks made: we also read of it elsewhere²; it was quite a common saying. But at court no more was said about it, as the King, when Bentinck had changed his tone, treated him cordially. At the public audience, which took place the next day (March 10), the King even spoke first—a thing never before done at any state-reception. For etiquette in his case was not merely a thing to be strictly attended to; he even sometimes purposely broke through it to give stronger expression to his sentiments. He said he was

¹ Report in Gumbot, Letters i. 181, 182.

² In a letter of the Duchess Elizabeth Charlotte of Orléans.

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glad to see Frenchmen and Englishmen together, and threw emphasis into both his wish to preserve the peace and his intention to cultivate the friendship of King William, for whom he felt high esteem. Every one was amazed. But the enigma was to be explained at once.

While Louis XIV rejected the personal demands of the English, he still wished to keep them in good temper against the great event, the Spanish succession. It was expected that Portland would touch on it; but as he did not, Pomponne and Torcy, the two ministers who at that time had joint-charge of foreign affairs, went to him, to lay before him the necessity for an understanding between France and England on this great question, if the peace just concluded was to stand. They laid before him the Dauphin's claim to the whole inheritance, and the dangers that would arise, if it fell into the Emperor's hands. Portland replied in the most general terms he could find, and referred it to his master, carefully guarding himself, as he said, from making any declaration as to these projects.

King William received with pleasure the overture, which he had been looking for already during the negotiations for peace. In England he told no one; he took none but his trusted Heinsius into his counsels.

I hope the reader will once more follow me in the discussion of the chief elements of this negotiation: the most important of them depends on the point of view which the great powers in the interchange of their views took up and expressed.

The Pensionary's judgment depends on the conviction that Louis XIV would persevere in the attempt to get sole possession of the inheritance, and that at last war must be waged with him about it. He thought therefore that the old alliance ought to be kept going, and nothing negotiated on except the settlement of an agreement between the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria. For William and Heinsius (so far as one can see from their last interviews at Loo) had fixed their eyes on the Electoral Prince, grandson of that daughter of Philip IV who had had her rights declared by the will of that prince: they thought they could thus bring matters to an understanding with the Emperor, who had to conclude a peace with the Turk, and put his land-forces into good order, just as the two

maritime powers had to strengthen their navies, if they were to make a good stand against Louis XIV. Heinsius welcomed with pleasure the approximation of the Emperor to William, for it would be of great service towards the preservation of peace.

King William indicated that he approved of these reflections; they expressed the deep distrust with which the world awaited the coming overtures of the French.

In April 1698, the French ambassador, Lieutenant-General Count Tallard, who was entrusted with the negotiation, arrived in London. We will describe the conversation which took place between him and the King at his second audience: it would not have seemed decorous to mention so great an affair in the first.

Tallard said he did not understand the subtleties and ins-and-outs of diplomatic procedure: he was only a soldier; without circumlocution he would simply ask the King whether it was to his interest to let all the territories which formed part of that great inheritance fall to a son of the Emperor. William thought it undesirable to answer this question. But he said he would express his own opinion quite plainly:—he considered that the man who, under existing circumstances, was best fitted for the succession was the Elector of Bavaria (by right of his son)¹. What! cried Tallard, should all these territories—Spain, the Indies, Italy, the Netherlands, all come to the son of an Elector? He declares that he did not exactly understand what the King said in reply.

William had expressed his view as merely his own personal idea: he even immediately introduced a second view, and a somewhat opposite one. It was to the effect that Spain and the Indies should be handed over to the French Prince, the Italian districts to the Austrian Archduke, the Netherlands to the Elector of Bavaria, with a good barrier left for the Republic, while, with a view to the security of their trade, England and Holland should each have some Mediterranean

¹ Letter of Tallard, April 11: 'Qu'il me disoit que l'Électeur de Bavière (so runs the original, not 'the Electoral Prince') seroit le prince, qui convenoit le mieux à toute l'Europe.'

seaports¹. William even joked over the pretensions involved in this partition of the territories of others: still his idea is a most remarkable one; for most of the suggestions he made then were carried out some fifteen years later at the Peace of Utrecht, after a long and bloody war, in the most unexpected manner. They corresponded fairly to the actual relations of the powers, as they settled down after great fluctuations and catastrophes. But he had thrown out this idea simply as a private person; still when once it was in train, he thought he might also bring forward his own affairs. He said, when Tallard was now wishing to take leave of him, that he must also say something on his own behalf, and proceed to speak out freely. Then, continuing the subject which Portland had introduced in France, he expressed a wish—simply as a personal matter—that King James should leave France: otherwise he could not see how possibly to enter into close personal relations with Louis XIV. But the Ambassador had no instructions to enter into any discussion on this subject; the King noticed that he tried to get out of it, and broke off somewhat abruptly.

It was a passing negotiation, in which words and views alone were exchanged; but it did also become the foundation of the Partition-Treaty. For France also was above all things obliged to uphold the peace.

At the next hunting-party at which Portland was present, Louis XIV called him to his side, and expressed his satisfaction at the overtures made by William. And as these contained two separate proposals, the French thought it advisable to set forth in each case a more detailed project for consideration.

In so doing they at any rate made their point of view remarkably clear:—namely, that they would allow the English

¹ The words, which for this reason are noteworthy, run thus: 'Je crois, qu'il faudrait donner les Pays-bas a Ms. l'Électeur de Bavière en composant une barrière raisonnable, car ce n'en est pas une que ce qui reste aux Espagnols, donner l'Espagne et les Indes à un fils de Mgr. le Dauphin, ce qu'il y a de considérable en Italie qui est, je crois, le Milanais et le royaume de Naples, à l'Autriche, et faire un traité de commerce, pour que l'Angleterre et la Hollande ne puissent être troublées, en donnant quelques places de sureté pour le commerce de la Méditerranée et des Indes.' Translated in Grimblot, *Letters* i. 369, but with little inaccuracies which disturb the sense.

no extension of the barriers, nor any transfer which could serve to secure to them the universal dominion of the sea.

Over their first project, which was based on the portioning of a son of the Dauphin, we need delay no longer. Closer consideration showed at once that at that time its prospects were worth nothing. It need only be noticed that William III let the maritime places which he had in view for England at this time be mentioned. He even at this early time spoke of the acquisition of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, of Oran also or Ceuta; across the ocean he thought he might claim Havannah and Cuba; and on the Channel coast Dunkirk: pretensions which the French, as the world's politics then stood, could never concede.

Over against this came up their second proposal; in which they fell in with William's idea of recognising the Elector of Bavaria as chief heir to the Spanish monarchy; and this was a basis on which negotiations could go on. They proposed that in this case Milan should be the price paid to the Archduke, and South Italy together with Luxemburg to the Dauphin, for their claims.

The most striking thing about it, and for the maritime powers the most offensive, was the French demand as to Luxemburg: for each side knew its great value in a military point of view: accordingly the French let it drop for a while, but only to raise a much larger claim afterwards; they demanded for France on the one side Navarre, and Milan with the Tuscan ports on the other; while they destined Naples for the Archduke.

William expressed his amazement at finding that Louis XIV, far from dropping his demands in the course of his negotiations, or even lowering them, as was at least the custom at such times, had actually even raised them. The French asked for Luxemburg or Milan; he declared that he could assent to neither one nor the other. For the one was their roadway to the Lower Rhine, and the other would give them the command of Upper Italy: but these were both inadmissible, unless people were ready to submit to the risk of being subjugated by France. The maintenance of peace was the object of the negotiations; it was therefore necessary that there should be

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a fair prospect of the Emperor's being prevailed on to accept the arrangement come to : but in face of such proposals this was absolutely impossible.

In the June of 1698 it looked as if the whole affair would be broken off. Louis XIV at that moment received such favourable intelligence as to the progress of his Ambassador in Spain, that he began to hope that the whole inheritance might at last fall to one of his grandsons. How paltry did that which William proposed to concede him seem when compared with this acquisition of immeasurable extent ! It would be even to the detriment of his interests in Spain, were they to learn that he had made terms as to the partition of the Spanish monarchy¹.

Tallard warned him very emphatically against any such thoughts. Europe would never let his grandson inherit all the Spanish monarchy : England and Holland, with the other opponents of the French claims, would combine, and throw their overwhelming naval force on South America, a chaotic confusion would spring up and enwrap them. And farther :—the future of Italy would be thereby made uncertain ; whereas, on the contrary, if Milan were for the present left in the Archduke's hands, an opportunity of wresting it from him could easily be found at another time.

It was feared in France that William, who now went to Holland, might use his present sojourn there to form a union with the Emperor, the Elector of Bavaria, and the chief Protestant princes, against France : and it was deemed prudent on this ground not to let the negotiations be greatly protracted. Tallard, who accompanied King William, while he kept incessantly urging on the negotiations, succeeded in securing the inclusion of Tuscan ports with Finale, as well as Guipuscoa with San Sebastian and Fuentarabia, in the Dauphin's share : Milan however and Luxemburg were excluded from it, in accordance with the powers given him.

Now that Milan was to be in the Archduke's share, it was

¹ July 11 : ' Il ne conviendrait pas de céder pour des médiocres avantages ceux que je puis raisonnablement attendre de l'état de mes forces et de la disposition de peuples d'Espagne '

thought that the Emperor might be induced to enter into the compact; but William III at once declined to guarantee, as the French proposed, that he would secure the Emperor's consent; such a step might have led to new complications; still, he was not far from it when he proposed that all princes should be invited to enter into the Treaty, with a view to an offensive and defensive alliance against any who might object to it.

The articles of this agreement were drawn out by Tallard, and revised by Portland, who had now returned from his embassy. First, William signed them with his own hand; he put his name to each article in both the French and the English copy. This seemed the more necessary as there had been some difficulty about making out in England the full powers for the minister engaged in the negotiations. We will return again to this point.—to the grave accusation levelled at a later period against the Whig Lord Chancellor Somers, for having let himself be persuaded into such a grant of powers, especially as it was made out in blank, and as he knew no more the names of the ministers who were to authorise it than he knew the terms of the agreement itself: anyhow the result was that the treaty could now be signed and ratified in due form. A fresh renunciation by the Dauphin was drawn up in writing, in his son's name as well as his own; it was couched in the most binding terms. The Archduke was to issue a similar one the moment the Emperor adhered to the compact, as he was expected to do. On the side of the maritime powers and France all that could well be done had been done. Tallard, who, reasonably enough, credited himself with a decisive share in the result, regarded it as one of the most important political transactions that had ever taken place. In his eagerness he exclaimed that nothing now was wanting except the death of the Spanish King: he would be impatient were he to linger on another month.

But, as it fell out, not the sickly King who was to leave the inheritance behind him, but the young boy, who was to succeed to it, and whom even the Spaniards recognised as the heir, was called off the world's stage. The Electoral Prince was carried off by the smallpox in February 1699.

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Thus perished an arrangement, which was in harmony with existing circumstances, and probably could have been carried out. The contingency of the Prince's death after becoming King of Spain had been foreseen and provided against; in that case his father the Elector was to take his place; but no arrangement had been made for the case of his dying before succeeding to the throne, and during the lifetime of the Spanish King. William III read the article through; he judged however that it did not apply to the case. Louis XIV declared himself very emphatically against a substitution of the father in the present case; for the Elector had not the slightest claim to that throne.

Things had only gone so far as to create a common interest between the powers as to the settlement of this affair; and new negotiations might be set afoot for the purpose: still they offered even greater difficulties than before.

From the very beginning the French came forward with increased claims. They proposed that the Spanish crown and the Indies should go to the young Archduke; and, on the other side, in addition to what had been settled on the Dauphin by the first agreement, they claimed that he should also have Milan. But, they added, as the connexion of that district with the French crown might cause jealousy, it could be handed over to the Duke of Lorraine, and, at the same time, Lorraine might be definitely united with France; and the Spanish Netherlands might pass to the Elector of Bavaria as a separate principality. It is plain enough how vast an addition to her power this would have given to France: first, the rounding-off of her own territory; next, a predominant influence over the Netherlands by the establishment of a dependent Prince, and finally, the complete subordination of Italy to the authority of the French King; previous concessions, to which he clung tenaciously, opened to him a gateway into the Spanish peninsula.

William III and Heinsius were amazed. What grounds had France for claiming advantages to herself out of the Electoral Prince's death? Apparently it was now no longer a question of rights, but only one of covetousness and ambition: should this be allowed?

We will now at once consider the state of England at home, which made it impossible for her to break with France. In Holland also the tendencies towards peace and conciliation were overwhelming in strength. And besides this both the statesmen were afraid that, if they rejected the King's proposals, France would all the more, behind their backs and to their detriment, endeavour to come to terms with the Emperor. Much, therefore, as they had to urge against it, still they deemed it best to entertain the French proposals.

But the one point to which they would not be brought to consent was the formation of the Spanish Netherlands into an independent state: for, were that done, in any future war with France the whole burden of its defence would fall on the States-General. Would it not be better to connect the district directly with England? William once said he would even have claimed it for himself, had it not been of a different religion from his own. Much as the neglect of Flanders by the Spaniards had been regretted, still its connexion with Spain had given it a political support of European importance: it was desired that this should be maintained in the future. Louis XIV declared that his proposal offered the best solution: but he let it drop when he learnt that, if persisted in, it would make the treaty impossible. In this affair, then, William and Heinsius were the victors. On the other hand they gave in so far as to accept on their side the second basis of the French propositions, namely, the transfer of the claim on Milan to the Dauphin, and the exchange of it for Lorraine, objectionable though this was¹. It was thought that the union of Lorraine with France was not so very important for the equilibrium of Europe, as it had already, through previous stipulations, been robbed of all military independence. And as to the fate of the Italian districts no definite plan was agreed to as yet. The arrangement which would have fitted best with the political interests of France would have been the union of Milan and Piedmont, the junction of

¹ Letter of Louis XIV to Tallard, 17/27 March, 1699; it may be regarded as the basis of the agreement.

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Savoy and Nice with France, (as had already been suggested in the treaty of peace with Victor Amadeus,) and lastly the cession of the kingdom of the two Sicilies to the Duke of Lorraine, as a compensation for the loss of his territory. William did not refuse this, though the commercial interests of England and Holland were opposed to a close union between France and the Italian kingdom. English manufactures had, in fact, a profitable market there, and they were afraid of losing it through the protected competition of the French.

And now, as we pass into the eighteenth century, how much more clearly do we discern the tendencies which were to be specially characteristic of the age :—the partition of territories from the point of view of European convenience, with an utter disregard of the wish of the inhabitants and of their historical origin :—the policy of rounding-off the great monarchies, which all the continental states copied : the overwhelming regard paid to commercial interests and their advancement.

Even the court of Vienna was not absolutely against all this ; only it did not wish its own interests to be sacrificed. When the conditions were communicated to it through the Dutch ambassadors (1 August, 1699), they amazed and enraged the Emperor and his ministers. For each state has its original inborn and natural tendencies. To Austria, which now began to consolidate herself as a separate state, the possession of the Netherlands was of but little value ; it was remarked that the owner of them must always be on his guard against France. On the other hand, the policy of that court directed itself towards substantial acquisitions in Italy. There was a wish to form a kingdom of Italy out of the provinces to be vacated by the extinction of the Spanish line ; this should be for the present an independent kingdom under the young Archduke, but one that at some future day might again be united with the Transalpine hereditary states and with the Empire. Austria was not unwilling to let Lorraine and, in spite of the maritime powers, Luxemburg fall to France ; the Emperor was even ready himself to compensate the Duke of Lorraine, and would arrange his compensation according to his

convenience: only he would not at any price abandon Milan¹.

We know that the point against which the Emperor struggled most was also that most opposed to the interests of the maritime powers. But France clung to it obstinately, and they were not willing to make it a cause of war. William III said he thought that the Emperor, whose house kept Spain and the Indies, would at last bow to this necessity, and come to terms; while the court of Vienna would have to be compelled to do so. In this expectation the second Treaty of Partition, after being this time laid before the English Privy Council, was signed at London in February 1700, and at the Hague in March; the ratifications were exchanged in April. King William expressed to the French ambassador his satisfaction that he was now once more united with Louis XIV.

This union, from the moment of its completion, was the great connexion which influenced the world.

Among other things, the Peace of Carlowitz depended on it—one of those great treaties which have affected the relations of nations for centuries. For up to this time all union in the East had been hindered by the rivalry of the two Western powers. The English ambassador, Paget, had already been working long as a mediator there with a view to peace; his labours were always frustrated by the opposition of Chateauneuf, his French colleague. But after the first Partition-Treaty had been agreed to, Chateauneuf gave up his opposition. Under the mediation of England and Holland a Congress was held in the plains of Carlowitz, and thence came the great agreement. This mediation is an actual epoch in international history: it was the first time that the Porte acceded to such a meeting of European plenipotentiaries².

Northern relations, as well as South-eastern, were ruled by the influence of the Western powers.

Between Denmark and Holstein a difference broke out in

¹ Letter of Heinsius according to the Hope Letters, also one by Tallard, 17th Aug. and 13th Sept Cp Ranke, *Franz Geschichte* iv. Werke xi 100 (Ed. 1869)

² Von Hammer, *Osmanische Geschichte* vi. 587, 649.

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1700, as to the interpretation of the compact agreed to ten years before; and this at once took large dimensions, thanks to the relations of Denmark with the corresponding German princes, with Poland and Russia, and of Holstein with Sweden, and the partisans of the Electoral house of Hanover. William III was immediately concerned; for he was closely allied with Luneburg and Hanover. It was even to be feared that discord might arise again out of this question between the two great powers. For at that time France always upheld the friendly princes, and Denmark counted on her protection. William III urged Louis XIV not to allow the flames now beginning to blaze up in the North to spread any further. Heinsius emphatically pointed out to the French ambassador how perilous it might prove even to the Partition-Treaty. For since that treaty aimed specially at the preservation of peace, it would never do to allow war to break out anywhere. Were a difference of opinion on any point to spring up between the contracting powers, the great work would thereby be imperilled; whereas it would be much advanced, if it were seen that they were everywhere united to preserve peace. This was not in itself the idea of the French; a war in Germany would have promoted their private interests. But this would have made the ratification of the second Partition-Treaty, now just ready, impossible. So they let William III and Holland send their fleet to the Sound, to help Charles XII in crossing over into Zealand, and in compelling the Danish King to make peace. The first compact he made was a secret one with the house of Luneburg, recognising the ninth Electorate; then followed the peace of Travendahl, which once more settled the Holstein difficulty. In conjunction with the English and Dutch ambassadors the French also took part in it¹.

By this means peace was preserved unbroken in Germany: and it was thought that fresh hostilities in the North might be entirely prevented.

William III now held a splendid position. Affairs had reached this point:—a compact had been entered into as to

¹ From a letter of Heinsius to William: cp. Hoyer, Friedrich IV, 32.

the Spanish succession, by which the general peace might be maintained; the negotiations with the Emperor for the acceptance of it had been taken up again with great eagerness, and William deemed himself safe on this point. He had secured peace in the East, he had prepared the way for it in the North. He was arbiter of Europe; the glory of Louis XIV began to pale before him.

But at this very moment, when his position was at its highest abroad, at home the ground shook under his feet.

In the home-politics of England the conclusion of peace had on the whole the effect of seriously shaking the stability of his power.

CHAPTER II.

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS IN THE SESSION OF
1697, 1698.

THE news of the conclusion of the Peace of Ryswick was brought to London by Prior the poet, who took a considerable part in public affairs: he had a slow and troublesome passage. The intelligence had already reached England by post, when Prior landed and made the official announcement: it was received with universal joy, except by the Jacobites: the public also were generally content with the stipulations.

Bank shares and the funds rose in proportion as the tidings became more certain and distinct. The peace secured the credit of the English commonwealth, as it had been established by the Revolution and happily maintained in arms. All were weary of the constraint and disturbance which the war caused to business: now however every one thought the sea would once more be safe and trade unchecked. The great merchants reckoned on voyages and profits¹. Who could have been unaffected by the pressure of taxation and the confusion in the currency? Every one looked for some improvement in his own personal relations.

But with these matters a political reaction was also necessarily connected.

The war had tended to moderate the one-sided impulse of opposite principles on which the State rested, and which kept it in agitation; it had hindered the open outbreak of their

¹ Correspondence of Ellis and Yard in the Record Office; it becomes somewhat more full in the year 1697. Yard says 'they all (the trading men) talk now of fitting out ships, so that we shall have a very brisk trade.'

opposition. The King's power itself was really based on the prosecution of the war, which was the all-important matter. The nation had put up with the military authority he possessed and with the army which was for the most part composed of foreign troops; for, as every one felt, it was indispensable. But when peace came all this was changed. The first question with which the ever-deliberating nation busied itself was whether any standing army at all should be kept on foot in time of peace. Among the reasons brought forward against it in numerous pamphlets the most notable certainly was that drawn from the main principle on which the Revolution of 1688 rested. The right of resistance at that time realised, and the existence of a standing army, were felt to be incompatible. For how could the people ever again take up arms to resist the encroachments of a vicious government, if there were to be a standing army in the country? A couple of regiments would suffice to suppress any movement in that direction. External help would again be required;—a medicine as bad as the disease. 'If we have not in ourselves the power to defend our laws,' they cried, 'then is the land not free!'

On the other side it was argued that England surely had foreign foes as well, against whom an army, not solely composed of militia, was indispensable. For the British isles were open on every side; a hostile landing with a favourable wind could not be hindered: inland there were neither fortresses nor difficult rivers to be crossed: there must be a disciplined army if such an invasion, as was even now quite possible, was to be resisted. That the King should use his army at home against his political opponents was a thing never expected from him.

The affair had also another side for William III. In the face of the restored predominance of France, and the fresh changes now impending over Europe, and even as a support in his negotiations with Louis XIV, William thought it indispensable still to be as well armed as possible. His whole life and being were absorbed in considerations of European policy, which concerned both England and the continent.

Here again we may observe that the two leading thoughts

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which had worked together at the Revolution,—the idea of a steadfast foundation for popular freedom, and the idea of securing the equilibrium of Europe, ideas very different in origin,—now again stood out over against one another: on the subject of the standing army, which could not be reconciled with the first, but, on the other hand, was required by the second, they were now sundered, and fell into antagonism.

The proofs of personal sympathy, which William III received on his return this time to England, were perhaps not distinctly warmer, but were certainly more general than hitherto. Even the University of Oxford, which heretofore had ever stood aloof, was moved to address her good wishes to him immediately on his landing.

The King delayed a while before opening Parliament. He wished first to learn how far France was preparing to carry out the peace agreed on, and especially to get information as to what might be accomplished in Parliament.

It was now a fairly well-established custom that the members on their first meeting held preliminary conferences, and perhaps agreed as to the most important affairs in private among themselves, and even with the ministers of the crown¹. We are told that, in a general way at least, an understanding was come to that the King must have an addition made to the civil list, and a considerable extraordinary sum to restore order in the finances. William could mention these points with some confidence in his speech from the throne (Dec. 3, 1697); but at the same time he thought it well to give emphatic expression to his views as to the necessity of keeping up the land forces. For it was impossible to feel sure that the enemy would not, under cloak of peace, obtain what he had failed to achieve in war. He closed his speech with these words. 'By staking all I have delivered your religion, your laws and liberties, from the uttermost danger: I will also hereafter seek the glory of my government in

¹ Bonnet: 'Ces Messieurs n'attendent jamais qu'ils soient dans leur chambre pour convenir des articles, qu'ils y devoient traiter: ils sont aussi dans cette occasion convenu par avance de quelque article.'

upholding it unharmed, and so in handing it down to posterity.'

Both Houses greeted the King with addresses, thanking him for the peace so honourably made. The Commons chiefly extolled him for having restored to England the honour of holding in its hands the balance of Europe; they laid especial stress on the fact that by thus ending the war, he had given to the country peaceful possession of its rights and liberties, and had 'fully completed the glorious work of our deliverance'¹. But not a word as to his opinion that these results, obtained by hard fighting, could only be secured by a strong military establishment.

In the very first debate, on December 7, the expected struggle began. Contrary to ancient usage, there had in late years established itself a custom of beginning business by voting supply. This time the old Tories, Musgrave and Seymour, urged that the contents of the King's speech should first be considered: for now that peace had been made, there was no longer so much need for haste with supply as there had been in time of war. Montague replied that the matter pressed as much as ever; for all funds were exhausted and the Treasury empty: were the House to seem dilatory, Exchequer bonds would utterly lose their credit. Seymour rejoined that there were a great many abuses to be attacked in this matter: that Parliament had been put in pawn; that is to say, that money had been got in advance on the votes of the future. The sharp expression called up a sharp reply; but this did not quiet men's minds². On a division ministers carried their point, but only by a majority of three, 156 against 153; no doubt the order of business was thus arranged according to their wish: but the conclusion then come to was simply the general one, that supply should be taken first; nothing was settled as to the amount.

But before it could be discussed, the question as to

¹ Journals of Commons xii. 3.

² I here combine information contained in a letter by Yard in the Record Office (Dec. 7) with the account given by Bonnet. Seymour directed his attack against 'those who had pawned the Parliament.'

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keeping up or disbanding the standing army had to be decided: the attention of the nation was entirely given to this.

We are told that in the preliminary discussions an understanding had been come to already concerning the greatest of the difficulties of principle. The constitutional objection raised was to the effect that there most certainly ought never again to be any question about a standing army. This the most advanced members of both sides, now named Republicans and Jacobites, also urged: on other points they might be at open war, but they agreed entirely as to this—that both wished for an unarmed government. Those who had any interest in the maintenance of the state of things introduced since the Revolution neither would nor could go so far as this: far from moderate, however, were the demands which on its side the majority set up. When on the 10th of December the House proceeded to discuss the King's speech, the leader of the moderate Tory party, Harley, came forward with a motion, supported by detailed reasonings, to the effect that the land forces enrolled since September 1680 should be disbanded, and that only the same number of troops should be kept up as had been on foot at that time under Charles II. A short time before that date a very considerable English army had been under arms: it will be remembered how, through the combined action of French influence and parliamentary opposition, it had been condemned to be disbanded. The same thing was now to occur again, only without French influence, on the plea that England was now at peace with that power. At that time about 6500 men had been left in arms: a similar number was now also to be kept up. Hereon came up a very lively debate in which there spoke, on Harley's side, Seymour, How, Grenville, Warrington; on the side of the ministers, Montague, Littleton, Coningsby, Wharton. In favour of the motion it was argued chiefly that the officers were petty tyrants; that they had attempted to influence the elections by compulsion and violence; that, furthermore, the people were sorely in need of relief from taxation, and must think about paying off the war-debts, a thing impossible, so long as such

a great army was kept up; that the regiments to be left would suffice for the King's guard, and for the suppression of any disturbances that might occur; that for defence against any invasion the militia must be drilled; and that their good King would willingly set his hand to that work, were it only to keep his own supporters within lawful bounds. To this it was replied that the militia must have long training before they could defend the country from invasion; and yet that invasion might take place at any moment; that there was no wish to keep up all the army on its present footing; but that a middle course might be discovered, by which the needs of the time might be met, without in the least endangering the freedom of the country; that the King would know how to punish any encroachment by the officers on the region of politics; that if the troops were dismissed at once the crown would be in danger, and an ungrateful return made to the King for all his services to the country. The debate was vigorously resumed next day in the House; it was said by the extreme men that it was clearly impossible expressly to approve of the existence at all of a standing army; that they could but wink at it: thus the form of words was, in fact, negative rather than positive: the current of opinion set directly against the army. Harley's motion was carried in the House, just as it had passed in Committee: it was useless to move the renewal of the discussion: members of mark, who had hitherto voted with ministers, now went over to the other side¹.

The King remarked with apparent calmness that, in disbanding the army, Parliament had accomplished a feat which France had striven in vain to do for eight years. The words show how deeply hurt he felt.

It may seem strange that this befell him with a Whig government in a Parliament elected under Whig influences. But it was the characteristic of parliamentary affairs in these times, that the ministerial leaders were not actually masters of their party. As the Tories some years before had abandoned Nottingham at a time of Whig agitation, so

¹ Yard, Dec. 10 and 14, Bonnet, Dec. 14/24.

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now the Whigs voted against the interests of the ministry which had sprung from themselves. There were always some strong popular wishes—as formerly that for triennial Parliaments, and now for the reduction of the army—against which party-ties were powerless. And, as a general rule, the opinions and feelings of the county members, and of the country-party which was ever undergoing fresh construction, gave expression to this movement. These men were country-gentlemen, who took small notice of European affairs, but brought from home very clear convictions as to questions lying directly before them, and to these they clung tenaciously. They were now full of the thought that taxation must be lightened, and that the only means thereto was the dismissal of the army. A warning as to ever-threatening dangers had but little effect on them; when peace was once made, they thought no more about them. The fact that among the troops brought back to England were two Dutch regiments, against which the national antipathy was specially directed, had a very great effect on their conclusions¹.

So it was not a mere party struggle, but one corresponding to a natural and general feeling, connected with the dislike of a standing army, that led the Commons to declare against Sunderland, who at that time held one of the highest offices at court, a place which brought him into direct communication with the King, and gave him a seat and a voice in the Privy Council. The King's outspoken phrases in his speech from the throne as to the need for a strong army were, no doubt correctly, ascribed to him². But this was just what Parliament claimed; namely, that great questions should be laid before it, and its judgment thereon left simply to itself: Parliament should give advice, not take it. But surely, said they, is not this the very man whose counsels have already been ruinous to the last two kings? Was it not known that he

¹ Bonnet: 'ils avoient vu que les troupes Hollandoises avoient fait le trajet de la mer avant les Angloises.'

² Vernon to Shrewsbury, Dec. 14. 'It has made some impression on my Lord Sunderland, that notice was taken by one or two of the House of Commons of an old minister, that should advise the King to give the House his opinion in a speech that a standing army was necessary.' (Vernon, Letters to Shrewsbury i 439).

had turned Catholic, and had bartered his God for a piece of bread?—and now this same man stands at King William's side: must they not fear, then, lest he should ruin him also? The political morality of the nation felt itself hurt by the influence a minister, once before banished from the country, was now again clever enough to regain under an utterly different state of affairs: he was hated for his resistance to the general desire. A motion was made to ask the King to dismiss him.

Sunderland was a man who, upholding the authority of the state, acted as mediator between it and the different parties; but a party-leader he was not. No one had done so much for the Whig preponderance in the administration and in Parliament; but he did not know how to hold the party together or to satisfy it. Between Wharton's claims to an important place in the ministry, and the King's refusal to grant it for fear of alienating the Tories, and on the other hand between Shrewsbury (or rather Shrewsbury's friends) and Mordaunt, then Earl of Peterborough, for whom he was anxious to get a place, Sunderland got into difficulties which became quite unendurable to him. He said he felt as if he were pulled asunder in the rack, when he had to deal with the different fractions of the Whig party.

The address against Sunderland was not carried: rather because the Tories, with whom he had always kept up relations, did not press it, than because the Whigs had exerted their strength on his behalf. Wharton answered the King, who spoke to him about it, with remarkable coldness. But Sunderland thought it well to ask the King to dismiss him; the King reluctantly acceded. The man who in a high degree enjoyed his confidence, and might be regarded as his chief minister¹, resigned office, because Parliament declared against him. Still, his influence was not destroyed for ever by this: we shall see him appearing again in critical days.

Yet Parliament had won a great victory, and was glad to be freed from the person who, at the moment, seemed to be hostile to it.

¹ Bonnet: 'Myl. Sunderland a présentement presque tout le poids des affaires.'

In all this there was no thought of affronting or alienating the King. The leaders of the zealous Tory party especially wished to make him feel their power, even in his personal affairs. and accordingly Seymour and Musgrave turned every stone in order to get the Civil List limited to the earlier amount of £600,000. But every one else noticed, on the other side, that the King would presently have to provide for the young Duke of Gloucester, the heir-presumptive; and that moreover the amount fixed to meet the claims of the consort of James II would also have to be paid by him. The majority agreed to vote the Civil List at £700,000, and above all to secure it to the King for his lifetime. Against this all opposition was in vain. For the feeling was still strong that the nation owed a debt of gratitude to King William. This time, however, it was again proposed that the Committee, which had reported in favour of these proposals, should be asked to reconsider the matter: but this motion was lost by 225 to 86.

Sunderland being gone, the Whig government again won some victories in Parliament.

Among them was reckoned the defeat of the proposal of the opposition to apply the best and handiest source of income to paying off the troops; as had before been settled, this part of the income was applied to pay the Exchequer bonds as they fell due¹.

Montague, the author of this proposal, had to meet the most violent attacks: but as the Whigs held firmly together in his defence, the debate ended by the committal to the Tower of Duncombe, his most marked opponent, who was also fined: as to Montague himself the Commons declared that he had done the state good service and deserved the King's favour.

And indeed he was at this time still indispensable for finance affairs; he now proceeded to carry out one of the most far-seeing measures ever undertaken. After his usual way, he thereby again connected the Whig interest with that of the state.

¹ Letter of Vernon, Jan. 20, 1697/8 (Vernon Letters i. 473):—'The party was never more unanimous, and if it lasts thus, they will carry all before them.'

The deficit of the past year was reckoned at six millions, the debt contracted in the war at twenty: many sources of income had been anticipated, and much grumbling was heard as to the taxes imposed to cover the debts. But for the coming year even the necessities of life, such as coal and salt, would have to be taxed; there was also a land-tax, no doubt a very moderate one, but still always a considerable burden: a poll-tax also. And yet only the most pressing needs were covered by these, and that but partially; without fresh and large loans the difficulty could not be got over; but where should these be raised? on what could they be based? It was considered that England had come to a financial crisis which must seriously affect her credit, her trade, and future power¹.

Things were in this position when the East India Company offered a very considerable loan, on condition that its monopoly of trade with the East Indies should be renewed. This demands some explanation.

For some years past the dispute between the Company and the Interlopers, as they were called, men who, in spite of the Company's privilege, considered that they had a right to trade with the East Indies, had occupied the attention of government and Parliament. When the Tories were strongest in the government the Company had succeeded in getting from them a new grant of privilege. The lawyers in the Privy Council thought it one of the privileges of the crown to limit the right of free trading, gratifying some with it and excluding others. On this ground the Privy Council decided, though not without scruples, that they would issue a new patent to the Company². This was in the summer of 1693. On his return at that time from Holland the King concurred. Still the patent had a condition, that the Company should submit to such regulations as Parliament had already made. But yet Parliament was by no means satisfied. The Interlopers, who

¹ Bonnet: 'On peut regarder cette année comme une cuse, qui fera juger à tout le monde de ce que l'Angleterre sera en état d'entreprendre cy-après.' Jan. 25/Febr. 4, 1697/8.

² I follow here Bonnet's letter, dated Sept. 22/Oct. 2, 1693. 'Le conseil fut un peu partagé sur une affaire qui parait assez délicate.'

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claimed the right of free trading, aroused on their behalf the interest of Parliament as against the King's prerogative. It was carried that all subjects have an equal right to trade with the East Indies, unless some limitation be put on it by Parliament. In vain did the Company put all its machinery in action against this attack. Not only could their new patent not be worked; it was actually turned into a charge against those who had granted it. In the enquiry as to bribery in the session of 1694, 1695, the Company's presents to the leading Tory statesmen were of great use in bringing the charges home. The actual sums expended in this way stood in the Company's books: at last the governors of the Company were induced even to give up the names of those who had received the money. We have already hinted that the Duke of Leeds was the most distinguished of these men; at that time he might have been regarded as Prime Minister; the guilt of these bribes could not be actually brought home to him, yet the charge was strong enough to drive him from his high position.

The affair of the East India Company had at the same time become a question between King and Parliament, between Whigs and Tories. The Company clung to the Tories as the defenders of the prerogative; the Interlopers were supported by the Whigs and the champions of parliamentary rights.

The Company was never weary of representing that the damage it suffered from the insecurity of its patent and the competition of the Interlopers was a loss to the nation. It insisted, above all, that they hindered it in its undertakings; that it had spent large sums in securing the most profitable branches of its trade; that it had sometimes been compelled to fortify its numerous factories; that hitherto many of its enterprises had failed (as for example, the opening of trade with Japan) without however having been abandoned; that it must be in a position to do without profits in the outset, and to undertake ventures the importance of which for England might not be seen for twenty years, nor their profits reaped even by the existing generation; that this trust in the future was the foundation of all the greatness ever achieved

in the history of the world. But then what could be done as things were, when the Interlopers perpetually interfered, ruining their market, and looking to nothing but their own immediate gains¹?

But when the Tories began once more to lift up their heads, the Company thought its prospects would brighten. It offered to succour the kingdom in its necessities, if its privileges were secured to it for a sufficient term of years. Thus, says Davenant, their eloquent spokesman, one of the finest branches of foreign trade would be secured, and a good sum of money obtained, which would cover the amount voted for the Civil List, or pay off those debts of which the pressure was most felt.

The Chairman of the Company, Sir John Fleet, made a motion in this sense in Parliament early in May²: it was to the effect that the capital of the joint-shares should be raised by new subscriptions to a million and a half, and the Company secured by Act of Parliament for thirty-one years in possession of all privileges needed to carry on its trade: in return for all which it engaged to take up a loan of £700,000.

This would have been at once an expansion and a consolidation of the Company on its old Tory foundations; its opponents, the Interlopers and the Whigs, led by Montague, made common cause against it. They affirmed the right of Parliament to annul the King's patents, if useless or prejudicial; they declared that a common trading-company would be more useful than one like the East India Company, which was based on a joint-stock principle. Moreover, the Company's offer seemed far too small for the needs of the state. Montague proposed the establishment of a new Company, which should undertake a loan of two millions, and in return should get from Parliament the exclusive right of trading with the East Indies. While the basis of the offer made by the old Company was the maintenance of its East India trade in its old form, the leading feature of the second proposal was the financial difficulty of the day. The right of trading was

¹ Davenant: Discourses on the public Revenues, etc. part ii, 420, 424.

² Old East India Company's proposals, in the Journals of Commons xii. 253.

similarly to be the prize of those who were willing to lend the most money¹.

No one doubted that the struggle at the same time did involve the opposition between the two political parties. The great wish of the majority in the Commons to get money-matters straight, but, in so doing, to burden the public as little as possible, stood the Whigs in good stead. On the 26th of May, Montague's proposals were adopted as a whole. Parliament at the same time expressly affirmed its power of disposing of the right to trade with the East Indies².

The old Company, which could not be abolished all at once, was allowed three years to wind up its affairs: it even got the right of taking part as a corporation in the new Company: but the latter, to be distinguished as the 'General Company,' was then permanently to take the place of the old. All further proposals by the old Company—and it was not sparing of them—were fruitless.

In the House of Lords the Duke of Leeds, always a great upholder of the old Company, raised his voice against this measure; he was especially emphatic in declaring that the King's patent, granted entirely through his influence, had not been recalled as yet, and therefore the Parliament had no right to make enactments in contradiction with it: this, however, was the question of principle, as to which the mind of the Lower House was already quite made up: the Duke found but scanty support; the Lords acceded to the views of the Commons.

Still, even now it was generally thought that Montague had gone too far: he would have done better if, after the old Company had made overtures to him, he had united both Companies in one common interest: it was doubtful whether the new Company would be able to make good its promises. In order to secure the subscribers, who feared the liberty

¹ Vernon to Shrewsbury, May 10, 1698: 'If Mr. Montague's proposal succeeds, he will not only disappoint all the designs of the opposite party, but yet further establish the credit of himself and his friends' (Vernon Letters ii. 75). He even subscribed for shares for Shrewsbury. see Macaulay ch. xxiii. (v. 62, sqq.)

² 'That the powers and privileges for carrying on the East India trade shall be settled by Parliament.' Journals of Commons xii. 286.

conceded to the members of ordinary companies,—especially as the Interlopers were already so experienced in the trade that they would have been likely to get all the profits,—permission was given to all who desired it to form themselves into corporations and subscribe jointly. Hence arose a rather complicated state of things: still the shares were instantly taken up. The old Company took the largest portion, subscribing for upwards of £300,000; for it wished at once to secure its property in the East Indies, and for the future also to exercise a permanent influence in the Company. The Directors felt sure that in time they would get the mastery over their rivals.

There was a loss of royal prerogative involved in all this; but King William once more gave way, as he so often had before: he even actually invited the old Company to take part in the new, as we know it actually did.

Above all he was deeply interested in the opening of a new source of financial relief, and in the peaceful progress of public economy.

CHAPTER III.

REDUCTION OF THE ARMY IN THE SESSION OF 1698, 1699.

KING WILLIAM as yet did not feel himself seriously imperilled by the parliamentary opposition he had met with. The steps agreed on even proved useful to him in his European position, although they had not originally met his wishes. It made a general impression on the world, when it was seen that England by the late subscriptions proved herself still so wealthy after a long war, which had utterly exhausted all the other powers. This was one of the reasons why France was conciliatory and yielding over the first Partition-Treaty: and, besides, he thought there need be no hurry over the disbandment of the troops: for the funds set apart for this object had not yet begun to come in¹. Accordingly, when he left for Holland, the King gave orders that a far larger number of men than Parliament had voted should be retained². He held that this was sufficiently justified by the necessity of having the country properly defended with an army in the case of a vacancy to the Spanish throne. With the self-confidence of a good conscience he rose above the anxieties which Parliament had expressed about the security of the common freedom. For what had any one to fear from him? He had no children, no successor to care for: he was alone; he had nothing but the good of the nation at heart: for its own good the country must be armed.

¹ Bonnet: 'Le fond ne sera pas rempli d'une année,—et pendant ce tems là on trouvera moyen de conserver les troupes, et cela d'autant plus facilement que le terme de ce parlement expire avec cette séance.' According to the information of some of the ministers this reflexion appeared at the very beginning of the quarrel

² Burnet ii. 210, followed by Ralph and Smollet (ii. 25), affirms this.

When he looked at the general relations of Europe, he considered that he might well be excused if he did not observe constitutional forms very strictly.

And here, as at least it seemed, he had the Whig statesmen, with whom he had been governing for some time past, on his side; men like Somers, Montague, Russell, who were regarded as the triumvirate of leaders, and who during his absence held in their hands as Lords Justices the supreme administration of affairs. Secretary Vernon, who had risen through Shrewsbury, and might be regarded as his representative, attached himself to this party: he was a man of business, moderate, cautious, and very industrious. These men agreed together in thinking a permanent force, as well as the continuance of the present burdens, absolutely needful under existing circumstances.

The Parliament had run out its legal life; and all depended on whether the elections, which were coming on at once, would be favourable to government, as men flattered themselves they would. Montague and Vernon came forward in person for Westminster.

But these elections showed at once that the administration and its views were unpopular. Sir Harry Colt, one of the decided opposition, stood against the two ministers. He called them the slaves of place, who would therefore be faithless to the people's interests; he drew his own picture as the true old Englishman, whom the court could not corrupt. His supporters cried 'No courtiers, no inventors of taxes!' for a couple of days he ran the two powerful officials close¹; and though he was beaten, still the defeat was a very honourable one; it was chiefly due to the influence of the French refugees, who had become citizens of Westminster in very considerable numbers, and worked incessantly for the King's side.

But in the general electioneering campaign the result was different. The so-called patriots, the opposition, everywhere beat the other party which supported the government. Again in this Parliament there were very many new members, whose

¹ So says Bonnet very distinctly: cp. Vernon Letters ii. 133, sqq.

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opinions were not known in London, but of whom it was generally said that for the most part they were keen opponents of the taxes.

As against the Calvinistic refugees, the clergy exerted an influence favourable to the Church party. It was by their efforts that men like Seymour were re-elected in spite of all opposition.

It may be said, generally speaking, that the Whigs, who represented the government, were in a minority. Still the opposition had lost many members of great parliamentary influence: ministers looked forward to a stormy session, but trusted that, if they dealt patiently with Parliament, they might get their own way with it.

When the King, early in December 1698, came back from Holland, he would have liked to have delayed the meeting of Parliament a little longer, in order to enter on some preliminary negotiations: but the leading Whigs, especially in the Commons, thought it better to see without further delay what could be done with the new House.

The first preliminary debate strengthened them in their expectations. They had put forward for Speaker one of themselves, Thomas Littleton, who had not consented to stand till the King also had expressed his approval. What had been attempted in vain before actually succeeded this time. The opposition had thought of setting up Foley or Grenville; but they soon found out that the nomination of a second candidate would lead to nothing, unless a decision were first taken about Littleton. But everything had been so well prepared beforehand for him, that he was chosen as Speaker, on the first division, by a large majority.

Lord Chancellor Somers this time drew up the King's speech; it aimed at expressing clearly what were the King's wishes, while it avoided everything which might wound the susceptibilities of Parliament. The King said nothing about the land-force in general, only as to its strength for the current year; reminded them of its importance for the security of the country, on which everything, including trade and business, depended; and spoke of the maintenance of England's influence in the present state of Europe: but the speech set forth his

views no further, leaving to the consideration of Parliament the numerical strength necessary for this object¹.

But how vain it is to think to win over an assembly by concessions as to matters of form, when it has once taken up a steady policy! The new Parliament opposed the King and his ministers as steadfastly as the old one had done. His neglect of the votes already passed had also set the new members against him; they had pledged themselves on the hustings to stand firmly by the conclusions come to last session. In the new Parliament also the country-party, which regarded the reduction of the army as essential to any relief in taxation, was very strong; it was vain to argue with them against this fixed idea.

'It is certain,' says the Brandenburg reporter, 'that the very name of army is hated by the English. Men who have not the slightest touch of Jacobite opinions, but are supporters of the government, abandon it the moment the army is named. They are very willing to hear that England has great influence abroad: yet their idea as to their liberties and their very scanty knowledge of foreign affairs, make them unwilling to endure any army in the country.'

Was not this the old question at issue between the Long Parliament and Charles I, only on another footing? It was no longer a question as to the feudal notions of the cavaliers which had impressed a special character on the armed forces of that period. But the army of the Protectorate had made the very name of an army hateful through its violent encroachments. Its dismissal had been one of the conditions of the re-establishment of monarchy. Even Parliament at the Restoration would hear of no strong armed force: thanks to a combination of circumstances, Charles II was compelled to reduce the army to very limited dimensions. When James II increased it, and wished to employ it for his objects, which were opposed to the constitution of the country, the ill-will of Parliament and the people towards an armed force was

¹ Dec. 3, 1697: 'I think myself obliged to tell you my opinion that for the present England cannot be safe without a land-force'—1698: 'Two things seem to require your consideration: the one is, what force ought to be kept up at land for this year.' Here the general tone is different.

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redoubled. Nothing but the absolute necessity of withstanding their powerful foe in arms had kept the ceaseless activity of the opposition quiet. But peace once made, it broke out again with all its force, strengthened by that dislike of foreigners which played a great part in it all. Now that the King and army had defended parliamentary government, and made its farther development possible, Parliament forthwith gave free course to its antipathy towards the army and the connexion of that body with the crown.

Such are the discords that make themselves heard in the course of the world's affairs. Opposing principles and powers may for a time join hands against some common foe ; but the moment he is beaten down, the hostility once more breaks out between them.

The new Parliament even refused to vote the supplies as promptly as the last had done in the late session ; the motion to that effect was thrown out, and a resolution carried that the question about the army in England and Ireland must be first considered. The two paymasters were instructed to send in official lists of all troops in the two countries. It was found that there were 14,834 men in England, and 15,488 in Ireland. In England the proportion of cavalry, which with the dragoons came to 4860 men, was unusually large. There were also some companies of invalids, and a couple of regiments in the West Indies, to be maintained. The ministers never flattered themselves that they could save all these troops for the King : but they hoped the House would sanction 10,000 men, and might be induced to put up with the Dutch regiments then in England. But the moment they began, as the phrase is, to feel the pulse of the leading men in Parliament, they were made aware that they would find it no easy matter to carry either point. On the very day on which the army-lists were laid on the table (16 Dec. 1698) all absent members were expressly summoned, and the House went into Committee, with Conyers as chairman : a decisive debate followed. Some members grew quite hot in their zeal ; others were unwilling at the outset to break with the majority on a question on which the country had declared itself. Even the Whigs in the government had not the courage to support the King's de-

mand with energy. It was not that they in fact thought it extravagant: they themselves proposed a vote for 10,000 men; but it added to their embarrassment that they were not able to declare that the King would admit himself satisfied with that number of men. They lowered their proposal to 9000¹; but all in vain. At last they judged it prudent to take 7000, as there were some symptoms that a still lower number might be fixed on. Paymaster Ranelagh allowed in fact that 3000 men would be enough for the Guards, and 4000 for the garrisons. And so a resolution was proposed to the effect that all the land-forces in England, with the exception of 7000 men, should be paid off and disbanded: even the officers were counted in this number. The following day not only was this vote passed, but an instruction to the Committee was added, that the troops to be retained must all be native English. They would allow no Irish or Scots, still less Dutchmen. Two days later 12,000 were voted for Ireland, a somewhat greater concession: but these also were to be entirely composed of native subjects of the King, so as to exclude both Dutch and Frenchmen, who were plentiful there. The pay for these troops was to be levied in Ireland alone.

To be sure it was said in England that it would be wrong to regard these votes as indicating any ill-will of the nation towards the King: that it was simply an expression of the views of the country-gentlemen, who held a standing army to be incompatible with the general liberties of the land²; but even this opinion of theirs expressed the antagonism between them and the King. William must have feared that his authority would be lessened in the eyes of friend and foe alike on the Continent; his whole position was shaken and rendered doubtful. That position depended on the combination of European and English interests, and had its expression in the support of an army composed of diverse elements in English pay. But now the economical and exclusive family-

¹ So says Bonnet. Vernon's Letter to Shrewsbury (Dec. 17) gives the most exact information. Vernon Letters ii 235.

² Yard, Jan 6, 1698/99. 'The principle is fixed in the country-gentlemen, that an army is dangerous to the constitution of the kingdom, and may in time bring them to the same condition their neighbours are in.'

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feeling of old England rose up against any participation by foreigners in the revenues and offices of the country; nay, even the other parts of Great Britain were excluded. William, who, to use a modern phrase, deemed himself 'Head of the Army,' felt the liveliest sympathies for the brave fellows who had fought under him, and had bought with their blood the peace men were now enjoying, and the independence of which England was proud:—the brave generals and officers from all parts of the world, who had no other means of livelihood, the Dutch guard, on whose fidelity he could implicitly rely, the French refugees, without whose aid his great undertaking could scarcely have been achieved. With all these he must part, and know no more of their further fortunes.

But this blow was struck by the hand of a newly-elected Parliament, expressing the direct opinion of the country, under Whig ministers, who though they might not know all his undertakings, yet understood enough of the importance of his European position to be anxious to support it. It was thought at court that the ministers might have carried out the King's wishes in this, just as well as they had carried their Speaker, had they but been in earnest about it; but that instead of standing out, they had, on the contrary, made no serious fight at all. The King also made no secret of his opinion that this was the case.

And doubtless there was some truth in it. The Whigs had not even brought forward the King's own views, far less had they ventured to fight for them. They were unwilling to come to blows at once with a majority, the attacks of which they dreaded. But, above all, could they have adopted the King's views in full? They were too thorough Englishmen to take any pleasure in the foreign troops the King wanted to keep up¹. They had long been thinking of a plan whereby to satisfy the demands of both sides: and even this at the time they defended weakly, and in yielding mood, because they were by no means clear that the King would assent to their proposal.

¹ Somers to Shrewsbury:—'They say that their conduct . . . was so far from aiming at what the King desired, that it was a downright delivering him up.' Shrewsbury Correspondence iii. 572.

The great question, at the stage which the development of constitutional government had then reached, was this:—Can the King still find ministers who will undertake to support and carry out his personal will against all party-considerations and against the overwhelming voice of the majority; or is the highest power henceforth to be the expression of the parliamentary majority, as it declares itself after the conflict of opposite opinions? William III was fully conscious in himself that he would never imperil the nation's rights and liberties, he had a sense of what was due to him and his army for the services he had rendered it; and that the nation, unless well armed, could have no weight in the counsels of Europe, while otherwise it could only find security in servile compliance towards France: his own personal authority in the world also depended on this. The King, otherwise so calm, felt an agitation he could not hide. 'The attitude of the Commons towards me,' he writes to Heinsius, 'is so hostile that I can attend to nothing else: I see clearly that I shall have to take some extreme step.'

'Affairs in Parliament are in so critical a state that I shall have to do something that will make a great stir in the world¹.'

The thought crossed his mind—and he told it to his friends—that he must even leave England to herself and return to Holland.

He had already prepared the sketch of a speech to be delivered in case a fresh debate on the army, which was expected to come on at once, should go against him: in it he was determined to express to Parliament his intention of withdrawing from England. He proposed to remind them that, God helping him, he had succeeded so well that England could henceforth live at peace in possession of her liberties and religion, if she were but willing to care for her own safety; but that he now saw that she paid no more heed to the counsel he gave her, that she was bereaving herself of her means of defence, and was on the road to ruin. That he

¹ Jan. 6/16, 1699. 'Soo dat ick in 't korte yets sal moeten doen dat in d' werelt groot eclat sal maeken.'

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would be no eye-witness of this : and that as it was impossible for him to save and defend the realm, he had determined to withdraw : let them point out to him the men to whom he should entrust the government in his stead : should they at any future time need him, he would at once return, ready again to venture his life for England¹.

Some resolutions there are, to which a man makes up his mind in private against impending eventualities ; tells no one, but when the moment is come carries them into action. Others there are which he regards as, at the worst, courses which may perhaps become necessary, but about which he still reserves to himself a right of further deliberation ; these he does not hide so carefully ; he lets his trusted friends into his secret, in order to obtain some effect from it.

And thus William III acquainted not only the surest of the Whig ministers, like Somers and Montague, but even the Princess Anne's confidant, Marlborough, with his intention of withdrawing into Holland. It is quite clear that, had he carried it out, not only would the administration have been broken up, but the very monarchy would have fallen into danger. It would have shown at once the impossibility of a really monarchical government with a parliamentary constitution. I think that, even without express proof, one may feel quite sure that William's chief object was to make all parties ;—the Princess and her friends, who were chiefly Tories ; the ministers, backed by the Whigs ; Parliament especially ; and finally the nation ;—understand what an injustice they were doing him, and the danger they were thereby incurring.

But if we look at his point of view we shall see that he could not possibly carry out this intention. What confusion would have followed such a declaration ! What a chance for the Jacobites, with their aims and claims ; and they still so numerous and powerful ! What an addition to the preponderance of France ! The King's whole life's work would have been imperilled, perhaps ruined, by it. The conse-

¹ Speech, which the King William intended to make to the Parliament. First published by Dalrymple, *Memoirs* ii. 130.

quences of our actions even come to be conditions of our existence: in vain does the stormy indignation of our personal feelings strive from time to time against them.

The King so far prevailed with the ministers, that they once more agreed to try and persuade Parliament to vote 10,000 men, among whom the Dutch Guards might perhaps also be included. On the third of January it was proposed to entrust the Committee with a reconsideration of the figures of the forces.

Blaithwaite, the Secretary of War, declared that it was by error that 3000 men had been named as the amount sufficient for the garrisons; at least 5000 were really required, so that the numbers must necessarily be raised. Then Montague again appealed to the general feeling against so great a diminution of the forces. The French king, terrible alike by land and sea, and at every moment master of all his forces, could far sooner be in a position to attack, than England with her slow-moving form of government could be prepared for defence; and what, said he, would one live to see, were God at such a moment to take away the King? All parties would rise against one another; government would lose all power of holding them in check. This time, however, even such members as Lord Hartington, eldest son of the Earl of Devonshire, and Pelham, who had a place in the Treasury, declared against government. Pelham had been in favour of a larger vote of troops in the previous session, but now he went against it, on the ground that peace was firmly established everywhere. The majority in the House was all the more firmly fixed by this in its opinion. Only if each member could have learnt that the King would be grateful to him for the concession proposed, might it perhaps have been possible to carry the augmentation. But the King was very far from encouraging any such expectation; nothing less than the retention of the full number of troops then on foot would have satisfied him. Even the ministers hesitated to take a division on it, seeing that all who had before voted with the majority must have considered themselves bound by that vote. The proposal to refer the subject back to the Committee was rejected.

Still, after all, the King did not carry out his idea: he fell ill; and this was attributed to his annoyance; he did not venture even to let it be mentioned¹.

In the House of Lords however he found some support in this affair. When the Bill for disbanding the troops was laid before it, experienced members like Marlborough, and after him most of the other speakers, expressed themselves against the great reduction in the troops: they were of opinion that the Commons ought to have considered the subject in conference with the Lords: and made it a special ground of complaint that they had excluded the French refugees as well, who had no home to return to. But they did not on this ground venture to reject the Bill: not merely because it might be regarded as a Money-Bill, but especially for fear of provoking any discord between themselves and the Commons, which would have reacted on the King, making his position even more unsafe than it would be made by the reduction of the forces.

Government still hoped to be able to gain a victory in the debate on the strength of the navy, which might have been made use of to fulfil the King's wishes. Instead of 12,000 men, as heretofore, a vote of 15,000 for the naval service was carried. The intention was to apply the increase to military purposes, and plans for the retention of soldiers, who might be employed in the navy, were already based on it. But the next resolution the House passed was that the whole number should be composed of sailors only. After the Bill for disbanding the forces had gone through both Houses, the King, unless he meant to break directly with the nation, had no choice but to give his assent to it. This he did on the first of February, as well as to a number of other Bills, in a session of both Houses. He hoped, by abandoning his resistance on the main points, to get somewhat better terms on a secondary matter. He told them how painful it was to him to have to part with his Guards, who had come over with him to help England, and had been with him in every action. But even this appeal

¹ Tallard expresses himself doubtfully; Vernon very positively: 'he cannot overcome himself under what he thinks an hard usage'

altogether failed; for the Guards were Dutchmen, and they would have any other foreigners in the country rather than them.

Once more, in March, the King expressed his wishes to the Commons in the strongest terms. The Dutch Guards were on the point of embarking; all was ready: the King told the House so in an autograph letter, and added the remark that it would give him the utmost gratification, were they to decide that the Guards might stay in England. Parliament had no wish to hurt the King; all felt how deeply they were indebted to him; but the majority refused to pay the least attention to personal considerations either for him or for his well-deserving soldiers. The general feeling of the nation demanded the dismissal of the troops: Parliament had voted it, relying on its right, mindful of its interests: it would not yield a single step. This disposition was so decided, that none but a few of the King's adherents ventured to propose the discussion of the subject, and even then had not the courage to speak for it¹. On the other hand, there was a great deal of declamation against the King's bad advisers, who had persuaded him to this; and it was proposed that he should be asked who had advised him to take this unconstitutional step. They did not eventually go so far as to resolve this: but the address with which they replied to the royal message was strong enough even without it. They said the resolution voted for the dismissal of the troops had been needed to satisfy the people; that they could not recede from it without doing a wrong to the constitution, for the establishment of which the King had himself formerly come over to England. King William thought the address impertinent—that was his phrase—but he was forced to bow to necessity.

The disbanding of the troops was already in full course. The King kept all the cavalry, except a regiment or two, which were sent over to Holland, and as many officers as he could possibly retain: for he felt himself specially bound to them,

¹ Bonnet. 'L'orateur ayant fait la lecture de cette lettre, il se trouva un très petit nombre de députés, qui vouloit qu'on examinât cette demande du roy, et ce petit nombre n'osa parler.'

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and they seemed to him indispensable against future contingencies. This provoked no small complaint, as involving too great an expense. For the West India troops the Commons refused a separate vote. They did not count themselves bound to make up the deficiency, which arose through the reforms in the sums previously contributed by the officers towards the expenses of the invalid establishment.

Everything combined, — natural antipathy against the foreigner and against the military profession, the desire for economy, the opposition to the royal authority, the hatred for the ruling ministers. Extreme Whigs and Tories had coalesced against them.

Those members who held new-made places were thrown out, because they were looked on as the special tools of the ministers; the French refugees had now to pay the penalty of having supported Montague at the elections: thanks to their monarchical and ministerial opinions, they were declared, in spite of their naturalisation, incapable of holding any civil or military post. On the other hand, the proposal to take all electoral privileges from those who had been backward in recognising the King was thrown out. The old East India Company and the Tories in general now had overwhelming influence. Admiral Russell, now Lord Orford, was pursued with the bitterest complaints. He was charged with having lent out at high rates of interest the money destined for the navy, instead of applying it at once to its proper object; so that the most important undertakings could not be ventured on, or, if attempted, they failed: they declared that he had made immense profits from prizes, and had succeeded in escaping all enquiry by producing a royal declaration of indemnity.

In the debates the party of Leeds and Nottingham was stronger than the supporters of Montague and Russell.

In this direction, which suited the Tory views and the popular wishes equally well, men pushed on to the most extreme proposals. One of the most notable of these was that which related to the better management of the county militia. They must, as had been proposed in the Long Parliament, be made independent of the crown and the Lords,

and submit to Parliament alone¹. Had it at that time been well-drilled, the standing army would have been regarded as unnecessary, and entirely disbanded: the war-power still possessed by the English crown would have been utterly taken from it. The Lords, who were unwilling to give up their old rights in connexion with the militia, once more threw out the Bill: but the King felt that his position was very insecure.

If one asks whether in fact his European position, the maintenance of which he was wont to regard as a matter under his special control, was disturbed by all this, there can be no doubt about the answer. When the Electoral Prince died, and France came forward with claims which the King in principle condemned, why did he and Heinsius eventually accede to the French proposals? It was above all the impossibility of persuading the existing Parliament to make a stand against France that led to this result.

But under no circumstances could he venture to come to an open rupture with Parliament. He prorogued it on the 4th of May, not without expressing his displeasure at the results of the session. The sums voted him were scarcely one-half of those voted in former years. His military power had already to a great extent been wrested from him.

¹ Bonnet: 'Par les règlements, qui y étaient faits, on mettoit elle (la milice) et ceux, qui la commandèrent, à la devotion du parlement' Bonnet, who is so valuable for these sessions, in which we lack detailed information as to the debates, holds that the object was 'à donner par là lieu de former des parties contre la cour et à ôter au roi les officiers qui ne relevoient que de lui.'

CHAPTER IV.

CHANGES IN COURT AND STATE. RESUMPTION OF THE
IRISH LAND-GRANTS. 1699, 1700.

AT this time William III had the pain of losing one of his nearest and dearest friends in a way that amazed the world. William Bentinck, Earl of Portland, his trusted friend in all the complications of his life, and his second self, could not be persuaded to remain in his service.

The proximate cause for this was that Bentinck's rooms at Newmarket, which were close to the royal apartments, had, during his absence in France, been given up to another of the King's friends, Joost Keppel, who already held high rank in England, having been created Earl of Albemarle. Portland, on his return, wished to resume his old quarters; but Albemarle, who had fitted them up with his own household-stuff, refused to go out: the King decided in his favour.

It almost looks as if favour and confidence, like love, were indivisible. at all events, every one who has them in part wants to have them exclusively. Portland, who had already long noted with jealousy the growing favour shown to his rival, now declared himself determined to resign his office as Chamberlain; when the court came back from Newmarket, early in 1699, he appeared without the accustomed badge.

The King, in whose correspondence with Portland there breathes a brotherly and friendly spirit, assured him even now in the warmest terms of his lasting goodwill, and took every step he could to recall him from his purpose; sent friends to him to allay his anger; on his return to London, himself visited his wife and children, whom he treated as

kindly as if they had been his own; even told him that if he did but half reciprocate the royal friendship, he would withdraw his resignation¹. But Portland was immoveable: the King could only persuade him to go on with the French negotiations, which could have been entrusted to no other hands: in all other points, he held firmly to his determination. The King wrote about it to Heinsius: said that no consideration, no offer, no reasonable satisfaction could move Portland; that he was carried away by a blind jealousy.

The world in general thought Portland was alarmed for his great possessions, which would be imperilled unless he could get clear of the antipathy aroused by the share that foreigners had in the King's most secret counsels².

Most people found the affair unintelligible. A favourite, who throws up his place of his own accord; a King, who struggles to keep him in it but in vain:—this was indeed a marvel! Still it was not displeasing to the courtiers. Portland was dry and cold: without being actually arrogant, he still clung obstinately to his opinions; above all, he did not know how to make friends: his life, though frugal and economical, was yet in a way magnificent; in his bearing he showed a certain self-consciousness, which no one likes in another; but above all, as his wealth grew he had put a stop to all private connexions which imposed personal considerations on him. He was no longer able to lay before the King what people wished him to know, and to communicate the King's utterances to others; a service which is above all the special function of a king's confidential friend³. In this respect Albemarle was preferred. He was younger, more

¹ I find this in a letter of Tallard, April 22. Bonnet gives a different account; but Tallard was in a position to have the more accurate information.

² Bonnet, April 21. 'De peur d'être entrepris tôt ou tard par le parlement,—qui l'accuse d'avoir surpris le roi en lui faisant donner un état infidèle de dons très considérables, qu'il a demandé.' He was assured of this 'bien fortement, quoique en secret.'

³ If we may believe information given by Onslow in Burnet (*Hist. O. T.* iv. p. 402, ed. Routh), Sunderland expressed himself coarsely about it; he praised Albemarle—'he bungs and carries a message well.'

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pliant, more courteous; as yet he had no private interests, or he gave them up readily enough; as, for example, he had lately resigned his military rank, which would have given him precedence over one of the first of English peers, and would have been very distasteful to the nobility.

But an easy and disinterested channel of communication with the King was at this time specially desirable, as the results of the late parliamentary session had made modifications in the position of the chief personages at court inevitable.

We know that William was especially reluctant to rule by means of a party. Closely as for some years past he had been bound up with the Whigs, still he had always shunned those of them who, like Wharton, had displayed their colours very openly: for the Church-loving Tories would have regarded the employment of such persons as an act of hostility. He was also very glad to give office to moderate Tories. But hence it followed that the ministry was never quite harmonious; discord smouldered in its bosom, and came to light when great questions arose, as had been seen in the late session, in which distinguished members of the government, at the Admiralty, and in the Treasury, had joined the opposition, and had thereby given it its majority.

But this must now come to an end. The King did not hesitate to eject from the Treasury Pelham, a Whig, who had been especially troublesome to him: it was still more significant that Lord Russell, once a great party-leader, left the Admiralty. But William would not part with Rooke the Tory; who in the late debate, though he had not actually attacked his superior Russell, yet had not defended him, because he declared he was convinced of the justice of the charges laid against him. Rooke was naturally taciturn, but trustworthy, and above all things, obedient:—such a man as William loved. Russell was induced to resign. Rich as well as Rooke remained in the Commission; he was another of Russell's opponents: but care was taken to reduce the numbers of the body, so as to avoid the charge so lately made, that places were multiplied in order to secure adherents. One of the Secretaryships of State remained in

the hands of that pliant Whig Vernon, of whom it was said that he knew how to avoid making enemies of those he was obliged to injure; one sees from his letters that, on the other hand, he was ever cautious, even in his warmest confidences—a caution needful in one's lifetime, no doubt, but useless to posterity: one would gladly have seen plainer language in his correspondence, to which we have often had to refer. The other secretaryship went to Lord Jersey, who did not shine as a statesman, but who, though a Tory, was unbounded in his devotion to the King: he was brother to Mrs. Villiers.

Montague thought it prudent to resign the Exchequer, keeping only a lucrative Auditorship, a sinecure he had secured to himself in the Treasury. Montague has immortalized himself by being Newton's patron: he is said to have remarked that a lamp which gives so much light must not be left without oil; he took other men of letters and science also under his protection¹. But he dealt all the more roughly with his political opponents: he showed that he despised them when he overthrew them; of course they hated him cordially. He was a fair, lively little man, still rather young, who did not give up his ambition when he gave up high office. His friend Smith came in as Chancellor of the Exchequer; he was a man who had the reputation of sticking at nothing, if it was to the advantage of the established order of things and of the King: he was also a ready speaker in the House. The preponderance of the Whigs was after all to be preserved. It was of the highest importance to them that Lord Shrewsbury, whose name gave the Whigs unbounded confidence without shocking the opposite party, let himself be persuaded to accept the place vacated by Sunderland at the King's right hand. By his side appeared Somers, who had been his close friend from his schoolboy days, and who, both in laying the train for the Revolution of 1688, and since that time had always been on the same side with him. In his religious opinions also he was almost as free; he was not always quite blameless in his way of life; in these matters also he was a child of the age: in

¹ Brewster, *Life of Newton* 247, 248 (Family Library xxiv.)

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all other things he was far more energetic, cultivated, many-sided, than his more illustrious friend; Somers secured an unparalleled and most extensive field for his activity. Men marvelled to hear him pleading in Chancery, or leading the debates in the House of Lords from the woolsack, or arguing some disputed point of the Law of Nations with foreign envoys. When great questions came up, he spared no study, however wide it might be, if it enabled him to form a well-grounded and safe opinion. We may add, that we have to thank him for the impulse he gave to the works of Rymer and Maddox, so invaluable for the home and foreign history of England. The collection of pamphlets he left behind him has become a source of rich information for posterity. His private notes show a penetrating power of attending to every detail, while he never loses sight of general principles. In private intercourse he never violated social forms; and this he did to keep others at a proper distance. But he not merely knew how to advise, he knew how to convince; people felt their minds elevated as they listened to him; even in the hottest excitement he retained sufficient coolness to express himself with moderation. In all things he was quiet, solid, trustworthy. Never did any Lord Chancellor enjoy more credit in the city: people were willing to advance large sums on his bare word. The effect of his measured and yet conciliatory bearing was such that he seemed to be at home even in the highest court-circles. But it was thought he was not so independent in the cabinet as he had been in the law-court. His tendency was to try and conciliate monarchical power with constitutional liberties; though a thorough Whig he still had feeling for the King's prerogative, and not merely himself submitted willingly to it, but even devoted himself heart and soul to its interests¹.

With such ministers, moderate yet vigorous,¹ united and personally devoted to the King, William III thought he might still overcome the antagonistic temper of Parliament.

The speech with which he opened the session was as

¹ See Campbell, *Chancellors v* 64 (ed. 1857).

cautious as possible. With a view to the negotiations with France, which as yet had come to no conclusion, he deemed it all-important that there should be an increase in the fighting power of the country on land. But he would not arouse the prejudices of the nation, which were hostile to such a step; he spoke of the restoration of order in finance, the maintenance of the navy, and of trade; he never even mentioned the army. One can see from his correspondence with Heinsius that this self-control cost him much. But this reticence had not the slightest effect.

It was not forgotten in Parliament that at the last prorogation the King had given tokens of his displeasure. The judges in their circuits had spoken unfavourably of the proceedings of the House of Commons, holding that they had exposed the country to the risk of invasion by the Catholic powers. And when people now looked about them, they saw that the very men to whom they attributed this attitude of the King and the utterances of the judges, were still at the helm of affairs. And so, in opposition to ministers, moderate as they were, but with the Whig element preponderating, the zealous Tories undertook to lead the House of Commons¹, and that too with so much energy and effect that in the debate on the King's speech the ancient customary vote of thanks was omitted. On the contrary, an address was drawn up requesting the King to name the men by whom the votes of the House of Commons had been set in a false light; it must have been from nothing but selfish motives that any one had tried to sow distrust between the King and his Parliament. William replied that this had never been done: that he never had permitted it, and never would: for he knew that the welfare of a King of England depended on his good understanding with his Parliament:—words which were well enough to listen to, but which scarcely touched the true grievance. For its true meaning was that the King's ministers must have more respect for the decisions of Parliament than

¹ Bonnet: 'Les sieurs Musgrave, Seymour, How, furent les premiers qui tinrent le dé'

to speak against them afterwards: and that they must submit to those decisions simply and absolutely.

The Commons forthwith made a direct attack on Lord Chancellor Somers, whose influence they deemed the strongest, and to the charge of whom they more especially laid those utterances of the judges.

It was alleged against him that he had given a certain sea-captain, by name Kidd, a patent for the suppression of piracy in the East Indies: that Kidd himself was a pirate, and was embroiling all the relations of England with the Oriental potentates by his doings; that the character of the man must have been known beforehand. But what was objected to even more strongly than the authorization was the order inserted in the patent, that all the goods brought in by Kidd were to belong to those who had equipped him—among whom was the Lord Chancellor himself. It was denied that the crown was able to give beforehand to individual adventurers a right to such prizes; the whole transaction was stigmatised as alike illegal and offensive. But could the highest legal authority in the realm have bestowed an illegal title? The jurists who were consulted on the point held that it was indubitably true that formerly the Lord High Admiral had a right to all goods taken from pirates; that as there was now no one holding this exalted office, the right had lapsed to the crown, and that the crown could grant it as it chose; and therefore that it might pass lawfully to those who had equipped a ship for the suppression of piracy. The Old East India Company had great influence in pressing this grievance: its still remaining trade had been ruined by Kidd; its relations with the Great Mogul interrupted: its members and adherents were among the chief opponents of the Whigs, and broke out into the wildest invectives. On the other side, it made a deep impression when the names of those engaged in this business were announced, in order that every one might know whom he was going to vote against¹. Among them

¹ Vernon to Shrewsbury, Dec. 7. 'I named the Lords who were concerned in the grant, which proved of use, that people might know whom they were passing sentence upon, which otherwise they would have pretended to be ignorant of.'

were Shrewsbury, Orford, Rumney and Bellamont. It made men hesitate before they ventured to offend at once so many men of great name and position. Personal considerations thus combined with the opinion given by the jurists in making the House of Commons declare that the patent was legal; not unanimously, however; there was a very considerable minority on a division. Many were absent, so as to escape voting either way in a doubtful matter.

But even before this there had come up the beginnings of another storm, of a different and far wider extent, touching the innermost circle of the King's friends, and even himself personally; it was at the same time an affair of high constitutional importance.

As early as 1690, directly after the King's return from Ireland, and even before the further reduction of that country, the question who had a right to dispose of the forfeited estates there had occupied the public mind. King and Parliament had agreed that the supporters of James II, who were in arms to recover the districts wrested from his hands, had by this rebellion forfeited all right to those estates which had hitherto been left to them untouched.

But when the King insisted on the right of disposing at his own pleasure of the forfeited and confiscated properties, a right which had ever been exercised by his predecessors on the throne, the Commons proposed that these estates should be applied to make good the war-charges incurred in reducing the island; very much as Cromwell had done, though he did it in another way. The royalist idea of older times, and the popular views of later days here also came into collision. The Commons were specially emphatic in holding that the confiscated lands ought not to belong to courtiers, above all, not to foreigners¹. At that time no agreement was possible on this point. The King, when he left for Holland, promised that he would not dispose of the confiscated lands before the question had been settled in Parliament.

But the question had never been settled from that day;

¹ Bonnet, Oct 31, 1690: 'oster le moyen aux courtisans et à d'autres de s'en faire les dons, et afin qu'on ne s'en pût faire des gratifications à des étrangers.'

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both parties had alike clung tenaciously to their claims. 'The Commons from time to time brought theirs before the world¹. The Court, on the other hand, basing its acts on custom that had never been broken, had proceeded to make grants of great extent: first in favour of those generals who, like Ruvigny and Ginkel, were specially credited with the successful reduction of Ireland²: and secondly in favour of the King's immediate friends and servants, such as Bentinck and Keppel.

While the war lasted, this matter had been let pass, as had also the exercise of several other disputed rights: but in the very first session after peace was made, when men began to busy themselves about the relief of burdens and the payment of debts, then this question was taken up seriously. Loud complaints arose over the grants made by William III, and an enquiry as to their extent and lawfulness was called for. The Whig ministers remarked that it would be unjust to have an enquiry into the proofs of favour shewn by the present worthiest of sovereigns without at the same time taking notice of the grants made under the two previous monarchs, from whom the Tories had drawn no small advantage³. They actually passed a motion to go back in their investigation to the 29th of May, 1660; but only with great difficulty, and without any due regard to the consequences of so doing; for it was truly pointed out to them that the earlier grants had already passed into the hands of third persons. The importance of the resolutions agreed to lay in their first Article, namely, 'that leave be given to bring in a Bill or Bills for vacating all grants of estates and other interests forfeited in Ireland since the 13th day of February, 1688 (the day of the accession of King William III), and for appropriating the same to the use of the public⁴.' Without considering the ancient usage of

¹ As in the session of 1692, 1693 Address, in Tindal iii 235.

² I have myself seen in the Dublin Archives the original patent by which Ginkel held his grants in it the King praises him for having by his valour and generalship forced the rebels to abandon their strongholds: the phraseology is modelled on the language of the Plantagenet sovereigns.

³ Bonnet, Feb 8/18, 1697/8. 'Si le parti de la cour n'eût agi fortement, on n'auoit examiné que les dons qui ont été faits sous le présent règne.'

⁴ Resolution passed Feb 7, 1697/8. Journals of Commons xii. 90.

the monarchy, the Commons laid direct claim to the right of disposing of forfeited property, and placed themselves in downright opposition to the actual ordinances issued by the King. We are told that William felt it deeply, and refused to admit any one to audience on the evening of the day on which this resolution was passed ¹.

The Bill was not carried through at that time; the matter did not come again under discussion till towards the end of the next session, and then under the impression produced by the personal advances of the King toward the Whigs and of that attempt to subject English noblemen to the precedence of Albemarle in military command, which had aroused the antipathies of the nation. Then the Commons resolved to add a clause to the Money-Bill, ordering an enquiry to be made into the Irish grants: commissioners to be entrusted with this duty were named; there were seven of them, all men who enjoyed the confidence of the majority in this matter ². The affair was distasteful to the King from the first moment: he was not sorry to see that a dispute sprang up between the two Houses, not indeed on the appointment of the Commission but as to their payment, the arrangements for which had been tacked to a Bill levying a new tax; the King prorogued Parliament before the matter was adjusted ³.

But the Commissioners were not hindered by this from crossing over to Ireland to do their work.

They met with manifold difficulties, as of course might have been expected, through the want of arrangement in the register laid before them, and through those personal considerations which affected every verbal communication made to them: moreover, they were not unanimous among themselves; the report they drew up was signed by only four, a bare majority; the

¹ Tallard: 'Détail de ce qui s'est passé dans cette dernière séance du parlement.' May 24, 1698.

² Journals of Commons, April 19, 1699.

³ According to Bonnet it was 'une clause, par laquelle on donnoit 3000 livres st. aux commissaires qu'on avoit nommés.' Thanks to the deficiency of English reports, and the defective condition of the Journals, we are here limited to the reports of Bonnet and Tallard.

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other three had scruples. In this report the number of rebels who had forfeited their estates is put at nearly 4000¹; the extent of the estates exceeded a million acres; their value, by the average yearly income, was reckoned at over two millions and a half. A large part had been restored to its original owners, in consequence of the Treaty of Limerick, and by special acts of grace; still, the larger part (reckoned as worth over a million and a half) had been granted to the King's favourites, and in large part even to foreigners².

It was now intended to make all arrangements which had taken place under royal authority depend retrospectively on the authority of Parliament. In support of this proposal Davenant, the skilful spokesman of the financial opposition, issued a pamphlet in which the immense cost of the late war and the melancholy state into which the country had consequently fallen were set forth together:—the estimated income was anticipated, the duties out of all proportion, taxation oppressive; if they wished to gain a breathing-time they must for a year at least give up the Land-tax and cover the deficit so caused by the resumption of the Irish grants. He reckoned the war-expenses for Ireland alone at four millions and a half: what could be more reasonable than that the country should to some degree indemnify itself by means of the rebels' forfeited property? He did not fail to draw from English and French history examples of greedy favourites, who had been punished for their rapacity: the parallel was obvious.

On the 15th of December, 1699, the papers collected by the Commission were laid before the House of Commons in nine parts; there was a tenth document, containing the report of the majority, which was at once read out. What made especial impression was the account of the false representations as to value with which the king had been deceived, and the personal intrigues by which many, who had certainly been guilty of rebellion, had succeeded in getting their pardons.

¹ The exact number was 3921.

² We find in Ralph, *History of England* ii. 833 sqq., the report of the majority, together with an extract from the memorial made by the minority; the latter however contains no very important objections.

No one paid the slightest attention to the memorial of the minority of the Commissioners. Every one started from the point that here was an obvious case of fraud, and that no further enquiry was needed. Accordingly, in the same session, without the slightest delay, two resolutions of very decisive importance were passed: one that all grants of forfeited possessions and crown-property in Ireland, which had fallen in during the reign of William III, should be resumed; the other, that all claims on the forfeited property should be decided by a court of justice established for that purpose, so that the whole matter should be taken out of the King's hands, and entrusted to Parliament: and that no petition against this arrangement should be received. These considerations were so overwhelming that even those members who had themselves received considerable grants—men like Montague and Coningsby—voted for their withdrawal.

There was much discussion on the Commission's Report, and very disagreeable it was to the King; for the favour he had shewn to Mrs. Villiers, formerly a lady-in-waiting to the Queen, now Lady Orkney, was referred to; she had received a considerable grant. Did it not look as if he was a King ruled over and deceived by favourites, even by women, a king who spent the public wealth on his personal fancies?

But even now the courtiers hoped they might save at least a part of the grants thus attacked. On the very first discussion of the matter in 1690, it had been proposed in the Bill then drawn up to leave the King the right of disposing of one-third of the confiscated property; the clause was not adopted in the Commons, and the Bill, as a whole, was shelved: the decision of the matter in Parliament was to come first; and it was fully expected at court that this proposal would still be carried. What could be more moderate? Had not England to thank the King's personal efforts and abilities for the whole success obtained? The suggestion that the vacant properties should be divided into three parts, one for the King, one for the Army, and the third for the English nation, gained some popularity. On the second reading of the Bill (January 18, 1700) the King thought well to make the proposal that the

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committee should be instructed to introduce into it a clause to that effect. The ministers most reluctantly consented to accept a proposal of the kind; as a fact, it only served to arouse warm opposition. The King had wished to take a formal division on it; the ministers however considered this useless; for they would have been left in a minority, with none to support them except the movers of the clause.

But this attack was not merely made against the King's pretensions; it was aimed still more directly at his counsellors, the ministers. It was laid to their charge that they had shewn no regard to their previous promises. They replied that they could not be blamed for any illegal procedure, seeing that there was no law on the subject¹; the acts of former kings had been a precedent for them. But in saying this, they aroused the most vehement antipathies of the House of Commons. They were not charged with having directly broken the law, but with flagrant neglect of the interests of the public, and even of their duty towards the King. A resolution was drawn up to the effect that by their advice and co-operation in these alienations the ministers had burdened the nation with debts and taxes, and had even stained the King's honour; and that this was a grave dereliction of duty.

This was a very heavy blow to the members of the government. They thought it was intended to deliver them up utterly to the hatred of the nation, and thereby to get support for a possible prosecution. The Whigs tried only to shew that they had not alone been partakers in these alienations; in earlier days Godolphin and Seymour had also had to do with them. 'But, as usual,' cries Vernon, 'the other party got a great triumph: the Whigs suffered a lamentable overthrow; I do not see how they can ever rise again: I wish the King and Kingdom be not the greatest sufferers².'

The King at first adhered tenaciously to his own view.

Without awaiting the discussion of the matter in the

¹ So says Bonnet: 'Ils se crurent en droit de rémontrer, qu'ils n'avoient pas contrevenu aux lois, en tant qu'il n'y en a eu aucune, et qu'ils ont de leur côté l'exemple de prédécesseurs de S. M.'

² Vernon to Shrewsbury, Jan. 18, 1700 (Vernon Letters, ii. 413); I am again obliged to combine what he tells us with the reports in Bonnet and in the Journals.

House of Lords, the Commons laid their resolutions before him by a deputation, which embraced the most distinguished members of the Tory opposition. The King considered that he had not exceeded his rights towards them. It was, besides, clear that the revenues from the Irish grants to be resumed had been greatly exaggerated for party-purposes, and that in the existing state of the island not much immediate relief of the burdens of England could be expected. He gave them to understand that the House of Commons might well have adopted better and more practical ways of paying off the country's debts than that of recalling the grants of the properties of rebels; and, he added, 'I was not only led by inclination, but thought myself obliged in justice, to reward those who had served me well, and particularly in the reduction of Ireland, out of the estates forfeited by the rebellion there¹.

But the days were past in which such answers were well received in Parliament. The leading members even saw in these words an attack on the House, and threw the responsibility of it on the ministers. For the King could surely not reply to his Commons without first having consulted his Privy Council²? What gave most offence was the passage in which the King had asserted his right to the forfeited estates: it was noticed that this might be true enough of small confiscations, but to such great forfeitures, after a rebellion, the suppression of which had cost the country millions, it was no longer applicable, especially as the King was bound by an express engagement. They insisted that the country ought not in time of peace to have to bear these burdens which had been imposed on it in time of war, and was justified in taking possession of the revenues of the confiscated lands. Howe was

¹ I am here puzzled, I confess, by the Parliamentary History. It makes William say he has not been led by inclination. The Journals (xiii. 228) have 'not only'. Also in the Vernon letters the phrase runs 'not only;' so that I consider this the correct one. So also Harris has it; in contradiction to the other historians.

² 'Que le roi ne pouvoit donner de réponse à une adresse de ses communes qu'après en avoir conféré avec son conseil privé,—qu'on avoit fait dire à S. M. que ces biens confisqués lui appartenoient' (he had been speaking of 'estates forfeited to him') 'que cette proposition étoit d'une dangereuse conséquence.' Bonnet's dispatch, Febr. 27/March 9.

for a declaration that the ministers who had induced the King to make such a reply were enemies to the King and the realm. Musgrave said he was not prepared to go so far; yet he proposed a declaration that the ministers had been guilty of an attempt to sow discord between the King and the nation. And this was adopted unanimously.

This was an attack on the ministers, which at the same time struck the King himself, and touched one of the gravest points at issue between prerogative and parliamentary right.

There can be no doubt that in this matter the nation approved of the claim made by Parliament. For every one hoped there would be some alleviation of the oppressive public burdens through the resumption of the late grants. Davenant's views had been universally adopted. When then the Commons, in their later deliberations, even themselves inserted some grants, it had simply the effect of still more distinctly confirming their right to dispose of confiscated property without considering the King.

To the principle of parliamentary right, which was decided by this, was joined another of great importance for the existing composition of the government. It might in fact be asserted that it would be affected to the very heart by it.

For the largest grants had fallen to the share of the most intimate circle of the King's friends—Bentinck, Earl of Portland, Keppel, Earl of Albemarle, and Mrs. Villiers; who undoubtedly all possessed a certain influence in personal matters. It was assumed that if the chief ministers had been concerned in this, it had surely been with the intention of winning these confidants of the King to their side, while at the same time they hoped to get some personal advantage for themselves. It was of the highest importance to the Tories and the majority in the House of Commons that this connexion should be broken up, and their opponents ejected from office.

It has been said that the Tories had been led by the King's friends to think that the Whig ministers would be sacrificed if some compromise were come to about the grants. The Whigs, on their side, thought they might still hold their own, and make head against their antagonists; they succeeded in

making stout and effectual resistance in the Lords to the votes of the Commons¹.

It was not till the beginning of April that the Bill reached the House of Lords. It was designedly tacked to the Land-tax Bill, which had meanwhile been passed, though for a smaller amount : for the Commons thought the Lords would not venture to throw out a money-bill.

But this very combination of measures gave its opponents at the first reading the opportunity of raising objections in themselves sufficiently well-founded. For the arrangement put a kind of compulsion on the House of Lords : certain clauses were thus criticised, as being specially offensive to the Lords, and as likely by this procedure to become law. Still the second reading passed ; only the Bill was still to be considered in detail in Committee. Then it was that the Whig peers especially, headed by Wharton, proposed some amendments, and, supported by the court-party, carried them. The amendments did not directly touch important points, but it might have been known beforehand that the Commons would throw them out. It could not be concealed that their adoption by the Lords and the difference with the Commons which would ensue, might cause the utmost embarrassment : still they did not shrink even from this. Many of the Lords, above all several Bishops, voted with them on the sanguine supposition that the Court would be prepared to find a satisfactory escape from the difficulty. Others were influenced by irritation at the repeated attempts of the Commons to reduce the Upper House to an inferior position. The Duke of Devonshire declared that the barriers between crown and people would be broken down by this Bill : he swore he would never consent to such a Bill ; his example had great effect in leading the younger Lords : the amendments were actually adopted².

¹ 'There is a notion, as if the Tories would be pacified, though this Bill were thrown out, upon condition that the Whigs be discarded, and on the other side, the Whigs may think it an opportunity for strengthening their interest with the King, if they can support the rejecting of the Bill.' Vernon Letters, iii.'3, cp. iii. 8. He expresses himself very cautiously ; but the tenor of his letter shews that this was his view.

² Bonnet, Apr. 9/20. 'Le Duc de Devonshire déclara même avec serment, qu'il

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The less violent friends and associates of government were not well-satisfied with all this. For the Commons would be only all the more determined; if they were led to draw up a new Bill, it would be still more hostile to the King and his favourites: people were already talking of instituting proceedings against the King's friends, to whom they attributed his obstinacy. When the amendments were sent down to the House of Commons, all the leading men, Musgrave, Seymour, Harley, Harcourt, Howe, rose up against them. They declared they were determined, under the circumstances, not to proceed to vote the supplies; their duty to the country would not allow it. Then the army would be entirely disbanded, the fleet would get no pay, credit would perish, the nation be undone:—and all for the sake of a parcel of foreigners, who cared nothing for England, and upheld a corrupt ministry which shared the spoil with them.

Even within sight of an open breach and the great perils it would cause, the Lords stood firmly to their amendments; but the King hesitated to draw so violent a storm on his head. We suddenly find Sunderland again active. It has been attributed to his interference that the King let his friends in the Lords know that they must give way.

And now the Whigs were completely beaten. Wharton made a voluntary retreat, to escape from the effects of his unlucky counsels: Lord Somers was threatened with a formal impeachment; but escaped with the proposal of a mild motion against him, which satisfied the hostility of his opponents so little that they let it drop. But in general the passing of the Bill carried with it the overthrow of the Whigs who had opposed it. And the King's friends were also directly hit by it. When the Commons begged William III to admit none but native subjects to his council, they demanded the exclusion not only of Portland, who had already resigned, but also of Albemarle.

To stop the excitement from going any farther, the King

ne consenteroit jamais à un bill, qui diminueoit leurs privilèges; qu'insensiblement les communes acheveroient avec leurs bills pécuniaires toutes leurs prérogatives et même celles du roi.'

hastened to prorogue Parliament (April 11). He signed the Bills laid before him without a word. He ought to have said something by way of thanks for the supplies voted him: but he could not bring himself to do it. He breathed freely when all was over: it was the most unpleasant session he had ever yet passed through. It seems as if he could not even now get accustomed to the party-movements which stormed around him. He said well that they could scarcely be credited by those who saw them with their own eyes: far less then could they be described to others.

Apart from this the position he was in was one of the utmost difficulty.

His system of softening the hostile impulses of the majority by means of moderate Whigs combined with an infusion of moderate Tories had utterly broken down; a few days after the close of the session he was obliged to bid the Lord Chancellor resign the seals. Montague, whom the Commons would now scarcely listen to, and still less do anything he asked them, was raised a little later to the peerage by the recently vacated title of Lord Halifax. The majority, composed of the Tories, triumphed over the Whigs, the ministers, the King himself. When Seymour went to Kensington to take leave before his departure, the King told him he did not mean to think about the past,—only about the future; that he hoped they would be better friends next session than they had been in the last. ‘I doubt it not,’ replied Seymour; and his tone was that of the superior on whom it all depended.

Still things had come to a point at which it seemed almost impossible to combine the respect due to the King’s authority with a parliamentary constitution. The party-leaders felt themselves stronger than the King.

The French ambassador tells us that an important personage, to whom a place as minister was offered, replied that he must first learn whether he was to be the minister of a King or of a Republic. Without taking the anecdote as literally true, one may understand from it in how doubtful a position the King’s authority now stood.

CHAPTER V.

AFFAIRS IN IRELAND, SCOTLAND, AND NORTH AMERICA.

WE will now glance at the countries which lie close to England and at her colonies :—a complete investigation scarcely falls within our province. We will first take Ireland, where the prominent questions have the characteristic of connecting the earliest with the latest times.

The English and Protestant interest had been reinstated by the war, but still the native and Catholic elements were by no means entirely suppressed, seeing that the capitulation of Limerick granted them rights, though indeed limited ones. How far, when occasion served, the articles of that agreement might be stretched may be seen from the Earl of Antrim, who, having posted himself with his followers on a height behind a slight entrenchment, claimed to be included among those troops under arms in towns and garrisons in the neighbouring counties which had received a promise of pardon, on condition that they laid down their arms. He thus saved his very large estates, valued at £5,000 a year. Similarly, the Maguires, one of the O'Neals, and many others recovered their forfeited estates. To such as submitted letters of protection were granted in great numbers by government; as many as three hundred such were deposited with the Sheriff of Dublin alone. Some native troops passed over into the King's service, and then took advantage of the free quarters which could not be refused to the standing army in Ireland as it was very insufficiently paid; they were no slight burden to the Protestant inhabitants¹.

¹ Sloane, 'Account of the affairs of Ireland,' a paper laid at this time before the English Parliament.

What induced the King thus to spare the smitten foe, was the prospect of a general war: for at no price dared he leave the Catholics so dissatisfied as to tempt the French King to make a descent among them.

But the Irish Protestants were intensely disgusted at it. The Bishop of Meath, otherwise a worthy man, preached against it; others, however, took up the opposite side in the pulpit. Both principles were represented in the government; the exclusively Protestant view by Chancellor Porter, the milder view by Lord Coningsby and his friends. The zealous Protestants accused them and even him, declaring that they only did it for the sake of the profits which the pardons brought them in.

In 1692 King William named one of his most trusted friends, Lord Sidney, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland: Sidney at once convoked a fresh Irish Parliament. The last had been exclusively Catholic, this was exclusively Protestant. It began by recognising its dependence on England, and the indubitable rights of the King and Queen, to whom it also voted an ardent address of thanks¹. The Lords and Commons protest therein that they are ready to spend their lives and properties, which their Majesties had rescued for them, in defence of the royal dignity. But for all that the innate jealousy forthwith began to show itself. The administration was most vehemently attacked for its bearing towards the Catholics. The Parliament did not go so far as actually to refuse the supplies: but when the ministers laid before it a Bill for raising them, based on a new Land-tax, a violent opposition sprang up; though it was on the formal ground that it surely was not the part of the Privy Council to introduce proposals as to the ways and means of raising supply². Sidney took his stand on this privilege as an indisputable right of the English crown, and adjourned the Parliament. So sharply and irreconcilably, at the very first

¹ Printed in Harris, App No. lxiv.

² Their view was 'that when the Commons—having the sole right of first founding or proposing the heads of bills for raising of money—had proposed them to the council board, the council board should draw them into bills and transmit them into England to be transmitted back.'

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step, broke out the strife between the exclusively Protestant Parliament, and a government which was lenient towards the Catholics. When a member of that Parliament expressed his opinion to Sidney that the House would never bear such a pretension as that, the Lord Lieutenant replied that, if so, Ireland would have to do without a Parliament.

But the Irish Parliament found support in the English: William found himself obliged to remove Sidney. The next Lord Lieutenant, who was appointed under the influence of the growing Whig opinions, Lord Capel, again summoned a Parliament in the summer of 1695: it proved just as exclusive as the last; but now he himself fell in with this tendency.

The Land-tax was not mentioned again; it would have touched the holders of property: a Poll-tax was substituted for it; and no difficulty was made as to accepting a form of taxation which was light, was introduced from England, and affected every one alike. Government and Parliament were only bent on carrying out a thoroughly anti-Catholic policy.

The Acts of Parliament passed under James II were declared null and void, and the actual documents publicly burnt: as a matter of fact they have as good as disappeared: even the edicts passed under Charles II for the relief of Catholics were revoked; Catholics were ejected from every corporation, were ordered to deliver up their weapons at the royal armouries; armourers might not take any Catholic apprentices. The education of native subjects in foreign schools and even in the private houses of Catholics was forbidden under the heaviest penalties. Regulations were framed which should stop for ever the marriage of Protestant heiresses with Catholics. The Articles of Limerick were not actually cancelled; but whereas their limits had previously been stretched wide, now they were drawn in as tightly as possible¹.

And with this temper the enactments of the next Parliament also coincided. In 1698 the settlement of Charles II, abrogated by James II, against which the natives had specially taken up arms, was re-enacted, with all the Protestant rights thence arising. It was ordered that in courts of law such

¹ Extract from the Acts, in Harris 417.

Catholics only should be admitted as were willing to take the oath introduced; but even these were pledged to let their children be brought up as Protestants.

Once more religious hatred joined with the antipathy of the races: the English Parliament, which was just as full of a lively dislike to the Catholics, made no objection to the Irish legislation in this direction.

But in another department very far-reaching differences again broke out between them.

The English noticed with jealousy that the production of wool had increased very much in Ireland, and that the Irish had actually exported it in large quantities to France, and had also begun to manufacture it successfully in the country itself. King William was reminded that the English wool trade, on which the wealth and commerce of the country greatly depended, was thus being crossed by a damaging competition, which the Irish ought rather to avoid, seeing they had been saved only by the power of England. The English Parliament wished to see the productions of Ireland limited to flax and linen; for that would be useful to England. Under the King's influence, who wished to put an end to the strife between the two legislative bodies, the Irish Parliament declared that it would conform as far as possible in both respects. But this, however, was not done to the extent demanded: the export of Irish wool to France rather increased, so that the manufacture of cloth in that country advanced in a way very distasteful to the English: and, besides this, so audacious a claim aroused in itself much uneasiness in Ireland. The Protestants observed that the English interest did no doubt support them, but only to confine them again within narrow limits. It increased this feeling when the arrangements made by the English trustees as to the recovered estates by no means met their wishes; these too seemed to turn out favourably for the Catholics. People began to ask themselves whether the English Parliament was in its legal right when it passed laws which should be binding on Ireland.

A pamphlet by Molyneux appeared at this time, and made a deep impression; it denied this claim on the ground of old

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parliamentary enactments. The author insisted on the idea that Ireland, being a conquered country, was specially subject to the crown and to the will of the Prince who wore it. Parliament, still excited by some other occurrences, took notice of the point, and for its part begged the King to take care that the laws passed in England to affect or restrain Ireland should be strictly applied to that country¹.

Thus Ireland, though kept down and obedient, was still full of ferment. The two great questions, the relations between Catholics and Protestants, and the dependence on England, agitated all men's minds. Had it depended on the King, the Capitulation of Limerick would have been sustained in its liberal interpretation, and the royal authority made valid: but we know how little he was in a position to accomplish this; even in Irish affairs the English Parliament had made him feel its power in the most oppressive way.

Let us now turn our attention to Scotland, which undoubtedly was still constitutionally independent of the English Parliament, and, though under the same King, was yet autonomous.

But, all the same, it was closely bound up in a communion of interests and fortunes with England. Every time an attack on Great Britain was planned the French and James II reckoned specially on Scotland. Among the Scottish lairds were more and hotter Jacobites than among the English nobles: in the Highlands there was an incessant ferment; even the Scottish Episcopalians looked forward to the return of the ejected King for their deliverance and salvation.

Under such circumstances the Presbyterians could not possibly persist in their most extreme demands. When Middleton obtained from S. Germain's the declaration which established Episcopalianism, the Scottish Parliament, in consequence, granted greater toleration to the members of that communion; it declared that it would be content with a recognition of the Church-government introduced as a legal institution, without insisting as of old on its divine right. The Episcopalians still hesitated to make the desired recognition, and it might have appeared from the wording

¹ Cp. Ralph, *History of England* ii. 779.

of the Act as if they would hereby lose the King's protection. But the King promised them this all the more emphatically, if they would but take generally the prescribed oath of allegiance to him and to his government; and the most prominent Episcopalians forthwith resolved to take the step. Moderation in religious matters was almost the most important thing that William recommended to the Parliament of 1695, and this time his recommendation bore practical fruit¹.

It was in this session that the enquiry into the Glencoe massacre came on. But it did not seem to be the right moment to arouse serious ill-feelings, which might lead no one knew how far, when supplies had still to be voted to the King for the war. And if anything more was needed to scare men from the subject, it was to be found in that connexion between the strongest Presbyterians and the Jacobites which now came to light. The majority clung all the more closely to the King. He was pronounced blameless as to the conduct of that business; even the immediate author of the massacre, the Master of Stair, found favour with Parliament: his punishment was entrusted to the King, who satisfied himself with dismissing him from his service: only the subordinate instruments of the execution were punished.

But though in political and theological matters an understanding had been come to between the King and Parliament, hot and vehement discord sprang up in Scotland as well as in Ireland on commercial affairs.

We have already noticed the scheme for the establishment of a Scottish trading colony in Darien, which was expected to gather into its hands both the western and the eastern commerce of the world; it caused, as we have said, much dissatisfaction in England: King William was compelled by the English Parliament to withdraw the permission he had already granted to the Scots; he even dismissed the ministers by whose advice it had been done².

¹ Report in Tindal's *Rapin* iii 287.

² Dalrymple ('*Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland*' ii. pt. 3, bk. 6, 89 sqq.) has an article on this subject, drawn from original sources, but deeply tinged with Scottish prejudice.

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But the only result was that the Scots undertook to carry out the project by themselves, without external support, even without the King's permission. William Patterson, from whose brain the scheme had sprung, in actual and direct opposition to the old East India Company, which he hoped to rival, had met with support in his own country which surpassed all expectation¹. It is an example of the manner in which the human mind, ever striving after novelty, will throw itself suddenly into tracks hitherto utterly untrodden. The Scots seized on the commercial tendencies of the age with quite as much enthusiasm as they had previously shown for religious matters only; towns and villages, the great nobility and gentry, mercantile companies and learned corporations, private persons, some of whom even risked every penny they possessed, were found as subscribers to the undertaking. The lately established Scottish manufactories for wool and linen, for weapons and agricultural implements, also helped: the Highlanders volunteered as soldiers; even the Jacobites took part. The hope of profit and the jealousy of England united the whole nation.

In July 1698 six ships, well-manned and equipped with all that was wanted to establish and defend a colony, put out to sea. The instructions given them by the Directors were not to be opened till they reached Madeira. They contained orders for an enterprise on the Isthmus of Darien, where the Scots landed on the 4th of November, 1698, after coming to an understanding with the natives, who hoped to find in them allies against the Spaniards. They then proceeded to build a fort, and called it St. Andrews²; a New Edinburgh was to be founded; the country was to be named Caledonia.

Patterson, who sailed as a volunteer with the expedition (for no part in the conduct of it had been granted him), has left a report on all the shortcomings in the management both of the voyage and of the settlement, shortcomings which arose

¹ As appears in a memorial to the King, in which 'the honour and independency of the nation, as well as the credit and authority of the Parliament,' are said to be involved. Tindal's *Rapin* iii. 381.

² Report of matters relating to the colony of Caledonia. *Darien Papers* 178.

from the incompetence of the Directors, a body of seven who often quarrelled. The most important omission seems to have been the want of boats and small vessels with which to communicate at least with the nearest English colonies, those of North America and Jamaica. Moreover, they received hardly any news from home, still less any support. On the very spot which the Scots had persuaded themselves to regard as the connecting-link between the utmost parts of the globe, they found themselves cut off from all mankind. Their merchandise could not be turned into money; their stores wasted; sickness broke out. Yet their courage was still high, when news reached them that the English colonies had been forbidden to traffic with them, and this in such terms as opened their eyes to the serious danger they were in.

The English made merry over the fancy that these people had newly discovered the importance of the Isthmus; both French and English statesmen had long noticed it, but had not ventured to take possession, as such a step would have endangered the peace with Spain, thereby risking the whole of the very profitable trade with the Spanish possessions¹. And they could at once see the effects of it on the pending negotiations, when the Spaniards supposed that William III favoured the undertaking. The King himself took it amiss that the Scots had landed on foreign territory without inviting him to give them counsel in the matter; he did not hesitate to place himself full in their way. The proclamation he issued declares that his Majesty's peace with his allies is broken by the Scottish undertaking: all English subjects are forbidden any business-transaction with the new colony. The King's expression seems to justify the Spaniards, who were already threatening the colonists, in treating them as pirates². In the face of such a prospect, coming after the manifold difficulties they met with, the colonists at last utterly lost heart; the opinion generally gained ground that Darien must be abandoned as soon as possible. In vain did Patterson try to stop them by representing that help would

¹ So says Bonnet, who generally pays great attention to this enterprise.

² Patterson's Report, here also the best source of information. *Darien Papers* 178: Bannister's Writings of William Patterson 1. 57.

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doubtless very soon arrive from Scotland. In May 1699 they got news of their danger. early in June they set sail for home. When, a little later, a second expedition which had been fitted out meanwhile reached the coast, it found nothing but a desert: it had also to struggle against the growing hostility of the Spaniards, which it was not strong enough to cope with.

This was the first venture of Scottish mercantile enterprise, and its failure was the more productive of trouble, because it caused the most tangible losses to every class in the country.

A great part of the blame was not unfairly attributed to the King, who had been guided in this affair by the counsels of English and Dutch jealousy; in the Scottish Parliament indignation broke out in violent attacks on government: the man who specially had charge of Scottish affairs in the King's council was described as a destructive monster which ought, like any other such, to be got rid of. The Parliament was on the point of declaring that the Darien scheme, which it seemed determined to take up, was lawful, when it was suddenly prorogued: its determination was then asserted in an address, couched in an almost hostile tone. We are told that the national animosity thus brought to light caused such a stir in England that the northern counties were put into a state of defence.

Had William been King of Scotland only, he might perhaps have favoured their enterprise. But the English Parliament laid it on him as a kind of duty to oppose it. The proclamation with which the Scots reproached the King, answered almost word for word to an address which the English had made him some years before. This was the characteristic position of the kingdom of Great Britain. Each member of it had its own special Parliament, the interests of which sometimes fell in with, sometimes clashed with, those of the others. The King, constitutionally dependent on them, could not have maintained unity of government: this depended on the preponderance the English Parliament had over both the two neighbouring countries and over the King himself.

But no interest lay so near the heart of the English Parlia-

ment as that of its commercial supremacy over all British possessions. Even the colonies founded by voluntary emigration were held in very strict subjection under it: Massachusetts is an example.

This, the most powerful colony of New England, had at that time lost its letters of patent, which had granted it very extensive rights: it had lost them chiefly because it did not observe the Navigation Acts, which defined the relations between the plantations and the mother-country. This had taken place in the last days of the Stuarts: the colony considered itself just as much wronged by this as the corporations were by the withdrawal of their civic charters, and thought it just as much an attack on lawful rights fairly earned¹. And so the change of affairs in 1688 was nowhere received more enthusiastically than in Massachusetts. The interests of religion, of their chartered liberties, even of the common struggle with France, which broke out at once in Canada, these were all most intimately connected with the new order of things in England. But for all this the colony did not recover its letters patent. On the contrary it was much discussed in England, whether it would not be best to unite all the northern colonies, and govern them by a Commission acting under royal authority without any regard to their charters. But this again was opposed to the general course of movement in England. Under Somers' influence fresh letters-patent were drawn up, in which the constitution might indeed have been preserved in form, but certainly was not so in substance. Above all, while the Governor had hitherto been appointed by the colony, and had been really dependent on it, henceforth he was to be nominated by the crown, and furnished with an independent authority coming from above. The first Governor under the new arrangement was Bellamont, a Whig nobleman, who had been implicated in Kidd's affair; he had fitted him out, and afterwards again

¹ Letter by Stoughton 1677. Hutchinson's History of the colony of Massachusetts Bay i. 319 (Ed 1760): 'The country's not taking notice of these acts of navigation to observe them, hath been the most unhappy neglect that we could have fallen into.'

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had kept him back and given him up to England. His chief duty, which he also fulfilled, was the extinction of piracy in North America, an evil incompatible with a well-ordered colonial administration.

But the chief aim of the new regulations, drawn up mainly under William III, was to establish such an administration in complete subordination to the mother-country. The Governors were pledged by oath to carry this out, and were also clothed with the independent authority requisite for it: any statute of the local legislatures which was opposed to it, was beforehand pronounced invalid. The manufactures, which were also beginning to flourish in the colonies, were limited to private consumption. A system was thus introduced, the pressure of which, seventy years later, was the chief cause of the emancipation of the colonies. But at this time the votes of Parliament were absolutely binding on North America¹.

¹ Hutchinson II. Cp Bancroft's *History of the United States* iii 105.

CHAPTER VI.

ORIGIN AND CONDITIONS OF THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION.

WHILE the English Commonwealth was in this condition, with Parliament predominant over kingdom and King, and the Tories predominant in Parliament, there came up a new succession-question, which as yet had not been provided for.

Hitherto William Duke of Gloucester, the Princess Anne's son, had been regarded as heir-presumptive to the throne after his mother. The boy was just eleven, and of the numerous children whom the Princess had borne seemed to be the only one destined to grow up; he appeared to justify good hopes for both mind and body. A little court had been created for his education at Windsor; over this Marlborough presided; Bishop Burnet not only superintended his teaching, but himself taught him history, theology, and everything relating to politics, the branches of education which seemed to be of special importance for the heir to the throne. He praises the good memory and sound judgment which the boy showed: the prince not unfrequently interrupted the monotony of his lessons by original remarks. Many were glad to hear that these remarks often harmonised but ill with the latitudinarian and Whiggish views of the Bishop. He seemed also to have a still stronger taste for arms than for books. The Tories who, while they accepted the Revolution, still hoped to see a return to the doctrine of hereditary right, looked on the boy as their future strength. They thought they might expect him to be a prince of the old stock, yet energetic, and impressed with all the old monarchical ideas, enterprising and English to the backbone. But it was not fated that the affairs of England should be developed in

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this direction. The boy from whom so much was expected, was suddenly carried off, a few days after his eleventh birthday (30th of July, 1700) by a malignant fever and small-pox¹.

In the sickly condition of the King, and the physical state of the Princess, which seemed to promise her also no great length of days, there was every prospect of a speedy vacancy of the throne.

On that border-land in which advanced Whigs and Republicans met, the idea once more arose that monarchy might altogether die out of England, as being nothing but a burden to the nation: its cost would be better spent in strengthening the armed force; state-dignities, now concentrated on one single person, would then be distributed among the different classes of society, high and low:—why then should William III not be the last King of England²?

On the other hand, all the hopes of the Jacobites for the restoration of the legitimate sovereign revived. The English ambassador in France describes the expectations which sprang up at once at St. Germain as amazingly confident. Most Englishmen living in France had been won over: many at home also joined. Here too there was a border-land in which Tories and Nonjurors joined hands. From Scotland the manifestations of devotion were all the more numerous, in consequence of the then prevailing dislike for William III. Men's views were not always directed towards James II, but towards the Prince of Wales, whom most of them now acknowledged as his legitimate son, and also as rightful heir to the throne; he was one year older than the Duke of Gloucester; it was thought that an agreement might be made with him as to his relation to Protestantism; or that he might even be prevailed on to renounce his Catholicism.

¹ So an Article in the London Gazette, reprinted in the 'Annals of Windsor' ii. 465.

² Bonnet: 'Les républicains se flattent de pouvoir fonder leur empire, si la princesse et S. M. le roi venoient à manquer.' Tallard's correspondent writes very expressly from London, 27 August, 1700: 'que la dépense, que fait un roi d'Angleterre sur le pied, que sa maison est présentement, seroit capable d'entretenir une puissante flotte ou une armée formidable par terre.' Some such arguments were used in the pamphlet 'The Free State of Noland,' the contents of which are given by Ralph, History of England ii. 892.

And was not William III even inclined for a time to fall in with some such arrangement?

It has been often declared, both at the time and since, that in the days of his political approximation to Louis XIV he had allowed himself to make promises favourable to the King's protégé, the Pretender. Yet this is only true so far as this,—that people in France flattered themselves that they might be able to evoke some such expressions. The matter was discussed at Versailles with Tallard, who had taken a short holiday away from his embassy: it was thought that, so long as the Tories clung to the young Duke of Gloucester, King William and even the Whigs would prefer to look out for some other successor. Some wished that a proposal should be made to King William to have the Prince of Wales educated as his heir under his own eye in Holland; with the reservation that for the future the exercise of the Catholic faith should only be permitted him in private; religion and state in England being secured firmly in their existing condition¹. It was almost like the state of affairs in 1460 when the Lancastrian King secured the throne for his own lifetime by recognising a Yorkist heir. Tallard meant to mention the subject if William again referred to the dismissal of King James from St. Germain. And this actually did take place one day: but in a way which gave the ambassador no opportunity or encouragement for coming forward with his proposal.

William III seems to have been more in favour of the claim to the throne raised by Victor Amadeus of Savoy for his children. He had married the daughter of Henrietta Duchess of Orleans, the beautiful and intelligent sister of Charles II, whose political career and unexpected death we have already noticed: now that the elder brother had died leaving no legitimate children, and the younger was shut out with his posterity, the nearest claim surely was that of the descendants of the sister and her daughter in the house of Savoy. The Duke always maintained that the English made but one condition—namely, that the heir, supposing him to be one of

¹ 'Mémoire du roi pour instruire Mr. le comte de Tallard des intentions de S M. sur plusieurs articles, dont il a eu l'honneur de lui parler.' 17 Dec. 1698.

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his sons, should be educated as a member of the Anglican Church¹. The secession of the Duke from the alliance necessarily put a stop to these negotiations; he then, as we have remarked, threw himself entirely into the hands of the Catholic party.

There had also been another arrangement suggested long before, at the time of the first settlement of the succession in 1689. At that time the Lords had not as yet come to a definite conclusion as to the succession to the throne; at the King's wish they had considered the eventual rights of the house of Hanover. Burnet gives himself the credit of having specially brought this claim into notice, and of having at that time proposed its recognition; the affair, however, he adds, was opposed by the Republicans who kept their eyes on the possible extinction of the dynasty². The proposal fell dead at that time, chiefly because of the birth of the Duke of Gloucester. After his death the original idea revived.

Let us state the facts on which the matter depends. In the days of his connexion with the German Union, James I had given his daughter Elizabeth in marriage to Frederick Elector Palatine, the head of the Union; we have sketched their rise, misfortunes, and long exile. The failure of James I to send them the expected help was the chief cause of all the complications in which he, and after his death Charles I, were involved. Warm Protestants even at that day had fixed their attention on the Palatine branch of the family. Now the then Electress of Hanover was of this branch. Sophia, twelfth and last child of Frederick and Elizabeth, who was born in her parents' exile in 1630, had, in 1658, married Ernest-Augustus, Bishop of Osnabruck, a member of the Brunswick-Luneburg House, a family which also on its side

¹ Schulenburg to Leibnitz in Kemble's State papers, 45: in the Turin Archives there appears, if we may believe Carutti, to be nothing of importance on the subject.

² Burnet, *Own Times* (ed. Routh) iv. 28, mentions them only. 'Hampden,' he says, 'pressed it vehemently. But Wildman and all the republican party opposed it.' When Tindal, who copies Burnet iii 55, after the word 'vehemently' adds 'but the Tories and also Wildman,' it is nothing but an insertion due to party-hatred. Moreover, the passage is not to be found in the first edition of Burnet.

had ancient relations with England. Ernest-Augustus, who, under the influence of William III and the Elector of Brandenburg, had changed sides from France to the Emperor, thereby acquired the title of Elector for the new house of Luneburg to which he belonged. From this marriage sprang a vigorous family: the eldest son George Louis, a man of forty, to whom his mother's rights passed, had already succeeded his father; he again had a strong and vigorous son of seventeen. The attention of the English was now directed to this family. It is worth noticing that the Electress Sophia herself did not much like the plan. She was advanced in years, and could have no hope of outliving either William III or Anne, both of whom were her juniors. In truth she favoured the claim of the Prince of Wales; she thought he would allow himself to be brought up as a good King of England, for he was still too young to try to follow the example of Louis XIV; she wished him to recover the crown his father had so carelessly let drop. She was not clear that her own son would suit England: for he was too fond of playing the part of a sovereign. He had already accustomed himself to see his will obeyed in all things¹, and his mother feared that if after her death he went to England, the family would always be treated as foreigners. 'But,' she added, 'foregone conclusions are all-important in England.' She rather resigned herself to accept the crown for her family than actually sought it. Such at least was her feeling at the time.

Still, not mere prejudices, but fixed judgments and great interests, led to the rise of the house of Hanover. The revival of the word Republic had already reminded people that the succession-question ought to be promptly settled. We are told that the Presbyterians and the mercantile classes were not unwilling: the English Church, the land-owners, the Tories were accordingly all the more averse to it. But after the decisions that had been arrived at they could not come

¹ 'Dont [de mes fils] l'aîné est bien plus accoutumé de trancher en souverain que le pauvre prince de Galles.' Letter to Stepney, printed in Hardwicke's State papers ii. 442, where it is put under the year 1701. But as there is in it a reference to the impending journey to the Netherlands, which took place late in the summer of 1700, the letter must be put under August of that year.

to terms with James II or the Prince of Wales. It was impossible for them to help in getting a share of political power for Jacobites, Nonjurors, even Catholics, whom they had hitherto shut out and persecuted; these men would have been exceedingly dangerous to them: they dared not allow the foundation of the constitution, of which the Test-Oath was the corner-stone, to be shaken. Nay, rather, it was an opportunity for establishing on a still firmer basis the rights of Parliament, by introducing a new dynasty. And even the moderate Whigs would not hear of a Republic. Their idea went at most only so far as to wait and see whether the King might not marry again, and have children to whom the throne would necessarily come: so the right to the throne which was based on the national sovereignty would be fully maintained¹.

King William was very far from such an intention; he also fell back on his original idea. In the troubles of the North he had just lately entered again into the closest relations with the house of Lüneburg: the Duke of Celle was one of his most intimate friends; the Peace of Travendahl was their common work: he did not hesitate a moment in declaring for the Electress Sophia and her son. The Princess Anne was also of the same opinion; for she regarded the Prince of Wales as a formidable opponent, by whose claims her own rights might come to be excluded, and she and her friends shut out. It does not admit of historic proof, but is transmitted on credible authority, that the relations into which William III at this time entered with the Tories, and specially with the Earl of Rochester, rested on an understanding as to this point².

Still the Tories in no way wished to see his way of governing perpetuated: much rather they thought to seize the opportunity of remedying all the evils that had befallen

¹ Vernon (Vernon Letters iii. 129, 10 August) says 'we shall make it a party business. It is supposed the Tories are for it, and therefore the Whigs must not approve of it. But they will think nothing more is to be done, than to desire the King to marry.'

² The Elector George says later of Rochester: 'Je suis fort bien persuadé que Mylord Rochester est, et a esté toutjour, dans les interets de S. M., de sa religion, de sa patrie, et de ma famille.' Clarendon Correspondence with Rochester ii. 459. Cp. Onslow on Burnet, Own Times (ed. Routh) iv. 485.

them during its continuance. The resolutions they drew up in the Parliament of 1701 for this purpose are so independent of the party-movements of the time—for the Whigs readily followed the lead of the Tories, directly it became a question of the extension of parliamentary powers—and are in themselves also so important, that we must at once discuss them.

The limitations of the supreme power which they desired to prescribe to the future King as the conditions on which the crown should be conferred on him, form a constitutional programme of great importance.

The first article affirms the necessity of communion with the Church of England as by law established. No secret was made of the fact that the special object of this was to shut out Calvinism. For that confession, as it shewed itself in England and Scotland, was incompatible with civil government and liberty. Strange as it may sound, it still could not be otherwise:—the King was perhaps the only man in the country who could not have any liberty of conscience. For he was the Head of the national Church, and must consequently be of her confession¹.

There was clear ground for the further declaration that England would not pledge herself in adopting a new King to the defence of the districts which did not belong to the crown: for England ought only to spend her blood and treasure on her own defence, and for the maintenance of her true interests. It was a far more captious stipulation which forbade the King to leave the country without permission of Parliament: the reason given was that he might otherwise stay so long abroad that the nobles and gentry might be compelled to go over to him, to obtain anything from him which would estrange them from their homes.

Was not William III a Calvinist, and had not his absence been often a subject of lamentation? The precautions now agreed on for the future were at the same time a censure on the existing government. The fourth clause went even fur-

¹ Histoire du Parlement assemblé à Westminster le 12. Février 1701, où l'on examine l'acte pour régler la succession etc.

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ther; for it ordained that all government-business should be dispatched in the Privy Council, and the decisions arrived at signed by its members. For bad and culpable advice had often been given; but no one had ever been able to lay his finger on the giver. Above all, there had been a cabal unknown to the government of old—the so-called Cabinet Council—in which a small circle settled the decisions which the Privy Council only legalised: but an end must be put to all this. It could not be allowed that a man of no capacity or experience should get a seat in the ministry and cabinet, should maintain himself by blind subservience, and should have a chance of rising to be head of a party, when he formerly could scarcely have enjoyed even the simple right of suffrage. Most emphatically were foreigners excluded from all public posts civil or military. For such persons delighted in instilling distrust of his subjects into the Prince's mind, and sacrificed the people's rights in order to exalt to an extravagant height the royal prerogative, and to establish a tyranny under which they hoped to be the gainers. The old fellow-countrymen and earlier friends of the Prince would always know how to turn his ungarded moments to their own advantage. The demand that no one who held office should sit in Parliament was at any rate to be put into active force under the new ruler. For nothing should henceforth be heard in Parliament about the antagonism of the court party and the country party: there should never again be in Parliament any faction of so-styled 'King's friends,' ready to calumniate good patriots.

Finally, serious care was to be taken that the Bench of Judges, as had already been proposed at the time of the Act of Settlement, should be made independent of the government. A judge should be deprived only by a decision of Parliament. For on the judges depended the life and property of Englishmen; and therefore a foreign-born ruler could not be allowed to have any influence with the judicial bench. Similarly, they did not hesitate to revert to the enactment that no accusation originating with the Commons should be arrested in its course by the royal pardon. The Commons were the people's representatives; and it might be presupposed that they would undertake nothing unjust.

If these conditions were accepted, the Commons declared that the Princess Sophia and her descendants should be called on to succeed to the throne. But one can see what a price was asked for the recognition of this right of succession.

The Commons, as far as they could, excluded all personal government: they affirmed more fully than ever the right of Parliament to be regarded as the representative of national independence. The government was to be for ever relieved of all foreign elements, and tied down to ancient and customary forms: it should use no influence on the composition of Parliament; new relations to be entered into should depend on the decision of Parliament: the Bench of Judges was to be subject to it, but independent of the King; the Episcopal Church was designated as National, to which the new ruler must necessarily belong; the King might not even leave the country without permission of Parliament. When taken together with all that had been decided either in the Act of Settlement or afterwards during the reign of King William, with or without his approval, these stipulations formed the complete idea of a parliamentary constitution as it was then understood. It is quite clear how predominant was the intention to put an end to the inconveniences which had arisen under King William: each separate point was at the same time an indirect censure on him. This was the programme of the Tories of that day, and they were the majority in Parliament; one of their leaders, who was of the moderate party, Harley, took the initiative and led the debates: we have here likewise the expression of the preponderance which they had gained since the Peace of Ryswick.

But changes in the situation of Europe had already begun, which also affected home-politics and gave them a new direction. We can no longer avoid once more giving them our close attention.

CHAPTER VII.

CHANGE IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. SESSION OF 1701 IN RELATION TO THIS CHANGE.

TILL late in the year 1700 the understanding between France and England, or rather between their two Kings, the one representing legitimacy and Catholicism, the other Protestantism and the English revolution, governed the movements of the world. The need for peace and the wish for its continuance prevailed over their great and permanent antagonisms.

The internal differences of England also had no small influence in this direction. The French ambassador often told Louis XIV that he believed, as things now stood, that William was the best King France could wish England to have. For he had no right by birth to the throne; he was not only a foreigner, but, thanks to his preference for the Dutch, to whom he entrusted all important business, he was disliked by the English, whose interests were opposed to those of Holland¹. The French King sometimes even thought that under the pressure of these home-disagreements, William might be brought to depend on him as his predecessors of the house of Stuart had done. Tallard did not go so far: he had a nearer view of persons and things. It seemed to him a sufficient foundation for his political aims, that the condition of things in England compelled William to be on good terms with France. For the King, who was so powerless in England, was so powerful

¹ April 3, 1699: 'Il est étranger; il aime une nation, dont les intérêts sont diamétralement opposés à celle, qu'il gouverne; sa confiance et toutes ses affaires secrètes sont conduites par les Hollandais; il sera, toujours occupé de se maintenir, dans la nécessité de bien vivre avec la France, quand elle ne fera rien, qui réunisse son pays à lui.'

in Holland and with the German princes, that any stipulation agreed on with him was sure to be carried out. Tallard only warned his master not to undertake anything that might excite the English nation against France; for that might incline them to listen to the military demands which William made, and against which they now struggled.

Louis XIV was thus warned by his experienced envoy; but when the event happened, which at that time was ever before his eyes, and which he had exactly forecast, the King after all did the very thing he had been warned against; and did it too with eyes wide open, believing in the strength of his own general position, and not thinking that the English nation would quarrel with him about it.

In the Partition-treaties it had always been understood that the interest of the house of Austria in Spain would be strongly defended and actively maintained by the government there. We need not here discuss how it fell out that this was not in fact the case. The most important point undoubtedly is this, that ancient constitutional law in Spain did recognise the right of female succession: the renunciation of the daughter seemed to be invalid to the Spanish jurists and nation; the same right by which the house of Austria had gained the Spanish crown now stood in the way of that house, and decided the question in favour of the claim of the Dauphin and his sons.

Moreover, the pride of the nation was aroused against such a partition as had been devised by the powers in opposition to Austria; above all were the Castilians offended; they thought to maintain the high position they had once enjoyed; the religious feeling of the country also was roused. They did not wish to lay so many orthodox provinces open to the influences of Protestantism. Pope Innocent XII was consulted on this point, and declared himself in the same sense. It was important for the See of Rome that the mighty Prince who had again abandoned that position of antagonism towards ecclesiastical prerogatives, which had been a source of discord with the Papacy, should be shaken loose from the maritime powers, and attached exclusively to the interests of Catholicism.

When then the King of Spain died, and his will was made known, it was found that the younger son of the Dauphin—for the Spaniards did not wish to be united to France, but rather hoped to remain independent—was called to ascend the vacant throne of Spain. Then came the question: should Louis XIV accept the will or no?

It was a vital question for France also. For in the Partition-treaties so great an accession of power had been secured to Louis XIV that in all probability he would have been able to play that pre-eminent part on the Continent, which was the aim of his ambition. But on the other hand, the balance was weighed down by the thought that the will fulfilled the most important of the political ideas which Mazarin had impressed on his mind, and which he had ever cherished; namely, that such an increase of the power of France would be attained by the dependence of Spain as could be got in no other way: finally, there was the religious question. As might have been expected from the tone of mind and character of Louis XIV, he finally resolved to accept the will.

He expected at this moment no danger from England; for William had suffered defeat after defeat in Parliament, and that body was of an utterly peaceful spirit.

How often had Tallard written to him that William was so detested in England that the nation might still at any time declare for James II¹. It was certain that no one would lift his hand in behalf of the Partition-treaty.

It seemed possible for Louis XIV still to accomplish all the dynastic and religious aims he had ever thought of carrying out.

William III was engaged on the ministerial and parliamentary combinations we have referred to above, which presupposed the preservation of the peace of the world, when he received tidings of the Spanish will and its acceptance by Louis XIV. The news did not move him from his wonted composure; he only said he could not have believed that people would break solemn treaties at the very moment when they ought to take

¹ E. g. Dec. 13, 1699: 'Les choses sont au point en ce pays-là, que je ne serois étonné, quand on s'entenderoit avec S. German.'

effect. This was the only public notice he took of it; but in his heart his old hostility to Louis XIV burst forth again into conscious life. In his letters to Heinsius he expresses the uttermost amazement: in fact he had not expected it, and to the end had clung firmly to the hope of being able to persuade Austria to come into the Treaty: at the same time he shews a kind of shame at having let himself be duped before the eyes of all Europe. How could he have forgotten that the French government never considered itself bound by its word? 'Might I but follow my own instinct,' he says, 'I would call on all the courts of Europe to raise an energetic opposition. But I feel humiliated at not being able to set them a good example in the matter¹.'

At the first burst William thought it might still be possible to carry into effect the second Partition-treaty, even after France had broken it, and that too in conjunction with the Emperor, who surely would now be moved to accede to it².

He little knew how heartily the Treaty was disliked even in England. It was simply the universal opinion that the whole advantage arising from the late war was being lost by it. By getting South Italy and the Tuscan shores, France would be mistress of the Mediterranean and of the Levant trade: out of the Mediterranean ports no ship would be able to sail without her leave; and who did not know how energetic and clever the French were? They would quickly create a very formidable naval force: by the possession of Guipuscoa they would also get hold of the west coast of Spain, and thereby of the trade to the West Indies and South America. The command of the sea was now the one thing wanting to secure universal monarchy to France: should England, in fact, engage herself to help her to it? If France were supreme at sea, England would run the risk of losing her free passage up and down the Channel, her American trade, and even that with the East Indies. In addition to all this, the ill-will felt towards France

¹ Letters of Nov. 16 and 18, in *Sintema de Grovestins Histoue des Lutttes*, etc. vii. 398 sqq

² Nov. 12: 'Ik kan nu qualyk mee twyfelden, ofte den Keyser sal het tractaet van partage aennemen—daerom dient geen tyt verlooren te werden, om het kaiserse hof te presseeren tot acceptatie.'

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helped to make the Whig administration, to which it was attributed, and even the King, unpopular, and to put the power into the hands of the Tories. A man who was no partisan tells us that the English people would have preferred a war to the adoption of such a Partition-treaty¹.

And so the nation, far from feeling hurt by the breach of the Treaty, actually regarded it as a kind of deliverance from a heavy burden and risk. Even the act of the Spaniards in summoning a French prince to their throne was approved of, as any other choice must have inevitably brought on a general war: this was her only means of keeping her monarchy undivided, and of pledging her powerful neighbour to its maintenance. Thus far, the late King's will was regarded as wise and well considered; at the same time the young prince whom he had named as his heir was yet but a boy; he would let himself be led by the Spanish Junta of government, and would readily imbibe the ancient principles of the monarchy.

It was also thought natural and sensible in Louis XIV to have accepted the will. For he hereby withdrew from Austria a hitherto powerful ally; he put a stop to the irritation of the Spaniards against the French monarchy; he increased its security and augmented the glory of his house; at the same time he strengthened the peace. Every one believed he had had this result in view in all his political negotiations, and marvelled at the prudence and adroitness with which he had attained it. A certain satisfaction was felt at seeing William and his advisers duped.

But all this was based from the beginning on the idea that the division between Spain and France would be fully maintained, and no opportunity given to the French to injure the commerce of England, either in the Spanish peninsula, or in the West Indies, where it was spreading very profitably from Jamaica. On this point all were agreed. If this condition were observed many were indifferent as to what else might happen on the Continent: yet all were not so satisfied; more experienced persons added a second condition—that the

¹ Bonnet: 'Le peuple préféreroit ici une guerre au traité.'

French King should not presume to encroach on the Netherlands¹.

But how would it be if this took place, and the connexion between Spain and France were to become so close as to endanger England? The King made no secret of his anxiety on this point. The nation's reply was that, when the case occurred, then it might be met. For the wish to preserve peace was still predominant. All shrank from the burden of taxation which war would renew and render permanent; no one was in the least inclined to forfeit the profitable trade with the Spanish provinces by a war which would have to be directed against both monarchies.

The nation was in this frame of mind when the King was called on to decide whether he would keep his Parliament, and how he would construct his next administration.

He could not fall back on the Whigs, for they had become generally unpopular, and were not sufficiently masters of their own party to be able to protect him against hostile demands. On the other hand, the Tories had been with him on the English succession-question, and were also at this moment popular. The King disliked them, but thought it prudent to connect himself with them. He gave Rochester high office; made Godolphin first Lord of the Treasury; Montague was made Lord Halifax (the title had lately fallen vacant), and took his seat in the Upper House. In the other changes care was taken so far as possible to choose men who might be expected to 'support the crown rather than oblige their party².' As before the moderate Whigs, so now the moderate Tories were in the ascendant. But, for all these changes, the King could not hope to come to a good understanding with the existing Parliament: particularly as the House was

¹ Bonnet, who is on the spot, and describes the state of opinion, Nov 29, O. S. 'Il paroît ici indifférent, de quelle famille est le roi d'Espagne, pourveu que le commerce des Anglois ne souffre pas; les plus raisonnables et les plus éclairés ajoutent, pourveu que la France n'entreprenne rien sur la Flandre. Il ne vaut pas la peine de s'arrêter à la pensée de ceux, qui disent et écrivent ici, qu'ils ne doivent se mêler que de ce qui se passe dans leur île: il est à croire, qu'un parlement agiroit avec plus de prudence.'

² Prior to Manchester, in Cole, Historical and Political Memoirs 269

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in the last year of its legal term of existence, in which members, in order to secure re-election, were all the more minded to raise new pretensions in favour of the country, and to oppose the court; and this would be a matter of less anxiety in a new Parliament. After some hesitation the King and his ministers decided on dissolving, and issuing writs for a new Parliament¹.

The elections were as stormy as ever; there were said to be five candidates for every seat, each with his supporters the two parties hotly contested every point here and there it came to blows between them. The influence of the two East India Companies was specially noticed; the one going with the Whigs, the other with the Tories. The action of the Church of England was very effective. Still, the Tories were not satisfied with the influence exerted by the new ministers; it was not energetic enough to please them. In the counties country-gentlemen were returned for the most part, men who wished to sustain or restore the old patriarchal state of things, in which there were no taxes, and who on this ground were against war; the towns elected leading capitalists, who, remembering their profits during the late war, were now too in favour of another war².

This question of peace and war especially occupied the national mind during the elections. On one side men urged the general position of England, her duty of sustaining the balance of power, and of defending Protestantism against the growing preponderance of the united Catholic powers: on the other hand, it was argued that this must not be granted so absolutely; for armies were needful for this purpose, and they, as men had persuaded themselves, were an element of danger for freedom; the zealous Protestants became suspicious of an inclination towards absolutism. One idea, destined at a later

¹ Bonnet: 'Le parti des Whigs en charge ne pouvant surmonter les entreprises de Whigs non employés et de Tories mécontents, il étoit de la prudence de S. M., d'abandonner un parti faible, de sonder le gué dans l'autre, et ensuite de dissoudre le parlement, pour en convoquer un nouveau.' Cp. *Vernon Letters* iii. 113.

² Bonnet: 'On trouve, que les marchands, qui dans la dernière guerre ont confié leur argent au gouvernement, amorcés par le profit, qu'ils ont fait, sont prêts d'ouvrir leur bourse dans une nouvelle.'

time to find very bitter expression, was already in being: it was thought that the special aim of war, and of the taxes and loans inevitably bound up with it, was to attach as many persons as possible to government, to command both London and the country through the moneyed interests of the city, and to strengthen the highest power by means of the enormous sums entrusted to its administration, and of the crowds of officials required to collect the money: and finally, it was thought that the steady growth of this system was bringing the ancient liberties of the land into greater peril since the Revolution than they had ever been in before. No one listened to what the King said as to the need for resistance to France;—it was to his interest to have war¹.

But ere long it was proved by the very clearest evidence how right the King had been in his anxiety.

The most important question at first was the maintenance of the Dutch garrisons in the Spanish Netherlands. It may be remembered that the Dutch had already been reminded by the sudden fall of Mons that the Netherland fortresses in Spanish hands were but a feeble barrier for them: they had made an agreement with the Elector of Bavaria, the Governor-General, by which they got the right to garrison some of the most important fortresses with their own troops. William deemed this absolutely necessary, in face of the greater strength and easier power of movement of the French; its accomplishment he regarded as one of the great results of his life; English statesmen and the public (at least the large majority of it) were of the same way of thinking; their own safety still seemed to them indissolubly bound up with that of the Republic. King William now thought he might get this provision secured—he set all the more store on it as France was now dynastically connected with Spain—by means of an agreement with the Junta, which held all the authority of government in Madrid: if it was seriously intended to keep the two kingdoms separate, these garrisons must surely be strengthened rather than weakened: William's plenipotentiary in Spain, Schonenberg, thought even this

¹ Bolingbroke, *Letters on the study of history*, ch. 1.

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attainable, and in all good faith began a negotiation about it; the recognition of the new King was to depend on the concession of this demand¹.

But the situation, as based on the acceptance of the will was not so understood either in France or in Spain. Even in the circles of well-informed diplomacy it was assumed at this epoch that the Junta, scared by the rumours of war which arose on every side, had called on Louis XIV to defend the Spanish Netherlands; but from the correspondence of Louis XIV with Harcourt, his former ambassador in Spain, whom he now again sent there, it certainly appears that he had not waited for any such request; even on the 17th of November he says it is his intention to keep the Netherland provinces united to the crown: he even mentions these very Dutch garrisons. 'The Spanish fortresses in the Netherlands,' says he, 'are full of foreign troops; if the Spaniards need any support in ejecting them, the help they might desire would be forthwith at their command.' Even before the new King reached Spain the antagonistic demands of England and France came into collision at Madrid. The Junta, or rather the smaller council of it called the Despacho, did not hesitate to side with Louis XIV; it ordered the military and civil authorities to carry out the French King's instructions; the English ambassador at Paris reports that Louis XIV on receiving intelligence of this cried out that this would make him his grandson's first minister. It is not clear that this is literally true: it is enough that the ambassador believes and reports it, and that he was believed: it was self-evident that the wish of the Spaniards to see their monarchy re-established in its integrity, and the ambition of Louis XIV to become indirectly master of it, were now combined together.

In their very first reply to the notification that Louis XIV had accepted the Spanish will, the Dutch mentioned this matter of the security of their barriers; they proposed a

¹ Schonenberg to Manchester: 'Provided England and Holland keep firm, there may be means found to maintain the new King in a convenient independency' (Cole, Historical and Political Memoirs 274).

conference on the subject, the English ambassador joined in this memorial, and declared that a difference on this point would endanger the peace of Europe; he said he was convinced that this consideration would restrain the French court from any arbitrary and hostile step.

Louis XIV indubitably wished to preserve peace. at first his grandson met with no opposition whatever in taking possession of the crown. One might have thought he would have left the Dutch garrisons alone for a while, their existence depended on a public treaty which could not be set aside by one party only; but this treaty had been concluded against himself, and might still have dangerous consequences for him, were war to break out. For, as he says in a despatch to Tallard, they were getting themselves ready on the other side; alliances were being formed; as soon as these were fully established, the existence of these garrisons—he heard already that people were reckoning on them for this case—might be a great disadvantage to him: he therefore let Cardinal Portocarrero, who held the highest post in the *Despacho*, know that not a moment should be lost in getting rid of the garrisons, and he deemed it advisable to take the step at once, and, in fact, before any formal negotiations were undertaken on the subject.

William III saw the blow coming, and yet thought it better not to resist. He clearly foresaw, as is plain from one of his letters, the whole loss it would be to England—it was equivalent to handing the Netherlands over to France—and at the first moment it might perhaps have been possible for the garrisons to make themselves complete masters of the fortresses, and to defend them with success; but then, he said, if this were done war would break out; and for that they were not prepared.

Sick at heart, chagrined, and fully persuaded that war must come, William nevertheless at this moment receded a step; what he could not prevent, he would not resist. Without hesitation Louis XIV pushed forward. In order, as he said, to make his grandson, the King of Spain, more completely master of the Netherland fortresses than he then was, he issued orders, in harmony with the Madrid Junta, that the French troops

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already in the neighbourhood, should reinforce the Spanish garrisons in those fortresses, so far as to make them stronger than the Dutch troops. The thing was done with perfect ease. The Governor-General, the Elector of Bavaria, made no difficulty about facilitating it. By his orders the French troops, which appeared on the 6th of February, 1701, before the seven fortresses (amongst which were Luxemburg, Mons and Charleroi), were at once admitted into them; the Dutch garrisons had already received instructions to withdraw without resistance, if this were done. Louis XIV did not hesitate to send French troops also to occupy the seaports, Ostend and Nicuport.

Hitherto the Spanish Netherlands had been meant to be a barrier against France; and under the idea that Spain and France were to continue to be completely distinct powers, there had been some thought of strengthening the Dutch garrisons with English troops. but how utterly different had the position of affairs become in a moment! These strongholds for the possession of which there had been a struggle with the French King for half a century, that is for the whole term of his reign, now as good as fell into his hands without resistance, and became so many points from which Holland might be attacked. It is plain that here too an eventual war was looked forward to; the measure was actually recommended to the Spaniards by the consideration that the war would thus be entirely transferred to the territories of the Republic: still it was at this time spoken of only as an eventuality; for the peculiarity of the situation is that Louis XIV always clung to the opinion that there would be no war;—the English would certainly avoid one, because war must be to the advantage of the King in his home-troubles, while the Dutch would not venture to go against France and Spain combined.

No one will deny to Louis XIV extraordinary gifts of government, skill, and adroitness; but he was himself dazzled by the splendour of his position; the thought of his own greatness and power hindered him from seeing the inevitable consequences of his acts.

While he attacked England in the direction which her politics had constantly followed for centuries past, he wounded

her at the same time in the point in which she was more specially sensitive. He did not for a moment hide his intention of now becoming her most successful rival in the world's commerce. In one of his first instructions he speaks of the necessity there might be at some future time, for the advantage of Spain, of excluding England and Holland from the South American trade. He describes the closing of all the Spanish harbours against the two maritime powers as the most effectual of all measures if war were to break out. It was not till a month or two later, that companies were formed in France to trade with Spain and her colonies; but even at this early time negotiations had been going on for a close commercial connexion between the two countries; the duties on imported goods were to be taken off on both sides, and it was rumoured, at any rate in England, that the American harbours were to be closed against England and Holland, and opened to the French alone¹.

All this now caused no small excitement in England. Events in the Spanish Netherlands awoke old antipathies against France; commercial anxieties had a very important effect on the price of goods and the money-market. A general panic took place. We are told that for a few days almost all business was at a stand-still.

This excitement found its echo in the meetings which preceded the opening of Parliament (Feb. 11/22, 1700/1701). Still the King did not on that account think it well to express his whole sentiments at once. Even in his opening speech he forbore to make any special reference to the Partition-treaty, and the affront to himself which the breach of it involved, deeply though he felt it: he thought he knew but too well that Parliament would not trouble itself about the matter. Besides the need of securing the English succession, he of course mentioned with some emphasis the change in the general situation which had followed the death of the Spanish King and the establishment of his successor, an event which called for most mature consideration: even on this subject

¹ 'Le bien de son royaume (du roi d'Espagne) demandera un jour, qu'il prenne des mesures pour exclure les Anglais et Hollandais du commerce des Indes'

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he expressed himself with great caution. He asked for no increase of the land-forces, which he deemed really the most important, and spoke only of strengthening the fleet, as England's bulwark. Above all, he expressed his expectation that Parliament would come to such conclusions as might conduce to the welfare and security of England, the maintenance of Protestantism, the peace of Europe.

At this time louis-d'ors were plentiful in London, and thence it was concluded that the French ambassador was making large money-presents to different members of Parliament. This conclusion was doubtless wrong. The influx of gold arose from the simple fact that it was at that moment dearer in England than abroad. Still it is quite true that the ambassador was in communication with some of the leading members, among whom he specially names Howe; he furnished them with arguments for attacking the foreign policy of the late ministry¹. It was also proposed to make a special demand for the production of the treaties concluded. Vernon insisted that it would be far better to begin with the declaration that the House would support the King². And this was carried against the other motion. The House of Commons immediately voted that it would vigorously support the King in striving to attain the objects he announced; they recounted them word for word. The only hesitation, and that but slight, was caused by the mention of the peace of Europe; for this seemed to many to go beyond the immediate interests of England:—the majority that voted for it was not very large.

We must not lay too much stress on this vote. In these preliminary meetings the main idea was to avoid a breach with Spain; above all, it was wished to demand securities for the maintenance of the present state of things; war appeared to be a far-off contingency. It was also specially noticed that the King's speech said nothing about the general interests

¹ Tallard, Feb. 15: 'Je me propose de les tenir très informés de l'état des affaires, par ce que c'est l'article, par lequel on peut leur imposer le plus' (he thinks he is receiving false intelligence from the English government).

² This the French ambassador declares, Feb. 15, O. S.

of Europe; that he even spoke of paying off the loans, which would of course be impossible if war broke out¹. Under these impressions, confirmed by the fact that ministers expressed themselves very undecidedly and variously on the subject, an address in harmony with the speech was voted directly on its second reading on the 14th of February².

But this did not hinder the Opposition from attacking the late administration and the King the next day. Howe, in a violent speech, laid the whole blame of the perplexities of the nation on the Partition-treaties, which had led to the Spanish will: it was not enough for him that Vernon replied that when fire breaks out one first extinguishes it, and then enquires into its cause: he went on with such violent invectives against the King that the narrator does not think it advisable to repeat his words. No one made any further reply, or defended the Partition-treaties; it was at once agreed to beg the King to lay before the House all treaties concluded with foreign powers since the late Peace.

These motions did not directly contradict one another: but they had very different tendencies, which were equally apparent in the House, and which only when taken together express its meaning.

The predominant Tory party was certainly determined to defend English interests with all their might, if they were attacked; but they thought this danger far slighter than the King did; and actually went so far as to assail his previous policy from hatred of the instruments he had made use of. They feared above all lest they should be involved in such a war as the last had been: they had no conception of the far-reaching plans which influenced the views of Louis XIV as to the Spanish succession.

¹ Bonnet says this, with the remark that he was expressing the opinion of the English, 'qui ont part aux affaires et qui en raisonnent selon leur liberté accoutumée'

² 'That this House will stand by and support his Majesty and government; and take such effectual measures as may best conduce to the interest and safety of England, the preservation of the Protestant religion' (the King had also added the words 'in general,' and it had a certain significance though not one of great importance, that they were omitted) 'and the peace of Europe.' Journals of Commons xiii. 333.

Doubly valuable to the King, under these circumstances, was a letter of Melford's which fell into his hands: it contained a proposal for the resumption, with French help, of James II's plan of invasion, which had failed in 1696: it was set forth with complete confidence, on the ground that the French fleet was already in so good a state that next summer it would undoubtedly become master of the sea¹. The government did not lose a moment in laying the letter before both Houses of Parliament, where it was now at least seen that the risk of a restoration of the Stuarts, against whom they had fought so earnestly, and of the overthrow of the present system, was still threatening. Not only were men prompted by it to make haste and settle the English succession, for which everything was already prepared, but the road must also be barred against the Prince of Wales: the negotiations generally received a fresh impulse, of which William III at once made use.

The Dutch, in recognising the new King of Spain, had certainly attached no stipulation to the act, but had at the same time brought under notice the negotiation as to the securities to be given for the continuance of peace, with the remark that the King of England, who had taken part in the previous transactions, must also be represented in these. William III did not delay to place this before Parliament in the best form he could. On his suggestion the Dutch ambassador, Geldermalsen, handed in a memorial in which, after stating the fact as to this decision of the Republic, and declaring that Holland would never do anything without England, he added the request that the English plenipotentiaries might be instructed to take part in the negotiations². But what would come of it, were these unsuccessful and consequently broken off? The French troops could then overwhelm Holland in

¹ The genuineness of this letter was not seriously impugned: it was only said that Melford was 'fou et insensé,' and not in the confidence of the French court.

² To Heinsius, March 1, 1701: 'Ick heb in desen tyt seer notsaekelyck geordeelt, dat Geldermalse aen my de memorie soude presenteren, daervan U. Ed. de copie sal ontfangen. Ik meende, dat hy daertoe genoeghsaem door den staat was geautoiseert.'

a moment. the Dutch must know whether under existing treaties they could in that case venture to reckon on the support of England.

And now the hostile demand of the zealous Tories for the production before Parliament of the late treaties, stood King William in good stead. He had not hesitated to accede to it: as early as February 20 the treaties concluded with Holland in 1677/1678, and all other agreements depending on them, were laid before the House and read aloud. The debate which followed was sure to be a decisive one. It might be expected that the King would be authorised to join in the negotiations; but whether he would also be allowed to give the help the agreement looked forward to in case the negotiations failed, was still very doubtful. 'But this,' the King exclaimed, 'this is the critical point: if this be gained, I may expect a good session.'

Vernon, still aiming at more than was absolutely necessary, proposed that the King should be authorised not merely to negotiate, but also to conclude alliances, as had already been suggested in a resolution of the Lords: but not even did all the members of the government demand this. Another proposal was that the negotiations should deal not only with the maintenance of peace, but also with that of the balance of power in Europe. The French ambassador declares that the mention of the balance of power was avoided through the influence of his friends. But at the moment this was unimportant. It was enough that the King was authorised to negotiate, in order that the general safety of the British kingdoms and of the States-General, and the peace of Europe, might be secured. Tories and Whigs agreed here; the former rather in the hope of maintaining peace, the latter in the wish that it might lead to war. Howe stood alone in his opposition to this; he felt himself isolated, and scarcely ventured to speak. Seymour on the other hand at once fell in eagerly with the prevailing tendencies. The King got all he had most set his heart on; he had scarcely ventured even to hope for it: the House of Commons at once promised its co-operation in carrying out the alliance between England and the States-General. Vernon declares he had never before perceived so

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much zeal for the independence of the two countries and their close connexion with each other.

The Brandenburg Resident repeats to his Prince the remark of sagacious members of Parliament, that that body in voting on the negotiations had not thought of authorising the King to enter into every kind of transaction, but only into such as might serve towards the object they had in view, the maintenance of peace: the House insisted on seeing the actual documents, before the conclusion of any alliances. The Resident, otherwise a great worshipper of prerogative, deems this not prejudicial, since by this means a far more powerful co-operation of both parties would be obtained¹. He says that the prevailing desire was to take up a position by which France might be compelled to permit that, as of old, there should be an entirely independent government over the Spanish monarchy and its territories; if that could not be accomplished, then they would make up their minds to have war, and to carry it on with all their might.

¹ Bonnet: 'Cette démarche s'accommode mieux avec l'esprit ouvert de cette nation. Elle rendra les mesures qu'on prendra par deçà, beaucoup plus efficaces.'

CHAPTER VIII.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN TORIES AND WHIGS. NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1701.

WE once more meet with a Tory combination of no little authority and power. Depressed by the death of Queen Mary, the Tories had risen again afterwards, and specially since the peace; they had an immediate prospect of a government conducted according to their principles, under the Princess Anne—for how much longer was the King likely to live? the Church of England had already recovered that representation which had been formerly refused her. Convocation, after a long interval, had again been called into being. The Tories had turned to their own profit the parliamentary opposition to the royal prerogative: the reduction of the army, the withdrawal of the Irish grants, were their special work. How strictly they meant to tie up the monarchy, in the matter of personal government, home-administration and foreign relations, is shown by the propositions agreed to respecting the succession to the throne after the death of the Princess Anne. There may have been a few of them who desired the restoration of the Stuarts; but the party in general clung to the Protestant succession, with which all the interests which had grown up since the Revolution were connected. Their ideas would be to maintain the position then gained in Europe, to make an end of the burdensome loans and taxation, and, at the same time to restore, in the counties at any rate, the old patriarchal and aristocratic system of authority, bound up as it was with self-government. Had the Partition-treaties been unbroken, they might have hoped to carry out all their principles with the support of the popular ill-will arising from

those arrangements. The change in the political situation introduced by the breach of the Treaties would have given them but little anxiety, had it stopped at the separate and independent establishment of the Spanish monarchy. When Louis XIV, however, imperilled this independence, he actually thereby drove the Tories nearer to William III : they were even forced steadily to face the possibility of an outbreak of war : but they still hoped to escape the extreme step, and to hold the decision as to peace and war in their own hands. Their approach to the King, however, did not hold them back, nay rather, it was even bound up with a new attempt on the royal prerogative, and with an attack on their political antagonists who had let the prerogative run its own course.

Even before the negotiations which the King was authorised to undertake could be begun, a violent storm broke out in Parliament against the way in which the previous negotiations had been carried to a conclusion.

Government had laid before the House of Lords the second Partition-treaty, and the papers needed for the signing of its ratification, but even this was not enough for them : they desired also to see the King's instructions. Lord Jersey replied that the King had given only verbal and not written instructions : the Lords reproached him for having lent a hand to transactions of this kind without written instructions¹. Then, as no explanations were forthcoming, they broke out into most violent invectives against the contents of the Treaty². It was said that since the compact between King John and the Pope, by which he received back his kingdom as a papal fief, it was the worst treaty that had ever been concluded, the most ruinous for England, the most disastrous for Europe ; moreover the Privy Council had never once been properly consulted about it. The Duke of Devonshire, whose opinion had never been

¹ Bonnet 'Que personne ne pouvoit s'ingérer de faire des traités sans des instructions écrites.'

² Bonnet, March 17/28. 'On condamna sans aucune retenue le traité, la manière, dont on l'a ménagé et les personnes, qui l'ont négocié ; et quand un Pair avoit cessé de parler, un autre appuyoit ce qu'il avoit avancé, et enchérissoit par dessus ce qui avoit été dit.'

asked, cried out that those who had taken part in this business ought to answer for it with their heads.

The next day the Lords were engaged on an address to the King against the Treaty, when Lord Portland came forward to undertake its defence: not till that moment had he got the King's leave to do so. He argued that it was not this Treaty, as was said, that had caused the Spanish will and its acceptance: that those had been the work of the French party in Spain; that the fault lay far more in the disarming of England. It was also false to say it had not been laid before the Privy Council; he named Pembroke, Longdale, Jersey, Marlborough, and Halifax, whose advice had been asked in the matter. These persons declared they had only hitherto kept silence, just as Portland had done, because their oath bound them to secrecy. These explanations did not stop the attack on the Treaty, the stipulations of which were held to be actually contradictory to its professed object, and on the way in which the business had been transacted: still, the debate grew less passionate as it went on. For in the House of Lords the Whigs were as strong as the Tories, perhaps stronger. The fact that the Tory ministers, Rochester and Godolphin, forbore to defend the earlier proceedings of the government, at that time in their opponents' hands, helped in the Upper House to a decision favourable to the Whigs.

On the other hand the House of Commons, in which the Tories were in the majority, was not satisfied with condemning the Treaty, by which broad districts belonging to the Spanish monarchy would have fallen to France, especially as it happened that it had been negotiated while Parliament was sitting without being laid before the Houses: bitter and passionate language was used towards the King; it seemed to have come to this, that the statesmen who had had a hand in it must at once be called to account. They began with Portland, without however making a great point of his condemnation: from the foreigner who could not know much of English law they passed on to the Lord Chancellor, Somers, who must have known all about it: he was the most distinguished supporter, and indeed in a sense the head, of the Whig party. The Whigs could not allow him to be removed from office; the

Tories, on the other hand, hoped to eject him now and for ever from the King's councils. It came to a sharp struggle between the parties: the Whigs emphatically declared that Somers, as the King's adviser, had been opposed to the Treaty, which they objected to as much as their antagonists; if nevertheless he had affixed the Great Seal to it, they remarked that in so doing he had simply done his duty, since it was part of the King's prerogative to conclude treaties. And this argument had weight; the accusation against Somers again fell through, though only by a majority of seven votes, 189 against 182.

But ere long a phrase used by Portland gave the House an opportunity of returning to the charge on a broader basis and with greater results. Hitherto only the second Partition-treaty had been under consideration, and it alone, in England at least, had been discussed: it may be remembered that the first Treaty had hardly been even mentioned, and yet it was this of which Lord Somers had been induced to legalise the acceptance by a commission granted to persons for whose names blanks had been left. Lord Portland mentioned this previous transaction, when he really need not have done so: consequently Vernon could be compelled to publish the correspondence which at that time had passed through his hands. Even Somers' warmest admirers have not been able to justify this commission; his antagonists seized on it as a most welcome opening for a decisive attack on him. Somers thought he might yet escape any further proceedings by his personal authority. He even appeared before the House (April 14, 1701) and was received with due respect. The etiquette was that he should enter uncovered; that when he seated himself in his armchair he covered his head, all the others being also covered: when he rose to speak, he again bared his head. He declared he had never had anything in view but the honour and profit of England: that even at the time he had objected to the Treaty, but that the King had then declared it impossible to make any alteration in it, and that it could not be concluded except under the conditions stated; how then could he take it on himself to be the cause of the failure of so important and urgent a Treaty? How great a

responsibility would have rested on him, if, as was expected, the King of Spain had died at that moment¹? Lord Somers had friends and adherents in crowds in the House; the Whigs were with him to a man: but the other party painted the risks which might have arisen out of the concession of such powers in colours so gloomy that the majority, though this time also a very small one (198 to 188), was for his impeachment; no notice was taken of his excuses; he was impeached for his share in the Treaty of 1698, for grave offence and dereliction of duty. A similar impeachment was directed against Russell Lord Orford, and Montague Lord Halifax, and this with larger majorities, in which the numbers of the minority only had fallen off; the number of their opponents in the Lords remaining about the same. These men were the heads of the Whig party, on which the Tories hoped to inflict a crushing defeat. Without having even drawn out the points of the impeachment, the Commons requested the King to exclude for ever from his councils and his presence the impeached noblemen, Somers, Orford, Halifax, and Portland.

It is quite clear that personal party-divisions and personal hatred prevailed in these discussions: but they also at the same time touch on the great constitutional questions. The man was to be punished who had done the King good service in the free exercise of the royal prerogative in foreign affairs; the King's most trustworthy advisers, men also of the best abilities, were to be withdrawn from his side. Vernon once remarked that Parliament would approach as near as possible to a Republic, if it only succeeded in carrying two points, first, that no Treaties should be concluded without its participation, and next that office should be held only during its pleasure². And were not these the very points which Parliament was now trying to carry through?

¹ Lord Campbell laments that no trustworthy report of this speech is to be met with. In Foss too, there is nothing about it. We are obliged to refer to Burnet, whose statement is confirmed, and in some points expanded by Bonnet. Cp. *Journals of Commons* xiii. 489.

² 'Some say, there is but that [viz. to prove, that treaties are not to be made without the consent of Parliament], and the disposal of offices by Parliament to bring us as near a commonwealth as they desire' (Aug 22, 1700) *Vernon Letters* iii. 132.

The party-spirit which characterises these votes of Parliament was favourable to the crown, in so far as it aroused the warm resistance of the opposite party in the House of Lords. The Whigs were here strengthened by the Bishops, who felt themselves greatly harassed by Convocation. In vain did the Tories warn them against a collision with the Lower House, in direct opposition to the address projected in the Commons but not yet brought in, the Upper House carried a resolution to address a request to the King not to censure the statesmen impeached by the House of Commons¹, before the grievances alleged against them had been investigated by the House of Lords, and judgment taken on them. This address was at once presented to the King. He had, thanks to the position of parties and his relations with them, good grounds for keeping quiet: he made them no reply.

When, a few days later, the address of the Commons was presented to him, he said he would admit no man into his council whom he did not know to be prepared to strengthen the good understanding between King and people, on which so much depended at that very time. The Tories would have liked a less ambiguous declaration; still they interpreted the King's reply as favourable to them: thanks were voted to him by the Commons for his gracious answer. This was also the general opinion outside, where people expected that the King would draw still closer to the Tories and keep the Whigs still further off.

But the Whigs had already found support outside Parliament; for in all parts of the country Somers had devoted and influential adherents, who, to a great extent, owed their position to him, and depended on him for their very existence. But above all, even in public opinion a change arose in their favour, springing out of the state of European affairs, and from the progress of negotiations which were being carried on in the Netherlands.

The Count of Avaux had again appeared there as French

¹ 'Not to pass any censure or punishment against the four noble Lords.' The word 'punishment' was in the draught, but was omitted from the Address. Journals of Lords, April 16, 1700/1, xvi 654.

plenipotentiary; at this time he was certainly anxious to maintain peace, as it undoubtedly suited the French interest. He thought he might manage this by holding out a prospect of the withdrawal of the French troops from the Netherland fortresses, as soon as ever the new King of Spain should be completely armed and able to defend himself. But how far short was this of the securities William III and the States-General were agreed on demanding! These were, for Holland the right to garrison the three great fortresses of Luxemburg, Namur, and Mons; for England the same for Ostend and Nieuport; for both, in addition, the confirmation of the liberties of trade they had formerly enjoyed, and the extension of them to the same point to which they should be granted to the French. Avaux expressed the greatest astonishment when these claims were put before him: more comprehensive ones could not have been drawn up, had England and Holland already won a couple of battles. Avaux declined to recognise the right of Stanhope, the English minister at the Hague, to take part in the negotiations, on the ground that he was only accredited to the United Netherlands.

William did not delay an instant in bringing this result to the knowledge of the House of Commons: without the slightest scruple as to his prerogative, he at the same time begged them to advise with him, as to how the security of the two countries and the peace of Europe might be maintained¹. In the House of Commons the King's demand to be allowed to garrison Ostend and Nieuport with English troops was not at all approved: it was regarded as the renewal of a policy for which they had no liking. The emphasis laid on the peace of Europe aroused their anxiety; they were afraid of being thereby involved in the continental complications which had already begun. After lively debates it was agreed (though in this case also by a very small majority) to omit those expressions which might be construed

¹ The King demanded 'such advice thereupon as may be for our own security and that of the States-General and the peace of Europe' (*Journals of Commons* xiii. 462). The Commons, 'humble advice' is 'to carry on the negotiations in concert with the States-General and take such measures therein as may most conduce to their security' (*Journals of Commons*, April 2, xiii. 466).

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or explained in this direction¹. The new authorisation granted to the King referred only to the continuance of the negotiations for the security of the States-General in conjunction with that body.

Tallard had by this time left London: the agent he left behind, Poussin, who paid special attention to parliamentary proceedings, declares that the tendency of the Commons was peaceful, and that the want of enthusiasm with which they received whatever might tend towards war was displeasing to the King and the Whigs: yet the King's letters to Heinsius let drop no sign of such displeasure. In accordance with this, the overtures which Avaux made, on a fresh application from the States-General, were shaped so as to spare as far as possible the feelings of the English Parliament. He persisted in declining a joint negotiation with the English and Dutch plenipotentiaries; but he allowed the former to be present when the subject of the securities demanded by Holland was discussed; only there should be nothing said about the English demands, as Parliament also (without repeating them) had simply insisted on joint negotiations.

It had not yet come to an open quarrel; men still clung to the hope of peace: even William III, under existing circumstances, deemed it well to recognise the new King of Spain; for he did not wish to have to do it at the dictation of Parliament.

But approximations of this kind, mere passing phases in negotiation, will never arrest for long the general progress of events, which moves as by a kind of inner necessity. As the Commons declared themselves warmly against the Partition-treaties, not only in their form but in their general tenor, while still they were quite inevitable, if peace was to be maintained as they desired; so now they shrank from looking straight at the connexion between the Spanish will and the general relations of the balance of power in Europe, which must one way or other react on England. On the other hand William III lived and moved in these affairs.

¹ Bonnet gives the figures as 193 against 187; this must have been in Committee; for there is no notice of it in the Journals.

While, out of especial consideration for Parliament, he took up a peaceful position, he still thought he might combine it with the recognition of the new dynasty in Spain, if at the same time he entered into alliance with the Imperial Court in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe; and this he expressly tells the Parliament¹.

That this might even become necessary for the safety of England, was an opinion now generally spread; as is said in a fly-sheet of the period, the French King had accepted the will simply on the ground that he would thereby get into his own hands the command of the whole Spanish monarchy, whereas the Partition-treaty would only have secured him certain provinces: it was doubtless his intention to overthrow England and Holland, by reason both of their maritime supremacy and of their religion: how could any one, after what had gone before, feel any doubt on the point? the dynastic connexion with Spain offered him the means for this; he would again attempt to restore the Stuarts, in order thereby to make England dependent on him; religion, freedom, commerce, were once more in imminent peril; peace was even more fatal than war; if hesitating counsels now prevailed, and at some later time arms were after all taken up, the powers on which they could reckon would by that time have been overthrown, and there would be no more allies to be had².

Under the influence of the times public opinion, which hitherto had been pacific, now swung round quite in the opposite direction. The country-folk said they did not know whom they might be sowing for; perhaps the French would come over and reap the harvest. A remembrance, as it were, of the ancient conquest swept over England; the fear of a new invasion was aroused by the slightest thing.

And as the opinion that the peace-policy of the Tories was no longer timely now gathered force, the Whigs, who shared

¹ People will be offended, 'sonder reeden, want ik nu eerder tot een engagement ofte tractaet met den keyser sal kunnen komen.' (April 29, to Heinsius).

² George Stepney: An essay upon the present interest of England. In Somers' Tracts xi. 199.

the King's wailike views, got an opportunity of making head against their antagonists in the country, as they were too weak to make any impression within the walls of Parliament.

This took place first in the so-styled 'Kentish Petition.' At the Kentish Quarter Sessions at Maidstone, the chairman, William Culpeper, joined a number of respectable freeholders on the grand jury, in a representation to the House of Commons, in which they, starting from the principle that no nation can be happy if disunited, begged the House to lay aside all variance, and especially to arouse no mistrust towards the King, whose great acts were engraven on the heart of the nation: this moment might be perhaps decisive as to the fortunes of this and future generations, instead of framing addresses, they ought rather to vote supplies, in order to put the King in a position to help his allies before it was too late.

How amazed was the House of Commons when this petition was first brought to its notice in an indirect way by one of the members to whom it had been entrusted, and when, on the 8th of May, it was presented in due form. Against the House of Commons, the recognised representatives of the people, there had sprung up opposition from one single county, an opposition in the name of the people itself! Scymour and Howe joined their rich and passionate eloquence in denouncing the authors of the petition: 'Double war-taxes ought to be imposed on them, their goods seized, an example made of them, how many scover they might be.' The House declared the petition scandalous, insolent, revolutionary; for it surely aimed at the overthrow of the parliamentary form of government. The members who presented it, and who were also its most prominent authors, were taken into custody by the sergent-at-arms.

This, however, did not stifle the movement; for it had the support of the whole Whig party. Parliament was reproached with refusing to recognise the right of petition—one of the fundamental rights of the country; the portraits of the imprisoned members were taken, and shown to the people as those of the champions of their rights; their names were

coupled with those of the noblemen so lately impeached: 'The health of the Five' became a popular toast.

Out of the panic of the day arose a demonstration of great importance. 'In the name of the gentlemen, freeholders, and many thousands of the good people of England,' a memorial was addressed to the House of Commons, in which it was emphatically claimed that the House should submit its conduct to some control on the part of the people; for the people, from whom the House of Commons drew its authority, had a right to withdraw it again. In this memorial the freeholders were distinctly spoken of as the masters of the House; a long list of errors was imputed to it; among them the impeachment of the former ministers, and the unworthy treatment the King had met with at their hands. John Howe, who had made use of some offensive expressions, was described as an insolent fellow, who ought to be ejected from Parliament.

A similar petition was at the very same moment under consideration in the Common Council of the City of London, in the framing of which the indifference of the House as to the public credit had great weight. It was rejected:—chiefly through the influence of the old East India Company, which did not wish to break with the Tory ministry, to which it was bound:—but only by the smallest possible majority, by one vote¹. The common people in London were already in a state of excitement; the order passed among the artisans that they should come to a great public meeting at a fixed time and place. Some of the men who had spread the invitation were thrown into Newgate. The House of Commons begged the King to take steps to repress the outbreak of any disturbance.

In the memoirs of the time this movement is described as a struggle between the old and the new ministers; the Whig and Presbyterian ministers on the one side and the Tories and Anglicans on the other.

This most clearly shewed itself in the motions for impeach-

¹ 'La requête, qu'on méditoit de présenter au parlement sur les conjonctures présentes, fut rejetée à la pluralité d'une seule voix et cela par les brigues de la vieille Compagnie des Indes, et par les artifices du nouveau Ministère.' (Bonnet, May 20/31).

ment of the leading Whigs, which from time to time (there was no disposition to hurry) were brought up in the House of Lords. It would be waste of labour to repeat in detail their contents and the replies of the accused¹. It is clear from what has been already said, that the Whig majority in the Lords could not possibly think an impeachment well-founded which had been set up in a party spirit by the Tory majority in the Commons. Among other things it was remarked that Tories, like Lord Jersey, who were just as much implicated in the negotiations of 1698 as the Whigs were, passed unmentioned. Formal difficulties now arose between the two Houses, especially as to fixing a time for the trials, which the Lords claimed as their own right more definitively than heretofore². The result was that the Commons did not appear on the day fixed; therefore the Lords pronounced a verdict of acquittal: this however the Commons refused to recognise, declaring loudly that they would reserve to themselves the settlement of this matter for the next session.

For the present session this affair gave way before the popular feeling aroused against the Lower House. This agitation certainly was chiefly founded on the position of European politics, specially on the anxiety felt as to the danger to trade and manufactures inevitable from the union of Spain and France. But at the time every one believed that it was purposely fomented by the great Whigs; and that no one had so great a hand in it as Lord Somers, who influenced the justices of the peace and other officials of his own appointment, all of whom felt that they must stand by him, and thought they could keep their places only through his means³. It was a reaction prepared by the Whigs, and one moreover which fully succeeded in its object so far, that it actually shook the Tory government. All depended on how far the

¹ Documents in Howell's State Trials xiv. 234.

² It comes to the difference between the two phrases, 'limiting a convenient time,' and 'determining what is a due time,' and this led to a protest in the House (Journals of Lords xvi. 668).

³ Bonnet. 'Par le moyen des lieutenants des provinces et des juges de paix, ses créatures, qu'il avoit établis dans tout le royaume et qui se tenoient réciproquement attachés à lui, pour se conserver dans leur poste. Ce n'a été que dans l'exécution de ce dessein, qu'a paru toute l'habileté de ce pair (Somers).'

party point-of-view could be made to coincide with those interests of which the nation had now become conscious. In the city a Whig ministry was already being called for.

But the Tories would not let themselves be beaten in this way. For their part, they had certainly never actually set themselves against war; they had recognised the duty of carrying out the old compact with Holland; and as the nation seemed to wish for war, they were ready to undertake it, principally as auxiliaries for Holland.

Since the Partition-treaties had been broken by France, the King and Heinsius had deemed an alliance with the Emperor to be necessary. Not that they would at once have recognised the claims of the house of Austria, though Heinsius was glad to see that the court of Vienna held firmly to them. The special idea of the two statesmen, as we see from their correspondence, was that, for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, the house of Austria must be strengthened. They thought of proposing such an increase of power and calling it a 'satisfaction': it was to consist of the annexation of the Spanish Netherlands and Milan to Austria. The recognition of Philip V as King of Spain, which William had decided on, was not absolutely contradictory to this. Heinsius and William always stood firmly to their original conviction, that a partition was necessary. In case Spain had fallen to one of the Archdukes, they had acceded—we know how unwillingly—to the French plans as to Italy: but if the Duke of Anjou got the Spanish throne, they desired as little that he should have Milan as the Netherlands. The question now was whether the English Parliament could be brought to endorse this demand. William foresaw no small difficulty in this: he thought that negotiations must first be entered into with Holland on the subject; he hoped that England might then also join in. He had, he says, to deal in England with men who must be led by indirect paths to their best interests¹.

But things were now so changed that so roundabout a path was no longer necessary: the course of the negotiations that were going on tended of itself to the desired point.

¹ April 8: 'Ick doe den voorslagh,—om dat ick hier met menschen te doen heb, die men door indiecte wegen moet leyden tot haer eygen best.'

Thus, when Avaux with all his concessions was, only willing to allow the English envoy a very limited participation in them, while he actually excluded all the English demands—one of the flimsiest barriers with which a diplomatist has ever tried to keep asunder the hostile forces raging fiercely against each other—the Dutch, as might well be understood, did not consent to this. they replied that the interests of the two nations were inseparably bound together, that in fact King William had taken as large a part in the negotiations as they had; that it would be a grave affront to him if they accepted this proposal. They gave him, as he wished, official intelligence of this, renewing their assurance that they would never let themselves be separated from England. But they added also a sketch of their position and of the pressing dangers to which they were exposed. The French troops in the Spanish Netherlands, they said, were being daily reinforced; they were already beginning to draw fortified lines along their frontiers, and to build works under the guns of their fortresses; at the same time France was making allies in Germany, and seducing away those of the Republic. on all sides, except perhaps by sea, they felt hemmed in and threatened with an attack; their position was worse than war itself would be, since they could do nothing to meet these hostilities. If, in accordance with a communication made them by the King, Parliament was now on the ground of old treaties resolved to furnish powerful help, the moment was come: help must no longer be delayed, if they were not to run the risk of sudden ruin. The King laid the document addressed to him before Parliament without a moment's delay, remarking at the same time that the safety of England and the existence of Holland were alike at stake.

The reply of the House of Lords was as satisfactory as possible. Convinced that the ruin of Holland must inevitably draw with it the downfall of England, they requested the King at once to set in operation the old treaties, and even to renew the alliances of 1689, in other words, to resume the compact with the Emperor. Were he to undertake to save the peace and liberties of Europe, the unanimous spirit of the nation would carry him through all the difficulties in

which this righteous war might involve him. In the debate even those who had been suspected of being under French influence spoke out the more warmly in this sense, in order to put an end to all such suspicions. Lord Normanby said that in the time of Charles II a certain powerful lady had been drawn under French influence. that James II had sought support for his policy from the same quarter; was it not astounding that even under a Protestant King there should be men who, bought by France, were willing to become traitors to their country and their faith?

But the Lower House did not go so far. As the Lords had cast a reproachful side-glance on the vacillations of the Commons, the latter replied that they were astonished at the proposal for an alliance with the Emperor made by the Lords, seeing that they, the Commons, could not vote the sums needful to carry out such a compact: but that Holland should not be deserted was the general opinion in the Commons as well. The chiefs of both parties vied with each other in hostile expressions towards the French policy. Seymour, the Tory leader, declared with great warmth for the necessity of supporting Holland against France; and, if it could be done in no other way, then by open war; and if by war, then by one carried on with all their might; he repeated his former words, that men must be willing to risk three-fourths of their property in order to save the remainder. In the resolution agreed to, though the Emperor and the great Alliance were not mentioned, it still came very near it, when it was decided that they would put the King in a position to support his allies in maintaining the liberties of Europe; they called on him for some proposal as to the help they should forthwith grant the States-General.

With this change of opinion in both Houses in the direction of unmistakeable hostility against France was connected the carrying out of the conclusions come to about the Hanoverian succession to the English throne. Here also there was a certain reference to the French court; in so far as there were people there who wished for the success of the claims made by the house of Savoy,—which might eventually fall in to the Bourbons through the marriage of its Duke's daughter

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with the Duke of Burgundy¹. Even a distant hint of such a combination must have had the effect of driving the English over to the other side. In the House of Commons, as we have observed, the moderate Tories had declared for the house of Hanover through dislike of the zealous Whigs and Republicans, in the Lords the Whigs, who wished to create a comprehensive anti-Gallican alliance in Germany, now took up very warmly the Hanoverian scheme of succession. In the upper aristocracy came up the thought of using the change of dynasty as a means for the extension of the privileges of their order; they desired to limit the right of heiresses to marry beneath their rank, and in general to make the peerages go with fixed landed properties, which should be inalienable². But these proposals must have been submitted to the Lower House, and would have been opposed there. The delay caused thereby would probably have been damaging both to the question itself and in relation to politics generally; the Whig party as such declared against them; the Lords voted to adopt the bill with the limitations inserted by the Commons.

The succession of the house of Hanover was the work of both parties, which on different grounds, and each from its own point of view, joined in supporting it.

Leibnitz, who was more warmly in favour of it than the court was, had been inclined to take up his pen for it, and there had been some thought in England, where he enjoyed great reputation, of requesting him to do so; but people were convinced that it was not necessary; for the English people had already entered warmly into the project.

It was not King William's way to send back an act which in the main answered to his wishes, on the ground of constitutional decisions which might be distasteful to him, but which could not now be altered, and which, in this case, might not come into operation till some far distant time. At present

¹ In Manchester's despatches this subject is alluded to more than once.

² 'Que ceux, qu'on créerait pairs, eussent un certain revenu en fonds de terre,—que les terres des pairs fussent inaliénables de la pairie.' Devonshire made the proposition about the peeresses, 'alléguant, qu'il étoit absurde, que leurs enfans fussent pairs, quand même elles auroient épousé des cordonniers ou des tailleurs.'—So says Bonnet, May 22/June 2.

the ratification of the Act promised him a still further advantage. The Tories were exceedingly eager for it, for they would have found but a sorry welcome on returning to their counties, had they come back without having passed the Act which every one regarded as a matter of life and death. Besides, they wished the session to end early, on this ground also, that they might not have to undergo the humiliation of having formally to acquit the impeached Lords. But before this certain other Acts on which much depended had still to be passed. We are assured that it was in consequence of an agreement with the Tories that the King, who also desired a prorogation that he might get away to Holland, appeared in Parliament June 12 '23, and gave his assent to the Act of Succession together with a number of other acts¹. At the same time he thanked the Houses for their care in settling the succession in the Protestant line, and for the zeal with which they had supported his plans for the liberties of Europe, and the safety of both Holland and England. The Tories had promised him an address which should re-echo his views: never had they been more zealous than in the debate which followed the reading of this speech from the throne. Edward Seymour said no one could thank the King enough for it; and declared himself to be warmly in favour of war, however much he might feel that by so doing he was contradicting his former utterances. But, said he, he had then thought that the English navy was not fit for sea, but now it was: then there had been a great many merchant-ships at sea, which would have run serious risk, had war been suddenly declared; now they were in port: now too the Emperor had chosen his side, and had ordered his troops into Italy: things being thus changed, a change of counsels must prevail. He accordingly proposed to support the King in his alliances not only with the States-General, but with

¹ Bonnet, June 13/24. 'Les chefs de parti firent entendre à M^{rs}. Rochester de prier S. M. de passer le bill de la succession et les autres, qui sont prêts, de prendre cette occasion, pour remercier les communes de ce, qu'elles ont fait pour le public, et en même temps de presser l'expédition des affaires importantes, que la chambre basse ne manqueroit pas de répondre à cette approbation d'une manière glorieuse au roi.'

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the Emperor, whose very name had not hitherto been mentioned. Bartholomew Shower went farther still: the aims named by the King were not enough for him; he was for adding that the King must be supported in limiting the excessive power of France. This change of views in their opponents was not altogether pleasant to the Whigs; it seemed to indicate an unwelcome understanding between the Tories and the King; still, when it came to the point, they made no opposition, for it was in truth the very thing they had now been urging for many months past. Both proposals were adopted unanimously in the address. There had originally been introduced a mention of the limit to be put to the forces to be kept up in the country; but after some hesitation the words were struck out; they did not wish to say anything unpleasant to the King.

One can see that these great parties were anything but immoveably rigid. The Whigs, who originally had wished to throw over the succession-question, had afterwards forwarded it with all the greater zeal. The Tories, who at first had thought of nothing but peace, in the end had, to a great extent, declared for war. Both parties sought the King's favour; and he, thanks to the changes in the political situation, which he ever regarded from a right and discerning point of view, and thanks too to the support which public opinion gave him, suddenly found himself once more in a grand position: master of both parties, he could now take his part in European affairs with energy greater than he had ever before shown.

CHAPTER IX.

BREACH WITH FRANCE. THE SIXTH PARLIAMENT OF WILLIAM III.

STILL, war was not yet declared; the King, while making preparations, under the powers granted him, for shipping over 10,000 men from England and Ireland to Holland, declared, at the same time that it was unfair to charge him with a desire for war. No doubt he did not wish exactly for war, but for the acceptance of his conditions.

As affairs actually stood between France and the maritime powers a peaceful settlement might perhaps have still been come to: the French offered to still the anxieties of Holland by allowing the Spanish Netherlands to be given to Lorraine, and then indemnifying Spain with Roussillon; they were now willing to let England take part in the negotiations, with the sole condition that they should be carried on in Paris¹. William acceded to neither proposal; he remarked that there was no security to be gained by establishing in the Netherlands a weak Prince, dependent on France: he also thought the transfer of the negotiations not an honourable proposal; he insisted that they should still go on at the Hague; and at the same time he likewise demanded the entrance of the Imperial ambassador into the deliberations.

He himself had still no kind of understanding with the Emperor. The court of Vienna was much rather set against him, in consequence of his declining to renew the old alliance, and of his continuing to negotiate with France; for this they thought would lead in the end (just as before Nimuegen

¹ Stepney to an English statesman (probably not Blathwaite) in Kemble's State papers 245.

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and Ryswick) to an agreement between the two powers to which the Emperor would then be forced to accede. But the Emperor's interest would even in this case have been duly cared for: William III demanded 'satisfaction' for the house of Austria: that is, as matters then stood, he asked that Milan and the Spanish Netherlands should be made over to the Emperor. For by this means the balance of power in Europe, of all things the most important in his eyes, would still be secured, in spite of past changes.

But no sooner was this demand put forward, than it became clear that it could not be attained. Avaux refused to listen to any mention of satisfaction to the house of Austria for its claims, on the simple ground that Austria had no claims to make. Stanhope, the English envoy, paid him a private visit, in order to make him fully understand that William was firm about the Austrian satisfaction, and the permission to the Imperial envoy to take part in the negotiations, and to assure him that his King would never separate himself from the Emperor. He increased the unpleasant nature of the communication he had to make by bluntly neglecting the usual formalities¹. But at Versailles also, where the English again made these demands, they were regarded as almost insulting.

And we must not forget that Louis XIV was also on his side under obligations. The maintenance of the Spanish monarchy in its integrity was the express condition of the will. Such an exchange as the one which had last been suggested, with an indemnification for Spain, might perhaps have been reconcileable with the terms of the will; for Spain often of herself suggested this; but never a cession to Austria, or any recognition of her claims. For the Spaniards based their submission to Philip V entirely on the principle that the old Spanish right of inheritance was the exclusive title by which the French prince succeeded. Louis XIV would have thrown doubt on his grandson's rights, while he also shook his own reputation, had he been willing to entertain the proposals favourable to Austria. The question was just

¹ Avaux, in Lamberty's *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du xviii siècle*, i. 485.

such a one as had been laid before him at the time of his acceptance of the will; and he decided it in the same way.

The decision of the French court is expressed in a memorandum, in which bitter and offensive reproaches are cast on Holland for her share in the negotiations; especially for her assumption of the post of arbiter of Europe, and at the same time for her servility towards the King of England. Avaux, who had hastened to pay his respects to King William on his arrival at the Hague, and who, in general, personally wished to keep up tolerably friendly relations, handed in this memorandum with the remark that it did not originate from him: soon after (August 11, 1701) he received his definite recall.

William III, who had not expected this yet, and least of all in this form, regarded it as the first symptom of a coming comprehensive attack on the United Netherlands¹.

He was already negotiating in every quarter, with the greater and smaller German princes, such as Prussia and Münster, as well as with the Emperor, in order to get some trustworthy support for Holland. It was in connexion with these negotiations and occurrences that the English Act of Succession was brought over to Hanover by a brilliant embassy headed by Lord Macclesfield. He had been chosen for this post on the ground that his father had formerly been connected with the court of Elizabeth of Bohemia. On the 15th of August, Macclesfield kissed the hand of Elizabeth's daughter, and presented the document by which the reversion of the throne of England was secured to her and her descendants. The members of the embassy admired the aged lady, still so full of life and high intelligence; she spoke to them fluently, in pure English, and shewed herself well-informed on English affairs and persons. She declared that she warmly and sympathetically adopted the main principle on which all depended—the union of religion with liberty through the law. 'God grant,' she said 'that these laws may endure! may

¹ William to Heinsius, 12 August. 'Men sal nu sekerlyk aen alle kanten wel op syn hoede moeten syn ende alles sonder tydverlies prepareren tot syn defentie.'

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their descendants never give the English cause to be weary of them!’ The complex union of international interests deeply impressed her learned friend Leibnitz: ‘above all,’ he said, ‘I trust there may be done in the Empire also whatever is needed to bridle that overreaching power which desires to dictate laws to all the world!’¹ And so it was. But who can describe the effects which this union of a great German principality with the English throne has had on both nations and on the world in general. The house of Hanover saw that its European duty was that of direct resistance to the power of France.

On the 6th of September King William read the Treaty which had meanwhile been negotiated with the Emperor by Marlborough; he approved it, and next day it was signed

In this document the maritime powers had not even yet come to the point of acknowledging, as the Emperor insisted, his full right to the Spanish throne; they promised him equitable compensation for his claims on it; there was a wish that on this subject, and on that of sufficient securities for the maritime powers, further negotiations were to be carried on with France; but if nothing were satisfactorily settled within two months, that then the two parties should support one another to the uttermost. When they came to define matters more closely, they went somewhat further than had at first been intended. Originally there had been a wish to stop at this, that the Emperor should have Milan and the Spanish Netherlands, as a barrier for Holland, and that the maritime powers should retain their old right of trading with the provinces of the Spanish monarchy. The Dutch were anxious not to go further. But the Imperialists were not to be satisfied with this, and Marlborough remarked that England also might wish for some arrangement about the Mediterranean and the West Indies. Thereupon the acquisition of South Italy for the profit of both sides, and a conquest in South America for the maritime powers, were taken into consideration. In all this however it was always definitely

¹ Cp. Oldmixon's *History of England* ii. 242. Malortie, *Court of Hanover* 135.

presupposed that Philip V must remain in possession of Spain ; it was only agreed between the parties never to let the crowns of Spain and France be united, or to allow the French to get any share in the South American trade¹.

Even up to this point all was yet contingent : more negotiations were still looked for ; the English ambassador was still in France. But now came an event which utterly destroyed all chance of agreement.

On September 6/17, 1701, James II died at St. Germain. How great is the contrast when one looks from the intense and all-embracing activity of William III, in which the fortunes of future ages took their origin and direction, to the position of the prince whose throne he had taken ! King James found his highest satisfaction in the bosom of the Congregation of La Trappe, which sought complete renunciation of the world in silence, mortification, and manual toil. He had at first visited La Trappe from curiosity, but had been attracted by the magical power of the discipline there exercised (which was still kept up in all its original energy under the founder) ; the King actually subjected himself to it from time to time during the latter years of his life : for there, he was wont to say, he got a sense of the nothingness of all worldly grandeur, and of the duty of living solely in the love of God and in mortification of self. Since the invasion-project had failed, he had renounced all thought of recovering his throne : what then could have comforted his soul, save communion with those who had willingly renounced the world ? At times he had still gone a hunting, had heard comedies, and even been at balls ; but only lest he should offend by being singular. A review of French troops, at which he was present, had filled him with amazement at the bearing of the soldiers, and the officers' zeal for the King's service. When he came away he asked himself in solitude whether they also thought of Him who is called the Lord of Hosts : it pained him to think that their life answered so ill to the precepts of the religion they defended. For his own part he only busied himself with the way to do penance for

¹ Marlborough to Godolphin, in Coxe i 70

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all that at any time might be laid to his charge: joyfully he grasped the idea of a purification in the world to come: in his self-accusing devotion he actually begged his confessor not to let the prayer for deliverance from the fires of purgatory be said for him: he thought he ought to exhaust all the torments of that place. The confessor replied, with words of deeper meaning, that the soul cannot too soon see God

As early as March, 1701, James II had had an apoplectic stroke; on the second of September, in the Chapel of St. Germain's he had another, so severe that his life was despaired of. As he had sacrificed his crown to his religious convictions, so in his present state he exhorted his son to cling close to the Catholic faith, happen what might, and never to think his claims to the throne of any account compared with it. They could scarcely tear the boy away from his father's neck; for James II was dearly beloved by all around him¹.

Now came the serious question for the French government. Should the Prince be acknowledged, on the death of James II, as his successor? The question was considered in a full council. For the affirmative it was remarked that such recognition would not violate the stipulations of the Peace of Ryswick, for there was not one word in the treaty about either James II or his son; while the royal dignity could not lapse and become extinct; it could not be taken from those whose birthright it was. On the other side reference was made to the agreement contained in the Treaty of Ryswick, by which Louis XIV had promised neither directly nor indirectly to interfere to the prejudice of King William's peaceful possession of the throne; and what could be a greater prejudice to it than the recognition of another as king during William's lifetime? Was it not as though the Prince, with whom friendly relations had been kept up for years, should now be declared an usurper? Such an act would rather raise up foes to the Prince of Wales: better to wait till William died—it could not be long—the

¹ So the Duchess Elizabeth Charlotte tells us. she had paid a visit to St. Germain's on the 8th of September. James had still a strong voice and recognised her at once. but he looked 'very very bad, his beard was like a Capucin's, the good Queen in a condition not to be described: it would melt a stone'

Prince might then be recognised, seeing that there was nothing in that treaty about King William's successor¹.

This was the view taken by the ministers, and generally by those present, excepting the princes of the blood. The Dauphin specially declared, with the violence peculiar to him, that he was for sustaining the rights of the exiled family, which, in fact, through the mother of James II, belonged to their own royal house; he exclaimed that it would be a piece of cowardice to drop it. These dynastic ideas, once warmly embraced, become a kind of religion which allows no yielding, no discretion. Hostilities had already broken out in Italy between France and Austria; to carry them on vigorously the most oppressive taxes must be laid on: what a beginning then was it wilfully to inflame the antipathies of the English nation at the same time, and to render war with England inevitable! But things went, as they had gone at the time of the question of the acceptance of the Spanish will; the idea of birthright, bound up with religious tendencies, carried all before it.

Finally, the King said he was of Monsiegnur's opinion. He met political objections with the assurance that he had no thought of supporting the restoration of the Prince of Wales to the English throne with ships, troops, or money. It was a matter of personal feeling with him to keep the Court of St. Germain's as it had been. It is affirmed that Madame de Maintenon had been won over to this view by the Queen Maria Beatrice, who had ever enjoyed great consideration at court, to whom Louis XIV first announced in person his intentions²: the next day he returned to St. Germain's, to see King James once more, though he was already senseless, and to declare his mind to all the dying King's court. He had the

¹ Sur la proposition, s'il convient de reconnaître le prince de Galles roy d'Angleterre: Sept. 9, 1701. This little document expresses different points of view. The conclusion was added at a later time.

² He said to her: 'maugre all the difficulties he had met within his great council, yet having the unanimous consent of the dauphin and all the rest of the princes of the blood, he resolved to acknowledge and declare the prince his majesty's lawful heir' So says the 'exact account of the sickness and death of the late king' in Somers's Tracts xi, without doubt the most trustworthy of existing accounts, less written for effect than the narrative in Clarke's 'Life of James, II,' 592 sqq; from which Macpherson has an extract, and which has since been readily repeated

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doors of the sitting-room thrown open, and all who belonged to the court-circle were allowed to enter. he gave orders about certain domestic matters; especially he laid weight on two points; first, he said that after the father's death the son was to be proclaimed King of England, secondly, that he intended to let everything remain as it then was. All were in tears. At the King's words the hopes of the Jacobites, which had been almost extinct, revived once more; they lightened the blow of the impending death of James. It was a moment in which Louis XIV had a sense of magnanimity, self-satisfaction, pain; the tears even came into his eyes.

Next afternoon King James died. Then Maria Beatrice first saluted her son as King; the members of the little court kissed his hand and addressed him with the title of Majesty; Middleton brought him the seals of his office, and received them from him again. In a somewhat tumultuous fashion¹ he was proclaimed King of England, Scotland, and Ireland at St. Germain's. Louis XIV did not fail to pay him the first visit. This was the youth whom as a child the King had first saluted on the arrival of the fugitive court, and with whose life a crisis in his political career was bound up; he desired to keep the Pretender to the three kingdoms under his protection.

Even now this was of some importance for him. The Jacobites were still both numerous and active: the English ambassador is never weary of sending tidings of the messengers going between St Germain's and Scotland; there were English noblemen who were said to have boasted that they could bring ten thousand men into the field for the house of Stuart. Nor can it be denied that there was some truth in it, when one knows that the consideration of this hostility towards King William had been one of the causes of the peace.

But this was never for a moment to be compared with the

¹ Manchester to Blathwaite, Sept. 19 in *Manchester's Court and Society* etc., ii. 195, 196: 'Lord Middleton, etc. did not appear, by reason they could not tell how the title of France would be taken here, had they done it in form.' So that it really appears as if they had not left out the word 'France' from the proclamation of the titles of James III. Strange contradiction! One could almost think the herald must have been an Irishman!

effect that the proclamation of a King James III, must necessarily produce in England.

William III, though once more very ill, no longer hesitated to recall his ambassador. Lord Manchester remarks that it surely was the first time that a court, at which the envoy of a foreign country had been accredited and present, had decided to recognise another prince as king of that country. Negotiations, whether they related to the Anglo-Dutch conditions, or to Austria, were definitely broken off, and war now for the first time became inevitable.

But, more than this, the great majority of the English people felt themselves outraged. They had scarcely cared about the breach of the Partition-treaties; but that a foreign power should cause a young prince, excluded from the throne by repeated votes of Parliament, to be proclaimed King of Great Britain and Ireland, was regarded by the nation as an insult. And the principle which had now come into full activity on the one side, aroused by internal necessity full antagonism on the other side.

The dangers to the liberties and religion of England, which men feared from the union of the two great Catholic crowns, found intelligible expression in the establishment of a Catholic and legitimist Pretender who depended on them. The first popular manifestation against it took place in London. Some warning voices were raised; for a declaration of war against the King of France could easily be foreseen in it. But the general feeling was that he had begun hostilities, and that they therefore owed him no further consideration. An address was drawn up, accusing him of wishing to hurl William III from the throne, and to uproot the Protestant faith. Similar addresses were presented to King William from every quarter. The Tories were as active as the Whigs; in fact the London address had a very Tory tone about it.

This in fact was the special characteristic of the state of affairs at that time; the Tories were for war as much as the Whigs; they made a point of giving the King their warmest assurances of support. But we have often seen that nothing was so dangerous to the Tories as an extreme development of the principle of legitimacy; they had certainly themselves

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fallen away from that principle, although the axioms on which their party-position was built up had a natural affinity for those of legitimacy. The chief reason why of late years they had been able to attain to the consideration the party now enjoyed was this, that the close connexion between William III and Louis XIV made the Jacobites no longer formidable, as they then had no one to support them. But now the position of affairs was changed. The recognition of a third James by the King of France was in itself favourable to the Whigs, whose political tendencies were exactly opposite, and corresponded to the warlike tendencies of William III. Did not all the world know that the Tories had only reluctantly come over to him? Their final adhesion to him had by no means removed the ill-feeling prevailing against them. It was represented to the King that next session they would again take up the trials against the Whigs, and try to effect their more thorough overthrow; that they would also even dictate to the King the conditions under which they would co-operate with him; that above all they would aim at two things,—first, to introduce such innovations into ecclesiastical affairs as would take away from the King the higher patronage in the Church; and, secondly, to get into their hands the military authority over London. Against this there had for some time past been a talk of breaking up their preponderance by means of a change in the administration and ministry. King William still felt very undecided about it. He thought that if he broke with the Tories and called in the other party, and then the Whigs proved unable to serve him, he would be left without support; and he held it sufficient to anticipate the resumption of the trials by an act of royal grace, so that no dangerous and embarrassing division need be apprehended. But on the other hand it was noted that the intended act of grace could only be drawn up in such general terms as to include the Jacobites also, which might have disastrous results. Moreover, he received from many sides addresses begging him to dissolve Parliament: if he would persevere in his desire to save the land from Popery and slavery, men should be sent to Parliament who would be thoroughly determined to stand by him.

Lord Sunderland, to whom the King had once more turned, as in great party-crises he was wont to do, was also very strongly on the same side. We know that the exclusive rule of Tories and Anglicans was of all combinations the one most offensive to him. He pointed out to the King that the Tories were flattering him for their own objects; and that they certainly would not support him effectually in the war. What could he expect from ministers who had never yet been masters of their party, and could only maintain themselves by bringing him to ruinous concessions? But the credit of the ministers and Tories was already sinking, and that of the Whigs was on the rise: the King might also count on the moderate clergy. Sunderland advised him once more to call to his counsels Lord Somers, who was really the true soul of his party¹.

There are still extant the heads of a complete opinion which Lord Somers, to whom the King now applied from Loo in October, had drawn up for him on this subject. In it he gives great weight to the fact that the majority in the Commons was not composed of Tories alone, but also of the Jacobites, who had sided with them. But would or could the King expect a majority so composed to provide him with means for energetic preparations against a war with France and the house of Stuart? If the Tories were to break with the Jacobites they would no longer be in the majority. And the Whigs would give no support to ministers from whom they could expect neither favour nor justice. Then Somers goes on to say, that it is an established maxim in parliamentary government, that the right moment for a change must be seized the instant it occurs; and that such a moment had arrived. By a dissolution of Parliament no risk would be run; the temper of the nation, especially as expressed since the declaration of Louis XIV, made it quite certain that the elections would be favourable to the King's views. He adds, that a good Parliament would, in the course of its three years of existence, give a prospect of also getting over the great difficulties which

¹ Sunderland to the King, Sept 11, 1701, in Hardwicke ii. 444, where this estimate of Somers also appears.

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beset home affairs. And even if the elections did not turn out as they wished, there was still no ground for fear; for the temper of the nation was such that Parliament would not venture to do anything against the King.

This opinion, in which every point of view was well weighed, settled the King's determination. Still he deemed it well to lay the question before his Privy Council on returning to England. The Tories, as may easily be understood, were against a dissolution. Godolphin did not conceal his intention to resign if this were decided on. He was the minister who had constantly corresponded with the King, and who enjoyed his confidence. But for all his opposition the Privy Council decided, by a small majority, chiefly formed of men who knew the King's wishes, in favour of a dissolution. The proclamation came out on the 11th of November; it was an unexpected blow to the Tories¹.

But what excitement blazed forth on either side! Commercial relations also exercised much influence on the warlike humour of the nation. The ordinances against English manufactures, which were at this moment issued in France, shewed the English men of business what they had to expect if Spain were to fall under the influence of France. It was thought that in that case they would neither get the silver from the galleons nor the Spanish wool, still indispensable in England; not merely would the trade with the Spanish colonies be lost, but English ships would be entirely excluded from the Mediterranean. The commercial interest clamoured loudly for war.

In the elections, moreover, the Whigs had an advantage as the public voice declared itself against those Tories who inclined towards Jacobite views. And the ultra-Whigs also, who at times had voted with the Jacobites, were this time thrown out. At Cambridge Sir Isaac Newton was elected, chiefly on the ground of his being a moderate Whig. The French refugees in Westminster and Southwark once more came forward with their votes to help the Whigs; they steadily held that a war against the principles which had

¹ Here, and in the following pages, I draw mostly from Bonnet.

originally ejected them from France would be the safeguard of the world. Yet the instructions given to the members elected had occasionally, as for instance in Cornwall, a Tory tinge. In that district there was even a wish to ask who had advised his Majesty to dissolve Parliament, and to insist on the continuance of the trial of the accused Lords.

In this somewhat undecided state of parties, it was of great importance that the two East India Companies, which had been implicated in the antagonism between the two parties, now came to an understanding.

In the last session the Tories, and the old Company with them, had had it their own way. They even went so far as to try to abolish the new Company by repaying it the sums it had advanced: but the new Company was not inclined to allow itself to be broken up: the affair could not be carried out. The old Company was certainly richer, more firmly established, with more extensive interests involved in its support: still the directors of the other were men of influence, and care had to be taken not to offend the public, who had paid their money in good faith. Both companies now began to wish, thanks to the deadlock that things had come to, to discover some possible compromise. The old Company gave such a sketch to Rochester, the new Company to Montague Lord Halifax; Lowndes, as an experienced businessman, acted as umpire between them. The difference between them lay chiefly in the question how to estimate the value of the old Company's possessions; they put them at a higher value than the new Company was willing to allow. But the conviction that still greater profits would be made, if the companies worked together, than if they kept up incessant rivalry, led at last to an agreement even on this point; the two companies coalesced on the 24th of December, 1701.

Immediately afterward (Dec. 30) Parliament was opened; the parties were about equally represented. The Whigs had the longer purses, and people believed that their intentions in the present crisis were the most upright. The Tories had the better heads, and were the better speakers; they were held in great and traditional respect by the nation, and at this moment it was in their favour that people believed them

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determined to undertake the defence of constitutional rights. The Whigs had the Bishops appointed by King William, men of moderate opinions, at their backs; the zealous Anglicans went with the Tories: the Whigs had towns and trade with them. the Tories carried the country districts and the counties.

These parties were very far from coming to an understanding; but in face of a hostility which threatened the existence of the constitution as founded by the Revolution, they rallied round the King as the personal representative of that constitution: they were agreed that the struggle now impending, if not actually begun, must be carried on with the utmost energy.

Of this feeling the King made use in his speech from the throne, though he did so most cautiously. He could not at all be persuaded to reproach the Tories again with their attitude, as Sunderland had wished: he even approved of their proposal to demand a strict account of the way in which the public money was spent. For it almost seemed as if even now they would hold their own. They had the best of it in the choice of a speaker; their majority no doubt was small, still a majority it was: Harley was re-elected, and that too even against the King's wishes. It was therefore impossible for him to offend so powerful a party, and irritate it against himself. He only noticed the affront Louis XIV had put on the nation by recognising the Pretender as James III, and the risk with which he threatened their religion and liberties; he also expressed his expectation that this would rouse all the ancient strength of the nation: they would show whether they truly meant to hold the European balance of power in their hands, and to stand at the head of the Protestant interest¹.

The reply of the Commons re-echoed the tone of the speech. They promised to be faithful to the alliances the King had made or might make, by advice of the late Parliament,—the mention of which no doubt had a special significance,—above all they would uphold his rightful and lawful

¹ *Parl. Hist.* v. 1329: and a despatch by Bonnet.

claim to the throne and the succession in the Protestant line. And that they might give irrevocable expression to this decision, they came to the astonishing and in itself monstrous conclusion that they would pass a Bill of Attainder, declaring the young Prince who had assumed the title of King of England guilty of high treason. It was thought desirable to make the breach between him and Parliament as wide as possible. Every kind of correspondence with him was most emphatically forbidden: it was declared penal for any one to maintain by voice or pen that the so-called Prince of Wales had any right to the throne of England. All this the Tories were not inclined to oppose. On the contrary, Edward Seymour proposed that in the alliances to be concluded there should be inserted a condition that no peace should be made with the King of France till he had given satisfaction for the insult to the English nation contained in his recognising the so-called Prince of Wales as King. This was adopted, and recommended to the King in an address; it was a pleasant surprise for him; he replied that he would take care it should be done. A special article to this effect was subsequently put into the treaty with Austria.

The King had looked forward to the debates with some anxiety; as early as the 10/21 of January they were over. 'God be praised,' he writes to Heinsius on that day, 'the difficulties are overcome.'

On Vernon's motion the Commons agreed to set on foot a land-force of 40,000 men; on Rooke's motion they sanctioned a vote for 40,000 sailors. This last vote was extended so as to include the establishment of a force of 10,000 marines, though this would cost somewhat more. As war was again actually coming on, no difficulty was made about allowing the incorporation of 10,000 foreign troops into the British army.

Both parties vied with each other in the endeavour to put the King in the best possible position for the prosecution of the war, on which depended the maintenance of the constitution as settled by the Revolution.

CHAPTER X.

CONSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION BETWEEN WHIGS AND TORIES.

DEATH OF KING WILLIAM III.

AT this time it caused no small wonder to see how well King William understood the way to be master of both parties, by playing them off against one another: as neither could accomplish anything by itself, each sought to win for itself the King's support, reminded him of its past services, and held out hopes that, if he would make it stronger than its rival, it would carry out all his views. But William knew well that in that case either party would try to secure to itself the exclusive possession of power; and that his own position required him to keep the balance between them¹.

Sunderland had at that time advised him to take this course; he must not let the Tories hope for too much; and in the Whigs he should arouse some anxiety; for the rest let him go on his own way unwavering, promoting to high office no man who had spoken out emphatically against him.

The Whigs of course enjoyed most of his favour. Lord Manchester, now just back from France, after having there conducted himself as a zealous adherent of the King and his policy, was made Secretary of State; there were three Whigs and but one Tory in the Finance-Commission; and similar changes were expected in other branches of the administration.

¹ Bonnet, 9/20 January; 'De ces différentes passions procède une émulation à bien faire, qui avance les affaires publiques'—13/24 January, 'Les affaires publiques ne procéderaient pas si bien, si l'un ou l'autre parti avoit la supériorité.'

In some of the most important debates, too, the Whigs had the best of it. It was on their motion that an oath was imposed on all members of Parliament, officials, and public teachers, to the effect that they accepted the succession as settled, and expressly declared the claim of the Prince of Wales to be null and void. The Tories resisted, on the ground that such an oath would certainly not restrain any one who wished to desert the cause from doing so; but at last they agreed to it, rather than cause discord. And though it would have gone with their ideas to have pledged those who had to take the oath also to defend the Church as by law established, still they did not insist on the proposal, as it did not seem to them at this moment prudent to alienate the Presbyterians and other Nonconformists from the national cause. The great parties, anyhow, did not carry out their principles so logically as to lose sight of the general interests of the country, or to make a delay in doing whatever was necessary for the community at large.

Yet for all this there was not at the time peace between them. On the contrary, the pamphlet-war raged more fiercely than ever. The most notable persons in the realm, the party-leaders, were very bitterly hated by their antagonists; attacks were met with recrimination rather than defence. It is not worth our while to detail these hostilities between the parties, in which nothing but personal hatred discharged its venom. The age brought them, the age has swept them away again.

But among them were two questions of great constitutional importance; these had been already mooted in the previous session, and now came on for debate, nor could they be passed over. The one was connected with the Kentish petition, the other with the trial of the Whig Lords; both affected the extent of the rights belonging to the House of Commons; and this as much with reference to the manifestations of the popular will as to the influence of the royal authority.

No one set himself so decidedly against the claims of Parliament to legislative omnipotence, in either direction, as Daniel de Foe, of all the pamphleteers of the time perhaps the one who combined the greatest literary ability with ideas the

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most original and most independent of the opinions already rooted in the very life of England. On the one hand he laid down the doctrine that constitutional authority was only held on commission, and might again be withdrawn by its true owners the people, who had but lent it: Parliament, he held, had often been unserviceable, sometimes even harmful;—and what in such cases had saved the country? The voice of the people, he replied, expressed, not through the representatives, but by those who ought to be represented¹. This popular doctrine, which aimed at justifying not only the Kentish petition, but all the addresses which had called for the dissolution of the late Parliament, was bound up in De Foe's mind with a tendency towards monarchy. He did not go so far as was afterwards done by one at a later time and in another place, who even called the Prince the representative of the people: but he treated William III as the restorer of the original rights of the nation, on which he was able to build, because he had it on his side. Thus then the appeal to the people appears to be the last resort for the monarchy, if it would in any degree free itself from its subordination to parliamentary power, when it became tyrannical. According to De Foe, English liberty lies in this connexion between Prince and people. The King is not so much King over the people, as he is the people's King. His crown is not of less account because it depends on the popular approval; the people on its side does not desire a Republic; for if it had one it would only thereby introduce a worse kind of administration instead of a better: the King's government secured more freedom than a republican form of constitution could give.

There was no formal debate in the English Parliament as to all these theories: that would have been contrary to its character; but they came under consideration so far that the Tories set themselves against the claims that might be deduced from them.

The instructions given by certain towns and counties to their representatives for the present session came first under

¹ Cp Forster, *Historical and Biographical Essays* ii 31.

discussion. As we have observed, they were sometimes favourable to the Tories, but more frequently against them; but the Tories were specially firm on the principle that such instructions tended to hinder freedom of debate, and that by their very existence the independence of the Lower House would be destroyed. Strangers were amazed at it, yet the train of affairs actually brought it to pass, that the Tories now insisted on the exclusive prerogatives of the Commons¹.

In a question which touched the authority of Parliament, the Whigs could not resist very earnestly. A committee had been appointed to preserve the privileges of the House: and on the 17th of February this committee not only refused to let such instructions be given, but also at the same time denied the statement that there could be any other representative of the Commons of England except the Lower House; it was affirmed that such a statement would be ruinous to the rights of the House itself and to the fundamental constitution of the kingdom.

It was argued in a number of pamphlets that by the arrest of those who had introduced the Kentish petition, the House had exceeded its privileges; the committee decided that the act was within its proper privileges; and that in general its proceedings ought not to be attacked in public prints.

The petitions in which the King had been requested to dissolve the late Parliament next came under consideration. The first grievance on this subject, introduced by an unimportant member, was taken up by one of the most prominent Tory leaders, Finch, Nottingham's brother, and was expanded into the demand that the authors of the petitions, who thereby had been guilty of a crime, should be enquired

¹ Bonnet, 20 Feb./3 March 1702, considers it no longer 'surprenant, que les Tories, qui aiment l'indépendance, qui ont de grands égards pour l'intérêt de leur parti, ayant opiné contre les instructions, que quelques villes ont données à leurs députés, et les aient voulu passer pour une innovation dangereuse, qui renversoit les prérogatives des communes.'—'Il arriva que les chefs des Tories, oubliant, jusqu'à quel point ils avoient porté l'autorité royale sous les règnes précédents, furent les plus échauffés à faire valoir les prérogatives de la chambre des communes, par là entraînant ceux de leur parti après eux.'

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after¹. There were members of the House who felt themselves attacked by this, but considered that they were within their rights; one of these, Strickland by name, declared that, if people were so anxious to know who were the authors of the addresses, they could see one of the supposed culprits before them: that the Yorkshire address had originated with him; but that people ought at the same time to know that it had received 5,000 signatures and had met with the King's approval. The energy of his language and the importance of the matter, produced a general sensation. The Whigs insisted that it was a right of the people to present petitions of this kind: they set themselves warmly against the motion, and found further support in so doing. There were always certain independent votes which usually turned the scale; these were nicknamed the 'flying squadron,' a name borrowed from the papal conclave; it was said in their praise that they had always been sensible enough to preserve the balance of the constitution. They understood that the motion would lead up to a great attack on the Whigs by the Tories, and to this they would not be parties. Their going over to the Whigs, the speeches and replies on both sides, the entanglement of the King himself in the affair, produced a state of wild excitement, which no one could escape from. Strickland, in the very midst of the hatred he had aroused, the support he found, and the sudden outburst of the old quarrel between the two parties, was stricken down by an apoplectic seizure; the chairman of the committee thereon left his seat: the speaker resumed the chair, and adjourned the House.

The question thus raised had not yet been settled, when, some days later (Feb. 26) the great affair, to which all the rest had simply served as a kind of introduction, namely, the renewal of the trial of the Whig Lords, came on for debate. In the committee of the whole House into which the Commons had resolved itself, the question was discussed, whether the conduct of the House of Lords as to the trial of the four persons accused had been lawful or not. The words themselves sound harmless enough—but how much was in fact

¹ Bonnet. 'Comme je sais de très bonne part, tout ceci n'estoit qu'un acheminement pour aller plus loin.'

contained in them! The jealousy between the two Houses was once more aroused by them, and it might have been supposed that the decision would be against the Lords, seeing that the Commons were fighting for their own privileges. But that would have given full force to the impeachment of the Whig Lords, and this impeachment, in its gravest article, touched even the King; for it was an act of obedience towards the royal commands with which Somers was more especially reproached. It was believed that the Tories, in case they were resisted by Lords or King, intended to withhold the ratification of the subsidies already voted, and would thus compel the King to restore to them the full possession of power. So much depended on, or was connected with, the decision of the question now before the House! It can readily be understood that each party was anxious to be fully represented, once more were messengers sent to Westminster Hall and the other law-courts to summon such members as were engaged there to the House; the gouty and sick even were brought up. There were 456 members present, a larger attendance than had been seen in the House within the memory of man. A warm debate began, both sides vying in eloquence and force of arguments. It was also in the Whigs' favour that, if the motion were carried, a fresh and irreparable breach between the two Houses would follow, and this would be a mishap which under existing complications might have incalculable consequences¹. It was probably this special consideration which this time also decided the flying squadron. On a division the Whigs had a majority of fourteen votes, the numbers being 235 to 221. It was agreed that every person accused had a right to demand a speedy decision on what might be laid to his charge; for the House of Lords justified its procedure by this very postponement of the trial by the Commons; it seemed a great triumph that the majority of the Commons actually conceded the point. But the Whigs were not yet satisfied. Lord Hartington, son of the Duke of Devonshire, at once brought up the question which had not yet been settled; he argued from

¹ Bonnet and Spanheim, 27 Feb./10 March Journals of Commons xiii. 767.

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the mistakes of the late Parliament that the wish for its dissolution had been fully justified, and that the petitions presented to the King in that sense did not deserve censure. A resolution to the effect that it was an undoubted right of the people to petition the King for a dissolution, and even for the summoning of a fresh Parliament, was carried.

Thus, at intervals of time, five resolutions were agreed to in the committee on the privileges of the House, which in principle contradicted one another. The first three expressed the Tory view, the others the Whig; the former affirmed the omnipotence of the House of Commons, the latter its limitation by the people, the House of Lords, and indirectly by the King. These resolutions were adopted by the House as they stood; no attempt was made to smooth over their contradictory character; it was very much what had been done with the votes on the abdication of James II.

In those days, in which the Tory and Whig parties first began to come into full being, the difference between them was not, strictly speaking, the same with that which people have since been wont to understand by these names: it was this:—The Tories claimed for the House of Commons, as against the people the House of Lords and the King, all the rights which, according to the dominant view, spring from the representation of the people: the Whigs claim for the people the right of expressing their opinion on public affairs, even in opposition to their representatives: they looked with more favour on the independence of the House of Lords and the King's prerogative. The Tories treated the state as strictly established, parliamentary, constitutional; the Whigs had a slight tincture of both democracy and monarchy combined.

This was the opposition of the great parties at the beginning of the eighteenth century. We shall be pardoned if, on the threshold of this great epoch, we make a retrospective sketch of the connexion between their formation and the historical progress of England.

Even in Tallard's despatches the Tories appear as Anglicans, the Whigs as Presbyterians: their origin, and, in part at least, their very being plainly depended on this division within the bosom of Protestantism.

The Presbyterian form of Church-government developed in Scotland, which had essentially deviated from its ancient custom, set itself in direct opposition to the Episcopal form maintained in England: this consequently came to have a political character, as the latter was intimately connected with the crown, while the other form had sprung up in direct hostility to it. We know how the great Rebellion sprang from this antagonism: Anglicans then succumbed to Presbyterians, and they in their turn to a third party led on to victory by one strong man, until he died; and then Presbyterians and Churchmen joined in effecting the Restoration.

The course of things then led to the restoration of the Church of England together with the crown: the conservative principle in its strictest form got the upper hand; the Long Parliament of the Restoration represented Tory principles, even before the name of Tory was heard.

But still the Presbyterian party were never entirely shut out: holding fast to their main principles, represented in literature by some men of genius, furthered by the shortcomings but too undeniably visible on the other side, they formed one of the most effective oppositions ever yet seen. Thus the Whig party also existed, though its name had not yet been invented.

And now, thanks to the Romanising tendencies of King James II and his hostility to parliamentary government, the conservative and Anglican party became hostile to the crown, and found its prerogatives, as actually exercised, to be unendurable.

Both parties, those who had hitherto been royalists and the Presbyterian opposition, starting from different points, now turned towards William III, who, influenced by the position of European affairs, leagued himself with them, and came to their rescue against the King: and so the Revolution was carried out, which, with help of Parliament, raised William and his consort, the daughter of King James, to the throne of England.

And this was decisive for ever as to the position of the English monarchy: never again could it attain to the independent power it had possessed from of old, and had ever claimed. Yet it could not be said to have entirely lost its significance:

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means were even found by which the idea of the hereditary succession was no further departed from than was demanded by the circumstances of the case that had lately occurred.

And now the two parties, having become more independent and powerful, came into all the more serious opposition to one another.

The Tories strengthened themselves mightily by the organisation of the Church, which always came to their help in the elections: the county-representatives belonged to them, and they often formed a considerable majority in the House of Commons: their idea was necessarily to extend the rights of the Lower House as far as possible, and that, as we have just seen, in opposition not only to the people, but also to the other two powers of the realm, the House of Lords and the crown.

On the other hand the Whigs, in whom the active principle of progress fermented most strongly, attached themselves to all who shrank from the strictness of the Church, the Latitudinarians and Presbyterians: their chief support lay in the towns, and the moneyed interests which the late war had developed. In order not to be crushed by the Tory majority, they counterbalanced the authority of Parliament and the preponderance of the House of Commons by supporting the House of Lords, the people, and the King. Among the nobility, which also had a popular colouring, they were particularly strong; and they allowed free play to the royal prerogative.

Certainly they had done William III great service, but on the other hand they had to thank him for a position which secured them an ever-growing influence over the general course of affairs.

No understanding between the parties, no compromise of principles, was possible; on the contrary, their antagonism was an important element in the development of the life of England. Something they had ever had in common; for both one and other was pledged to the order of things brought in by the Revolution, and could not let it be overthrown. Still, within the circle of these common interests each acted with its own inborn tendencies, as we may say; but these however could not be pushed to their extreme results.

Tallard describes the English constitution at this time as Republican, and the King as a public official whose duty it was to carry out the decrees of Parliament, and this only when the Houses were not sitting. And this perhaps might be actually considered as a correct view, had not the King, thanks entirely to the opposition of parties, been able once more to exercise great influence over Parliament. His plan of government was this:—he always passed over from the party at the time the stronger, if it became very troublesome to him, to the other side, which at the time was down and needed his help: he was maintained by the interest both parties had in common, and which was represented by the position he held. In the late sessions the Tories had got a preponderance, over both himself and the Whigs, that was quite crushing. They were just engaged in securing this power afresh and, as was supposed to be their intention, for ever. This February's session was of the highest importance, because it brought with it the shipwreck of their scheme.

One of the most important rights belonging to the prerogative of the crown, namely, the free management of foreign affairs, was definitely confirmed on the 26th of February, though indirectly rather than by any express formality.

In Ireland also and Scotland, as well as in England, the royal authority at this time once more became prominent.

In Ireland the trustees sent over to carry out the resumption of the forfeited estates had aroused universal dissatisfaction among the Protestant population. What had been settled by William III in favour of the Roman Catholics was left untouched, while on the other hand grants in favour of Protestants had been annulled. The Protestants complained that they, who had obeyed the laws, and had suffered most for the maintenance of the dependence of Ireland on England, were now treated by the parliamentary agents as if they had been rebels who had forfeited their estates. They maintained that the Act of Resumption rested on information culpably falsified by the first plenipotentiaries themselves; that the revenue of the estates were not a third or even a quarter of the amount that was supposed; that the proceedings of the trustees based thereon were utterly arbitrary, and yet were to be regarded as final

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and without appeal; that the insolence of the Papists was thereby daily waxing greater and greater. They once more turned to the King, the restorer of their religion, rights, and liberties, and besought his protection; in his entire kingdom none were so cheerfully resolved to defend him in person and government as his Irish subjects¹.

The English Parliament was not a little offended by the tone of this address. But apart from this, too, it was significant that the Irish now no longer turned, as they had done some years back, from the King to the Parliament, but from the Parliament to the King.

And just as this change of opinion in Ireland arose from the support the Jacobite portion of the population once more expected from France, so a similar change took place in Scotland also, and from the same cause. No pressure exercised by the English Tories had ever induced the King to dissolve the Scottish Parliament, which was still the very one that had met as a Convention. Through the imminent threat of war its interests had once more become most closely united with the King's. On both sides the idea of a union was again taken up; the King laid it before the English Parliament as his most pressing care. All those schemes of world-wide commerce and enterprise which the Scots had projected without being able to carry them out so long as Spain was at peace with England, now revived again, when war seemed imminent with both France and Spain at once: Patterson showed the King at full length what damage the trade of England would suffer from the union of the two kingdoms, and proposed an instant attempt on the Spanish possessions in South America: here, said he, the war ought to be begun, for the fate which smote the West Indies would also smite Spain; in no case should they let the wealth of the Indies be used as supplies for France. He assumed that, with a view to this, Scotland and even Ireland must enter into an union with England².

¹ The humble address of the Nobility, Justices of the Peace, Grand Jury, Clergy, Gentlemen, and Freeholders, of the County of Dublin, January 16, 1701/2. Journals of Commons xiii. 745

² Bannister's Life of Patterson 367.

Even without this King William was well inclined towards such a course. One of his first designs was directed against the Plate-fleet, now returning from America; he thought it would first make for the French coast, and ordered a squadron to cruise between Rochefort and Brest, so as to intercept the galleons on their way

He had likewise, when last in Holland, visited the frontiers, in order to put them into a state of defence against a sudden attack from the side of Cologne. Negotiations with the German powers were carried on just as carefully as before the late war; a treaty with Brandenburg and Prussia had already been agreed on, though its conditions were not quite satisfactory to King William; one with Hesse was almost concluded; the Prince of Hesse was named for a high command. All that was possible was done to keep Saxony, which thought that the complications in the North made it needful to gain the support of France, from concluding an alliance with that power, with which several smaller states had already come to terms. As the Duke of Wolfenbittel might be regarded as the head of this party, King William obtained from the Emperor an authorisation for Hanover to adopt swift measures in order to prevent anything further. In these very intricate negotiations the King found the help of Heinsius invaluable; he regarded an illness from which Heinsius suffered as almost a public misfortune; he sent Albemarle, who knew his mind, into Holland, to secure a complete understanding between them on every point. Thus all forces were in movement, preparing for a new outbreak of war, which would embrace all the world, and might even be decisive as to the future of the continental states and of England herself. The formation of the land-forces and equipment of the fleet were making excellent progress. It was expected that Parliament would be prorogued about Easter; before the end of April the King was to appear in Holland, in order to open the campaign in person.

At this critical moment the common fate of men overtook him.

One Saturday (21st of February), as was his custom on that day of the week, he rode out hunting: his horse stumbled

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with him, and threw him, he was brought home to Kensington with a badly injured arm and a broken collar-bone¹. Still, at the moment he did not feel seriously hurt. The day after that vote of the House of Commons which had given him so much pleasure, he appeared in society and seemed cheerful: he executed his signature with a stamp, which had been prepared for him; the proposal for an union with Scotland was then for the first time laid before Parliament by him; a Bill, declaring the Pretender's claims null and void, received his assent and became law; this was on the 7th of March. But meanwhile he had been seized by the fever which attacked him every spring; he was this time too weak to resist it; the outlets by which he had hitherto found relief closed up; his strength then suddenly failed him. On the 8th of March, in the morning, King William III breathed his last.

How often, since he had come to England, had his early death been predicted! An examination of his body showed, as indeed had been known before, that his lungs were diseased. He had remarkably little blood, which had all tended to gather there. His heart was small but sound; his brain completely healthy.

'Could this soul have been transplanted into a sound body,' cried Sophie Charlotte, Queen of Prussia, 'how well would all have gone! I fear that centuries will pass ere such another is vouchsafed to earth!'

William III was not a man of an imposing presence; neither as statesman nor as general did he develop qualities which could impress or win the crowd. In the field he shone through no startling combinations or brilliant victories; in the battles he fought abroad he had for the most part been compelled to give ground; he stands among considerable and capable generals, but not in the first rank. If we credit him with the advance of civil and constitutional liberties, as on

¹ Bonnet: 'S. M. estant allée à la chasse vers Kingston sur la Tamise . . . il arriva qu'elle monta contre l'avis des écuyers un jeune cheval, qu'elle n'avoit jamais monté; que vers les 3 heures après midi ce cheval s'abattit d'une manière si rude, que S. M. tomba et se cassa l'os appelé la clavicule' Bonnet makes them take him first to Kingston, then to Hampton Court, lastly to Kensington, just as Tindal does. Spanheim has also left an account of this fatal accident.

historical grounds we certainly may, we must remember that this arose more from circumstances than from his personal preference for that form of constitution. In the city of Amsterdam, as well as in the province of Gelderland, his arbitrary conduct was much complained of; even in England he regarded the maintenance of the royal prerogative as his special business; constitutional struggles disgusted him, because perverted to a prosecution of selfish aims. In spite of his parliamentary pledges he thought there was no harm in bestowing very extensive favours on his personal friends and confidants, and even on a lady who stood in close relations with him.

Wherein then lay his greatness? It lay in the position he took up and steadily maintained; in the world-wide historic results, some of which he himself achieved in his lifetime, while of others he only laid the foundations or advanced them a stage.

William III was, if one may say so, a man of an international nature: by origin a German Prince, the son of an English mother, the husband of an English Princess; by old blood-relations and religion attached to French Protestantism, and by his ancestors' services and by inherited claims belonging to the Republic of the United Netherlands; and though he was bound by special ties to each of these relations, yet it was no one of them in particular that gave the initiative to his energy: they were no longer vigorous enough for that. The most prominent question of the day, and that of the highest importance for the further development of mankind in Europe, was the rise of the French monarchy to universal preponderance, which threatened the independence of every country and every race. The living impulse, then, which determined King William's career, sprang out of his opposition to this already domineering and ever-grasping power: a power deeply imbued with all the elements of intellectual culture, and with a strong state-system; and headed by a Prince specially adapted for it, who was in fact at the same time the living expression of a strong national character. It was in itself a kind of puzzle to Louis XIV that he should be confronted by the limited Statholder of a commercial Republic, who took his title from a half-lost district

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—‘the little Lord of Breda,’ as the French called him. William, who had adopted the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, in a fatalist sense, and in that of an overruling Providence, declared this resistance to be his lot, his vocation; he regarded it as the destined duty of his life. If this was to be carried through, no political or theological party-attitude could be thought of. It was clear as the day that Protestantism must be upheld, seeing that Louis XIV had brought on, within his own kingdom, an extremely violent Catholic reaction; but still, as this procedure to a large extent was based on the idea of national unity and power, the religious question was by no means the only force on which the whole movement depended. If the Catholic world did not take part, nothing could be achieved against Louis XIV; half the powers allied against him were Catholics. In this conflict the idea of toleration emerged as a historical necessity: from the very outset William had inscribed it on his banners. For no land has it been more important than for the German Empire. From old time the North-German Princes had upheld Protestantism against the Empire; now the hosts of both North and South joined and marched in harmony against the power that threatened both: the Empire under the last Hapsburgs took up a fresh position, no longer barring the rise of Protestant Princes, while at the same time a wider expansion was made possible for the Empire itself. So also in Holland civic republicanism and the authority of the Statholder no longer stood up against one another in irreconcilable conflict, when a Statholder defended the Republic against a dangerous foe. But the chief thing was to tear England away from that connexion with the French monarchy which had first given it its preponderance: in opposition to the crown, which clung fast to France, the parliamentary forces must be drawn into the European alliance, and by taking part in it they actually became indispensable to Europe. To have brought a coalition of such heterogeneous elements into existence, and to have successfully opposed it to the overwhelming might of France;—this is the historic achievement of William III. But that which otherwise gives his character in general its special and marked individuality is the relation between the obligations laid on

him or taken up by him, and the peculiarities of his nature. The combination of these two it is that makes great men. For all his sickly constitution, his face so fearfully pale and haggard, his continuous and harassing asthma, he developed an unquenchable energy for work: he knew no pleasures, lived only for business, talked little, worked all the more: each step he took shows sound judgment and wise determination. No one was ever cleverer in building up confederations and in holding them together, or in commanding armies of the most various composition without arousing national antipathies, no one knew better how in contests at home to await the right moment, to give way, and yet to hold fast. In one of his letters is a phrase which might serve for his motto, 'with foresight and vigour¹.' He never undertook anything without first setting before himself the difficulties on every side which he would have to face, in carrying out his plans he seemed rather to follow the course of things than to make much preparation for them beforehand; his ambition always seemed thoroughly justified, and indeed demanded by circumstances. We have lately traced out one example of the way in which he handled affairs, and took his measures, conscious of the effects they must have on the different parties round him, and on their adjustment. The preparations for the Spanish war of succession may be regarded as his political master-piece. Once more his correspondence with Heinsius comes into the foreground in this affair; it is so simple and appropriate that one almost feels that, under the given circumstances, every one must have thought and acted as he did. When it breaks off, we miss with pain the fine intelligence which so firmly and concisely embraced all the relations of the interests involved, and which had hitherto had so decisive an influence in the centre of the European opposition to Louis XIV.

In England William III was never thoroughly at home. The cheerful sociability of his Stuart predecessors was quite foreign to his nature; sometimes he gave entertainments and saw company, but not because he liked it, but only to show his

¹ 20th June, 1695. 'Met voorsightigheyt en evenwel vigeur'

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gratitude for some vote given him, or to influence the minds of men with a view to some debate. He was not easy of access; but, once reached, he was both unconstrained and affable; he readily entered into discussion, and tried to convince his auditors. But it was only in his inmost circle of Dutchmen that he was confidential; with their culture way of thinking and tastes he sympathised. If we consider the buildings and grounds at Hampton Court, which still recall his memory, we feel that there hangs about them a whiff of Holland. Even in England he continued true to the habits of his earlier life, perhaps even from necessity. He did not venture to give up his accustomed hunting; it was necessary for his very life; he required much sleep and plentiful nourishment; he has been reproached for the long mid-day meal at which he sat with his Dutch friends: but there was his rest, there he took his ease¹. Every summer he hastened back to Holland; even when the posture of affairs did not absolutely require it; he always felt in better health there, especially at Loo.

William was not at all indifferent to the splendour of the crown he had won, and was very strict in observance of ceremonial: still his manner and way of life had in them, at the same time, something of the familiarity of a private person. The French, whose judgment on this point is confessedly good, held that his appearance and expression denoted simplicity, greatness, and even a certain charm.

Even his trusted friends complain that, as time went on, he neglected them. they called him heartless. This may have arisen from the fact that just at that time his opinions were no longer quite in harmony with theirs, or perhaps it was that he had no further need of them. He ever lived only in the midst of great things, which at all times he made essentially his own business; in the presence of these public affairs personal relations were forgotten.

His life is like a voyage; the ship sails often amidst dangerous reefs, in violent storms, and the skilful pilot must seize and use every shifting movement of the elements.

¹ I have drawn some notices out of the *Relatione di Lor Soranzo e Girol. Venier, amb^{te} estr^{ti} al re d'Inghilterra 1696.*

If we would describe generally the position held by William III in the course of English history, we should say that it was this.—he had seized on the tendencies which had come to the surface at the time of the Great Rebellion and the Commonwealth, and had provided and secured for them a regular influence on the working of the English constitution. At an earlier period it had seemed as if they must have destroyed the historical forms under which the inmost life of England had expressed itself. William III grasped these also in their main points, and preserved them. In this interpenetration of the old with the new lay the true life of the state. In theory it would have been impossible to bring the ideas of 1640 into harmony with those of 1660; they remained in perpetual antagonism: but William III knew how to unite the supporters of both in political action which harmonised with the true interests of the country. He reminds us of Cromwell; but yet how different were the two men! In Cromwell all was dim impulse, great political instinct, and masterful will: he never succeeded in even coming to an understanding with the popular assemblies, and yet he could not do without them. In William all is reflection, circumspection, forethought, conscious insight into the situation of affairs. Each had passed through civil strife to the attainment of power, and to a sense of what was the common weal: William, starting from the point-of-view of an external power, stepped in amidst the party-divisions at home, and learnt at last, hard as it might be for him, to guide them according to his own ideas; he deemed it among his higher duties to face the unpleasant things he must encounter in so doing. Moreover since, with or without his approval, the English Parliament rose to have definite predominance over British affairs and decisive influence in the affairs of Europe, the element of innovation, previously repressed and vigorously represented in it, also became important to the world at large. The conflict between the ideas of 1640 and those of 1660 became a general question for the nations of Europe. Who could have measured the effects which in the following epochs arose out of this antagonism?

BOOK XXII.

REVIEW OF ENGLISH HISTORY TO THE YEAR 1760.

AT the threshold of the eighteenth century it will be worth our while once more to recall to mind the influences which brought the English constitution into connexion with the great act of emancipation from Rome.

That act, by connecting itself with events in former times which prepared the way for it, had in England more than anywhere else a national and political direction. The national powers of King and Parliament, to which the dignitaries of the Church who were Englishmen allied themselves, became by this means for the first time really and truly sovereign. On their union is founded that omnipotence of the legislative power which is the characteristic of modern England.

The transformed constitution appears in its most simple and united form in the time of Queen Elizabeth, who made the decisions of the legislature a ground for repudiating every foreign claim to the crown, and maintained its full independence in the happiest manner.

But immediately after her, during the reign of her next successor, tendencies towards an internal disruption made their appearance.

The Stuarts adopted the theory of legislative power which sanctioned their birthright. They united themselves in the closest manner with the Anglican Church, which they intended to introduce into Scotland also, and to employ as the most valuable support to their authority; for the Church it was which continued to favour that notion of a plenitude of monarchical power which floated before their eyes. But by this means they excited the displeasure of the remaining

Estates, and above all the opposition of the House of Commons, under the influence of a party with less and less of ecclesiastical leanings,—a party which, no longer satisfied with the form of the Anglican Church, opened the way in England for Scottish Presbyterianism, because that corresponded better with their religious and political conceptions.

In the conflict, which was developed to such an extent within the legislative power, plans with far-reaching aims had been formed at a very early stage. When the leaders of the opposition in the Long Parliament doubted whether, with Charles I as king, they could attain their object even by using force, they formed the notion of declaring that he had forfeited the crown, and of offering it to the descendants of his sister, perhaps to the Elector Palatine, of whose opinions they approved. But events went far beyond these plans. The Lords and the Bishops were deposed ; the King was executed ; the Republic declared ; all under the influence of the enthusiastically excited troops, who would have nothing to say to the old state of things in any form. In the universal confusion which was the consequence, the general of the army thought himself justified in taking the supreme power into his own hands. He wielded it with absolute despotism, but with great sagacity, in accordance with the necessities of the situation. He first had the wit effectively to unite the three kingdoms in one, and at the same time to maintain the old social relations in England, which he restored to its former position in Europe.

People submitted to the intellectual ability of the general ; but the continuance of the Protectorate, which threatened to degenerate into the domination of a sect, aroused opposition. The two parties that had first struggled with one another and then equally suffered defeat, now worked together in this. Through their union the eldest son of the executed monarch was recalled ; and the legitimist monarchy appeared to be the corner-stone of the ancient edifice of the national constitution, which Presbyterians and Anglicans alike were determined to rear up again.

But a new complication was now brought about, in that the restored king had obligations to the Catholics also, which he

endeavoured to fulfil, in spite of the Protestant character which the legislative power bore. It lay in the nature of the circumstances, that the Anglican party which had befriended the old monarchy, should get the upper hand in this. But it was precisely with this party that the King now fell out, and this quarrel gave the Dissenters an opportunity of recovering their position. The two parties of the Whigs and the Tories began to form themselves. In perpetual conflict with one another, they nevertheless made common cause against the Catholics and against the royal prerogative, which was sure to be exercised in the Catholics' favour.

But it was a far more significant fact, that the second King of the restored dynasty himself belonged to the Catholic communion. Stirred up by the French monarchy, which had attained to supremacy in Europe, and which was the recognised representative of the Catholic idea, allied with it and drawn on by its example, he ventured on the endeavour to secure through his own initiative fresh liberty of action for his co-religionists. And seeing that he found no door for this in the legislature, his object was, if not to abolish the legislature, at any rate to modify it to such an extent that it would be able to place no further hindrance in the way.

With what power that opposition was to arise! It laid hands upon all the influential men who were in possession of parliamentary authority, or were aiming at it. Both parties saw themselves endangered by the Romanising policy of the King, which called the traditional constitution of the land in question; and they now stood up together against James II, just as they had done once before against Cromwell's successor. But, for all that, it would have been impossible for them to accomplish anything against him, had not his connexion with that monarchy which he took as his pattern won for them the sympathy of Europe, and above all the assistance of an ally, who saw in opposition to French aggression the aim and object of his life. Prince William of Orange had need of the English in the prosecution of his foreign policy, just as they had need of his assistance, in order to maintain their traditional constitution and the character of their legislative power.

James II retired in surprise and terror to France, with whose cause he now for the first time completely identified his own; on the other hand the English on their side transferred the crown to the Prince, who had made their rising possible. By this means, in that this prince's wife was the eldest daughter of James, it became possible for the two parties to effect as it were a compromise with one another, by means of which each party retained its own peculiar idea,—the one party that of hereditary right, though certainly under very important restrictions, the other the idea of a transfer of the crown by the people, though only so far as it was necessary to exclude members of the Catholic church from a claim to it. The main fact remained, that the legislative power received as its head a leader who acted in harmony with it.

The result was a great struggle between the two kings, which had at once a European and a purely English importance. The schemes of James II were so many attacks on the legislative power, on the religion, and on the independent position of England in the world. Nothing was more useful to the authority of William III, which during peace was growing insecure, than the fact that after the death of James II his son was recognised by France as King of England. On this occasion also William, supported by a great European combination, which was the result of putting forward a Bourbon to succeed to the crown in Spain, had once more banded together a great alliance to make war on France, and had every prospect of victory when he died.

For the great work of upholding the parliamentary constitution on its old basis, together with Protestantism and the independence of England, he had laid immoveable foundations; nevertheless the edifice was not yet, so to speak, roofed in.

The war so long prepared had first to be fought out. Moreover we know the mutual wrath and rage of the two great parties. What effect would the change of sovereigns and the events of the war have upon the leaders, and these again upon the war? King William's sagacity and energy had succeeded in keeping the two parties in a certain equilibrium

and in dependence on the crown. Would the same be possible for his successors? The main thing was the carrying out of the Protestant succession, in accomplishing which resort was now really had to the descendants of the sister of Charles I, at this time the house of Hanover. How much opposition to such a course was still to be expected? And what results must the personal union of the Anglo-Scottish crown with a German Electorate have on the politics, and possibly on the internal constitution of England, supposing that it came to pass?

It is, if I may say so, the duty of the historian to accompany the progress of events until what was undertaken is carried out to its accomplishment. The antitheses are now no longer either in idea or in fact so great as heretofore; they do not enter so deeply into all questions of constitutional progress; they confront one another more upon the ground which has been laid once for all. I shall attempt to depict transactions only in their important phases and in their broader outlines.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST YEARS OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE.

QUEEN ANNE undertook the government with the promise that she would maintain the Protestant succession, the government introduced by law in Church and state, and would spare no pains to carry out the war so long prepared against France, in conjunction with her allies

She stands now, says the Earl of Sunderland, in the King's place; she has the same interests as he had. If she acts as she speaks, she will be happy, secure, and revered; if not, she will bring herself and the country to ruin¹.

It very rarely happens, however, that a succession to the crown is accomplished so simply. Nor was it so in this case. With regard to herself and her interests Queen Anne had not only a different past from that of her predecessor, but a different position. Of the two principles, between which, so to speak, the Revolution of 1688 held the middle ground, the one is represented rather in William III, who had no claim to the English throne. He took his stand on the side of the rights of the people, just as after the death of his wife, and again in the last conflicts, he held chiefly to the Whigs. In Queen Anne, on the other hand, the principle of hereditary right to the throne came to the front, under the provision of the succession being limited to Protestants; and in fact it was stronger in her than it had been in her sister Mary; for her husband, Prince George, accepted the condition,

¹ Letter from Althorp, March 11. 'If she departs from it—she herself, her people and her servants will be for ever and unavoidably undone.' In Coxe's *Marlborough* i. 109.

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which William had rejected, and was willing to be nothing more than his wife's subject. In the struggles up to this time she had always sided with the Tories; so that the question was even raised by the Whigs, whether it would not be best to exclude her from the throne, and at once to call in the house of Hanover. She did not leave them for a moment in doubt that she would continue in politics to favour the Tories, whose ideas once again came to be more powerfully influential through her succession to the throne.

The reconstruction of the ministry, which had been undertaken by William on Whig principles, was now carried out on those of their opponents. Somers, Montague, Manchester, and Vernon lost their posts; on the other hand, Musgrave and Seymour took office. The secretaries of state, Hedges and Nottingham, who had been dismissed by William, came into place again; Godolphin succeeded afresh to be head of the Exchequer; Marlborough, who had always been reckoned among the Tories, was the man in whom confidence was placed. No one had expected anything else; no one felt aggrieved; he was the man through whom proofs of favour came, and he rendered himself accessible and courteous: the foreign ambassadors were glad to have some one to whom they could resort, and from whom they could count on obtaining a friendly hearing.

In the relations of greater importance, especially in those to foreign states, this produced no change.

One of the first transactions of the Queen after her coronation was a declaration of war with France. In the Privy Council the view was stated, that in this the Emperor should take the lead, and England appear only as a helping power¹. But it found no favour. The Queen considered it as an exercise of her prerogative, that she declared war without waiting for Parliament to request her to do so. The leading Tories also were much pleased with this step. If King William and the Whigs had carried through this and that resolution with a view to strengthening the administration, these now stood

¹ 'Protrarre ogni dichiarazione,'—as the Venetian ambassador Mocenigo says (12 Maggio, 1702), to whom we are chiefly indebted for the information.

the Tories, who had accepted the higher offices, in good stead.

But there was a matter of home policy, in which, after the change of sovereign, a course of action was commenced the exact opposite of that which had preceded. This was the religious question.

One has no notion of the hatred against the Presbyterians with which the Anglican fanatics greeted the event of a Princess of the house of Stuart ascending the throne. For fourteen long years, they said, the Church had suffered from associations and exactions of oaths, without any respect to consciences which were bound by an earlier oath of allegiance: but now it was necessary to fling out the snake from their bosom, which had been so long fostered there. No Monmouth or Shaftesbury was living now: the reign of the Dutch saints was over: the moment must be seized for plucking out the enemy root and branch, without caring about being reproached with cruelty: each true son of the Church must steel his heart against the oppressors of the Church¹.

The elections for the year 1702 gave the Tories and the Anglicans the upper hand in Parliament. Without resorting to acts of violence, which many writers of the time demanded, they formed a plan, which, had it succeeded, would have dealt the heaviest blow to the Presbyterians and Whigs—two designations which in the reports of ambassadors always appear as convertible terms.

All depended on the fact that the ‘comprehension,’ that is to say, the equality of Presbyterians with Anglicans as regards political rights, which had been expected with confidence after the joint working of the two parties for the Revolution, had nevertheless not yet been realised. By the Act of Toleration the penalties imposed by law on separation from the Established Church were abolished; but conformity with the Anglican form of worship was still required no less than before for the holding of public office. The Nonconformists obtained the compromise of receiving the Eucharist according to the Anglican form of worship, for that was what was

¹ Extracts from the writings of the day in Bonnet.

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required; but in all the rest they kept to their own congregation. This superficial and (as it was called) occasional conformity the Tories now wished to bring to an end. They maintained that, in order to keep up the national Church, the civil power which protected it must be concentrated in the hands of its members¹; the party, which for generations had openly professed the intention of destroying the Church, must be excluded from public office. Their favourite argument for this was taken from the prevalence of sceptical opinions, against which the Church must of course be in a position to erect impregnable bulwarks; the real motive, however, lay in the political position of the party. The Whigs and the Presbyterians were to be removed from municipal-offices, because there they exercised a decisive influence upon elections to seats in Parliament. It was precisely from the towns that most of the Whig members came. The Tories, who anyhow had the upper hand in the counties, intended by means of this change to win the towns also.

In this manner arises the idea of an exclusive national Church with political rights, which, after having expelled Catholicism with the help of the Presbyterians, once more, as so often in former times, took measures against the Presbyterians themselves.

It was an abolition of that tacit, or at any rate never definitely expressed understanding between the two parties, which had preceded the Revolution itself, and since then had been maintained chiefly through the exertions of William III.

With what clinging vivacity the old, half-religious, half-political antipathies once more prevailed even in the highest circles at that time is seen, among other things, from the dedication with which Lord Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion*, which appeared in this year, is presented to the Queen, herself grand-daughter of the author. In this work, she is told, she will see how necessary the strongest union between Church and state is: a great king had lost his crown and his life at the hands of men who attacked the Church,

¹ Or as Bonnet expresses it: 'Qu'il n'est pas à propos de confier l'exécution des lois à des personnes, qui ne les approuvent pas.'

first her external ordinances, and later on her very existence, in order to overthrow the state. The unhappy day of his execution, a day of general humiliation and penitence according to law, was celebrated with scandalous signs of rejoicing in circles, in which principles contrary to the Anglican and Episcopal constitution were acknowledged. The Queen, it was hoped, would accept the book as her counsellor.

All the more remarkable is it, that she herself, or at any rate her government, did not for the time favour the passing of the Bill (against occasional conformity).

For another of her principles was, that no party ought to be so strong as to be able to control the government. She had not excluded all Whigs from the ministry which she put into office. The two men who conducted the main business, Marlborough and Godolphin, belonged to the Tories, but to the moderate fraction of them; they themselves feared the domination of the high Tories, from whom the Bill emanated. The Bill was accepted in the Lower House in the first and again in the second year of Queen Anne: in the Upper House it found no favour. It was even remarked, that the opposition of the Lords to the Bill was still stronger in the second year than in the first. On the other hand the majority for the Bill in the Lower House was noticed to diminish. Every one attributed this to the secret action of the court and of the ministers, who always had the means of exercising a strong influence on the voting¹.

To deprive them of this influence was the main object of another Bill, on which the Tories at that time set great value;—the Place Bill, to regulate the part which those in office might take in Parliament. The government could count not only upon those members who were in possession of office, but also upon all those who wished to obtain office and to combine places of position with parliamentary activity. In order to be complete masters of the battle-field, the majority contended for the exclusion of those in office; the minority endeavoured to retain them, in order

¹ Mocenigo *Relatione d'Inghilterra 1706*: 'Per vie indirette e nascoste cercarono di frastornare l'evento di modo che di pochi voti non passo.'

A D. 1702.

to have their support. Even among the Lords there were always to be found many such, who for their own peculiar interests had need of the support of the government, and had a ready ear for its solicitations; for it was often remarked that some Lords with Tory predilections were fond of remaining away when they could have turned the scale. By these and similar means the leaders of the ministry hindered the acceptance and the progress of the Tory Bill. The Whigs saw that they had their security in the two ministers¹.

We may here subjoin a general observation.

In republican constitutions it is one of the essential difficulties which lie in the very nature of the case, that the representation of the highest power, which is formed in the struggle between parties, necessarily belongs to one or the other of them, and is under that party's influence. And it is in this especially that the superiority of monarchical government lies, that it has the function and natural tendency to comprehend general interests with less reference to the special objects of a party. But how important also it is for the sovereign, in the oppositions of parties which surround him, not to allow himself to be carried away by the one or the other. William III achieved this: under the appearance of hesitation, he successfully upheld the views of the supreme power. This was far harder to accomplish under a Queen, who to a great extent was more thrown upon her ministers, these again standing in immediate relation to the parties and their strife.

While the existing ministry, although in itself belonging to the majority, favoured the party which was in the minority, the proximate reason was the one already intimated, that the acceptance of the proposed Bills would be of great service to those men whom the ministry regarded as its rivals. The uncle of the Queen, Lord Rochester, would have become so powerful, that she would have been compelled to yield to him. But Marlborough generally took up a position which had conditions peculiar to itself, and did not allow the suppression of the Whigs.

John Churchill, the son of a cavalier and strong royalist,

¹ Bonnet: '*Les Whigs se confient entièrement en les deux grands ministres*' (Nov. 1704).

who had had to endure much for his politics, found in early youth, on the strength of his father's services, a welcome at court. He was a true child of the years of the Restoration, of their social training and lax morality, their restless activity in Church and state, in which each individual hoped to turn his natural gifts to account free from the trammels of any thought of consequences, and to attain to everything which in the eyes of men seems desirable. The young Churchill united a brilliant exterior with military talent, learnt his first lessons in the campaign against Holland under the eyes of Turenne, and came back thence with a reputation for personal bravery. He then attached himself to the Duke of York, whose first relations with France had been brought about by his means. His father's motto had been 'Faithful, but unfortunate¹.' He on the contrary had the favour of fortune in all that he undertook: he belonged to those men, whose special property it is supposed to be, to be fortunate: but of his fidelity to his sovereign he himself could not have boasted. What a contrast to Turenne, who submitted all his actions, even against his better judgment, to the monarchical principle. In England monarchy had lost its fascination; the loyal feeling of personal devotion and fidelity, which once had kept the state together, had disappeared from men's minds; what each man thought of before everything else was to create a secure and independent position for himself. So also John Churchill. The relation in which his wife stood to the Princess Anne, whose confidential bedchamber-woman she was, offered him the most favourable opportunities. They were both deeply involved in the quarrels of the royal family; when the crash came, the flight of the Princess into the camp hostile to the King was brought about by their means; the General never scrupled for a moment to head the great revolt against a King, to whom he owed everything. When he thereupon united himself with William III, who raised him to the rank of Earl of Marlborough, he appeared with him more in the character of a confidant than of a subject. This resulted from the fact, that the organisation of the English army after the

¹ 'Fidel pero desdichado.'

A.D. 1702.

Revolution was in the main his work. The nomination of officers, in which he had an important share, secured to him, according to the manners of the time, their dependence upon his person; and seeing that in the army composed of various nationalities, which was carrying on the war in the Netherlands, he always interested himself in the English soldiers in particular, these men soon began to regard him as a person of more importance than the King, their Commander-in-chief. As long as Queen Mary lived, no understanding was possible between William III and Marlborough; the latter once even went so far as to connect himself again with James II. Not until after the death of Mary, when Anne was reconciled to William, did Marlborough also enter into a confidential relationship with him. He accompanied him on his last journey to Holland, and took a most active part in concluding the new alliance for the war of the Spanish succession; he himself thus came into close personal relations with the continental powers. I fancy that this was what the King intended. That the transactions were partly conducted by a man, of whom it was notorious that he was all-powerful in the household of the Princess who would next succeed to the throne, would offer to the allies a guarantee for the continuance of the alliance, even in the case of a change of government.

And this was precisely what took place. After Queen Anne's accession Marlborough exercised, as indicated, the most decisive influence; his word was regarded in all cases as a definite decision. It was therefore of the greatest moment that he had taken his position on the side for war. Every attempt to postpone the declaration of war he met with the remark, that this would deprive the government of the confidence of the allies; and his authority caused it to fall through.

But in the command of the army he had no intention of being dependent on the good-will of the Tories, although they were for the war, and consented to all that was required of them. He made it a condition, that Godolphin, in whom he had the most complete trust, should remain at the head of the financial department; he declared that without that he would undertake no campaign; for from him alone could he

look for regular payments, without which the war could not be carried on.

This point secured, he crossed, as soon as parliamentary business allowed, to the Netherlands. On the continent he took, to a certain extent, the place of King William; he was at once general, diplomatist, and minister. He was quite equal to it; the weight of business did not oppress him; nor was he carried away by the impulse of the moment. He acquitted himself with vigour and energy, was never heedless or rash, was at once bold and prudent. He united geniality and solidity in a way peculiar to himself, and this was what won for him his great success and the admiration of the world. In the field he was as affable, accessible, and pleasant as in the cabinet; he paid attention to the wants of the rank and file. It is not, however, merely by brilliant qualities that the personages who make a name for themselves in the world are wont to shine.

In conducting public affairs Marlborough by no means lost sight of his own interests. While he procured good maintenance for the troops, he stipulated that he himself also should profit by the distribution. In making appointments to civil offices he took gifts. His cupidity may have had in it an element of ambition, that the family, which he was to found, might take an equal place with all that was wealthy and aristocratic in England; but over the brilliancy of his success and fame it cast a shade, which made the contrast all the more painful.

As minister of the Queen Marlborough assumed a unique position—in the administration and in Parliament, in the camp and in relations towards the allies—which may almost be represented as a policy of his own.

It was impossible that he should follow the Tories in their efforts against the Whigs. By such means it might easily happen that occasion would be given to disorders, which could not fail to react upon the course of public affairs. And moreover there was this further reason why he could not dispense with the services of the Whigs, because they had contributed most to the war, which it was his ambition to conduct.

A.D. 1703.

Hence it followed that he now continually drew on himself the hostility of the Tories. They opposed him in his military regulations at home with reference to the recruiting of the army¹. When he returned from the first campaign, in which he had got possession of some of the strongest fortresses, the Queen raised him to the rank of a Duke, and expressed a wish that this dignity should be accompanied by an income such as would be required to maintain it properly. But the Tory majority of the Lower House could not be induced to vote this, for it would have been a renewal of the irregular favours conferred by the former government. It was in vain that people remarked, that the distinction conferred on the Commander-in-chief would be an obligation to the allies². It was bluntly answered on the other side that the nation cared more for the passing of the Bill against occasional conformity than for all the allies on the continent. And at the same time the Tories had their own point of view with regard to the object of the war. They had no intention of lending the arms of England to bring about a union of the Empire with the crown of Spain, nor of causing the preponderance of Austria to dominate on the continent instead of that of France. It was through their importunity that it was brought to pass, that the Emperor Leopold renounced all claim to the crown of Spain in the name of himself and of his eldest son. And with regard to Spain itself, the Emperor had from the first to promise that the ancient commerce of the English with the peninsula and its colonies should be restored³. The abolition of it by Louis XIV was the chief reason for their being willing to take part in the war. In particular they held fast to the partitioning policy of William III. They would have tolerated the Bourbon succession, if a separation of France and Spain accompanied by a maintenance of the old commercial advantages, had been possible. A second object of

¹ Cf Boyer; Queen Anne 123

² 'That it would do her good with all the princes abroad,' as we read in Coxe i. 132. Heinsius had declared himself in favour of it

³ Mocenigo. 'Assicurare l'interesse della nazione, con li vantaggi del commerzi l'equilibrio delle forze in Europa.'

the war was the securing the Republic of Holland against French aggression. In this the Tories were quite in earnest; only they would not go beyond their obligations; in the Lower House declamations were heard deprecating an offensive movement against France.

But when once the sword is drawn, no one can decide how the struggle will end; least of all can the commander allow himself to be bound by considerations, which would involve a limitation of activity. The second campaign, in which Maastricht and some other fortresses were wrested from the French, was still carried on pretty much according to the policy of the Tories. But there was not the least chance of the end, which they had set before themselves, being reached in this way; for in Germany the French still had the upper hand. It was entirely Marlborough's own idea, and at the same time his greatest one, to undertake that unexpected march from the lower Rhine to the Danube, by means of which he joined his own forces to those of Germany and Austria, and was thus enabled to strike a great blow at the main strength of the French. The Tories, who were more than usually excited at a recent change in the ministry, looked upon the undertaking with disfavour, and yet (for they expected it to fail) with secret satisfaction. A saying was reported to have come from some of them, that they would mob the general, if ever he came back, as hounds worry a hare¹. Marlborough knew all that well enough; he made no secret of the fact that if he was not victorious he was lost.

On the plains of Blenheim was the great European conflict fought out to the defeat of France. It was one of those battles which determine the relation of powers to one another, and the fate of nations dependent thereupon, for many years to come. In the library at Windsor strangers are shown the spacious bay-window, where Queen Anne was enjoying in quiet stillness the landscape there spread out to view, when she received the news of her army's victory. It was the great

¹ An expression of Seymour's. In a letter from Mrs. Burnet, wife of the Bishop, we read: 'their expectations have not been higher of a long time.' In Coxé 347.

A.D. 1705.

moment of her life. That, after which her predecessors had striven in vain, had been achieved under her auspices, under the leadership of a man who stood nearest to herself among the politicians of the time;—a limit had been set once for all to the supremacy of France on the continent.

But such is man's fate; the victory reacted upon her government in a way that could not fail to be in the highest degree displeasing to her.

The Tories held stubbornly to their purpose of carrying the Occasional Conformity Bill through, and that too (as had already been done in other cases) by uniting it with the Subsidies Bill, which the Upper House would be obliged to accept, if the war was to be continued. This intention was the occasion of the changes in the ministry, which have already been mentioned. Marlborough had now returned victorious, his trophies were carried in magnificent procession through the city, a gift of money, far exceeding the one which had been proposed before, could now no longer be refused to him. The object of the 'tack,' as the jumbling up together of the two Bills was called, was still held firmly in view by the Tories¹; but it was soon evident that it could not be carried through, even in the Lower House. The moderate Tories joined the victorious Duke under the leadership of Harley and St John, so that the subsidies were voted without any condition whatever; to the Commander-in-chief this seemed to be almost as important as the victory on the battle-field. The high Tories were completely driven out of the ministry, and an attempt was made to form a new one from among the moderates of the two parties. The Queen also seemed to be content with this plan.

But the event had given a new impulse to the warlike tendencies in the nation at large; only in the zealous pro-

¹ A brief account of the tack: Somers, Tracts xii 475 The author argues against the Bill on account of the circumstances of the time also: 'a time that the Protestant dissenters are heartily and undoubtedly united with us against the common foe of religion and government.' Then follows a description of a tacker and of an anti-tacker. Of the latter one reads: 'He is a sincere friend to the present government and the Protestant succession;' the tacker, on the other hand, represents the growing corruption; 'he is half Protestant half Papist.'

secution of the war did there seem to be a possibility of obtaining an advantageous and honourable peace, such as was wished. When the time for fresh elections came in the year 1705, this sentiment made itself felt; under its influence the Whig party once more gained the upper hand in Parliament. Forthwith a ministry could really be formed of members of each party; Harley and St. John from the one side, Sunderland and Halifax from the other, grouped themselves with their friends round Godolphin and Marlborough.

This coalition was followed by the happiest results. The year 1706 has the name of 'wonderful' in English history. In consequence of the battle of Ramillies the fortresses of the Netherlands fell into the hands of the allies; in consequence of the battle of Turin the lands of upper Italy did the same. In the Spanish peninsula a king of the house of Austria, with the help of the English squadron, which came to his assistance, maintained himself in Barcelona. At the same time a home affair of immense importance was brought to a conclusion. The union between England and Scotland may be regarded as the work of this ministry.

Up to this time the separation of the great island of the West into two different states had continued, reaching back to the epoch of the Roman conquest, a relic so to speak of the Heptarchy, never abolished by the Normans, but rather a cause of political entanglements under them and the dynasties that followed them. Neither the hereditary right of the Stuarts nor the strength of the Protectorate had been able to bring about this unification. It was promoted to a very much greater extent by the interaction of political and religious ideas and (let us own) of factions, and by the great common interests which came in under William III. But the desired end was still very far off. Nothing could induce the Scots to recognise the succession of the house of Hanover; on the contrary a so-called Act of Security was passed in the year 1704, by which it was enacted that the Queen's successor in Scotland should be different from that in England; by this means the sovereignty of the crown, the liberty and power of the Parliament of Scotland, as well as the na-

tional religion and freedom of commerce would be fully secured¹.

The feeling of independence here found its way once more to emphatic expression. People said, that no doubt Scotland was not so rich or powerful as England, but it had the precedence of the older crown, from a unification people must be prepared to see a fall in the dignity of the nobility, a diminution or extinction of Presbyterianism, which nevertheless was most intimately bound up with the constitution, together with a depopulating of the capital, the lower orders could never regard the union otherwise than as subjection to a foreign yoke. But apart from all other considerations, looking to the position of affairs in the world at that time, there lay in the conflict of the Great Powers a most pressing call for the union. At any moment the French could invite the very numerous adherents of the Pretender in Scotland to rise; what then would become of the security of their religion or of the liberty of the people? The party which conducted the administration could maintain itself only by means of a union with England. And for England it was of the utmost importance to anticipate a change of affairs in Scotland. The union was one of the wishes of the Whigs in accordance with their previous policy; but the Tories also declared themselves in favour of it: they would otherwise have been regarded as opponents of the Protestant succession. But if the English were so inclined, they had a price moreover to offer which Scotland could not withstand. We have noticed the sudden awakening of the commercial spirit of Scotland, the animosity then felt was founded chiefly on the opposition which the English had showed to the first risings of this spirit. They now determined to offer their hand to the Scots in this particular. They guaranteed them a share in their colonies and in their foreign trade;—in return for which the Scots adopted the English imposts and a part of their system of taxation, especially the excise duties. This of course

¹ Somers, Notes 'The true argument for the union was the danger of the succession from a divided state.' Coxe: 'Godolphin had no alternative but to purchase the support of the Whigs by yielding to their demands.' II. 374.

involved also a share in paying the interest of the English national debt: but a compensation to the Scots for this was voted. The essence of the agreement lies in a union of imposts and trade which for the more wealthy country could be neither agreeable nor advantageous; but all special interests had now to be given up once for all. It was hard for the Scots to let go their legislative and administrative autonomy, for this too had been hitherto secured to them by the maintenance of a special Privy Council of their own. When they on the other hand stipulated for the integrity of their Church-constitution, the Anglicans on their side consented with the greatest reluctance. But the sense of danger to both parties if the separation continued overruled all difficulties. In the meetings of the commissioners of both countries to deliberate about conditions, which Lord Somers, though not holding any public office at the time, conducted with that legal and political superiority which is always so decisive, no ill-feeling or discord for this once arose¹. On the 22nd of July, 1706, he handed to the Queen a sketch of the agreement, which was then passed in both Parliaments. The last Scottish Parliament ended by adopting the Bill, but not without the most lively debates and protests from many quarters (July 1707). The strongest opposition was made to the article that henceforth England and Scotland should have only one Parliament; but it was the very foundation of the whole. Sixteen of the Scottish Peers, and five and twenty of the Commons were admitted into the English Parliament, too many as compared with the amount of property, too few as compared with the number of inhabitants².

Queen Anne enjoyed the glory of having accomplished a thing which her predecessors had attempted in vain—of having given to the expression Great Britain a reality of the highest significance³. The statesmen who took part in

¹ Bonnet: 'Les commissaires, que la reine a nommés, ont apporté un esprit de paix de douceur et de bonne volonté.'

² It is, however, worthy of note with respect to the origin of the system of representation, that the Scotch commissioners made it their object, 'to fix their representation agreeably to the combined estimation of numbers and property.'

³ Act in Somerville; Queen Anne 190.

A D. 1707.

it, especially Godolphin and Somers, but Marlborough also, have thereby won for themselves imperishable credit for furthering the development of English power, of English trade, and of the spirit of the nation itself.

What a unique position was that of Marlborough in particular! He was the great man of the day. He had broken the power which hitherto had been the greatest in Europe, had rescued Holland, had made the Emperor master of south Germany and Italy; and the Emperor in return had included him among the Princes of the Empire. At the same time he succeeded in confining the North to its own limits. Under his auspices united Albion took up that position in the world which William III had had in view, had striven after, but had not attained to. In England itself he concentrated the chief power in his own hand. The husband of the Queen, Prince George of Denmark, was nominally Commander-in-chief of the forces by land and sea; but he was deprived of his immediate influence in the land-army by Marlborough himself, in the Admiralty by Marlborough's brother, to whom most members of this Board attached themselves. He was perfectly aware of this and complained of it, but remained quiescent. The men who might have inspired him with different sentiments were removed from contact with him¹. The Queen was accustomed to follow the counsel of her old friend, and Lady Marlborough still exercised great influence at a court, at which she had acquired command of most places. The old relationship of confidential intimacy of many years' standing between her and the Queen, which appears in the correspondence between Mrs. Morley and Mrs. Freeman—the names which they assumed respectively—though it could no longer continue with the old closeness, had yet suffered no rupture. Marlborough was master at court, in the state, and in Parliament, as well as in the army and in the conduct of foreign affairs.

A brilliant company of connexions grouped themselves

¹ Bonnet mentions a Mr Clarke, 'créature de Rochester et de Nottingham, pour suggérer à ce prince des préjugés peu favorables aux mesures que prennent les ministres.'

around him; riches streamed in upon him as much as his heart could wish. He was accounted the happiest uncrowned person to be found in the world.

But along with all this, he was a subject, and at the same time anything but raised above the relations between the parties which struggled with one another in Parliament.

He had won over the Whigs only by promising them to procure for their most considerable leader at that time, the young Sunderland, the post of Secretary of State; and he felt all the more bound to keep his promise because Sunderland belonged to his own family and enjoyed the protection of his wife.

But Queen Anne opposed it. She observed that she should never be able to come to an understanding with Sunderland; his cold exterior was nothing but a cloak to an internal impetuosity which at times broke out all the more violently; as far as her own personal feelings were concerned, he would always be intolerable to her. The Whigs, however, stood to their demand, and made their further support of the government in Parliament, which was necessary for the prosecution of the war, dependent upon its fulfilment; they rejected every kind of compromise that was offered them. Godolphin, on whom they laid the blame of the refusal of their wish, could not but fear that he would not be able to maintain himself in Parliament; he told the Queen that it was impossible for him to stand up against the difficulties which he experienced in conducting her affairs, and at the same time to strive against herself. Lady Marlborough added the remark, that the Queen could no longer carry on her government with a portion of the Tories (for many of them were hopelessly alienated from her) without the support of the Whigs. With more particularity Marlborough laid before her the necessities pressing at the moment; five millions were wanted for carrying on the war in the following year; these would never be obtained unless the request of the Whigs was granted; the indispensable Godolphin would be unable to maintain his position: for her own best interests, for the well-being of the land and the freedom of Europe he implored her (on his knees he entreated her) to give way.

A.D. 1706.

Then the Queen gave her consent ; on the day of the opening of Parliament (Dec. 3, 1706) Sunderland was nominated Secretary of State ; the consequence was, that Parliament voted more than was absolutely necessary, viz. six millions.

But it cannot excite wonder that the Queen, who wished to feel independent, withdrew somewhat from the interests of the Whigs in the branch of affairs that was most of all left to her own judgment. Without consulting Archbishop Tenison, who himself might be considered as belonging to the Whigs, she nominated two Bishops of strong Anglican views. They were men of blameless conduct and especially gifted for their office. She had always determined to follow only her own judgment in this, uninfluenced by others, just as formerly her sister also had made the management of ecclesiastical affairs her own personal business. By this act, however, she roused the violence of the Whigs with redoubled force. Feeling sure of Godolphin, they came forward and asserted the principle that the Queen should do nothing without her ministers. But since the ministers, whose business it was to express the will of the majority in Parliament and determine the will of the Queen, were subject to the influence of the leaders of that party which happened to be dominant, one sees plainly that these latter would have been by this means in possession of the supreme power, and would completely have divested the crown of its autonomy.

The very men who had once been the objects of an impeachment, Somers, Montague and Russell, formed a confederation with Sunderland and Wharton, which ruled both the Parliament and the country. Wharton was exactly an instance of occasional conformity : he received the Eucharist according to the English form of worship, but remained in other respects a complete Presbyterian. Little by little this junta got possession of the highest offices ; Somers obtained the presidency of the Privy Council, Wharton the Lord-lieutenancy of Ireland. So also Russell asked for the position of admiral again ; Montague wished to be made plenipotentiary for the congress which was to negotiate about the peace.

But their purpose was directed more towards preventing

the peace than towards concluding it. Under their influence Parliament resolved that no secure and honourable peace could be made, unless the whole Spanish monarchy was allotted to the house of Austria. This object, however, was not to be obtained without a long and energetic war. In the continuance of war the Whigs, who held the military administration and the strings of the purse in their hands, saw the condition of their lasting supremacy. And most opportunely did the result of the war itself come to their support. Against the combination of the Imperial forces with those of England and Holland the attempts of Louis XIV, in the years 1708 and 1709, to establish his power in the Netherlands were shattered. People were looking for the moment when he should be completely exhausted and compelled to accept whatever terms the allies should dictate to him.

And at the same time the Whigs got the home government daily more and more into their possession. The zealous Churchmen, Nottingham and Rochester, were already excluded from the Privy Council. Now also the fraction of the moderates, Harley and St. John, were removed from the ministry, and it filled up its numbers with zealous Whigs such as Walpole and Newcastle. Marlborough was gradually won over to consent to the demand of Russell also. The course of operations was always this, that the Whigs first put pressure upon Godolphin and Lady Marlborough. After the Duchess had at last herself given in, not without a struggle, she set herself to induce Marlborough also, not only to abandon his opposition, but also to exert himself with the Queen for the fulfilment of the request. Hitherto the Queen could always be prevailed upon to yield by a representation of the general necessity. Could she not henceforward also be brought, by means of the same considerations, to do all that was desired?

Marlborough was no Whig; but in his conduct of the war from first to last, and now also in his course of action in home affairs, he maintained his position by means of the Whigs. United with the party which had the majority in Parliament, he conceived the idea of making himself secure against all possible contingencies (for his foes too were power-

A.D. 1709.

ful and prompt in action), by obtaining from the Queen a commission as Commander-in-chief for life¹. The records were searched, and it was found that the crown had never yet made such a grant; but Marlborough abided by his request and repeated it with emphasis. His plea was, that the alliance could be held together only by the English General having a position raised above the influence of momentary changes.

Thus in England also came to pass what has been more than once experienced in France and Germany, that a great general attempted to obtain an authority not dependent on the shifting inclinations of the supreme power; not in open opposition to the Queen, but under her enforced connivance. Marlborough wished to give a perfectly secure foundation to that unbounded reputation which he enjoyed in Europe, through the power of the party which he now considered as his own, and to give the same to his party through his reputation; without breaking with the Queen he wished to be practically independent of her.

The attitude which the Queen thereupon assumed is the most remarkable part of her conduct.

Queen Anne was, until near the end of her reign, much beloved in England. People were glad to see her at public functions, which she went through with dignity; the melodious tone of her voice created a favourable impression. She had the reputation of being sincerely and without any fanaticism religious, of wishing only to do good and of taking pains to secure the well-being of her subjects. She was economical and yet generous; a thoroughly good wife, but without thereby surrendering anything of her position; her husband was the first man to do her homage. Her court was quiet, even in comparison with the gaiety-shunning William III. After the death of her husband she always dined alone—people said, however, very luxuriously. She was not fond of giving audiences, or, when she did give them, of pronouncing decisions. She yielded to the necessities which the Revo-

¹ The Whig lawyers were not in favour of it. Campbell, *Lives of the Chancellors* iv. 322.

lution (brought about in part by herself) imposed upon her government; she never refused her assent to a Bill which had passed both Houses of Parliament; but at the same time she had no idea of being made a tool. She took it amiss if her ministers ever laid a measure before her for signature about which she had not been previously consulted; from those about her, to whom she allowed influence, she exacted at the same time the most attentive service; and she was punctilious about the externals which mark the highest rank. In her first years she felt happy in the respect which both parties paid to her. It was quite to her taste when, at the thanksgiving in St. Paul's for the battle of Blenheim, both Whigs and Tories walked side by side in the procession, as of old the Lancastrians and Yorkists under Henry VI. People thought to please her when they told her that her care for the Church of England was the cause of the success of the war in Germany. The Tories congratulated her on the choice of a general such as Marlborough, and a minister of finance such as Godolphin¹. Her predilection was for the Tories as the champions of the Anglican Church; as has been mentioned, only on the ground that neither party ought to obtain a predominance which might threaten the independence of the crown, had she put limits to their influence; now she had to experience that the Whigs, whom she did not love, brought her into a dilemma as regards this very principle,—a principle which corresponded with her personal feeling.

One cannot read without sympathy those of her letters to Godolphin in which she seeks to avoid nominating Sunderland as Secretary of State. For to raise a party-man, whose friends had already got places in all other departments, to this particular place, would be neither more nor less than throwing herself into the hands of a party². That is a thing, she says, which she had always sought to avoid. It might be that people thought that she would not be unwilling to follow the Tories: yet she was in no way inclined to give office to the violent fanatics who had treated her so ill. All that she wished for

¹ Oldmixon, *History of England* ii. 342.

² Aug. 30/Sept. 10, 1706, in Coxe's *Marlborough* ii. 136.

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was liberty to appoint those who devoted themselves honourably to her service, whether Whigs or Tories; if she were to be bound to one or the other, if she had to fall into the hands of either party, she would be a slave with the name of Queen; personally she would be undone and her government would cease. She had no object, no thought beyond the well-being of the country. Was she to be so unhappy as to fall into the power of a sect? The peace of her life was involved. She conjured Godolphin by the holiest of all names to stand by her in this ¹.

She might well feel hurt that not only Marlborough, but also his wife, yes even her intimate confidante of old days, opposed her in this. Sarah, Lady Marlborough, had not her husband's gift of winning people while ordering them; she loved not merely the possession of power, but also the appearance of it; she showed to all the world the ambition which ruled her soul. As she had espoused the cause of Sunderland, her son-in-law, and of the Whigs in general, she considered it as almost a matter of course that the court would take its stand on the same side. Towards the Queen, in speaking of this, she at times made use of expressions which drove the thorn of a violated friendship into the Queen's side. Over all the court circle she assumed the authority of a patroness, who had a right to count on gratitude ².

It now soon came to open dissension.

A bedchamber-woman, Miss Hill, a relation of Lady Marlborough and recommended by herself, acquired more and more independently of her an influence over the Queen, whose feelings on Church matters she shared. The proud Duchess had to find that her relation, without informing her of the fact, had married—her name henceforth was Mrs. Masham—the Queen herself having been present at the ceremony. How bitterly she must have felt it, that a creature, as she said, whom she had raised out of the dust, should assume an air of confidence and superiority when

¹ 'I must beg you for Christ Jesus, to endeavour to bring it about.' Oldmixon ii 148

² Swift, *History of the four last years of the Queen* 17; 'Three furies reigned in her breast, sordid avarice, disdainful pride, and ingovernable rage.'

the Queen was spoken of! One day my Lady, who, in spite of her position as Mistress of the Robes, at times did not come near the court for months together, condescended once more to appear before the Queen, in the hope of awakening the old feeling, and re-establishing the old relationship. The Queen was ill at ease, she seemed to hesitate between the old intimacy and the growing dislike; she did not allow the Duchess to kiss her hand; instead of that she embraced her once more in her arms; but at the same time she remained perfectly cold; not one word of kind greeting crossed her lips¹.

Relations of so tender a nature once broken are never restored; expressions of disapproval are not wanting and are repeated; attempts to remove the impression they make are made in vain, as was the case here; on each return to concord follows a still more violent dissonance.

Even as regards the government of the country these circumstances were to this extent of importance, in that Lady Marlborough had always directed her personal influence in favour of the Whigs. Now in immediate proximity to the Queen an opposite influence was making itself felt. Mrs Masham, through the slights and hostility which she experienced, was driven still more to the other side; she opened for the Tories, who attached themselves to her, a door of access to the Queen; she reported their representations.

Out of this personal difference grew a question of general importance for the constitutional system, in the form in which it now existed in England. Was a government, supported by the Parliament, to tolerate a household influence, which opposed it, in the case of the sovereign, whose consent it needed in order to direct the state? On the other side, had it the right to intrude into the circumstances of daily life, and to control the immediate surroundings of the holder of the highest authority? From the bickerings of persons and parties this question arose as a constitutional problem.

¹ *Conduite de la Duchesse de Mailborough* 242 The original was compiled many years afterwards by Dr. Hooke from information supplied by Lady Marlborough revised by herself She was much pleased with it, and made the editor a present for his services. *Maty, Chesterfield* 115.

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For the action of the various forces is not so rigidly defined, but that some purely individual element remains, which may contain a tendency opposed to the prevailing one and give it scope.

At that time the Commander-in-chief, who hitherto had had very much his own way in filling up vacancies, experienced an encroachment of an unwonted kind, manifestly through the increasing influence of the bedchamber-woman. A regiment, which had become vacant, was destined by the court for Colonel Hill, brother of Mrs. Masham, while Marlborough had another officer in view for it—Meredith.

For the man, who aspired to be Captain-general for life, it was a doubly strong proposal, to allow the exercise of the authority which he had hitherto possessed to be diminished. He thought that by this means a flag would be set up in the army, around which all discontented officers would rally, and assembled a junta of the leading Whigs to a consultation. When these consented to support him in the maintenance of his privilege—though at the same time it was not clear that it had ever expressly been conferred upon him,—he went, making no secret of his displeasure (which was not his wont), with a proud and offended air to Windsor, and this caused all the more astonishment, as he was forthwith missed in the sitting of the Privy Council.

His intention was, without further ado, to set before the Queen the alternative of removing Mrs. Masham, or of allowing him to resign all his high offices.

Not all the members of the junta, however, went these lengths with him, they saw that matters were no longer in such a condition (especially as negotiations were just at that time going on in Gertruydenberg respecting peace) that his dismissal would be simply an impossibility. But Sunderland conceived the idea of bringing the matter before Parliament, and by means of a formal address insisting upon the removal of the bedchamber-woman, who was opposed to the whole party; he would push the question to the extent of its full constitutional bearing.

But on her side also Queen Anne did not consider it prudent to let it come to this. She reconciled herself to

renouncing the nomination of Hill; whereupon Marlborough also gave up his candidate¹. But she was once more touched in her inmost personal feeling. As Queen she would as little allow Mrs. Masham to be torn from her by the Whig party, as of old when Princess she had allowed Lady Marlborough herself to be taken from her by her sister and King William.

Thereupon followed another demonstration of the Whigs, with a view to crush the tendencies towards peace, which were beginning to show themselves in Holland, and at the same time to afford a proof of the immense extent to which the nation depended on Marlborough. The Queen was asked to allow the Duke to go as soon as possible to Holland, and at the same time to nominate him, the general himself, plenipotentiary for the negotiations about the peace; for he was admirably fitted to exercise both these great offices². The Tories were opposed to it on the formal ground that the proposal involved an encroachment upon the royal prerogative, a view to which a member of the Queen's household also gave expression. But the predominance of the Whigs in both Houses was so strong, that the address was voted. The Queen in her answer did not reject the proposal, but at the same time she parried it; she also was of opinion that the presence of the Duke in the Netherlands was necessary, and was glad that Parliament recognised his services.

When Marlborough returned to Holland, he exercised a decisive influence upon the course of the negotiations; they came to nothing mainly owing to the demands of the Whigs: it was the Whigs and the Imperial ambassador who wished for the continuance of the war, not the Queen of England.

The latter had no longer any doubt that attempts were being made to control her even in the most important transactions of government; all the more heartily did she welcome the assistance, which offered itself to her from another quarter.

¹ Bonnet: 'Pour prévenir, que le parlement ne s'en mêlât, la reine fit la première avance.'

² 'Honour the same person with the great characters of two such important trusts.' From the detailed narrative in Bonnet it appears that Coxe's conjecture (iii.) does not agree with facts.

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A sermon preached on the anniversary of the Gunpowder-Plot, in which the right of resistance was questioned, brought the royalist and Anglican feelings of the capital and of the country to light in an unexpected degree. The doctrine of this right was the political axiom of the Whigs, the two Bishops above mentioned excited their displeasure by rejecting it, but at this moment, when the party who wished to enforce it seemed so desirous of prolonging the war *ad infinitum*, it was no longer popular. The Lower House impeached the preacher, Dr. Sacheverell, before the Upper House¹; but the population showed a sympathy with the defendant, nearly as strong as that for the Bishops at their trial, which also concerned the holding of Anglican opinions. The Upper House, in which Sacheverell found some people to agree with him (for there, in the debate which ensued, the principle opposed to the axiom of the Whigs once more after a long interval found expression²), condemned Sacheverell to a very mild punishment—suspension for three years; but even that created a tumultuous excitement in the capital; when Sacheverell appeared in the provinces he was received with an enthusiasm, of which those only are wont to partake who defend a popular cause at their own peril.

At the same time the landed interest everywhere roused itself in opposition to the continuance of the war for a purpose which no longer had the sanction of popular opinion. Who was it that was seen to drive about in stately carriages? the military authorities and the capitalists; these were the only people who were rich; the land-owner would soon be nothing more than a tenant.

Popular opinion now set itself against the Whig Parliament, as it formerly had done against a Tory one. Under the altered circumstances it was a remarkable event, that one of the most considerable of the old Whigs, the friend and confidant of William III, Shrewsbury, who had now returned after long absence with an Italian wife, sided with the Queen; in opposition to the junta of the Whigs, against whose ex-

¹ Excursus in Somerville xxvii.

² Cp. the proceedings of May 17, 1709. State Trials xv. 14.

clusive policy he had before this always contended, he voted with the moderate Tories for Sacheverell; without having consulted the ministry on the subject, the Queen re-installed him in his place as Lord Chamberlain, which she had first to make vacant for him.

One may regard this as the first act by which the intention of changing the ministry was announced. Shortly afterwards, in May 1710, the court and the moderate Tories came to an understanding, in which the latter pledged themselves to uphold the royal prerogative and the privileges of the Anglican Church, together with the Protestant succession¹. Gradually things went further.

Towards the end of June the storm broke on the head of Sunderland; the proposal of the address for removing Mrs. Masham was laid as a crime against him; he was also held guilty of Republican sentiments, inasmuch as he wished to subject the Queen to a kind of servitude. The foreign diplomatists were sorry to lose him; for though he was violent and irritable, yet he was not difficult to pacify, and they could trust him. Godolphin maintained his position little more than a month longer. On the 7th of August he had worked for two hours with the Queen, without her giving him any sign of her displeasure; in the evening of the same day he received in a short note, which referred back to a former unpleasant occurrence, his dismissal. For an instant anxiety was aroused at court, lest the peace negotiations at Gertruydenberg had been now really broken off²; for if the war were renewed in earnest Godolphin would be needed. But the successes, which the English army gained at the end of July near Almenara, quieted their minds; a great and pressing danger was now no longer to be feared. In the Netherlands Marlborough firmly established the superiority of the allies; it was necessary that he should retain the

¹ 'De soutenir et de maintenir les droits de la prérogative royale que les Whigs ont attaqués, et de soutenir l'église anglicane contre les attaques des presbytériens' (Bonnet). Onslow (Burnet vi 13) assures us that Harley at first thought he could win over some of the Whigs.

² From information, which Somers has preserved respecting a meeting of the Cabinet Council.

A.D 1710.

chief command, because his dismissal might have ruptured the alliance. But when he returned to London, he found that he stood on altogether a different footing.

One day he complained that some officers of high position had been appointed without his being asked, a thing which used not to be. The Queen excused the circumstance by saying that he was not there to be asked. He observed that it had taken place the evening before his return. 'Recollect, my Lord,' said the Queen with unwonted sternness, 'that it is I with whom you are speaking.' People said that they saw tears in his eyes as he withdrew; for of open unmitigated displeasure on the part of his old mistress he had not dreamed. His wife was made of harder metal; when the key, which was the badge of her position at court, was demanded, she flung it into the middle of the room; they might pick it up. Her acceptance of her dismissal was the condition on which her husband was at first retained at his post.

But how far had he fallen from his old power and position, his old influence!

The chain was broken, which, through his union with the junta, his authority over the Whigs, and the predominance of the Whigs in Parliament, had hitherto surrounded the Queen and restrained her freedom.

That she attempted to break it, and succeeded in doing so, gives her reign a very strongly marked character in English history.

CHAPTER II.

THE LATTER YEARS OF QUEEN ANNE.

FROM the dominant party, which carried the Parliament also unconditionally along with it, Queen Anne appealed as it were to the nation. The nation decided for her. Amidst a lively contest of factions, in which the government put all their resources into play, a new general election took place in the year 1710. The advantage was so decidedly on the side of the Tories, that Harley for the first moment was horrified; for it had never been his intention to call into existence the supremacy of any one party, which would have prescribed laws to him; but rather to govern with the help of both parties, perhaps somewhat in the manner of William III, only with a preponderance of Tory influence.

When Parliament assembled, however, the Whigs showed themselves to be still very strong; they had men of intellect and energy at their head, who hoped to get the power they had lost once more into their hands before long; they looked upon the new combination as merely transitory¹, and they were determined to offer to it the most obstinate resistance.

And if one seeks to know on what from the very first moment they grounded their hopes, it was the impending succession of the house of Hanover. Hanover, says Sunderland, must be our anchor; the Elector will one day bring everything again into the right track. But the Whigs might expect from Hanover, not only hope for the future, but also co-operation

¹ Bonnet: 'Un parti composé de bonnes testes qui cherche à rentrer dans les affaires et qui a pour lui des arguments forts.'

in the present circumstances, the central point of which was the question of peace or war.

The purpose of the Tories was directed above all things (and it could not be otherwise) towards the re-establishment of peace. For the power of their opponents depended upon interests created by the war, military, pecuniary, and diplomatic; it was owing to these that Marlborough had had recourse to a Whig policy. The Tories had long held that the allies were going beyond the original purpose with which the war was undertaken. For this had been directed towards maintaining the balance of power between the continental states: while according to the intention of the Whigs a dangerous superiority would accrue to the house of Austria¹. Were the English to bear the burden of war, to spend their money, and shed their blood for this? Impelled by the knowledge that peace was popular in England, the new ministry opened negotiations with France, which at first were held in secret, and in September 1711 led to preliminaries, which were publicly communicated to the allies. The most important article among them was, that the intention of handing Spain over to Austria was abandoned, and now it was merely proposed to separate Spain in perpetuity from France. The other conditions also were less oppressive to France, and less favourable to the allies, than the former proposals.

This scheme was proposed, not so much in consequence of the relative positions of the belligerents and the issue of the war, as of the internal troubles in England. The new ministry wished for no success from which their opponents could gain support. All the more eager were the latter to hinder the peace, and to hold fast to the obligations into which they had entered.

The most important of all arose out of the Barrier-Treaty, which Lord Townsend, one of the most active and zealous of the Whigs, had successfully concluded in Holland in the October of 1709. In it the Dutch, who since the last war considered their safety to lie in the right of holding a number of fortresses in the Netherlands, were granted such a right to an

¹ The main thesis of Bolingbroke's *Letters on History* viii.

extent which surpassed all expectations ;—a small kingdom, as Marlborough said. But on the other hand they had not only agreed to the succession of the house of Hanover (that of course), but had guaranteed it, and consented to fight for it with their own troops. The Tories were on principle against the guarantee, not as though they had any wish to call in question the succession, for that indeed was fixed anew in the preliminaries with France, but because, they said, a formal guarantee brought a foreign power into too close contact with the internal circumstances of England. They maintained, that in the fixing of the barriers Townsend had exceeded his instructions.

On the other hand, this treaty was in the highest degree welcome to George Louis, the Elector of Hanover, who, independently of the treaty, was a member of this combination.

The dignity of Elector, which was his pride, and gave him a high position in the Empire, had been obtained in opposition to a wide confederation of princes, at the head of which was France, and in closest union with the Emperor, Holland, and King William III. Already in the first war, when he was scarcely fifteen years old, George Louis had taken part in the battles against the French, and had stood firm in the greatest peril. The war of the Spanish succession began with a small campaign in lower Germany. Supported by an Imperial mandate, for which the Elector had to thank the intervention of William III, he could free himself from the hostile kinsman, who still held fast to France. Soon after he concluded an agreement with Marlborough, in consequence of which a splendid force of Hanoverian troops, in the pay partly of Queen Anne and partly of the States-General, took part in the war with France. These regiments, under Marlborough's immediate command, had contributed to the great victory at Blenheim. A time came in which the Tories, displeased with the court, thought of inviting the Electress Sophia, mother of the Elector, over to England in order to secure her succession. The Whigs were at that time against it, and when Marlborough undertook a journey to Hanover in the year 1705, he made it his business to oppose it there.

A.D. 1711.

The Elector was easily convinced that it was not to his interest¹. We find him henceforth having a more and more close understanding with Marlborough. It was at the latter's suggestion and through his mediation that the Elector undertook a command on the Rhine in the year 1707; he made the Whigs' point of view, viz. war, his own. In consequence of which they also had an eye to his interests. But what could have been more in accordance with his wishes than the Barrier-Treaty? His claim to the English crown was thus sanctioned by a compact between England and an important neighbouring state, the private interests of which required it to bring the compact to fulfilment. In the complications then arising the Elector held inflexibly to the Whigs. It was reported that Harley had offered him the command in the Netherlands, at once to win him over and remove Marlborough; the Elector refused absolutely off-hand. George Louis was cold by nature, and that in a way which made all cold about him; but he held firmly to his friends and to his party. His policy was to stick to his colours. With the Emperor and the States-General, he declared himself loudly and energetically against the preliminaries for peace set on foot by the Tories. In his protest against it he said; 'it cannot be the will of Providence that a foe defeated and exhausted in so victorious a war should at last, in spite of all, attain his object to the ruin of the freedom of Europe.' The Whigs were never weary of telling him that he owed the call of his house to succeed to the English crown to their suggestion and their principles².

It was certainly an immense gain to the Whigs that the allies, and among them the universally acknowledged successor to the throne of England, declared for their policy; but this was not sufficient. In order to be a match for their opponents at home also, they made another alliance, which in itself was a modification of their principle.

One of the most considerable Tories, certainly the one who exercised the greatest influence on the Anglican Church,

¹ Letter of Marlborough, Dec. 5, 1705 Coxé 1. 501.

² Hanover papers in Macpherson II.

Nottingham, promised his support to the Whigs against the ministry with regard to the peace, on condition that on their side no opposition should be made to the Occasional Conformity Bill. Should they close with him or not? This Bill had hitherto been the great bone of contention between the two parties; it gave to their opposition in politics a religious colour. And of this the Whigs must be convinced, that the most considerable hindrance to their obtaining a firm hold of power, lay in the antipathy of the English clergy, who exercised at least as great an influence over the elections as the dissenting magistrates in the towns. In this antagonism everything is personal. Nottingham remarked that he was not the only one whom they would bring over to their side by concession in this respect. It was said that the ministry were making overtures to the party-leader, with whom it was at variance, in order to win him over¹. And at the same time Nottingham promised to accept certain modifications in the Bill, which would make it more tolerable to them. At last it seemed to the Whigs to be of more importance to win over him and his followers, and to pacify the Church, than to be just to the Dissenters, from whom in any case they had no serious hostility to fear. They accepted Nottingham's conditions; when the Bill was again brought forward, the Whigs allowed the opposition they had hitherto made to it to drop. To no bishop is the English Church under such obligations as to this statesman, who, while he upheld her authority, brought her into good relations with the powers and principles which had come to the surface through the Revolution, first under William III, and now under the Whigs, who were preparing the way for the rule of the house of Hanover. This point of view was not forgotten at the moment. When among others the magistrates of the city of London, the aldermen and heads of the city companies, who were Dissenters, were in doubt after the Bill was passed, whether they should resign their offices, or content themselves with service in their houses, which the

¹ Bonnet: 'Afin de l'amener dans les vues de la cour pour la paix' Sept. 2, 1712.

A.D. 1711.

Bill still allowed them, it was political considerations which induced them to adopt the latter course. We are given to understand that the Hanoverian ambassador induced them to take this course ; for the entrance of zealous Tories into these offices might possibly endanger the succession.

How religious considerations retire before political ones, and fall more and more into the background ! The Dissenters contented themselves with the toleration once granted them, without standing out, as heretofore, for a full share in civil rights. The Whigs ceased to be Presbyterians.

At the opening of the debate on the peace, Nottingham also now raised his powerful voice against the separate negotiations with France. At his instigation the Upper House declared every issue to be insecure and dishonourable, which left Spain and the West Indies in the hands of the house of Bourbon. It cared very little that the Commons gave utterance to a different opinion. Once more, at the proposal of Nottingham, the Lords in a separate address petitioned the Queen at the coming congress to maintain her good understanding with the allies and to procure for them satisfactory terms.

The Conformity Bill had just then passed ; the House of Lords fixed the length of the parliamentary recess, and it seemed scarcely open to doubt, that the re-commencement of the session would bring with it the overthrow of the ministry, with all their schemes for furthering the interests of the Bourbon dynasty.

To retain his position, Harley saw only one way open ; he must reverse the majority in the Upper House by a great creation of peers. He proposed to the Queen, that she should nominate twelve new peers at once ; then, as long as she lived, she would have nothing more to fear from the Upper House.

The hereditary chamber had no doubt been augmented by the Stuarts with more freedom than by their predecessors, though always with moderation : yet considering its authority, an authority dating from the very earliest times, this was in the highest degree an astounding measure. Even one of the Secretaries of State, Lord Dartmouth, did not restrain his astonish-

ment, and expressed serious apprehension of evil consequences, when the Queen disclosed her intention to him. Queen Anne said that all possible means had been tried by Marlborough and the Whigs, in order to place her in a difficulty; she must do what she could to help herself¹. It contented her, that the step she took could not be called illegal.

The supporters of the new ministry breathed again, when they heard of it; they had already begun to entertain the gravest fears. Swift, who was hand and glove with them, exclaims on December 27, 1711, that God alone knows what will become of them; on the 29th, however, that they are all saved; the Queen had made twelve new Lords, in order to win the majority; she herself and the kingdom would otherwise have been very unhappy².

The party knew quite well what it was doing. Even Bolingbroke said later, that the nomination of so many Lords at one time could only be excused on the plea of necessity, and scarcely on that. That by such means they would double the hatred of their opponents, could not be doubtful to them; but for the moment they gained their end. We are given to understand that the Whig Lords deliberated whether they should not oppose the introduction of the nominees, but were unanimous in agreeing to let it pass, because the formal legality of the measure could not be disputed; they would not lay themselves open to the possibility of seeming to be opponents of the prerogative. The reception which the new peers found was not a flattering one; but they took their seats, and forthwith determined the issue of the votes.

One of the first votes was on the message from the Queen, that negotiations for peace had been opened at Utrecht; it was answered with a vote of thanks.

Thus much is plain; that it was owing to a victory of the Tory government over the opposition of the Whigs (won, however, only by violent means³) that these negotiations

¹ Dartmouth, note on Burnet vi. 98.

² From the Journal to Stella, Dec. 29. 'The Queen has been at last persuaded to her own interest and security.'

³ Swift (Four Years, &c. p. 45) describes them as 'driven down by open force.'

A.D. 1713.

could be commenced at all. The result was worthy of the commencement. While on the one side the allies and the Whigs wished to see the war continued until France was ruined, the governments of France and England had an understanding to bring about a peace, disregarding the allies in order to repress the Whigs. Only in the combination of conditions care must be taken not to risk rousing popular opinion in England, the result of which might be once more to give a war-policy the upper hand.

After a bloody contest of many years the peace of Utrecht was a return to pretty much the same agreement as had been taken into consideration in the Partition-treaties before it. Spain and the Indies remained in the hands of the French Prince, Italy was assigned to Austria, Holland was protected by a boundary, though a diminished one, England obtained a firm position in the Mediterranean, just as William III had proposed in his first conference with Tallard. The state of the world, however, was not thus made exactly the old one over again. Louis XIV had been conquered in the interval. If the English did not utterly overthrow him, that was only because they were not united among themselves, and the maintenance of the Bourbon power seemed to be necessary to the Tories, in order to prevent the Whigs from obtaining the supremacy in England.

At first, however, all this remained still doubtful.

The Emperor and the German Empire rejected the peace and continued the war. The Dutch had acquiesced; but without a further agreement with the Emperor the fixing of the barrier, which specially concerned them, was of no value. In England the Lords declared themselves as consenting to the peace only in so far as it included a recognition of the Protestant succession on the part of France. The Commons had greeted it with joy; but certain stipulations respecting the commerce between the two nations excited such great repugnance to it among the people, that at last it was thrown out even in the Lower House. In the elections of the year 1713 the Whigs, though they remained in the minority, yet gained a number of votes. By delaying the complete fulfilment of the condition of peace, which was almost the most

popular of all in England, viz. the one by which he had engaged to destroy Dunkirk, Louis XIV himself rendered the position of the Tories, to whom he owed everything, more difficult, and caused the Whigs again to gain ground more and more.

In this uncertainty in the relations of European affairs on the continent and of English affairs at home, the question as to the future of the English throne came once more to the surface; with greater strength than before, because the increasing ill-health of the Queen gave cause for fearing that her end was near.

The King of France in making peace had accepted the stipulations about the English succession, and had engaged never to recognise any other King of Great Britain, than the one who should thus be called to the throne; the Pretender was compelled to leave France and to take refuge in Lorraine. But the Whigs said, that in being there he was lingering far too near home; they thought the Tory ministers quite capable of working for his restoration, and that even in secret understanding with the King of France, whose promise could not be looked upon as serious.

To keep up this apprehension, and spread the reports through which it was confirmed, was part of the trickery of the Exchange then coming into vogue; the fall of the English funds, which was caused thereby, had always a damaging effect on the Lord Treasurer, Harley, and his administration.

The question whether there really was a serious thought of such a course, must, however, if I mistake not, be answered in the negative.

Queen Anne of course could not think of it; she would then have had to abdicate and recognise the Pretender as King; the ministry, even the dignitaries of the Church and of the Law, could think of it just as little: although in Jacobite writings, which were disseminated at that time, the doctrine is obstinately preached, that all that had taken place in Church and State since the Revolution was, in respect of the true possessor of the crown, null and void. And who would really venture to break the oaths by which they were

pledged to the succession sanctioned by Parliament? who would make himself liable to the punishment of high treason, which a departure from the principles established would involve?

It is quite true that in France, just at the commencement of the negotiations for peace, a mysterious communication about the means of bringing back the Pretender to the throne had been made by Harley. His reason for it was, that many Jacobites had seats in Parliament, and the majority depended upon them¹. He succeeded in persuading the Pretender to give instructions to all his old followers to unite themselves to the English ministry. This, however, was the whole purpose of the statement. Harley went only so far as was necessary to bring this about. The friends of the Pretender themselves came to the conclusion that they would attain nothing further.

In the parliamentary world the very first object is to gain the majority and keep it. Harley was a parliamentary leader of great practical ability; well educated and eloquent; ambitious but not vain; shrewd enough to see through others, without letting them see through him; always engaged in negotiations on all sides, without ever committing himself²; for he always kept his end, and that only, in view; and generally did the opposite of what was expected of him. He belonged to the Tories, and hitherto had held fast to the stronger opinions of that party, mainly because he would otherwise have to fear being driven out of office by Rochester and his party. After the latter's death people remarked, that Harley tried to stand well with the Whigs and the court of Hanover, provided that thereby he had nothing to fear from Marlborough, whom he regarded as his irreconcilable enemy. Many believed him capable, after the death of the Queen, of handing over the Tories bound hand and foot to the house of Hanover.

To prevent such a project was the chief thing which his

¹ Berwick; *Mémoires* ii.

² Bonnet: 'Sachant bien que le secret moyen de se maintenir est d'éviter les extrêmes.'

colleague, Bolingbroke (St. John), had in view, a man of much greater originality of thought, internal motive-power, and conviction. In his conference with the Scottish Jacobites he gave them to understand that he considered the Pretender as the true King, and loved to make the court of Hanover the butt of his wit. In conversation he developed that versatility and fire, which distinguish him as a writer; and perhaps he was altogether born rather to be a writer than a statesman. The worthy Scots believed him, because he spoke in accordance with their opinions, and conceived the fond hope that he would make preparations for attaining their object. But his end also was simply the parliamentary one; he merely wished to secure their votes in Parliament; in a short time they had to complain that nothing was being done for them. Bolingbroke's view, in opposition to Harley, was before all things directed to this;—so to strengthen the Tories, that they would be able to stand on their own feet and conclude a compact with the future King.

In order to unite the Tories by a new and great interest against the Whigs, he brought in a Bill, by which the Presbyterians were to be excluded from teaching—the Schism Bill, as it was called—according to which a certificate of conformity was to be made a *sine qua non* even for the imparting of private instruction¹. It was based on the idea of the intimate union between Church and monarchy; it would probably have been given up, if the Presbyterians, through the provisions that had existed hitherto, could have been excluded from the right of taking part in elections to Parliament. Harley was not in favour of it, for he did not wish to provoke the Whigs any more. Bolingbroke, however, carried the Bill through all its stages; but it excited the greatest astonishment, that the legislative power should have determined on a measure of such violence². The Dissenters were of opinion, that it was at the same time directed against the Hanoverian succession, in which cause they were interested.

¹ Lockhart; *Mémoires* i 460.

² The Venetian Grimaldi offers a construction, which probably is the true one. 'Il partito dei Tory's o vuol vedere il tesoriere rinunciare la carica o lo vuol obligare a scoprirsi interamente et ad unirsi con loro'

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Great excitement was aroused at this time by the Peace of Rastadt, between the Emperor and the French crown, inasmuch as in it Catholic projects once more came to the front. The Republic of Holland was aghast, for the two powers might easily unite against its barriers—even against its freedom—and that at a time when no support could be looked for from England. Who would guarantee that the union was not also directed against the Protestant succession in England? What if the Pretender, with the help of the French, who now had nothing further on their hands, should land in England? Would he not find innumerable followers? Would the Tories be against him?

It was no positive information of actual preparations which had been made for this end, that excited men's minds, but the possibility of such a thing happening at all, and its unspeakable gravity. All relations of the European Powers and of home politics were affected by it.

From time to time it appeared as if the old original hostility between Catholicism, strong monarchical forms, and all that is involved in them on the one side, and Protestant, parliamentary tendencies on the other, might break out afresh. In England the latter had for a long time had an undoubted preponderance. But in the hatred between the two parties people conceived the possibility of the Tories inclining to the Catholic way of thinking, while the Whigs held fast uncompromisingly to the Protestant. The fact that the Whigs were closely allied with the house of Hanover favoured the opinion that the Tories might be tempted to unite themselves with its diametrical opposite—the Pretender.

And so it came to pass that the two courts, that of Great Britain and the Hanoverian, were involved in this misunderstanding.

The Whigs had urged the Queen to proscribe the Pretender, in case he should set foot on English ground; but they were not content with this. Some time before, when the Tories were Hanoverian, it had been found advisable, in order to calm that court, to nominate the son of the Elector a Peer of the realm, under the title of Marquis and Duke of Cambridge, a title which was sometimes conferred in the royal family.

The Whigs now demanded that he should be summoned to Parliament, for only by his presence could the succession be secured.

Nothing was more contrary to Queen Anne's wishes. Not that as a matter of principle she wished to lay any hindrance in the way of the succession. But anyhow she thought it inconvenient, that the house of Hanover was allied with the Whigs and was opposing her policy. If the Elector's son should arrive, she foresaw that he would place himself at the head of the Opposition, and this would then become too powerful for her; she would have to submit to the majority. And little as she can be compared with Queen Elizabeth, still she had no less a dislike to the presence of her successor in England; to yield on this point she regarded as an act of abdication.

Legally the demand could not be refused. The writ of summons was made out; but it remained in the hands of the Chancellor, until it should be demanded by the court of Hanover.

But the Queen hoped that such a demand would never be made; she thought that in this she might count upon a promise of the Electress Sophia, that there at any rate they would not be induced to undertake anything which was displeasing to the Queen.

And hitherto the Electress had always had great consideration for the Queen's feelings. She could never think of coming forward as the presumptive successor, as she said, on account of her advanced age, which did not allow her the hope of attaining to the English throne, but at the same time also, because she knew the sensitiveness of the Queen on this point. Her letters express unreserved deference to the Queen's wishes;—and how often had she declared to both factions, that for herself she assuredly had no intention of setting herself at the head of the Whigs and preparing days of trouble for Queen Anne.

Perhaps her son, the Elector, was even less inclined to press for the delivery of the writ. It was not in accordance with his egotistical way of thinking, to allow his son and heir, of whom he was not particularly fond, to go before him to

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England and there perhaps take up a position which might be vexatious to himself.

But the leading Whigs, from whom the matter emanated in England, pushed it on with the same impetuosity in Hanover also. For the house of Hanover must above all things prove, that what its opponents said was untrue, viz. that it did not set much store on the succession; it must under all circumstances take care, that, at the moment of the Queen's death, a member of the house should be in England; otherwise the Pretender, who with the connivance of the minister might be on the spot, would awaken the sympathies of the legitimists and gather a large party round him; and who could say what would be the consequences? For every one shrank with horror from a civil war.

The wavering conduct of the Tory ministry, which was observable in its European policy, and the increasing rumours of its inclination towards the opposite side, made a not less powerful impression¹. Leibnitz himself, who had made the cause of the Guelfic house his own, and was greatly respected by them as a trustworthy and able counsellor, wrote from Vienna, where he was then staying, to this effect;—attempts were being made in England to cause a rupture between the Emperor and the Republic, and to organise, or rather disorganise the army, in the interests of the Pretender. One gathers from the correspondence, that Prince Eugene also had advised the house of Hanover to bestir itself; he was still the friend and the ally of Marlborough.

Under all these influences it came to pass that the Electress Sophia really made up her mind to demand the writ for her grandson, or at any rate to let him enquire about it, without demanding it². The heir-apparent and his wife (since her early days at Charlottenburg an admirer of the philosopher, who at the same time was a keen politician) expressed a very strong wish for it. As the Elector also had so far conquered his jealousy as not to oppose it, in the middle of April 1714 the Hanoverian representative, Schutz, received instructions

¹ Hanover papers in Macpherson ii. 558.

² The Electress declares that she meant nothing more than this.

to demand the delivery of the writ ; he executed them at once with great satisfaction, for he lived entirely in the society of the Whigs and was on good terms with them.

Queen Anne scarcely believed it possible ; she held to the position that something had been done in Hanover, about which she had received a promise that it should not be done. She had at least expected thus much consideration from the agent, as to have come himself and informed her before taking the final step ; she regarded it as a misdemeanour that he had failed to do this, and forbade him henceforth to appear at court. One knows that it was a trait in her character not to take lightly an infringement of the personal consideration which was due to her and her rank ; to her father, her sister, to the Tories first and then the Whigs, to her own Mistress of the Robes, and to her ministers, she had always exhibited a very keen sensitiveness. So now in the conduct of the court of Hanover she saw less of a danger than a wrong : but she still thought she could prevent the Prince from coming over, if she spoke her mind decidedly. She wrote to the Elector, that he would injure her sovereignty in this, while he was watching so jealously over his own ; the weakening of the authority of the predecessor was always to the prejudice of the successor. She expressed herself to the Electress with still greater plainness. ‘*Madame my sister and aunt,*’ she wrote, ‘*I must tell your Electoral Highness, that such conduct may imperil the succession itself, which is secure only so long as the Prince, who wears the crown, maintains his prerogative.*’ In England, she added, there were many men inclined to insurrection, who were only waiting for an opportunity to commence a disturbance. The letters, which were composed by Bolingbroke, breathe a spirit of petulance, ill-temper, and at the same time of superiority, which is elsewhere unusual with royal personages in an expression of opinion¹.

These letters reached Hanover on the 2nd of June ; on the 4th the Electress Sophia was taking her customary walk at Herrenhausen. Then it was that in the middle of a conver-

¹ Tindal iv ; Macpherson ii. 621.

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sation with a daughter-in-law she suddenly fell, and being carried into a neighbouring garden-house died immediately, as she had always wished, without priest, without doctor, and without pain; she was eighty-four. People said that the letters were the cause of her death¹; without doubt they cast a shadow over her last moments. In accordance with her nature and disposition, she would heartily have wished that the Prince of Wales should have the English throne; she considered him as more fit to rule Anglican and parliamentary England than her own posterity were. In consenting to accept the succession, she merely acquiesced in political circumstances and necessity. For herself, even then, she never had wished, or could wish, for anything more than the title, Queen of England, on her tomb. Her spirit moved in that free, observant, sceptical view of things human and divine, untroubled by any interest, which so peculiarly characterises the descendants of the Queen of Bohemia. Of the opposition of parties in England, in connexion with which so many other interests were at work, it was distasteful to her even to hear. But just then love for her grandson, and a consciousness of the great importance of the crisis, induced her to consent to a demonstration. She had the letters, which she had received from the Queen, communicated to the Whig party, to prove to them that the great questions respecting religion and politics in Europe and the interests of friends were not neglected in Hanover. Thus in her last days she fell a victim to that same division of parties in Europe, which had caused her mother's ill fate. It was nearly a century since then; but how utterly had the aspect of the world changed! The progress of public life, which was brought very nearly to an end by that catastrophe, was now on the point of winning one of its greatest successes, which opened to it the way to complete victory. The Electress Sophia thought herself bound to do something further for it.

By her death circumstances were thus far simplified, that now the Elector George Louis laid claim to the English succession in his own name. In a by no means humble, but at

¹ Letter of Molyneux from Hanover, Coxe iii. 574: 'I believe the chagrin of those villainous letters has been in a great measure the cause of it.'

the same time conciliatory letter, he communicated the fact to Queen Anne.

But it was Anne's fate also at the end of her days to be once more sensibly affected by the fluctuations of principles everywhere opposed to one another. She lived to see the Tory party, on which she had hitherto leaned for support, itself become divided. In Parliament, on the occasion of a debate on the commercial treaty concluded with Spain, it came to a formal breach between Harley and Bolingbroke, in which not Bolingbroke himself it is true, but one of his confidential subordinates incurred the extremest displeasure of the majority¹. The fall of the ministry seemed about to follow at once; it was attacked even by the Jacobites, who could not forgive it for having been induced to issue the proclamation against the Pretender. Only by representing to them that their hostile bearing would hinder the prorogation of a Parliament, in which the party opposed to them was predominant, could Bolingbroke induce them to let their opposition drop, so that the money Bills could be passed and the session forthwith closed (July 9, 1714).

But it was now impossible for the Queen to leave this divided ministry any longer in office; she must decide between Harley and Bolingbroke. Is it not in accordance with what is usual in parliamentary life, that she chose the latter, who at last had managed to accomplish the prorogation of Parliament? Moreover, Harley was specially displeasing to her, because he had not opposed the coming over of the Hanoverian Prince. Beyond doubt Bolingbroke both in this matter and generally came nearer to her views and wishes; and it has often been supposed that the purposes of both Queen and minister were now directed towards declaring for the Pretender. It is only astonishing that in all the secret correspondence of that time, as it afterwards became known, not a trace of any overtures, beyond the most general promises, can be found². And what a storm the

¹ Tindal iv. Parliamentary History vi. 1362.

² 'Bolingbroke assured Lord Chesterfield' (in later times, when the matter was no longer a secret) 'that he always avoided speaking of the Pretender to the Queen, who he said did never like to hear of a successor.' Maty, Chesterfield i. 16.

Queen would have brought upon herself by such a step! Once more the state of her health had improved; at the prorogation she appeared to be tolerably well; she hoped still to live. Who is fond of thinking of his death, or of that which will be brought about by it? The wishes of the Queen were directed, not so much towards plans for the future in favour of another, as towards securing her own peace during her life-time; by favouring the Pretender she would have roused the whole country against herself. But no less must she keep her Hanoverian successor also out of England. Towards this Bolingbroke lent her his aid, and thereby at the same time won a point against Harley¹. He represented to the Queen, that Harley's fluctuating conduct was to blame for everything, for by it (inasmuch as he wished to stand well with both parties) Parliament was led astray, and that again provoked the pretensions of Hanover². On the 27th of July, 1714, Robert Harley, Earl of Orford, received his dismissal. This was done merely to provide for the formation of a united and strong ministry, on which the Tories could depend, and for the sending back of the Hanoverian Prince, not at all for an invitation to the Pretender. With anxiety and very great hopes the Jacobites awaited the new nominations. How grievously they saw themselves deceived, when they learnt that Shrewsbury was to come forward once more at the head of the government, the man who certainly had effected the coming in of the Tories at the last change, but of whom they knew, that, originally belonging to the Whigs, he avoided extremes on principle, and in the position which he had hitherto held as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland had openly expressed his disapprobation of the last measures of Bolingbroke! How little it corresponded with their preconceptions respecting the disposition of the Queen, that she had once again given her confidence to a man, who was one of the original movers

¹ Letter to Wyndham: 'I knew we should have time and means to provide for our future safety.'

² 'Perche non si sono adoperati li mezzi adottati a reprimerla.' Dispaccio Veneto.

in the Revolution, and from whom it was not for a moment to be expected that he would ever declare for the Pretender.

But while this was happening, or rather while it was still preparing, Queen Anne was overtaken by the fate of mortals. She had a stroke of apoplexy, like her uncle Charles II before her. In her case also a moment intervened, in which consciousness returned, or seemed to return; in it she approved of the nomination of the new ministry; but she then fell into a state of lethargic torpor, in which, on the morning of the 10th of August, she died.

This happened at half-past seven. About eight o'clock the Privy Council assembled, and on this occasion there was an unusually large attendance, for hitherto the Whigs were accustomed to absent themselves when a Tory minister summoned them, and vice versâ the Tories; this time, however, they all came. The Hanoverian ambassador, Bothmar, was summoned at the same time, and in his presence the directions laid down for the formation of a regency, in anticipation of this event, were opened. The members of the ministry and those of the Privy Council who were called to take part in the regency tendered their oaths. When all was prepared—for no opposing voice was raised—they proceeded to proclaim the new King, and that in a form of words stronger than was at first used of William and Mary. The high and mighty Prince George, Elector of Brunswick-Lüneburg, was proclaimed as the lawful and rightful King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, amidst the general acclamations of the people.

A new epoch of English history now began. If one would be just, one must allow that the epoch just past—the reign of Queen Anne—was a very important one, strongly influencing the development of English history.

More successful campaigns, more victorious battles England had never known. The supremacy by land and sea, after which France was striving, had been beaten down; for no longer by means of an open understanding with France, which had formerly been the view of William III, but after a victory won over that power, were the conditions of the balance of

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power on the continent determined, just as the opposition between the parties in England produced them. The development of commerce was not damaged by the war. In the very heat of the strife it was calculated that the exports of England were three times as considerable as they had been a generation before. English foreign commerce, abundantly protected by ships of war, was spread over every sea; no other was to be compared to it in consequence of the Navigation Act, that of Holland was already at a disadvantage. It especially astonished foreigners how all held together; the internal trade served as a foundation for the foreign trade, while this again helped manufacture and industry without disturbing them; for example, articles of commerce, sold through half the world, were not admitted into England, lest they should damage the home manufacture. They admire the regulations of the Board of Trade, who took the mercantile world into consultation with them, but yet never lost sight of other concurrent interests; thus agriculture, which otherwise would have suffered, was encouraged by bounties on the export of corn, but yet not without the necessary reference to the home demand and the market-price of land; further, where war-time, as then, imperilled a great branch of industry, the Civil List did its best to take the specially affected province under its protection, until the coming of better times;—for example, Cornwall, through the precautions of Godolphin, who was of Cornish extraction¹. Between landed interests and commercial interests, between the counties and the towns, there was a natural opposition; but proprietors were now convinced that land and soil gain in value, in proportion as manufacture and trade flourish, and lent a ready hand to all that furthered these; if necessary, even to war. It was mainly on account of commercial interests that war was undertaken; in no political agreement were they lost sight of. The Methuen Treaty with Portugal, the acquisition of secure stations in the Mediterranean, the founding of the

¹ With Cornwall, the only part of the kingdom which had a provincial representation, a contract was concluded, by which the stock-in-hand of tin and all the produce for seven years to come were to be bought up at the expense of the Civil List.

South Sea Company, with the special commercial privileges granted to it in reference to South America, the acquisition of Hudson's Bay and Strait of Nova Scotia, are the work of this time; Annapolis perpetuates there the remembrance of the reign of Queen Anne. In Parliament the different interests of war by land and sea, as of peace, of trade, of manufacture and of landed property, were represented and made themselves heard. 'One feels,' as Bonnet says, 'that special interests are made to depend upon those of the whole community; imperceptibly a national interconnexion of all classes with one another has been formed¹.'

It is remarkable how the opposition and rivalry between the two parties, violent as they were, were nevertheless moderated by the parliamentary relations into which they mutually entered: even on the religious question political considerations brought them to an agreement.

For the majority of the English people were now decidedly Anglican, and the Whigs were at a disadvantage mainly because they were accounted opponents of this form of the Church; hence, in order to draw over to their side the great champions of the Anglican Church, they had consented to vote for the adoption of the law respecting occasional conformity. The Queen, who as she increased in years became more and more zealously attached to the Anglican doctrine, and the High Tories, at one with her in this, had further succeeded in carrying the Schism Bill, which was the severest blow the Dissenters could receive. But the Bill had not yet come into operation when the Queen died. That party had then neither the courage nor the authority to effect its being carried into execution. It was sufficient gain for them, that the politically active Presbyterians for the most part acquiesced, and that Anglicanism practically retained the upper hand. This was one of the great results of this reign, the last act of the spirit of the Stuarts in alliance with the Church on the English throne.

The literary fame of the times of Queen Anne is not due

¹ Bonnet: '*Remarques sur les terres, les manufactures, le commerce et la navigation d'Angleterre*;' sent to King Frederick I in the year 1711.

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to herself, nor to those immediately about her; it is based upon the condition of society, the great conflicting interests, above all on the parliamentary government. The party which was defeated on a great question appealed to the public; pamphlets and journals supplemented and continued the debates in Parliament, always with the idea that the debates might be taken up again, and then carried through to the desired end. This literature, the offspring of party, occupied itself with the most important questions in politics, in the Church, and in the development of mankind generally. In French literature one may observe that at different periods opposite doctrines gain the upper hand; the legitimist and Catholic under Louis XIV, the oppositional and anti-Church under Louis XV; but it is the characteristic of English literature that the two opposed tendencies come forward and contend with one another simultaneously. They are not diametrically opposed, for they both move on the basis of Protestantism, law, and the existing constitution; but yet the opposition is strong enough to produce opposite views on most branches of human thought and action. The comprehensive doctrines, and at the same time their foundation in the realm of ideas, which are distinguished by the words 'Conservative' and 'Liberal,' appear in relation to the pressing questions of the day; and both were represented by great ability. The Whig periodical press won for itself the merit of directing public attention to morality in educated society. And what incomparable controversial writings are those with which Jonathan Swift appeared upon the arena! He composed *Gulliver's Travels* in support of the Tories; the *Tale of a Tub* is a defence of the Anglican Church against Catholics and Presbyterians. The opposition of parties ran through everything; as Swift himself once said, he preached pamphlets. But, for all that, intellect was not entirely ruled by it, either in the authors themselves, or in the public. Addison's *Cato* is inspired by Whiggism, but its merits in the eyes of his contemporaries were so great, that the Tories also did not withhold their praise. The era of Shakespeare and of Milton was past. Poetry itself assumed an intellectual rather than an emotional tone; but the spirit of the age chiefly expressed

itself in that powerful and versatile, varied but pure prose, which is the peculiar product of that time.

It was an educated society, occupying itself with the largest interests, in which the most varied conceptions of the world and of life, of the state and of religion, force themselves side by side into notice, each with distinct merits of its own ; in ceaseless antagonism, not without passionate effervescence, from which, however, a higher union results.

CHAPTER III.

GEORGE I.

INTO this society, which in all essential particulars was a foreign world to him, the Elector of Hanover was now to enter as King. The hereditary right, which helped him to this, was but a very distant one ; only on account of his Protestantism was he called in, in order to maintain the Protestant parliamentary constitution, which had been established since the Revolution of 1688. The Commonwealth of England could not do without a king ; but at no price would they grant to the hereditary prince of the house of Stuart that authority, which necessarily must remain attached to the crown ; because with his Catholic predilections, he would have exercised it in a direction contrary to the established state of things. The chief reason for calling in the house of Hanover lay in this anxiety respecting the Pretender. That it came to this, in spite of a great party, which held fast to strict hereditary right, and in spite of the powerful support which such right found from time to time, was the result of the two last wars, which had been carried on with energy by the nation. It may be regarded as the final victory of the Revolution of 1688.

This was the reason why the proclamation of George I, of whom personally so little was known, so far from being regarded with indifference, was welcomed with joyful acclamations. It was reported that one or two isolated voices were vainly raised in favour of the Pretender ; but these expressions were not only suppressed by the tumultuous violence of the crowd, but provoked vengeance ; the new King was proclaimed amidst general assent throughout the British Empire and in the Colonies.

The towns and the Whigs may have had the chief share in this ; but the Tories and counties also, after having taken great part in establishing the succession, shewed all diligence. No cry of opposition was raised by the Church. The Tory Parliament, which still continued to sit, voted the Civil List of the deceased Queen undiminished to her successor, although he was a foreigner.

A reputation for moderation and love of peace preceded King George from Hanover. Many Englishmen also, who had lived there, declared that they were convinced that he would attach himself to no party, but would rather seek to root out the factions, and aim at becoming the Father of the people¹. The leading Tories did not give up the hope of maintaining themselves in the position which they actually held.

But we know that King George had long before taken the side of the Whigs. And in the agitation, which then filled the world, he would never have dared to separate himself from them. That condition of the Treaty of Utrecht, on which English and Dutch laid most value, was not yet fulfilled ; the harbour of Dunkirk, from which a swarm of cruisers had troubled the shipping of both nations, was still in no way destroyed ; and while the old canal was still in use, another was already made, in order to make Mardyck a still more convenient harbour than Dunkirk. Moreover, no agreement had yet been made between the Emperor and the States-General with regard to the Barrier ; the Dutch were not satisfied with the proposals which were made to them ; they declined to evacuate Ostend. The Tory ministry they regarded as their enemies, and believed that they intended to bring back the Pretender. For this reason Marlborough, who for some time had been staying in Holland, determined to return to England, in order to prevent all that might seem to threaten the taking possession of the throne by the Elector of Hanover. The anxiety, if not very well founded, was nevertheless very wide-spread. Friendly princes, such, for example, as King Frederick William of Prussia, had offered the

¹ I take this from a letter from Hanover of August 23, 1714, just before the departure of the King, in the Prussian Archives.

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Electors their help in acquiring the English throne. Under such circumstances how could it be supposed that George I would have seized the hand which the Tories held out to him. He would have been apprehensive of their using their official position to his detriment. The maintenance of the ideas of the Revolution at this decisive moment could not take place through those who held fast to hereditary right, and consented to its limitation only through a kind of inconsequence; but rather through those who contended for parliamentary rights and the lawfulness of infringing hereditary right. King George did not hesitate long. While still at the Hague on his way to England¹ he gave orders for the dismissal of Bolingbroke; he installed the author of the Barrier-treaty in its original form, Lord Townsend, who specially represented the alliance between Holland, Hanover, and the Whigs, as Secretary of State. At his first appearances, immediately after his arrival in England, people remarked that he received the Whigs with favour, the Tories with coldness. Then, as they went up the steps of St. James', he informed the commander of the standing army, the Duke of Ormond, that he had promised to give back the command of the troops to Marlborough. Ormond did not say a word, but instantly left the palace and the city. This made all the more impression, because Ormond had given no cause of complaint against himself personally; he was brave, liberal, popular; only his connexion with the government of the Queen could have been laid to his charge. Without loss of time the civil administration was altered in the same direction. None but the leading Whigs—Devonshire, Sunderland, Montague, Lord Halifax, Russell, Lord Orford, and Wharton, were summoned to the highest offices. Along with Townsend Lord Stanhope became Secretary of State; he had won for himself a considerable name in fighting against the Bourbon and for the Austrian dynasty in the Spanish peninsula. Among foreigners he was regarded as the Englishman who was endowed with the most universal genius; he was at once a warrior, a

¹ According to a letter of Horace Walpole's, this change was already determined on before the King left Hanover. In Coxe, Robert Walpole ii. 48.

politician, a scholar, and a good speaker. Lord Chancellor Cowper, who at the last great change in the ministry had, against Harley's wish, been turned out, and was now reinstated, tendered the King a statement respecting the relations between the two parties¹, in which he declares that the security of the dynasty depends upon its alliance with the Whigs. For, though not at present, yet the time might one day come hereafter, in which the Pretender would declare himself a Protestant, and then he would be received with joy by the Tories on the ground of their theory of Divine right. The principle of the Whigs, on the other hand, bound them to the Hanoverian succession, from which they could never separate without danger to themselves. He noted it as an error for people to suppose that the Whigs were against the prerogative of the crown; a government which held fast to the principles of the Revolution they would support with all their power in maintaining the prerogative as well as in other particulars. The advice of the Lord Chancellor was to entrust undivided authority to this party exclusively—which was forthwith carried into effect under the influence of public opinion. The Privy Council of Queen Anne was dissolved, and a new and much less numerous one formed, from which all members of the former ministry were excluded. Nottingham, the champion of the Church, found a place in it as an ally of the Whigs. The commanders of the naval stations and the members of the government of Ireland were nominated in the same way.

The original plan had been, in certain branches, such as the Admiralty and the Treasury, to preserve the talent suited to the administration of each, even when it had hitherto belonged to the other party. But this party also was unanimous and determined to hold together. On each of these attempts the King received an answer declining the post. It made a great impression when men, who had worked for the succession of the house of Hanover, such as the Speaker Hanmer, refused to take part in the new ministry even in lucrative posts. No Tory would consent to serve under Halifax or Orford; none would have dared to do it without

¹ Impartial history of parties, in Campbell's Chancellors v. 857

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for ever breaking with his party. Although in the formation of any ministry under William III and Queen Anne it had been the custom, while giving the preponderance to one of the two parties, to reserve for the other a share in the exercise of power, at the accession of the house of Hanover this proved to be impossible. The preference which the new King had shewn for the Whigs, had for its consequence a complete alienation of the Tories. A Whig combination, such as that against which Queen Anne had kept on her guard with such great and persevering energy, was accepted by George I on his first entry upon the government.

This was not in accordance with the nature of the English constitution; the old Whig Lord Somers, so far as we know, disapproved of it. But a foreign Prince on entering a country will always have his own policy. The parties were more violent than ever against one another; to reconcile them was an impossibility; to hesitate between them might easily have been most perilous to the King, who possessed no undoubted claim to the throne, nor had any root in the country. If he wished to remain at the helm with his dynasty, he must ally himself with one of the national parties and gain the upper hand for it. George I had long since sided with the Whig party, and he held fast to it.

That the Pretender bestirred himself and in a proclamation, in which he claimed his rights, inserted the statement, that he had had grounds for counting on the good-will of the deceased Queen, was of great service to the new government. For thereby the suspicion, that she had had an understanding with him, seemed to be confirmed. The conviction, that England must have a thoroughly Protestant government, gained fresh ground. All that for the last century and a half had been said against the Pope, all the repugnance to foreign influence over the contests between internal parties in England, to which expression had so often been given, now fell upon the head of the Pretender. The appeal, in which at the elections (which came on in the beginning of the year 1715) the government called attention to the interests of Protestantism, had produced its full effect.

Hitherto the Tories had made use of the danger, to which

the Anglican Church was exposed through the predominance of the Whigs, as an effective cry in their canvassing at the elections. But nothing was to be gained by it now, Nottingham having joined the Whigs, and the Occasional Conformity Bill being passed.

The Bank and the mercantile companies were in any case for the Whigs; every rumour in favour of the Pretender made the funds fall.

And now, in addition to this, came the direct influence of the government. There is a remarkable passage in Lord Cowper's statement, in which he declares, that it is in the King's power to win for the party which he might favour the upper hand at the elections also; so manifold were the advantages, which he could offer to his followers, that he might always count upon their constant support¹.

All these influences worked together to produce a favourable result for the new King and his government; the elections favoured the Whigs. Here and there, for example, in London, the body of electors put forth declarations, in which they protested in particular against the recent peace, and the negotiating it without the allies.

As soon as Parliament assembled (March 17, 1715), the chief attention was directed precisely to this particular, in which internal and external circumstances, European difficulties and party questions, were alike involved.

King George, in the speech from the throne, which the Lord Chancellor read in his presence, did not neglect to promise to observe the constitution established in Church and state; he spoke of his ascending the throne of his ancestors, but was thankful at the same time for the acceptance of the Protestant succession; he called special attention to the fact, that the Peace did not satisfy the just expectations which England might have cherished, moreover had been

¹ 'The generality of the world [in England] is so much in love with the advantages a King of Great Britain has to bestow without the least exceeding the bounds of law, that 'tis wholly in your Majesty's power, by showing your favour in due time (before the elections) to one or other of them [the parties], to give which of them you please a clear majority in all succeeding Parliaments.' Campbell, *The Lives of the Lord Chancellors* iv. 428.

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by no means carried into effect, and stood in need of further securities; for the Pretender was staying very close at hand, in Lorraine, and was issuing threatening declarations.

The sketch of the address, which the Upper House presented in answer to this speech, was not merely written altogether in the same strain, but expressed it still more strongly. It said, that they hoped the King would be placed in a position to carry into effect what had been agreed to in the articles of the Treaty; to annihilate the hopes of the Pretender, and to re-establish the reputation of the country on the continent, the loss of which would then not be ascribed to the whole nation. Just as if in fact it had been lost. A similar hint had been given with respect to the previous government when Queen Anne entered upon her reign; it was now flung back in the faces of the Tories by the Whigs with a view to a still stronger effect. Shrewsbury called attention to the unseemliness of these mutual recriminations; the members of the old Privy Council and of the former ministry protested against the calumny on the late Queen which was implied; Bolingbroke undertook her vindication in the most energetic manner, but without obtaining any success; just the very clause which was in the highest degree damaging to him was carried by a larger majority. Still more threatening were the proceedings in the Lower House. The leading members declared, that the memory of the Queen could be cleared only by calling to account the evil counsellors, who had led her to adopt such ruinous measures, and by punishing them¹. The recent peace was the subject chiefly alluded to in this; it was condemned without qualification in both Houses. Bolingbroke confessed to it, and even counted it an honour to himself, to have contributed the most towards the peace; 'from me,' he once said, 'emanated the instructions, the documents presented, and the letters;' he thought that it was intended to seal the alliances forming against the peace with his blood. But the joyous, witty Bolingbroke, accustomed to and needing a brilliant social activity or position for the sustenance of his wit, and hoping

¹ Parliamentary History vii. 46, 50.

still to play a great part in the world, was not born to be a martyr. In danger of being attacked by his deadly enemies, and thrown for his defence upon the assistance of his old colleagues, who hated him scarcely less than his foes, and that too before a House of Commons, in which the opposite party had the upper hand, he considered it not only prudent but imperative to leave England. He betook himself, as for long time past so many of those conquered in the strife of factions had done, to France. In England people were really glad to be rid of him. After the peace negotiations had been subjected to investigation by a committee for the most part composed of Whigs, and the very detailed and able report on them—a masterpiece of party strategy by Robert Walpole¹—had been sent in (June 9, 1715), there followed proceedings against Bolingbroke for high treason, and that under a Bill of Attainder, so that the duty of trying him fell to the House of Commons, in which the majority were opposed to the late ministry. A similar charge was lodged against Harley and Stafford, and they were taken to the Tower. It created still greater excitement that the Earl of Ormond also was accused; for he enjoyed universal respect and had done great service; his popularity was ruinous to him, but at the last moment he managed to come off scatheless. A system of reaction and revenge commenced, of which it was predicted in the Upper House at the time, that it would make the sceptre tremble in the hand of the King.

Lately in possession of an overwhelming authority, and now not merely robbed of it but threatened with bloody execution by their opponents, how could the Tories (who believed that the bulk of the nation was on their side) fail to be in a state of effervescence, and now in their turn also to embrace the principles and the system of resistance? For the succession of the house of Hanover had been accepted and confirmed by them, and even introduced by them in so far as the Peace, the concluding of which was now attributed to them as a crime, had contributed to enable the new King to take possession of his throne; they had met him with

¹ Report from the Committee of Secrecy. P. H. vii. App. I.

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loyal recognition; and yet a faction hostile to them and dangerous to the country had got possession of him. This faction intended nothing more nor less than (what it had failed to accomplish in 1710) to set up the authority of a junta, which could no longer be brought under the supervision or control of the sovereign; the Whigs were always telling the King, that he was indebted to them alone for his power, and that by renewing the war they would win for him a high position in Europe; but the nation could gain no advantage from this; for this purpose a standing army would be required, which, under an ambitious and unprincipled general, could not be other than fatal to the country. Excessive burdens would again be laid upon landed property, and the Anglican Church would be visited with fatal oppression; for men might say what they pleased, the constant aim of the party was to introduce comprehension, to confiscate the bishoprics, and to set up an ecclesiastical Babel of all sects; Nottingham, who did not desire that, was no true Whig; what would not the rest be able to accomplish under a King who could have no affection for the English Church? And this anxiety about the Church gained ground once more in the nation. With the names of the accused, as they drove through the city, the populace of London coupled a cheer for the English Church. But besides this the motive, which came from a sense of the necessity of peace, was very powerful; the repugnance to a standing army rose up afresh; a general feeling of uneasiness took possession of the country. The thought was conceived of opposing the introduction of a standing army and any interference with the English Church by means of a popular demonstration.

If then a faction, which, according to these representations, was threatening the liberties of the country, a faction whose power was based chiefly on its alliance with the new dynasty, were to be overthrown, while this dynasty itself enjoyed no personal sympathy in England,—for neither the King nor the Prince of Wales developed qualities which were calculated to make them popular,—what could have appeared

¹ Advice to the freeholders—*attributed* to Atterbury; in Somers Tracts xiii.

more natural than to invite over the representative of the old dynasty and boldly to set up his standard? In earlier times this would have happened under similar circumstances. But in the eighteenth century, as has been noticed, the legitimist feeling was dead, never to rise again; the Tories were no Cavaliers. The attachment to the monarchy and the dynasty, which the Restoration produced, had been broken by the secession of the last King to Catholicism; but to Catholicism the Pretender also held fast. Religious conviction drove loyalty out of men's minds. We learn with certainty, that the Tories determined not to bring the name of the Pretender into connexion with their cause¹.

But what the party as a whole avoided, the leader who had gone over to France undertook with reckless courage. The nomination of Shrewsbury in the last days of Queen Anne had already roused in him and his friends the intention of going to any extremities to secure themselves against the Whigs, and of setting on foot an alliance with the Pretender, which hitherto had presented itself only as a remote possibility. Not as if Bolingbroke entertained any strong legitimist feeling—his way of thinking all his life was in the opposite direction—with the circle of Catholic devotees round the young Prince he could never be on good terms. But he was a man who had no scruples about throwing a whole kingdom into confusion and perplexity, if by that means he could obtain the high position, which he flattered himself that he could fill successfully. In order to keep the Whigs at a distance, he had concluded peace with France; in order to overthrow them, he espoused the cause of the Pretender. He did not wait till the Act of Attainder was passed against him; is it an error or an excuse, that he says so himself? Some time before this he appears with the title of Secretary of State, and designates James III as his King. He considered that the only way of regaining power for the Tories, even without their express consent. Bolingbroke relied on the

¹ 'To have a general rising declaring for the Church against the Whigs and a standing army, without making mention of the Pretender or any king' Lord Stair in Hardwicke's State Papers II 548

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political combinations called into existence by himself, he hoped to win over Louis XIV and the Bourbon court of Spain, and at the same time the Duke of Orleans also, who was fixed upon in France for the regency; if he could only throw a few thousand men into England, he thought that he could compass the overthrow of the government; he was sanguine in his hopes to a degree that only an exile can reach. He even united himself with Charles XII, who at that time had returned to Pomerania, and was much disturbed at the succession of King George to the English throne, as the latter was a dangerous rival for the possession of Bremen and Verden

But in all this there lay from first to last a gross misconception. Closely as Bolingbroke may have joined himself to zealous Churchmen, he was for all that an enemy of all positive religion; he became one of the patriarchs of Deism in the aristocratic society of Europe; of the inner power of the religious idea he had no conception. That the Tories would decline the opportunity of defeating the supremacy of the Whigs, because the Prince who offered it to them was a Catholic, never entered into his calculations. But he very soon found it out.

In England the alliance of Bolingbroke with the Pretender had exactly the opposite effect to that which he had expected. As soon as news came that an attempt was contemplated, such as had been made in the years 1690 and 1696, every one rallied round the King. The supporters of the late ministry vied with the Whigs in their demonstrations of loyalty¹. Even Convocation came to the side of the King of the house of Hanover; the clergy promised to use their influence to instil into the people that support of the government was a matter of conscience; for the ground-principle of the English Church was obedience and loyalty. The government was armed with strong means of repression. There was an old Act, according to which every meeting of more than twelve persons could be dissolved by proclamation, and if

¹ So Bonnet July 22 / August 2: 'Le roi a repris son autorité, les deux partis se sont réunies pour le soutenir.'

this was resisted, punishment could be inflicted for a breach of the peace, it had fallen into oblivion since the time of Queen Elizabeth; now it was furbished up and made still more stringent; it has since then ever been ascribed to George I. The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended; the further detention of old conspirators of the time of William III was enacted. The two parties saw in the Pretender a common foe. It was decreed, that if the young man who called England his own, should set foot on English ground, a reward of £100,000 should be given to whosoever should deliver him up dead or alive. Measures were once more adopted against the son of James II, which that King had formerly used against Monmouth. The success was this time even still more complete. Among the friends of Bolingbroke after his flight William Windham held the first place; he was arrested, but escaped; his giving himself up after all only proved that he found it impossible to accomplish anything. Bolingbroke saw that it was so. When Ormond, who had been obliged to fly to France, and had joined the Pretender, appeared on the coast of Devonshire in the hope of finding things ready for an outbreak, he had to learn that his friends were either dispersed or in prison. In the South and West of England all remained in the profoundest quiet.

It was of the greatest value and influence at this crisis, that the government could count with absolute confidence upon the troops. These were the very regiments which had carried on the war on the continent, and with the greatest unwillingness had seen themselves stopped in their victorious course by the Tories. The transfer of the command to Ormond had been most displeasing to them; Marlborough's return to them they greeted with joy. The attempt of the late ministry to remove officers whom it disliked, and generally to call into existence another spirit in the army¹, had only strengthened the troops in their Whig bearing. Marlborough now took up the cause of the foreign officers also, especially of the French emigrants, in the parliamentary debates, and with complete success; for himself he maintained the right,

¹ Letter from Stair to Marlborough. Hardwicke Papers i 528.

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which was disputed, of fixing and changing the quarters of the army according to the requirements of the moment. His influence and authority, which to the Queen had seemed intolerable, were of service to the King.

From a letter of Bolingbroke's, in September 1715, one gathers that at that time he was already convinced in his own mind of the hopelessness of his undertaking; he had the whole weight of the government, the legislature, the army, and the fleet against him; and the government could count on help from Holland, Hanover, and Germany; while every source of help was closed to him¹.

The chief fact was, that those attached to the Pretender in England were neither strong enough to accomplish anything, nor courageous enough to undertake anything for him without strong support to fall back upon. Among the Tories, those who were attached to the established system in Church and state, of which each individual felt himself to be a part, formed the great majority.

In Scotland, on the other hand,—where this system had not struck such deep root, and where the natural unqualified affection for a King of their own stock, who at the same time represented the long established independence of the country, was not rooted out of their minds,—things came once more to the open outbreak of an insurrection. Erskine, Earl of Mar, under the Tories Secretary of State for Scotland, and under George I deprived of this post, suddenly appeared, in the midst of a considerable number of Scottish nobles, as general to the King of the house of Stuart, in order, as he said, to re-establish the old free and independent constitution under the rightful and native king. Once more it came to the Highlanders raising the shield in the old style. When in their first serious engagement with the government troops one of their leaders fell, the same Glengarry², who had already fought under Dundee, stepped out of the ranks, and waving his bonnet over his head, raised the Highland cry

¹ Bolingbroke to Mar, Sept. 20, in Mahon's History of England, i App. p xxii.

² So General Wightman's report in Tindal; the Earl of Mar, in his report of the battle, ascribes the call for vengeance to himself.

for vengeance; he succeeded on this occasion also in utterly routing the far weaker enemy, as at Killiecrankie. A rabble of Scottish troops pushed across the border and took up a firm position at Preston, where it thought it might look for reinforcements, not only out of the northern, but also out of the southern provinces. But the experience of former times repeated itself on this occasion also. Where a real danger appeared, as for example at Carlisle, the moderate Tories united with the Whigs to avert it; the risings of the Jacobite party were kept in check by an armed force. And the regular troops were far superior to the disorderly bravery of the insurgents. To the united forces of General Willis' infantry which had come over from Ireland, and the dragoons which had advanced from Northumberland, the Scots at Preston could offer no serious resistance; they were compelled to lay down their arms; all the High Tories and Jacobites who had joined them, 75 Englishmen and 143 Scots of rank, fell into the hands of their political foes. In Scotland itself the cause once more received a certain amount of impulse, when, towards the end of the year, the Pretender himself appeared there in person. His appearance in the manner and fashion of his forefathers aroused the national sympathies; on the 27th of January he was crowned at Scone as James VIII amidst the hopeful support of the national chiefs. And now the auxiliary force from Sweden ought to have met him. But shortly before, in September, the Swedish fleet was attacked in the waters of Rugen by a fleet of English line-of-battle ships, which bore the Danish flag, united with the Danish, and completely disabled. Charles XII could no longer maintain himself there, and how could he help the Pretender? The naval captain, Christophers, who was to have transported the Swedish auxiliary force to Scotland, had now with his cutter to bring the King across from Stralsund to Sweden¹. Nor from any other quarter did the Pretender obtain any help worth mentioning. On the other hand, the Dutch did not delay to accede to the demand of the English government that they would send help in

¹ Cp. Fryxell's *Biography of Charles XII*, iv. 17; v. 31

accordance with the treaty, merely stipulating that in the meantime Hanoverian troops should take the place of those that went away, as the Brandenburg troops had done in 1688. It was only a force of 6000 men that marched from Berwick into Scotland in January 1716, under the command of General Cadogan. But their arrival was in the highest degree opportune, for there was reason to doubt the steadfastness of the supporters of the government in Scotland. Their advance was of itself quite enough to put an end to Scottish particularism. As his father had fled before from Ireland, so now the son fled from Scotland, each believing that his cause still had a future. Those were lucky who could escape either with him or after him. The Highlanders went back to their mountains and dispersed.

It is certain that the bearing of Parliament, the English Church, and the bulk of the nation constituted an insuperable obstacle to the plans of the Pretender. The system now established maintained itself unshaken under the new King. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied, that there were movements in the opposite direction, even in England; when the Scots advanced to Preston legitimist feeling welled up in Oxford. The victory of the government was for the most part decided by force of arms; in England by the troops formed in the late war, in Scotland by the auxiliary force which had come over from Holland under trustworthy leaders. The great European alliance, on which the Whigs founded their foreign policy, rendered them powerful service in the establishment of their supremacy within the nation itself

Bolingbroke had wished to oppose them with a counter-alliance; but this it was proved could not possibly be effected. And he himself had so little in common with the Pretender's point of view, that he was dismissed from the latter's court. Threatened with death in England, he found himself on the other side of the Channel compelled to defend himself against a charge of misconduct.

As is always the case, the unsuccessful attack on the government of George I made it doubly strong.

Of conciliatory measures little was heard; nothing was talked of but ejectments, and confiscations, imprisonment

and execution ; the Executive brought the vengeance of the law to bear without mercy upon the renegades.

Two noblemen had to pay with their lives for having considered the young Prince, about whose legitimacy no one doubted any longer, as their rightful King. It is not for their own sake that we dwell on the measures of repression, calamitous in any case ; the circumstance had other consequences of a legislative kind, which have been of the greatest importance for the constitution and its further modelling. Let us consider above all the Act, on which it was intended mainly to found the security of the system which had triumphed, the law about the times of holding elections to Parliament.

Much could be said in favour of a long duration of Parliament. The chief argument is the ceaseless agitation which besets a nation through frequent elections ; for, as was said at the time, the educated classes, even the clergy, were thereby withdrawn from their proper calling. Another argument lay in the uncertainty with regard to foreign relations which is the result of frequent change. We must admit, however, that neither these nor other reasons were decisive ; what was so was the state of ferment existing at the moment. The Tories and the Episcopalians had in general not taken part in the cause of the Pretender ; but still they were discontented withal, and had no wish to prolong the rule of the Whigs. They armed themselves with eagerness for the coming elections, in which they hoped to put an end to the Whig majority. The leading Whigs took counsel how to prevent such an occurrence, through which the whole position would have been made doubtful. In a meeting at the house of the Duke of Devonshire they came to the conclusion, that not only a longer duration of Parliament ought to be decreed, but that this also should apply at once to the Parliament then sitting. Certainly there was much to be said against it. The Parliament was elected for three years ; what right had it to prolong its own duration ? and could not the same thing be repeated ? All election would then be at an end. But besides all this, henceforth the members could no longer be regarded as the representatives of the nation ; they would not be able to claim any obedience for their decrees ; they would

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be a self-constituted power. Very much the same objection had been made long ago, when the Convention was changed into a Parliament. Unanswerable in itself, it was nevertheless driven into the back-ground owing to the excitement of the moment. People supposed, or could suppose, that new elections would bring numerous friends of the Pretender into Parliament. The cause of the Jacobites, said the Duke of Newcastle, has never been more unsuccessful; they have been beaten in the open field; they and their King have been driven out of Scotland; but the party to-day is still as insolent as ever, and seeks to keep men's minds in commotion; it thinks at a new election to win back everything;—my Lords, he exclaimed, you must strengthen yourselves and disarm your enemies¹. In the Lower House Richard Steele mentioned the plea, that the change was a breach of trust; he answered, that the trust, which was placed in Parliament, was for the welfare of the country. He renewed the complaints which the former Parliament had incurred of having broken its word, the disgrace which it had thereby called down upon the nation. Now also a restless faction was thinking of uniting with foreign foes, and by means of a new election of causing the prison doors to be thrown open and traitors to be placed at the head of English affairs; this expectation kept Jacobitism alive; by the proposed measure it would be cut off at the roots.

At the commencement even the Whigs had been in many cases against the Bill; they had declaimed against it in the coffee-houses; but it seemed to be necessary to prove to the people, that there existed a supreme power in England, which could abrogate laws no less than give them, and which had the maintenance of the country as its chief object.

The Bill passed through both Houses by a great majority, so that Parliament continued for a succession of years such as it proceeded from the crisis; a firm foundation was laid for the rule already commenced².

Without much hesitation the conditions were transgressed,

¹ Parliamentary History vii 300.

² Moyle to Horace Walpole, in Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole* (ed 1798) ii. 62. The majority had about two-thirds of the votes, in the Commons 276 to 136, the second time 261 to 121; in the Lords 69 to 36.

under which the succession of the house of Hanover had been confirmed chiefly through the influence of the Tories, who wished to found on it a constitutional government in their own sense. When George I thought it necessary to go to Germany in the year 1716, this was in contradiction to an article of the Act of Settlement, and the Whig ministers had some hesitation in consenting to it; but Parliament did not make the least objection; it repealed the clause without opposition. In the first Tory pamphlets no grievance was so strongly expressed as these;—that the settlement had been put out of sight, and that Parliament had been prolonged; both these took place without their being able to hinder it. The saying of Cowper's proved true:—by his alliance with the Whigs the King had obtained greater authority than the Tories had thought of assigning to him.

The Church also received a blow from the attempts of the Pretender. In a demonstration in his favour some Nonjurors were involved; they died, as they said, in the faith of the orthodox fathers, who had been deprived by the Prince of Orange; now once more they were for realising the idea of a Church not dependent on Parliament. Thereupon an Anglican Bishop, Hoadley of Bangor, answered with a declaration, which placed the conception of an invisible Church so strongly in the foreground, that the rights of the Church as a visible institution became very doubtful. Between these two extreme tendencies, of which the one was connected with the doctrine of divine right, the other with that of national sovereignty, there raged a lively controversy, but of too theological and doctrinal import to have caused an actual disturbance at that time in England¹.

Hoadley is of importance, inasmuch as he again gave life to latitudinarianism; men of that school were then in favour at court and were preferred for promotion².

A real difficulty for the government was created by the movements among the Dissenters. They had furthered the

¹ Cp. the carefully written article on the Bangorian controversy in Perry, *History of the Church of England* iii. 283.

² Tindal v 524.

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succession of the house of Hanover with all their might, and expected in return a lightening of their burdens and disabilities. Two or three dissenting members of Parliament, who happened to meet in a tavern, agreed that something must be done; they brought their special friends to the place, and these brought others; gradually a very numerous company came together, and engaged to carry the thing through in Parliament. As was to be expected, they refused to live under the Occasional Conformity Act and the dangers which arose out of the Schism Act; they demanded the abolition of the sacramental oath, which the Anglicans under William III had not allowed to be taken from them. The King and the ministry were very well disposed towards the Dissenters, but to comply with their request was a matter for anxious consideration. The repeal of the Act, which indeed had never been put into execution, and the revision of the Occasional Conformity Act could offer no serious difficulties now that public affairs had taken a complete turn, but the abrogation of the sacramental oath might call up animosities again, as in the time of Sacheverell. Nottingham, who hitherto had exerted his influence to ensure the submission of the Anglicans, but on account of the late condemnations (of the Jacobites), which he did not approve, had withdrawn from the ministry, belonged once more to the Opposition, and would have thrown his weight on the other side. Sunderland, who on other occasions was frightened by no difficulty, declared that such a demand might ruin everything. The King said to the dissenting Lord Barington, he hoped the Dissenters were too good friends of his to press a demand which might be infinitely detrimental to him¹.

In the debates it was seen how little even the most moderate lords, temporal no less than spiritual, were inclined to relinquish the old institutions, which they regarded as the bulwarks of the Anglican Church. The Dissenters have always declared that they retreated of their own free will. Even the Occasional Conformity Act was only partially repealed; some enactments of it were maintained.

¹ Tindal v. Calamy.

It is the special characteristic of these proceedings, that, while the Whigs had the upper hand in the state, in the Church, on the contrary, the principles of the Tories, if not fully carried out, nevertheless prevailed on the whole. This is connected with the fact, that little by little the ecclesiastical point of view retired into the background, and the principles of the sovereignty of the people and of divine right occupied men's minds without the intermingling of these ecclesiastical considerations. The opposition of parties was not abolished, there was not much talk of an approximation; but the government which had been instituted stood and could make itself secure.

But to this there was also added a satisfactory attitude in European relations.

It looked as if the Peace of Utrecht, the concluding of which had been urged as a capital offence against the Tory ministry, would shortly be broken again. The standing dispute about the razing of Dunkirk, though often discussed, was not yet settled; while the French held fast to its being interpreted in a modified sense, the English stood out for its being fully and strictly carried out. In the uneasy excitement, which prevailed among the European powers on this account, there was no longer any thought of an understanding between the Emperor and France; but rather of a renewed alliance of England and Holland with the Emperor. In sketching this out objection was taken to a confirmation of the Peace of Utrecht. For the Emperor Charles VI was far from giving up the claims of his house to the lands of the Spanish succession; on these grounds he himself disapproved of the now Spanish line of the house of Bourbon renouncing the French succession, as was stipulated in the Treaty; for the one involved the other, and the full carrying out of the Treaty would for ever have withdrawn from him the support of England. The Whigs, who had so suddenly come into the possession of power, seemed to be obliged to take up the policy again, in which they had been interrupted by the sudden rise of their opponents.

But after a little deliberation they were convinced that this might be in the highest degree perilous to them. For the

nation in general was for peace. They were not for one moment willing to see the taxes doubled, and their whole position rendered uncertain. In this connexion also the wishes of the Tories and the interests of the land-owners must be considered, they must not be driven to extremities. The Chevalier de St. George, as the Pretender was called, was not altogether discouraged by his defeat; even after that he exerted himself very energetically; news came of his alliance with Sweden and Spain; it was thought that France would support him, in order to compel the English court to counter-preparations and to keep the people excited¹.

Extravagant as it might be, yet the declaration was repeatedly made at the various courts of Europe, that it only needed an army of 10,000 men to hunt King George I out of England. At any rate there is no doubt that the Regent, had he liked, might have put the greatest difficulties in the King's way.

But was that to his own advantage? Certainly not. He would thus have furthered the realisation of the new alliance, in which the maintenance of the succession of the Spanish Bourbons in France was one of the chief points. But we know how important their exclusion was for him and his house. The best prospects of the house of Orleans depended on the Peace of Utrecht being carried out and fulfilled.

Often since the commencement of the regency, and even before that, people had talked of the identity of the interests of King George and of the Duke of Orleans: the King's ambassador, Lord Stair, had mentioned it in more than one secret interview with the confidants of the Duke, and with the Duke himself; and yet he was but little pleased with what he had accomplished; and still less pleased were people in England. The Regent always made excellent promises; but his conduct so little corresponded to them, that the general conviction was that he favoured and supported the Pretender.

But now that this new alliance was in progress, he dared

¹ As Bonnet says: 'à chagriner les peuples contre la cour par les dépens où la rébellion les jette.'

not hold back any longer. Without first acquainting his official ministry, which had not yet broken with the policy of Louis XIV, he sent in the summer of 1716 his confidant, the Abbé Dubois, to the Hague, where George I and his Secretary of State, Stanhope, arrived just at that time, in order to open a final discussion of the proposals for a close alliance, of which Lord Stair had spoken, for the present and the future. Between Stanhope and Dubois there existed an old confidential relation, which was based upon similar views respecting the principles of European politics; Dubois found a good reception, and followed the English court to Hanover, where he lived in Stanhope's house, so that their intercourse with one another (for who knew Dubois in Hanover?) could remain wholly unremarked.

The Duke of Orleans offered two things, which were of the greatest importance to England; first, a definite separation from the Pretender, so that he even promised not to allow him so much as to be in Avignon, but to cause his removal to Italy; and secondly, to put an end to all the objections which had been raised against the razing of Dunkirk and Mardyck, and thus to carry out the Peace of Utrecht thoroughly¹.

And to this compact Stanhope agreed. He remarked that England certainly might undertake the war, which was in prospect, that she might fight one or two successful campaigns, and perhaps make some conquests; but the nation would not hold them; huge sums of money would be spent without result: on the other hand, if the treaty which had been concluded was thoroughly carried out, the nation would be satisfied. On the whole Stanhope judged that an alliance with France was the most advantageous which England could conclude; united with one another, the two powers would be in a position to dictate laws to all the rest.

Thus it happened that Stanhope and Dubois, George I and the Regent, came to a definite understanding. The declarations in favour of the succession of the house of Hanover in England were united with the establishment of the line of

¹ Correspondence and Reports in Sevclinges' *Mémoires* du Cardinal Dubois 1
184 ff

Orleans as heirs to the throne in France ; and the amount of help was fixed which each party was to render to the other in order to maintain their respective rights, and to put down internal rebellion.

What a contrast to the past ! While Louis XIV had done everything to ruin the Protestant succession, the Regent, who succeeded him at the helm of the state, pledged himself to maintain it ; and this in return for a similar pledge on the part of England, which likewise ran counter to the strict idea of hereditary right. The two Princes, who belonged to the Palatinate family by relationship (for the Regent through his mother was great-nephew of the Electress, from whom the succession of the house of Hanover sprang), forthwith gained very great authority in Europe by concluding this close understanding. Unwillingly and hesitatingly the States-General consented to the confirmation of the Peace of Utrecht. The Triple Alliance, which was now entered upon, was in its basis the opposite of that which had been intended.

For Stanhope and Sunderland, who likewise had come to Hanover, the transaction had further the personal result, that they thereby freed themselves from the superior influence which Townsend and Walpole possessed in the cabinet, and by which they felt themselves kept under. The former received, the latter requested, his dismissal. In England this was ascribed to the influence of the Hanoverian ministry, which aimed at having the conduct of all affairs¹, especially to Bernstorff's, who wished to have a finger in everything, and to the cupidity of the women about the King, which was not satisfied by the ministry in England. And it is certainly true, that Stanhope and Sunderland entered far more into King George's relations with Germany and the North, than the English ministry thought advisable. In this these two united with Bernstorff, who possessed the full confidence of the King, and who in return assisted them by his influence. But this doubled the indignation of the rest of the English ministry and of a large party in Parliament. For,

¹ As Bonnet, January 1, 1717, says: 'Que le ministère allemand aspire à une supériorité sur les ministres Anglois'

said they, the influence of a German ministry in England was intolerable; they must hold fast to the original arrangement, that England was to be involved in no war for the interests of Hanover. The others replied, that at any rate the people of England would not expose their King to the insults of foreigners, that it could not allow him to be oppressed¹.

The course of events had made the question inevitable,—how far the Hanoverian relations of the King of England should or should not have a leading influence in English politics. Even in the party of the Whigs there was a division on this point.

At first the principle of taking part in the most lively manner in Hanoverian politics had the upper hand. The English supported Hanover in acquiring Bremen and Verden; for they did not wish to see the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe in the hands of the Swedes or of the Danes, who, whenever troubles again arose, would disturb their trade, especially with Hamburg; they held it to be for their own advantage that these lands should come into the hands of their King. Just as little was the supremacy of Russia in the Baltic pleasing to them. They adopted the cause of Sweden, after it had once given way on the main point, against that of Russia, and have always taken the credit to themselves of having hindered the Czar Peter from getting possession of the Sound. In all these transactions the French also took part. Without a good understanding between the two powers this would have been impossible.

When then in the South the Spaniards attempted to overthrow the Peace of Utrecht, at any rate with regard to what had been arranged respecting Italian affairs, the Emperor was induced to let fall his objections to the Treaty and join the alliance of the three powers, which in itself was not to his mind. Thereupon George I, in conjunction with Holland,

¹ Sunderland remarks in a letter to Townsend, dated Nov. 11, 1716: 'As if the parliament was not to concern themselves in anything that happens in these parts of the world, which he looks upon not only as exposing him to all kinds of affronts, but even to ruin' Coxe, Robert Walpole ii. 128.

A D. 1716.

mediated the Peace between the Emperor and the Turks at Passarowitz to the advantage of the house of Austria; and in conjunction with France regulated Italian affairs, so far regarding the wishes of the Spanish court, that the inheritance of Parma and Piacenza was ensured to the house of Farnese. This solution of the difficulty was sketched out by Dubois and Stanhope in personal conferences, accepted by the Emperor, and at last approved by the Spaniards also, when they saw the determined purpose of the allies.

It is scarcely worth while to mention the counter-efforts which from time to time were made by Spain, Sweden, or Russia, in favour of the Pretender; they are lost in the great course of events.

It was one great system, which embraced Europe; George I assumed the position, which formerly William III had held after the Peace of Ryswick; without being able to compare with him in merit, he, nevertheless, had even the advantage over him in this, that he had not to contend with Bourbon ambition, but could count upon the assistance of France.

As in most cases, so also in this, personal and public motives were interwoven in the closest way. The analogous interests of the Regent of France and the King of England were handled by their chief counsellors, the Abbé Dubois and General Stanhope, in their confidential tête-à-têtes, were brought into unison and fully provided for in a series of treaties which embraced the whole of Europe. The Regent and Dubois, Stanhope and Sunderland, hardy natures that nothing could deter, were always ready for something fresh; no sooner emerging than they sought to turn the favourable moment to account without thought of consequences; they involved themselves on both sides of the Channel in financial undertakings, which then caused general confusion. In the midst of them appeared the Hanoverian minister, Bernstorff, who, being in possession of the fullest confidence of George I, and at that time the soul of his cabinet, exercised an influence unique of its kind, in which the situation of the moment was represented; a Hanoverian minister, who thought to rule Europe in consequence of the position of his master in

England and in Germany, and of his master's influence on affairs in the East and West¹.

Against Sweden and Russia he had grasped the general interests of Germany in the most masterly way; but the rise of Prussia did not suit him; all was to emanate from Hanover. The English found that he mixed far too much in their internal affairs; there he first aroused opposition to Hanoverian rule; by the German ministers his imperious lust for power was detested: the old man had the reputation of thinking himself infallible.

The names of the Regent and of his Abbé were specially remembered for their immorality, those of Stanhope and Sunderland for their arbitrary bearing among their party. An unexpected and early death carried off all of them within a short time of one another. For awhile they had lorded it over Europe, and had impressed the marks of their rule indelibly on the great European commonwealth.

The division which Sunderland and Stanhope introduced among the Whigs is of importance, inasmuch as it prevented the full carrying out of the plans of the party. Sunderland had a project for limiting the power of the crown still further, by making the number of members in the Upper House fixed, and allowing no nomination without a vacancy. Thus encroachments like the late one under Queen Anne, would be impossible; and the aristocracy, especially of the Whig party, which at that time formed the majority in the Upper House, would obtain a kind of independence with respect to the crown. In this plan the spirit of the junta breathed. But Robert Walpole was not willing to restrict the supreme power so much. And besides, a man ought to be able to attain to the highest honour, not only over the grave of his ancestors, but also by his own merit. The Whig commoners also wished to keep this prospect before them. The prevailing confusion in money matters caused Walpole to return to the administration of the finances, in which his strength lay, and for which he was indispensable.

¹ According to Stanhope he would have endeavoured, in 1714, to partition Prussia in favour of Hanover and Austria.

After Stanhope's death Lord Townsend again became Secretary of State; he succeeded in turning Lord Carteret, who regarded himself as the successor of Sunderland and Stanhope, out of the ministry. Townsend also brought about the disgrace of the aged Bernstorff in Hanover, and introduced a better understanding with Prussia. On the other hand he held fast on his part to a close union with France; for on this depended the peace of Europe.

This was once more shattered, when in a most unexpected way the Emperor Charles VI made an alliance with the Spanish court, in order to oppose their special interests to the authority of the two Western powers. Townsend answered with an alliance between England, France, and Prussia, which was applauded in England. It was a fresh advantage to the King, that mention was also made of the Pretender by the enemy, and stress could be laid on Protestant interests. Parliament, frightened out of its quietude, declared most emphatically for him and his policy. Three fleets were fitted out, one to maintain the maritime position which had been won in the West Indies, a second to do the same on the coast of Spain and in the Mediterranean, the strongest to maintain the relations established in the Baltic. Of success there could be no doubt; and yet it was still unattained and all was yet in fermentation, when George I, on his way to Germany, was suddenly carried off by a stroke of apoplexy.

Many had predicted of George I that his inclination to absolute rule would make him incapable of accommodating himself to a parliamentary commonwealth. If this was not fulfilled, the reason of it lay in this, that under him a tranquil reign was never actually attained. His life was passed in the contests necessary to taking possession of the throne or resulting from it. Just that firm and decided will, which he brought with him to the conduct of business, contributed to give the predominance to the party to which he united himself. As he had need of them, so had they of him, even of his independent power, of his connexion with Holland, of his influence with that republic. To this extent the reign of George I is of great importance. He brought England into closer contact with continental interests even than William III, and at the same time gave to

the principles of the Revolution of 1688, in their relation to the monarchy and the crown, a more decided expression than they had hitherto received. He himself remained unaffected by them; his autonomy was but little limited thereby; he transferred his German court bodily to England. That he thereby in the least subordinated English politics to his own, would, however, be a false supposition. As England was now situated, it had with him one and the same great end in view—to keep the Pretender at a distance, and to combat those powers who had the means or the will to support him. That this end was gained, and a Whig-Hanoverian government established in England, is the work of his life.

CHAPTER IV.

GEORGE II.

THE Prince of Wales had quarrelled much with the King his father, and had expressed himself in a slighting and contemptuous manner respecting his ministers. He stood united with the Opposition, the disaffected Whigs and even some of the Tories. It was supposed that he would try to rule with both, would change the system and above all the ministry; the men whom he would select were named.

It is worthy of note that this was prevented mainly by the position of foreign affairs. Cardinal Fleury, then at the helm in France, did not wish to have the line of policy disturbed which had now become effective; he accordingly sent Horace Walpole, brother of the ruling English minister, and at that time acting as ambassador in France, without delay to England, to warn the King against any alteration which might shatter the alliance¹. The danger which would have existed for England also in the disturbing of important relations, the prevailing opinion in Parliament, the needs of the court itself, which could not dispense with Walpole's support in regard to fixing the Civil List, the influence upon her husband of the new Queen Caroline, who precisely on this ground sought to uphold the order of things just established,—all this resulted in the change of King producing no alteration either in the system or in the persons. The ministers knew how to strengthen their system for further continuance with no less energy than foresight. The Catholics were kept in check as before by means of heavy taxes,

¹ Coxe, *Memoirs of Horace Walpole* i. 272.

and remained excluded from public office. The Tories who were inclined to Jacobitism were bound to the government by a new form of oath. Still it was not by repressive measures only that tendencies opposed to the house of Hanover were restrained.

The general drift was to be seen, among others, in Bolingbroke, who in consequence of a promise from Stanhope had come back to England¹, and although continually in opposition to Walpole, yet now held fast to the Protestant monarchy. He found the exclusion of the Pretender from the throne even just, because his principles must lead to a disturbing of the established government. He rejected the opinion that the caprices of a King can be made harmless by restrictive laws. For who could calculate how far the one or the other party would go with him in his aberrations, in order to secure for themselves the possession of the higher places? How easily, moreover, the old religious zeal might again seize him or his successors; if he attempted to lord it over consciences, he would throw open the door to every kind of arbitrary proceeding. In order to prevent this, such strong restrictions would have to be laid on the restored King, that scarcely a shadow of monarchy would remain; supposing he were to try and break through them, a new revolution would become necessary.

So far had people departed from the idea of hereditary right, that it seemed better for the power of the crown itself, that it should be worn by a Prince who was not endowed with full rights.

But though Jacobite tendencies might in this way be restrained by the course of events and by political necessity, yet the government was not inclined to excite Anglicans, who in this matter were on its side, into antagonism by showing favour to the Dissenters. It has been mentioned already that the Dissenters, after having given the greatest support to the Whig party in all these crises, thought that they had a right to claim to be freed from those Acts which excluded them from all direct political influence. In the

¹ Macknight, Bolingbroke 495

year 1734 they thought that they might expect this before the next elections from the Whig Parliament and ministry, which were well disposed towards them, especially as the latter could not dispense with the assistance of the great capitalists, a large number of whom were Dissenters, and controlled the Exchange and the Bank. But even Robert Walpole drew back in alarm at the thought of shaking the existing order of things; he foresaw that in consequence of this change the Anglican clergy would declare themselves for the high Tories, and would wrest the majority in Parliament from the Whigs. Rather he made use of his connexion with the Exchange and the Bank to induce the party of the Dissenters above all things to abandon their intention¹.

It was a maxim of Walpole's to secure what existed, and to wink at abuses which were naturally connected with the established system, rather than risk reforms, which might awaken the spirit of innovation.

He only once attempted a wide-reaching measure, the transformation of certain heavy custom-duties into excise, by which means he intended to obtain larger revenues, to lighten the land-tax, and gradually to transform England in general into a great free port. But in this he experienced violent and obstinate resistance. The old dread of the introduction of a general excise seized on the population. The land-owners themselves, whom he thought to win, were carried away to the side of the Opposition by the theory of Locke, that every impost in the end falls on the land. Walpole had to retreat before the combination of all these opposing elements, and let his measure drop. Not until a later age did it find due appreciation.

If one seeks for the reasons of this opposition, it was partly because along with the alteration would have been combined an advantage to the court, for the Civil List was in part based upon these duties², and would have gained

¹ Hervey, *Memoirs*: 'Monied men of the city and scriveners, who were absolutely dependent on Sir Robert.' 1. 156.

² Hervey: 'One-sixth of the duties on tobacco and wine being part of the civil list funds' i 183.

considerably thereby. The defeat of the ministry affected the court also, that is, the union between the two, which was cemented chiefly by financial relations, and in which the advantages gained by the court reacted on the administration. Walpole believed that he could have conquered the opposition, if he had been willing to use force. He was convinced that England could not be governed without a standing army, that is, without the support it gave in case of extremities (at that time consisting of about 18,000 men);—but he abstained from making use of it in the conflict of the moment, for to bloodshed he would not consent.

And it was even an advantage to him in his parliamentary position, that popular demonstrations were made on the matter; for these called in question the autocratic rule of the Parliament, and could not fail to arouse its displeasure afterwards. His authority was not shaken—at any rate not immediately—by the opposition which he experienced, and to which he was obliged to yield.

The peaceful course of foreign affairs also contributed greatly towards the shelving of all those apprehensions which had been excited by the alliance of Austria with Spain.

Further, under Townsend's helping hand, the Treaty of Seville was concluded, in which all their old privileges in trade with Spain and its colonies were restored to the English, and at the same time their claims to Gibraltar and Minorca confirmed. The treaty is a result of the continued good understanding with France; as a matter of fact it was concerted at Versailles between Horace Walpole and Cardinal Fleury in opposition to a proposal which had come from Spain, and which did not contain those concessions¹. But it was of vital importance to the English ministry, for the commercial classes could not be conciliated without the re-establishment of free intercourse with Spain. That on the other hand the recognition of the Franco-Spanish claims to Italy was stipulated, was to the English a matter of indifference. But when Townsend tacked on to this agreement

¹ Horace Walpole's account from his *Apology*, in Coxe's *Horace Walpole* i. 303.

A.D. 1731.

far-reaching projects of another kind against Austria, which threatened to bring about a war in Germany, Parliament and people were no longer inclined to give their consent; these being the misunderstandings in which the King and the Crown Prince of Prussia were involved on opposite sides, and in which the special interests of King George II with respect to his Electorate and his territory played a great part. An insertion in the answer to the King's speech in January 1731, giving expression to the expectation that the King would keep in view only purely English interests, could only be avoided by Walpole's giving the assurance that anyhow such would be the case¹. In order to induce the Emperor to consent to the carrying out of the stipulations of Seville, he was promised the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, without insisting on an immediate settlement of the questions at issue with the King in his capacity of Elector; the ambassador was instructed to conclude the treaty, nevertheless, even if he could not obtain anything on this point, and postpone the further discussion of it to a future time; the only indispensable condition was accession to the Treaty of Seville, on the carrying out of which the peace of Europe depended. It followed as a matter of course that Townsend retired; the consideration of Hanoverian interests began already to fall into the background.

By these treaties the Peace of Utrecht was at last completed. The Emperor, or Spain, or both—at one time together, and then again separately—had struggled against it; in the Treaty of Seville, Spain accepted the stipulations made in favour of English shipping; in the Treaty of Vienna the Emperor gave his consent to the concessions granted in compensation to Spain.

The basis of all this was the understanding with France, which the Tories had introduced in opposition to the Whigs, but which the latter had afterwards accepted, although divided among themselves on the question. The school of Stanhope and Sunderland had united itself with the house of Orleans

¹ Harrington and the Under Secretary, Wilson, May 8, 1731, to Robinson; in Coxe, Robert Walpole iii. 87.

against the collective interests of the Bourbons; Townsend and Walpole entered into the most confidential relations with the government of Louis XV at a moment when it had a difference with the Bourbons of Spain.

A consistent policy of the two parties in foreign affairs cannot be supposed. Just as before the Tories had offered peace to the French government mainly because the war was an advantage to the Whigs, so later on the Whigs caught at an alliance with the house of Orleans, in order to strengthen their own power and the Hanoverian dynasty; how the fraction, which was originally against it, afterwards under another sovereign was indebted to the French alliance for its own continuance, has already been mentioned. Thus the conclusion of these last treaties also contributed materially to strengthen Robert Walpole's position.

Internal and external relations worked together to uphold his authority. The position of affairs now at last won in Europe, the advantages of peace, and the care for material and commercial interests connected with it all worked in his favour; he avoided all which might again raise the great internal questions, and knew how to maintain, by fair means or foul, the majority in Parliament won at a difficult moment. He knew also how to draw the King on along with him. Of the correspondence of George II with his ministers, some specimens have been published, from which one gathers, that he specially interested himself in foreign affairs, that he accompanied the negotiations step by step, ordered and rejected ministerial declarations;—all with the self-consciousness of a sovereign. He was naturally inclined to personal activity; business was to him a pleasure. When he came to Hanover, he had not merely the satisfaction of being revered as an absolute prince; the escort of his English ministers in itself contributed to make the consciousness of the great and almost international position which his father had acquired, very strong within him; it was his ambition to realise it; naturally vain and convinced of his own ability, he was not exactly easy to manage. The contradiction of his ministers could make him impatient and ungracious. They not unfrequently called his consort to their assistance. Queen Caro-

A D. 1731.

line wished, like other gifted women of position, to exert an influence on affairs. She could not pride herself on the fidelity of her husband, and had much to bear from his temper; his domestic regulations were often inconvenient to her and even prejudicial to her health; but she submitted to everything in order to be as much as possible, and as long as possible, with him. Naturally gifted with a power of grasping and developing ideas, she had a lively appreciation of all political interests and of their interdependence. When she accompanied the King to the hunting-field, a sport in which she took very little real share, one of the high officials, Lord Hervey, who rode slowly by the side of her carriage, was fond of availing himself of the opportunity to tell her of the reasons for the ministerial measures; for he was one of the most confidential friends of Robert Walpole¹. Thus, put in full possession of the facts, she easily overcame the less securely founded opinions of the King; it was found that arguments, by which she herself had not been convinced, were yet conveyed in all their strength to him. Without the assistance of the Queen, Walpole would in many cases not have convinced the King, nor have brought him over to his side. But besides this, they had both come over to England with the conviction that the crown must not put itself in opposition to Parliament. It was in fine always decisive for them that Walpole possessed the majority; for which reason they supported his peace-policy also.

It was, however, impossible that the situation in Europe should long remain at the point which it had now reached.

The French had been vanquished in the field in the late war, and compelled to accept a peace, which, though far more favourable in its issue than the results of the war had allowed them to expect, had nevertheless inflicted heavy losses upon them. But their strength was again gradually increasing, and just in proportion to its growth they felt a temptation to renew the war, in order to re-establish their old reputation. Side by side with Cardinal Fleury, who himself wished for peace, sat in the council of the King of France men like Villars, who every

¹ Memoirs of the reign of George II from his accession to the death of Queen Caroline i. 397.

moment were quoting the example of Richelieu and Louis XIV, in order to goad him on to an energetic interference in European affairs to the glory of the crown and nation¹. The Pragmatic Sanction of the Emperor Charles VI aroused the greatest jealousy; it contravened the old hereditary rights of the house of Bourbon and of several Princes of the Empire, and could not be allowed to take effect, without endangering the high position of France with reference to Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands. Even Cardinal Fleury said that France ought to have lost three battles before she confirmed it.

Though urged on by an eager party, and himself not without some inclination that way, Cardinal Fleury still shrank from hurrying into war, until France and Austria had come to an open rupture in the disputes respecting the election to the Polish crown. The war now broke out, and at once seized Italy and Germany; it shattered the relations of the two powers at every point.

Now it was quite the old principle of the English Parliament to maintain the equilibrium between Austria and France; but then, as often, it nevertheless had no intention of throwing its own weight into the scale. That the former ministers had done so, had been urged as a crime against them; Walpole did not wish to commit a similar blunder. In holding back he had a difficult position to maintain even with the Queen, who still cherished German feelings, and still more with the King, who was jealous of King Frederick William of Prussia, and envied this sovereign the honour of taking the field with his troops. George II thought not merely that he was superior to his son-in-law, but that he himself was in a position to wrest their laurels from the French generals, and to twine them round his own brows, if he was only allowed to seize the opportunity. But Walpole's opinion was not to be changed. He argued that by the advantages which France might win the balance of power in Europe would not be shaken, but the Spaniards would be the chief gainers; that in a war to be waged about the Polish crown the English nation was in any case not inclined to take part, and it was far better for it that

¹ Mémoires de Villais (Petitot 71).

A D. 1733.

it should not ; by that means it would maintain its commerce with both parties undisturbed. Holland, he said, certainly could not be induced to join: and if it alone remained neutral, it would enjoy all the commercial advantages which belong to neutrality.

Only thus much could the King obtain, that England, notwithstanding the negotiations for the establishment of peace, should arm both by land and sea. For he held that only with sword in hand could he maintain the balance of power in Europe ; but it never came to a crisis in which the English ministers considered this in danger. Under their intervention Lorraine was transferred to France, and a great part of Italy, that had hitherto been Austrian, to Spain. The two lines of the house of Bourbon once more became in the highest degree prominent.

Yet it was not against Austria alone, but in reality against England also, that their alliance was directed. It had of old been the project of Louis XIV to open a new field for French industry and commercial activity by means of the dynastic connexion with Spain ; and, as soon as the disputes between the two courts were adjusted, this project once more appeared in full life ; for the spirit of European nations took a still stronger tendency to commerce and trade, foreign enterprise and colonisation ; even in Spain commerce was pronounced to be the sinews of the monarchy. The commercial privileges granted to the English in the Peace of Utrecht seemed to both courts to be intolerable. In acting against Austria they also made common cause against England. As early as November 1733 a Family Compact¹ (the first of the series) was concluded between them, in which they contemplated the possibility of a war against England, but without waiting for it entered into an agreement against the maritime supremacy of that power. The French government promised Spain not merely its good offices, but, if necessary, armed assistance, for the defence of Spanish territory. The French were to have all the advantages which the most favoured nations enjoyed in the Spanish possessions, and in like manner the Spaniards in France. But

¹ ' *Compacto de familia perpetuo et irrevocabile que debe asegurar para siempre el nodo de la mas estrecha amistad.*' Art. 14 (Cantillo 277.)

wherever—it went on to state—it seems good to both nations alike, the abuses which have crept into commerce (especially through the English) shall be abolished; and if the English make objection, France will ward off their hostility with all its strength by land and by sea. All treaties opposed to this compact which may exist between either power and other countries shall be declared at an end.

Thus the policy, against which William III had called on England and Europe to arm, and which even the Tory ministers had thought to hinder in the treaty by a total separation of Spain from France, at last came into existence, and had a most powerful effect on existing relations in Europe.

The treaty remained buried in the deepest secrecy; no third power had any suspicion of it. The hostile movements of the Spaniards, really based upon it, seemed to contemporaries merely the result of their own judgment, especially as these were by no means without justification.

For no one could deny that the trade of the English with the South American colonies went far beyond the limits assigned to them by the treaty. Hitherto the Spaniards had made no serious opposition. But now that resistance to English encroachments was stipulated, and the assistance of France was held out in prospect contingent on this, they summoned up courage for the act; and, in order to put a limit to English smuggling, they proceeded to take energetic and even hostile measures. The English traders regarded the extension of their business, as hitherto allowed, a possession honestly won, looked upon all interference with it as an unjustifiable act of violence, and claimed the assistance of government against it. Walpole gave himself unspeakable trouble to re-establish a good understanding; he even succeeded in effecting a compromise; but the Spanish court declined to ratify it; it would not submit to injuries at the hands of traders, against whom it had been asserting nothing more than its right; and now in England also people would hear no more of a compromise. All this accusing and excusing, all these well-founded or unfounded complaints, had roused the national feeling, and the direction which it took was against the mediating minister himself.

Under these circumstances the opposition, which had all along been on the alert, waxed strong, and assumed a threatening character. It was directed against Walpole's oppressive predominance, and at the same time against his weakness, at which the nation scoffed.

The followers of Sunderland, who had been kept under by those of Walpole, formed the nucleus of this opposition;—viz. Carteret, who had been obliged to yield to Walpole's party, but never gave up the hope of once more stepping into their place—and Pulteney, who by his passionate and bitter, his easy and sometimes even pathetic eloquence, made a great impression on the House. Lord Chesterfield united himself to them, one of the most agreeable spirits of the century, who with his *savoir faire* and his hard-hitting raillery was a perpetual torment to the ministry. Along with the men of universal accomplishments an alderman of the city, John Barnard, a quiet, disinterested, pious man, by his practical intelligence and his knowledge of business made himself felt. Every one in fact was convinced, that the plan proposed by him for the reduction of the interest on the national debt ought to have been accepted, and they attributed the rejection of it purely to personal motives, which had their origin in the party-position of the minister¹. Usually calm and reserved, against Walpole he could be at once vehement and pertinacious, the minister saw in him one of his most dangerous opponents. Another was the Tory Windham, a friend of Bolingbroke. Like the latter he had recovered from his predilection for the Pretender, and made it his object in life to give the spirit of the constitution room to develope above the ceaseless agitation of parties. With other Whigs he might perhaps have united, with Walpole never. His well-grouped arguments, his clear expression, his personal dignity, won him always a favourable hearing in Parliament². Walpole possessed nothing which could elevate the mind in the region of general ideas or satisfy the spirit;

¹ So even his friend, Lord Hervey, says. *Mem.* ii 330

² Cp. Onslow in *Coxe* i. 342 Hervey (i. 28) does not allow him so much ability.

what he did or omitted was directed merely towards what was expedient and recommended by circumstances; it was by the weight of his practical experience, and the number of followers bound to him either by expectations or direct favour, that he carried all before him. But for this very reason those who either had more comprehensive ideas, or who were merely aiming at independence, especially some younger members of Parliament of rising talent, such as Pitt, Littleton, and Grenville, violently opposed his administration. In Frederick Prince of Wales, who was on just as bad terms with his father as the latter had been with George I, they had at that time a support in the dynasty. Already in his personal affairs (those relating to his allowance) they had had a contest with Walpole, but had been defeated; then, however, they attacked his administration generally. One of the first speeches by which the young Pitt made a name for himself was directed against the convention with Spain, which 'suspended and called in question an undoubted right based upon treaty, a right granted by God and nature, and confirmed by resolutions of Parliament, and in some respects the first of all rights, the right of self-preservation and of self-defence¹.' Bolingbroke, who had not dared to re-enter Parliament, a friend likewise of the Prince, by his mental superiority in personal intercourse, and by his activity in the press, exerted an incalculable influence. His drift was, that, considering the inferiority of the forces at the disposal of Spain and the untenable character of its claims, the peaceful bearing of Walpole was only to be explained by supposing that he was afraid of having, in case of a war, to share the authority with others; merely to keep this in his own hands he was destroying both the letter and the spirit of the constitution. Even literature took part in the general agitation, and that in branches which in themselves were remote from it. It happened that in May 1738 imitations of the *Satires* of Horace by Pope, and of the *Satires* of Juvenal by Johnson were published on the same

¹ 'This convention is . . . on the part of England a suspension, as to Georgia, of the first law of nature.' Coxe, *Robert Walpole* i. 601.

A.D. 1739.

day. For in the appropriation of classical literature England was as eager at that time as Germany some decads later. The difference was, that in England it assumed at the same time a political character (the orators were imitated, and courtiers studied Tacitus), while in Germany it was the literary form and the general human interests expressed that were of influence. At that time it fell out that two imitations of old satirists lent words to the general excitement. Johnson, afterwards so measured and pedantic, called upon the nation not to suffer the insolence of Spanish oppression.

A new tendency in the public mind announced itself, which went beyond the questions hitherto disputed, and snapped the ties of party.

Even Walpole's colleagues in office, hitherto his allies, were not unaffected by it. The most considerable of these was Thomas Pelham, Duke of Newcastle—for the maintenance of the Whig majority an indispensable magnate, since he controlled a large number of boroughs. He supported Robert Walpole's system, but at the same time was not altogether captivated by it; he was remarkable not so much for his intellectual superiority as for being seldom contented with existing circumstances; a man never altogether to be depended upon. It was mainly through his influence that in the disputes with Spain measures were adopted of a kind which made war inevitable. Robert Walpole acquiesced in the declaration of war rather than wished for it. It seemed more like a victory of the Opposition in both home and foreign affairs over the first minister, who was regarded as the only man who set himself against the wishes of the people and was now obliged to follow them. The commercial classes also thought that the moment was come in which they could free themselves for ever from all restrictions in the South American trade. With what triumph was the news of Admiral Vernon's first success received! for he belonged to the Opposition, and took Portobello with very little effort. The whole military strength of the nation was vigorously directed to this quarter. Walpole felt that he was no longer master of the situation. He would have liked that a part of the fleet should be kept

back in Europe; 'but let it go,' he cried out at last; 'I no longer dare to do what I consider right!'

The English thought still that they had only Spain to deal with, and even counted on the intervention of Cardinal Fleury; but they soon were compelled to remark that the French would not allow the galleons, which were laden mainly with French goods, to be destroyed, and that they would never consent to the English establishing themselves in South America. The English felt the working of the Family Compact, though they were not aware of its existence; they felt that they were on the threshold of a new war, which must necessarily be a European one. In consequence of an occurrence in Germany the war took a direction, and led to complications, which no one had anticipated.

It will be worth while to get a clear view of the connexion between the great movements now at work, in which the internal conflict in England played a great part, and at the same time of this conflict itself.

Among the Whigs the thought arose of opposing the union of the Bourbon powers by a great continental alliance, as in the two last wars. Horace Walpole, the brother of Robert, sketched out a plan, according to which not merely Austria, but Russia also, and above all Prussia, where a young and able prince had just ascended the throne, were to be induced to join².

How greatly the public mind in England was set on this, is shewn, among other things, by the remark of the Archbishop of Canterbury on the occasion of Frederick II ascending the throne; that Englishmen ought to remember with gratitude the zealous share which the grandfather of the new King had taken in the English Revolution under King William III³.

It was thought to win the young king over by favouring his claims to Jülich and Berg, and to induce him to enter into a combined campaign against France, by means of which Hanover would be protected.

¹ 'I dare not, I will not make any alteration;' in Coxe.

² Coxe; Horace Walpole i. 428.

³ Andrieu's Report, June 17, 1740.

A.D. 1741.

But how greatly had times and circumstances changed! The great motive-powers of religion and of European independence, which had brought about the alliances of the year 1688, did not exist now; the same circumstances, which inspired Englishmen with the wish to unite with Frederick II, gave him the courage to carry out his own interests independently and without reserve

The great occurrence mentioned above was this;—that Frederick II invaded Silesia, in order to make good the old claims of his house against Austria. Between the powers on which England counted a violent and bloody war broke out. A new era for England also dates from that moment.

At first the English ministry thought that it could still gain its object in spite of this. It offered Queen Maria Theresa support for the maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction, and advised her at the same time to come to an agreement with the King of Prussia, who was making only moderate demands. But we are given to understand that the opponents of Walpole made entirely different representations to the Queen, and promised her, if she would only hold out, the full support of the English nation¹. The same men who had brought about the breach with Spain and hostilities in consequence, in order to rid themselves of the minister, now proceeded to make the coalition, with which England thought to meet the French, impossible; for by means of it the tottering minister would once more have been able to gain firm ground. By no means *only* on account of this motive, but yet partly owing to its effect, the proposals of Prussia were rejected in Vienna. In consequence of this, and also of the double bearing of the English government, Frederick II found himself now impelled to conclude an alliance with France for a term of years, the immediate result of which was, that the opponents of the Pragmatic Sanction under French leadership won a victory over Austria, and in opposition to the husband of the Queen of Hungary a Franco-Prussian candidate for the imperial crown was set up.

In this manner the English were compelled not only to

¹ So Horace Walpole declares in Coxe, Robert Walpole i 681.

see the sovereign, on whose alliance they had built their hopes, allied with their enemies; they had also to experience, that the latter by a sudden turn of events, won a supremacy on the continent and particularly in Germany, which England had always combatted.

The greatest perplexity was hereby introduced, owing to the attitude of Hanover. In the sketch for the renewal of the great alliance they had counted upon Hanover also, and sought to bring it into close union with Prussia, towards which result George II was very ready to offer assistance. When the war broke out in Germany, Parliament had determined to defend the King in his Hanoverian possessions; the Opposition, who set themselves against this, were overcome by the consideration that the war in which Hanover might under certain circumstances be involved, had its source only in the interests of England. But this assurance did not completely satisfy King George, and he went to Hanover himself. When the French came near the borders of the Electorate, he considered it politic to conclude a treaty of neutrality, by which he was compelled to bind himself (for otherwise he would have had no guarantee) to give his vote at the coming election of Emperor to the Franco-Prussian candidate.

It is manifest that by this means the interests of Hanover became opposed to those of England.

George II did not conclude the agreement without the assent of Harrington, the English minister who accompanied him on the continent. Walpole has declared that it was done without his receiving notice of it. Afterwards, however, he had given his consent.

The people of England, the Parliament, even the rest of the ministers, heard of it with indignation. That their King as Elector should promise his vote to a prince who appeared in the character of a protégé of France and the representative of French policy in Germany seemed to them intolerable.

The unpopularity of the already isolated Walpole could not of course but be increased by this. The odium, however, was directed not against him alone, but against the system of government hitherto observed. Let us listen to Boling-

A D. 1742.

broke for a moment, who won more and more influence, the older he became, over the leading men of the opposition.

'I think,' says Bolingbroke, in a letter to Lyttleton, of November 1741¹, 'two principal and fatal errors that have prevailed from the accession of the present Royal Family . . . are these,—that the foreign interests of Britain must be conducted in a certain subordination to those of Hanover, and that the domestick interests must be submitted to those of a party. . . . Both one and the other have degraded the majesty of our Kings: for let them think as they will, a Prince who acts with a crown, as if he had only an Electoral cap on his head, will have neither at home nor abroad the reverence, the authority, nor influence that are due to your superior character; and a King who governs in the spirit of Party, and renders his sceptre the rod of one set of men, and the tool of another, will be esteemed by his subjects and by foreigners the King of half his people, that is half a King. . . . Let him in the name of God rescue his country, for he ought to know no other, from disgrace and all the consequences of factious administration, and factious opposition; let Britain protect Hanover, and the whole Protestant interest in Germany; but let not Hanover, no nor Germany, direct your councils of Britain any longer.'

Robert Walpole, pressed also by the results of the war at sea, for enterprises in South America at first successful had finally been defeated, saw after the first debate in Parliament, that he could not maintain his position, and retired. The triumph of the Opposition was unbounded; for small at the outset, in a twenty-years' contest against an experienced and able general, they had at last won the majority and driven him from the helm. It was not the fall of an ordinary minister but the fall of the political system based upon the first union of the house of Hanover with the Regent of France. It was a return to the policy then abandoned of war against France and the Bourbon interest in Europe, and that at a moment when these once more had the upper hand both by land and sea. The outcast

¹ Phillimore's *Life of Lyttleton* i. 194.

of 1715, some time minister of the Pretender, contributed materially to the overthrow of the autocratic Whig minister. And at the same time the Tories, who were vanquished then, had raised themselves once more to a position of some importance.

But who was to seize the helm in this general confusion? In which direction was the bark to be steered?

First, Lord Carteret, who now entered the ministry, undertook the conduct of foreign affairs.

That most of the recent ministry remained in office is explained by the fact that on the decisive question they had separated from Walpole, and mainly contributed to his overthrow. In completing the administration they might have had recourse to the more advanced Whigs, who formed Pulteney's party; indeed an offer was made to Pulteney himself; but he was afraid of being carried too far in opposition to the King, whereby the hopes of the Jacobites might again have been excited. Carteret was preferred, who stood very much more in favour with George II.

Carteret was a man of intellect and culture. His speeches have precision and force; a learned editor of Demosthenes thinks that he can recognise in Carteret a successful emulator of the prince of orators. The study of the ancients had awakened in him a strong desire for fame in the future; he wished for nothing more than to attain a great place and immortal name in the histories of Europe. The details of business he left to others; but with the reservation that the conduct of the whole was to be brought into his hands.

In this he easily came to an understanding with the rest of the ministers, who from the first cherished the idea that France could be combatted with success only if peace was made between Austria and Prussia. The courageous and victorious bearing of the King of Prussia made this absolutely necessary. Accordingly under the influence of England the Peace of Breslau was concluded.

But now in order to drive the French out of Germany an imposing force of Hanoverian soldiers was taken into English pay; a body of English troops also appeared upon the continent; at the head of the combined army King

A D. 1743.

George succeeded at Dettingen in holding his ground against the French. And who would seem more suited to help him with his advice than Carteret, who accompanied him? He had learnt German, and knew how to thread his way among the tangled circumstances of the Empire.

Carteret's plan was, not exactly to overthrow Charles VII, for whom George II himself had voted, but to create a position for him in which he would again become independent of France. From a German point of view such a plan was unexceptionable; but the English ministers would not hear of it, for they held it to be impossible permanently to free the protégé of France from French influence. Carteret was compelled, to his own and his King's shame, to break off the negotiations which had been commenced.

On the other hand it agreed well with the sentiments of the ministers, that Carteret by means of the Treaty of Worms brought about an understanding between Austria and Sardinia; for without some such measure a check could not be put to the predominance of the Bourbons in Italy. But in this he again went too far in the other direction for the English ministers. He appeared to see the security for the balance of power in Europe solely in the re-establishment of the power of Austria, and stipulated that Sardinia should send help for the war in Germany also; whereas the English ministers wished this to be confined to Italy¹.

But against whom could Austria want help in Germany except Prussia? And in other respects also the Treaty of Worms, which breathed Hanoverian predilection for Austria, was couched in such a form, that the apprehensions of Frederick II were aroused that the Peace of Breslau was again threatened thereby. Soon afterwards he renewed his understanding with France and again betook himself to arms.

But in this way the opposite of the aim which the Whig ministers of the former school had always set before themselves came to pass; Prussia was once more on the side of France; France was more powerful than ever: the newly commenced hostilities now for the first time assumed

¹ Coxe, Horace Walpole ii. 59; Coxe, Pelham i. 77.

their full dimensions. In the year 1744 it came to a formal declaration of war between England and France. King Louis XV marked the cessation of his minority by an attack on the Austrian Netherlands, which caused all the more sensation in England, because it had been impossible to induce Holland to take any part in the war; England was also threatened with an invasion by the Pretender. In consequence of a quarrel between the commanders the English fleet in the Mediterranean suffered a defeat; the Spanish arms were again victorious in Italy.

All these mishaps were ascribed in England to the bad policy of Lord Carteret, who, they said, did nothing but long for war, and then was incapable of carrying it on. He was charged with two things; a ruinous carelessness in business, which he conducted jesting and laughing, not unfrequently when his brain was heated with claret, in a state of excitement, in which he broached impracticable proposals; and a predilection for the Hanoverian interests of the King, which made him forget his own country¹: the great island-kingdom was thus as it were made a province of an unimportant Electorate. The national antipathy was all the more aroused, because it was said to have been remarked, that King George had preferred the Hanoverians to the English even in the field; the English troops came back from the continent in a state of the highest displeasure. The question of the relation of Hanover to England, unavoidable in itself, for it had already been raised by the result of the Revolution, became at this moment the most important of all questions. It concerned both the authority of the King, which appeared to be exercised in favour of the country from which he sprang, and also the attitude of the various parties to the crown.

In the ministry differences of opinion broke out on this point, such as to cripple all united action. One day Carteret, who just then after the death of his mother had been raised to the earldom of Grenville, and the Duke of Newcastle, drove back to town together from a council, which had been held at

¹ Yorke, Parliamentary Journal, in (Hansard) Parliamentary History xiii, contains the most trustworthy account of the ministerial blunders.

A D. 1744.

the King's residence at Kensington. In the course of their conversation Carteret remarked, that the government could not go on in this way much longer; he for his part would not remain in the position of being perpetually liable to be out-voted; his opponents must either leave the direction of affairs to him or take it entirely into their own hands.

Among the ministers of the time the brother of the Duke of Newcastle, Henry Pelham, Chancellor of the Exchequer, enjoyed the greatest reputation. He shone neither in general culture nor in eloquence; but in the school of Robert Walpole he had acquired a comprehensive knowledge of the department over which he presided, the internal economy of England generally, and managed his office with a calmness and insight which won him the confidence of all. He was simple and moderate in all things; his one recreation was sought and found in the country-house¹ where his family were always about him. He did not strive after the conduct of affairs; it fell to him necessarily of itself through his influential office and character.

In November 1744 Newcastle, Pelham, and Lord Chancellor Hardwick laid before the King a memorial on the situation generally, and the want of management in foreign affairs. It contained a direct attack on Grenville², and when no notice was taken of it, they determined on the unusual proceeding of demanding the dismissal of their rival. The King was very much opposed to it; he consented to Carteret's applying to the Opposition, which hitherto had stood against the whole ministry, so long as it still held together. It consisted of the most various elements. There were, first of all, those friends of the Prince of Wales, Cobham, Pitt, Lyttleton, and Grenville, who held fast to their politics, even when the Prince of Wales deserted them; along with them were the Duke of Bedford, and Chesterfield, who still belonged without change to the party of decided Whigs, which had been left out of the last combination, when Carteret came in; and, moreover, some

¹ Esher, near Clarendon, where Newcastle lived. Thomson, in his *Seasons*, has devoted a couple of fine lines to him.

² Coxe, *Pelham Administration* i. 177.

Tories of distinction, such as Lord Gower, who himself had once been regarded as a Jacobite. At the moment of division they had formed themselves into a junta, which assumed an independent and united bearing.

Carteret let them know that he would find room for all if they would go along with him. They answered, that they were glad to be able to prove to him that they were not concerned to obtain place; they would never serve under a man whose plans were irreconcilable with the well-being of England. It was their fixed intention to unite themselves with the other ministers, among whom Pelham possessed their full confidence. However, on this side also there was need of negotiation. Was a change in the distribution of the higher offices, or the question of the measures to be adopted, to be the first thing considered? Chesterfield was strongly of opinion that they ought first to come to an understanding as to the measures. Then there was the further question whether certain determinations, limiting the supreme power, as it then existed, the exclusion of officials and the abolition of septennial Parliaments, which the advanced Whigs had always demanded, should be made indispensable conditions or not. In the junta of the opposition there was a formal division on the question; the majority voted in the negative. And by what means then was it won over? Newcastle reluctantly agreed to the express promise, that 'the interests of Hanover should be henceforth subordinate to those of England¹.' That was what it came to; that was the point where the opposition to Carteret and the national feeling met. It offended the old Whigs a good deal, that some Tories also were to be included in the higher offices; but they were told that it could not be otherwise; for else Carteret would have dissolved Parliament, would have made an appeal to the Tories and have completely overthrown the Whig party; the idea which rose above party claims was the one which prevailed, 'that the King must be set at the head of his whole people².' On this ground im-

¹ Coxe, Pelham i. 188

² As in Yorke 978: 'It might be hoped, that the King might be set at the head of his whole people.'

A.D. 1745.

proper demands could be refused all the better ; the war must appear as a national affair, not as a ministerial one.

In this manner a new administration was formed—on a broader bottom, as people said ; in it, along with Henry Pelham (who came forward as first Lord of the Treasury) and his old friends, a Russell (the Duke of Bedford) was once more seen at the head of the Admiralty¹ ; several of the friends of the Prince of Wales and of Cobham, such as Lyttleton and Grenville, were included in it, together with the Tories Gower and Cotton ; the Tory party was fortunate after so long an interval in once more attaining to places of power and trust.

One or two of the men who were proposed, Pitt for instance, the King would not accept, because he could not forgive the cutting words to which they had given utterance in the debate : on the whole it was evident that the King had yielded only for the moment to a moral pressure, which he still thought to break through. He complained that he was like a prisoner on his own throne ; people were forced upon him whom he could not endure, the kingly power was usurped in matters which peculiarly belonged to it ; after a certain time he once more made the attempt to recall Carteret ; the circular is still in existence, in which Carteret once more took possession of the ministry. But he could not fail to be quickly convinced that he would never again have the majority in Parliament ; of the ministry that had existed up to this time not one would join him ; one member after another sent in his resignation. Carteret had advised the King to stand to his opinion, and to complain in Parliament of the bad treatment which he experienced at the hands of his ministers. But the King thought that he dare not venture on that. He considered it as a condition of the crown which he wore that he should yield to the majority in Parliament, if it remained firmly by its opinion ; he still held out obstinately in matters of detail, when he had already given way on the main point ; at last, however, he succumbed, and after a while seemed even satisfied.

The change in the ministry, which had now been settled, was the most important that had taken place since George I

¹ Correspondence of Bedford ; Introduction i.

ascended the throne ; in very deed an event for the dynasty. The Hanoverian interests, in consequence of the general antipathy which they had awakened, retired into the background ; the Whigs surrendered the exclusive dominion, which they had exercised for thirty years ; from out of themselves a party arose, which would hear only of a policy from an English point of view, and this party entered into the ministry ; the Tories again came into power. The two principles, which Bolingbroke had propounded some years before, were now realised by Pelham and his friends, so far as was consistent with the power of the Whigs and of themselves.

This coalition in the course of years experienced one or two changes ; but on the whole it maintained itself throughout the reign of George II, and in the end was developed still further.

By it, as soon as it had once formed itself, the last attempt of the Stuarts, the invasion of Charles Edward, son of the Pretender, was successfully warded off. One of the things which led to this undertaking was the fact that the King had withdrawn his favour from the men on whom his supporters in Scotland most reckoned. Carteret would have been obliged to resort to new elections, which beyond doubt would have favoured the Tories. But these themselves were afraid of the commotion which might thereby have seized the land, and in several counties might easily have produced results favourable to the Jacobites, which was not what they wished. It was of some value, that attention was paid to the Jacobites by the new ministry. The settlement of the administration led to the defeat of the Pretender, which was more decisive than any of the former ones. At Culloden the Highlanders with their broadswords, which had been irresistible in 1690 and 1715, were overpowered by the small arms of the English musketeers and the fire of the artillery. Here also at last that instrument of state power, the fire-arm, put an end to all local separatism. This was followed by legislation, which abolished all hereditary jurisdiction, in order to destroy the feudal conditions, in which men regarded themselves, not as subjects of the same King nor as members of the same state, but as vassals of an hereditary lord. What the Stuarts had purposed, but had been too weak to attain was now carried out in opposition to them.

England was not so fortunate in the war with France. At sea she had the upper hand, but the alliances on the continent proved insufficient; financial difficulties were added; the Dutch seemed to be able to carry on the war, into which they had entered with reluctance only, at the expense of England. With the greatest unwillingness King George and his more military son, the Duke of Cumberland, relinquished the undertakings which they had been planning for the next campaign; even Newcastle, who accompanied the King to Hanover, agreed with him. But his brother Pelham and the ministers in England were urgent for peace. Among them was not only Bedford but also Pitt, who was now a member of the Privy Council, and was acting as pay-master of the army¹. The plenipotentiary at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Lord Sandwich, belonged to the same party and way of thinking; and of him the King complained bitterly for disregard of himself and his instructions. In all this what an action and reaction of influences is apparent! the interests of the German States and those of the Powers of West Europe; in England itself the relations between the reigning and the exiled dynasty, between the mother country and the colonies, between the English nation and the King's German hereditary country, between Parliament and the Crown, and in Parliament between the different but now once more converging party tendencies and the more prominent individuals! It was determined to accede to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. This was in the highest degree unacceptable to the Empress Maria Theresa; she was induced to assent only by a threat on the part of England, that otherwise it would come to terms with France, and that without her. The terms of the Peace were, that the French should relinquish their acquisitions on the continent, and the English theirs beyond the seas. At the same time the articles, which secured the possession of Silesia to the King of Prussia, were confirmed. Never, however, was a treaty concluded, the speedy rupture of which could be so certainly foreseen as this one. No decision whatever was made respecting the urgent and burning disputes between the two crowns. The French

¹ Coxe, Pelham ii. 3.

showed that they were determined to apply themselves with all their might to the augmentation of their colonial power and their navy, and thus to develop their maritime strength to such an extent as to be in a position once more to renew the contest for the supremacy at sea, with or without Spain. The English held fast to the notion of opposing the French with a better alliance. The remarkable thing is, that herein they fixed their eyes from the first on Prussia, without whom any confederation would be weak and lame and ineffectual¹. But how was that to be gained?

The antagonism between France and England on the one hand, and between Austria and Prussia on the other, filled the next few years; King George took the side of Austria at times more strongly than was pleasing to Austria itself; of his ministers, however, Newcastle was the only one who went along with him in this direction; the others followed only very reluctantly; the King often took it amiss that he was not better supported by his ministers². We must not linger over the complicated events of these years, although perhaps they are not unworthy of attention; for they exhibit an extraordinary phase of action and reaction, and then again of peace and equilibrium, until at last in the year 1755 the differences between England and France attained a pitch which shewed that war in a short time was a certainty. The North-American colonies, still bound by the closest ties to the mother-country, were threatened in their territorial extension, and perhaps in their independent existence; in England every one was agreed that war must be undertaken on their behalf.

Then the question as to the relation of England to the hereditary country of the King in Germany came once more to the front, for there could not be a doubt that the French would throw themselves upon the latter. The time had long

¹ 'If you gain Prussia, the confederacy will be restored and made whole, and become a real strength; if you do not, it will continue lame and weak, and much in the power of France' The Lord Chancellor to the Duke of Newcastle, July 15/26, 1748. Coxe, Pelham i. 502.

² George II urged as a ground of complaint against the Duke of Bedford, among others, 'his obstinate silence on the pendent negotiation for the election of the King of the Romans.'

A D. 1755.

since gone by when England and Hanover worked together in their European relations. The party compromise, according to which the Hanoverian interests were always to be regarded as subordinate to the English, has been mentioned. And though it was nevertheless agreed that the hereditary country of the King must be protected, whenever (as was at this moment to be anticipated) it was attacked on England's account, there always remained large room for debate as to the mode of protecting it.

King George II, in the anxiety (which corresponded to his old jealousy of Frederick II) lest Prussia should ally itself with France against him when the war broke out, had concluded a subsidy treaty with Russia, by which the protection of the Electorate was to be entrusted to a Russian army, which was already mustering in Livonia. In the summer of 1755 this treaty came to England. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer declined to sign it until it had been approved by Parliament. Of its being so, however, there was very little prospect. Pelham had died the year before; and the changes in the ministry, which thereby became necessary, had not led to a result that would have promised success in Parliament. For who did not see that the arrangement with the Russians at the same time contained a threat to the King of Prussia, since that sovereign would not allow their entry into German territory? The treaty, which had the appearance of being drawn up in order to maintain the peace of the continent, was much more calculated to provoke war. If the intention was to win over Prussia in a new continental confederation, this would have exactly the contrary effect.

The first idea was, to neutralise Prussia and Hanover in the impending conflict between England and France, which would also have involved the neutrality of Austria. An agreement among the ministers, by means of which it was hoped to maintain the majority in Parliament, led at the same time to a compact on the above terms with Frederick II, who entered into it with delight, for all that he desired was the maintenance of the peace of Germany.

The result, however, was altogether different from that which he had promised himself. Displeased with Frederick's ad-

vances to England, Louis XV formed an alliance with the Empress Maria Theresa, who at the outbreak of the war thought that the moment was come for reconquering Silesia, whether in alliance with England or with France. She was most inclined to the latter, and was now drawing Russia also to her side. The great war broke out, which was to decide the maritime supremacy of the one or the other of the great western Powers, as well as the existence or non-existence of the kingdom of Prussia.

At first it took a course very unfavourable to England both by land and sea.

In the year 1756 Minorca was lost, a misfortune which affected the government itself, inasmuch as Admiral Byng, who was to have relieved it, had not been properly fitted out; in 1757 Hanover was over-run by the French, the combined forces, headed by the King's son, the Duke of Cumberland—there had been much opposition in Parliament to the combined scheme,—proved insufficient; in the East Indies the English settlers were in the greatest peril, in America also the French had the upper hand.

Meanwhile in England itself no ministry could obtain a firm footing. Among the leading Whigs there were once more two factions, of which the one was regarded as entirely Whig, in agreement with the King and the Duke of Cumberland, the other had an understanding with the Tories and was supported by those about the heir to the throne. Frederick, Prince of Wales, had died some years before;—but his son, who was then in his eighteenth year, had already begun to attract general notice. About him and his mother, Augusta of Saxe-Gotha, who lived at Leicester House, a party was being formed, in its basis the same as that which had supported the father against Walpole, inspired by national impulses, Whig also in principle, but inclined to an understanding with the Tories. It was held together by Lord Bute, the Prince's tutor, but derived its brilliancy and power from William Pitt, a man as energetic as he was vigorous, who was then in high favour with the Tories. Among this party prevailed the idea, to which Bolingbroke had given expression, of a patriotic King, who must unite the two parties; and in it the Hanove-

A D 1757.

rian policy, even in the form which it then assumed, was rejected from the first, because it was represented by the Duke of Cumberland, who as regards the King's favour threw Leicester House into the shade. From the first Pitt had been one of the most violent opponents of Hanoverian tendencies and predilections; and it was precisely against him that the antipathies of the King were directed. Taken into counsel at the very beginning of the American difficulty, he had expressed himself with regard to the relation with Hanover in a way which left no possibility of an understanding. He would have liked straightway to have given up the country to foreign occupation, only with the promise that it was to be given back again to the King at the end of the war. For the forces of England must be directed exclusively to the contest at sea.

Such ideas were similar to those with which the Tories had opposed the continental alliances; then they had been rejected by the Whigs, who could not do without those alliances. It marked the change in the times, that the Whigs, who called themselves the patriotic party, now themselves drew back from the union with Hanover, which was the result of their former position. Pitt had been against Cumberland's going to Germany, for thereby a special dynastic interest in Hanover was always represented; he had himself opposed the motion to bring over troops from Hanover and Hesse for the defence of England; for every country must stand on its own feet; and it was soon found out, when it was tried, that the English nation would not be protected by foreigners.

The increasing superiority of the enemy, and the want of a powerful administration, combined to make the nation almost demand William Pitt as its first minister. Lord Bute declared him to be the only man who was capable (if indeed this was within the bounds of possibility at all) to rescue the wreck of the sovereignty for the young Prince, his pupil. A conference between Bute and Newcastle, who now joined the new Whig party, though hitherto he had admitted it with great reluctance, resulted in a new ministry, made up of very various elements, held together by the danger of the country and by the spirit of William Pitt.

This danger and the unanimous consensus of opinion induced even the King, however distasteful it might seem to him, to withdraw his opposition.

A special regard for Hanoverian interests was now out of the question; they vanished before the necessities of the general war, which at this very moment held Hanover in its embrace. The Hanoverians would have been obliged to make peace, their resources being exhausted by the first campaign; now England undertook the cost of the war almost entirely. Thus England supported the King of Prussia with considerable subsidies¹. For it was not in opposition to Frederick, but in union with him and with the co-operation of his forces, that support was given to Hanover. This greatest of native German Princes, in struggling for very existence, became at the same time a hero in the history of the world; and while at his side the Duke of Brunswick, who had been trained in his service, was keeping the French employed, warding off and returning their attacks, the English kept their hands free for the war at sea and for the colonies. In North America they succeeded in rescuing for their colonists the full possession of the coast, and also (by destroying the French settlements) in opening out unimpeded extension towards the West, and therewith an illimitable future. They became masters of the West Indian islands and of the coast of Africa. In the East Indies the English war-resources proved superior to the French: at this very time England laid the foundations for its East Indian Empire. The French once more conceived the idea of attempting an invasion in favour of the Pretender; the fleets of Toulon and Brest were to operate together in the year 1759 as in the year 1692; but the one was utterly defeated on the coast of Portugal, and the other on the coast of France, before they could act.

Once more in this world-embracing conflict between the two kingdoms the internal superiority of the English was proved. In spite of an enormous debt the credit of England

¹ According to one reckoning the army of Ferdinand of Brunswick in 1758 consisted of 58,000 men, of whom 50,000 were in the immediate pay of England.

A D. 1759.

held good, and it was not necessary to lay on very excessive taxes; while the French government had to resort to advances from those who rented state lands, and was obliged to increase by fresh imposts, taxes which were already oppressive, so that it exhausted all its resources.

France had put forth all her strength in bringing her navy into play, when this was once more demolished in the great battles just mentioned, she found no means of re-establishing it. A timely auxiliary force of moderate strength would have saved Canada for the French, but it was impossible for them to send it.

We may regard this war as a continuation and completion of those great contests which came in with the Revolution of 1688. They were all directed against the predominance of France, and were at once continental and maritime. Still there was a difference corresponding to the altered circumstances. Hitherto Austria had as a rule held to England, and England on its side had taken active part in the continental wars in favour of Austria. Now Austria was allied with France, so that the war no longer raged in the Belgian Netherlands, and there was no necessity for Holland to be drawn into it. And seeing that now not only Sweden, as so often before, but Russia also was on the side of the French, their hostility, like that of Austria, was aimed, though only indirectly, against England; but it had another and independent object, viz., to force the growing Prussian kingdom back within its old limits. Their whole weight fell upon Frederick II, whom they wished to hold down, but who withstood their attacks in such a way, that he thereby raised his kingdom to the rank of a European power. On the other hand England, without any assistance from Holland, carried on the war at sea exclusively with its own forces. One may note this as the system of the elder Pitt, who herein had both Parliament and nation with him. It maintained itself beyond expectation; the English supremacy at sea was thereby established in all quarters of the globe on a perfectly secure footing.

Less than ever was said about religious grounds. As a matter of historical fact, however, the religious motive was

more conspicuous than before. The Protestant powers were on the one side, those of the Catholic and Greek faith on the other.

The thing which the Revolution of 1688, besides the motives of upholding religion and the national power had above all others aimed at, was the maintenance of the parliamentary system; and now this system was steadily extended and built up more and more in the present war, just as in the former one. Opposition to Hanoverian policy told at the same time against the independence of the crown which the Electors of Hanover wore, in its relations to the English Parliament. We know how much the connexion with Hanover contributed to the carrying out of the ideas of 1688, under the exclusive authority of the Whigs. But gradually the interests of Hanover had to vanish before those of England, which were incomparably superior. In the general view of English history the importance of the reign of George II lies especially in the fact, that he brought himself, however reluctantly, to consent to this. He felt for Hanover; his sympathies and antipathies were concerned with his German neighbours, and it would have been his ambition to realise them. But he had no mind, for the sake of doing so, to awaken that opposition which had been fatal to his predecessors in England¹. He had once been heard to exclaim in rough ill-humour, that in England the ministers were King, that is, so far as they retained command of a majority in Parliament; but in this no change could be made: he acquiesced finally in the necessity of his position, always with dignity and good grace. He was far from wishing to enlarge the prerogatives of the crown; he would have been afraid of endangering those which it now possessed. The advance in views from the old to the later Whigs, from Townsend to Pitt, he had shared. And hence at the end of his life he had the happiness of acquiring the glory of a great and victorious position in the world, and at the same time a popularity such as he had never enjoyed before.

His grandson could ascend the throne with the words

¹ Waldegrave praised him for this. *Memoirs* 4.

that he felt himself a born Briton. And what a glorious Empire it was, to the head of which he came! the product of one history, all of one piece from the moment of the first Teutonic settlement in Britain until the founding of its maritime dominion in both hemispheres. Through long centuries the logical and active mind of the people, which rejected all that was foreign and accepted only that which was akin to it, had worked at the great edifice, which now was the strongest representative of the West among distant nations. The living elements of culture, which the Empire included in itself, worked in free movements, often opposed to each other, but for that very reason were all the more strong and many-sided: individual and corporate independence did not in the least disturb a united development of power. At that time everything was prepared to enable George III to attempt the union of the two parties, which had hitherto combatted one another, in equal obedience under himself. After the lively agitation, which accompanied the conclusion of peace and filled the first eight years of the reign of George III, circumstances arose in which the Tory point of view again got the upper hand, the monarchy and the Church worked together in complete harmony, and the constituted Parliament brought the omnipotence of the supreme power into full play.

This system under George the Third had still two great contests to undergo.

The first arose out of the opposition which these mixed ecclesiastical and political ideas met with in the colonies just at the moment when they were on the point of extending to them. The union of the moderate Whigs with the Tories and the Church in the mother-country was opposed in the colonies by the zeal of the Dissenters, who in former times had escaped thither, and by the idea of a constitution founded on a representation of the sovereign people, an idea akin to the projects from which the agitation of the pre-Cromwellian epoch had proceeded. Here, on the other side of the ocean, arose a republic, still on the principles of the old English scheme, which it was neither able nor willing to reject, chiefly because it adopted as its principle those ten-

dencies which in the mother-country had been conquered, realised them and gave them shape in accordance with the sentiment of the time, and raised them to supremacy in a contest for life and death. North America was supported in this by the reviving jealousy of the other European Powers, especially of the Bourbons, against the maritime supremacy of England, then so largely increased. The heaviest day in the life of George III was the one in which he was obliged to concede the independence of the colonies. These, however, have long since developed into a great Power, far beyond the limits implied by the word colony, have changed the unlimited territory offered to the Anglo-Saxon stock into a home for themselves, and in producing new forms of social life have won for themselves the dominion of the western hemisphere.

Then followed, through the impulse supplied first by the parliamentary system and its effects in developing the national power, and then still more by the ideas of popular sovereignty and of equality which had been realised in America, the French Revolution, which in strengthening itself seemed as if it must soon lead to an analogous transformation of all other nations, while it ran full tilt at the whole system of international relations as it had existed hitherto. Even in England it found numerous supporters; already the opinion was spreading, that in this way the tendencies involved in the Revolution of 1688 would for the first time attain their full accomplishment. Once in the English Parliament there was debate on this point. The majority decided that this was not the case, that the scheme introduced into England in the year 1688 would be in the highest degree endangered by the intrusion of the French ideas of 1789; it set itself with all its might against them. Among the Whigs, who during the American war had again acquired influence and authority, divisions now arose: the modern Tories developed themselves, for they now had the nation with them, because they resumed the war at sea, which in the last contest had not been fought out, and almost obtained the sole dominion of the sea for the English navy. All efforts in another direction could be regarded as a tendency towards

the modern revolution, which, far from strengthening the position of the English constitution and the liberties guaranteed by it, rather endangered them. Hence came the share which England took in the contests on the continent, in the restoration in France, in legitimist ideas; hence also the authority of George III, and after him of his son, and of the Tory party generally.

The settlement then effected, however, brought quiet neither to Europe nor to England. Another epoch has commenced in which, in connexion with the revolutionary movements in other nations, the Whig spirit also once more awoke and gained the upper hand. In religious and political relations advances were made towards reforms, which the spirit of the century, now powerful in England also, imperatively demanded. The parliamentary and Protestant constitution of Old England was thereby considerably modified, but by no means overthrown. But was it not injured? Now and then the old hostilities, which seemed to have been overpowered or silenced by concessions, suddenly burst out in flaming manifestations with the old hatred unenfeebled by time. Violent revolutions, such as have shaken the continent with perpetual action and reaction, were avoided in England. The two tendencies, which were implanted in the constitution from the first, combatted one another with fluctuating success, but always within the limits of law.

It would afford infinite delight to investigate and describe this epoch also from the stand-point which has been gained. How many great events, how many men of the highest rank in history, what momentous conjunctions would have to be depicted! That, however, is not the province of this work.

In the above sketch of the eighteenth century the author (and probably the reader also) has already discovered that a brief description, having reference to England alone, does not lead to a satisfying and perfectly convincing result. Still less would this be the case in the time now following, when the motives to action sprang more from general circumstances than from the internal progress of English development, powerfully as this also contributed to the result. One would have to set forth the violent impulse given to the

course of events by the American War of Independence, and the volcanic outburst of popular feeling in France, and to accompany the European conflict which made the restoration of the Bourbons necessary and then again led to an inevitable opposition to the same.

In order to understand and appreciate the position which England assumed at this moment and the outcome of events, one would have to write the history of a century throughout both hemispheres.

APPENDIX.

IN our days historical studies have been directed as never before to the original monuments of the past in every century. The deciphering of Assyrian and Egyptian monuments, the collecting of Greek and Roman inscriptions, the publishing of the records and literature of the Middle Ages, the ransacking of modern archives,—however different may be the objects, the means of study, and even the intellectual capacities employed—have all the same end, viz. to get free from the trammels of established tradition, to gain a mastery over the immediate circumstances and issues of life, to see the past as a present, as it were with our own eyes.

Moreover the last centuries have produced in more than one nation historians of genuine ability, who, in themselves, are perhaps the equals of the masters of antiquity: they stand, however, and that to their disadvantage, in a relation to modern studies altogether different from that in which the old historians are placed. For antiquarian discoveries scarcely ever extend to the province of political events, which forms the basis of descriptive history; whereas it is precisely to this province that the investigation of archives in modern times has been directed. The ancients stand in solitary grandeur above an extinct world; they are almost inaccessible to a criticism based on other sources of information; the moderns on the other hand are in the widest extent exposed to such. The materials still exist out of which they composed their works; but besides them there exist also countless other witnesses respecting the motives at work at each instant, from the course and connexion of the events themselves.

I shall appear to be speaking somewhat paradoxically when I maintain that investigating the archives of times some distance removed from us has even an advantage over the description of that which lies before us in the present. The former allows us to recognise the true relations of things more comprehensively and clearly than is possible when these are in immediate connexion

with the passions and interests of the moment. In every age how much must necessarily remain secret and is even purposely falsified! All that lies within is seen in its right light only in the results. While still in the heat of the contest, the contending parties cannot possibly do one another justice. But it is precisely from this strife of contemporaries that most of the contemporaneous historical literature has proceeded, which has determined historical tradition. Such works are sometimes in themselves of inestimable value; but in order not to depend upon them absolutely nor spread their errors, their involuntary or voluntary misrepresentations and partialities, it is necessary to find a broader basis for the description given, such as can only be obtained by a study of the original documents of the epoch, as well as of the elucidations, which a later age has contributed.

This mode of proceeding, I think, is the special merit of German historical research, which, in accordance with the genius of the nation, strives to grasp the history of all other peoples with the same exactness and thoroughness with which it would grasp its own. Here a man must not allow his opinion to be fettered and determined by the one-sided conceptions, which are necessarily formed in every nation and in every age under the influence of political movements. Under no other conditions could a universal history of objective value be thought of as possible.

All hangs together; critical study of genuine sources, impartial view, objective description;—the end to be aimed at is the representation of the whole truth.

I am here setting up an ideal, respecting which I shall be told that it can never be realised. Well, the conditions of the case are these; the idea is immeasurable, the realisation of it is from its very nature limited. Happy he who has entered upon the right path, and attained to results which can stand further investigation and criticism.

Suppose then that a man had conceived the idea of devoting his best energies to the treatment of English history, especially at that epoch in which it had the greatest influence on the development of European relations as a whole, in order to gain an independent view of it, uninfluenced by English historians and the stereotyped conceptions of the two great parties; then a comprehensive investigation first of all of the English archives themselves, but besides that of the reports also which the nations most affected by the circumstance in question have preserved in their archives respecting it, would be quite indispensable.

In the Preface I have already remarked in what various ways new

information has come to my hands from the archives. In those of Venice we have a representation of the penetrating attention with which the educated world watched internal relations in the island-kingdom, especially in so far as political relations in general could be affected by them. In those of France we find the liveliest interest in each phase of events in England, nay even a participation in them, sometimes in union with the supreme power in the island, more often in opposition to it. The reports of the French ambassadors of the times of Cromwell, of James II, and of a portion of the reign of William III, are already known: those of the times of Charles I, before and during the civil war, are of not less value: perhaps those respecting the epoch of Charles II are of still greater value, covering a quarter of a century; they are as ably written as they are instructive. The publication of this correspondence would indeed form a rich addition to the literature of political history; if only its immense compass did not terrify one!

The great interconnexion of momentous events appears in the reports sent to Rome and to the court of Spain. In certain periods the Dutch archives become of high importance, owing to the political union between the two countries; thus the correspondence between William III and Heinsius is invaluable. The relations of Brandenburg to England were not so close and intimate, but always near enough to make continuous communications from London of value in Berlin. Where the Venetian reports are interrupted, or do not exhibit the same amount of intelligence as the earlier ones, e.g. in the times of William III, those of Brandenburg come in. They originate not from the ambassadors entrusted with the management of current affairs, but from a couple of foreigners of French extraction, who by long residence in the country had become thoroughly at home in English affairs; here and there they fill up the gaps which occur in the English account of proceedings in Parliament.

Still, all this wealth of information sent over to the continent affords no sufficient material for the compilation of a history. The groundwork, on which all the rest must be based, is formed by the native English documents and notes, the parliamentary journals, and for the later period the correspondence between individual ministers. The Record Office contains an abundance of important documents respecting the internal and external relations of England, although it is not quite so complete as was perhaps supposed. Much that is looked for in vain in the archives, is to be found in the British Museum; other material I looked for and found in the rich and readily opened store of manuscripts which the late Sir Thomas Philipps has collected.

If I were to cite all the material that has come into my hands, though only in serviceable quotations, I should fill several volumes, and still have to fear that I was satisfying nobody. There are, however, passages which are worth citing for their own sake, and also set forth certain conjunctures of the circumstances themselves in a clearer light than was possible in the course of narration. It is mainly such passages that I propose to introduce here, together with a criticism of the best authorities, which they serve to complete.

FIRST SECTION.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF DETAILS FROM ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.

I.

JAMES I IN ALLIANCE WITH THE POWERS OPPOSED TO THE SPANISH MONARCHY.

THE complications of England with the court of Rome resulted from the fact, that after the Gunpowder Plot James I, with the consent of Parliament, forced Catholics to take an oath, in which they had to declare the doctrine that the Pope has the power of deposing kings to be damnable and even heretical. The papal Brief condemning the oath was answered by James with a defence of the oath; and this he caused to be sent to most European courts, and among them to the Signoria of the Venetian Republic.

In a Republic, which was just then engaged in a kindred strife with the court of Rome respecting the limits of ecclesiastical power, he hoped to find an ally in this matter. In his delight at the opposition which it offered to the demands of the Pope, he told them that he was before all things an Englishman, but then by God a Venetian. The Signoria, however, had already come to terms with the Pope when the book was conveyed to them: they accepted it with all possible respect, but found themselves compelled by circumstances to forbid its circulation in their dominions.

Terrified at the irritation which the resident English ambassador displayed at this, the Venetians thought it expedient to send an extraordinary ambassador to the King, whose good-will and friendship were indispensable to them in the situation of European affairs, to apologise for them to him. Francis Contarini, who had just lately defended the cause of the Republic in Rome, was selected for this purpose. He undertook the journey in the middle of the most un-

favourable season of the year;—he arrived in February, and in March had already left London again.

At his very first audience, at which the Princess Elizabeth, afterwards Queen of Bohemia, was present at the side of the King, he received the latter's assurance that no change had taken place in his feelings towards the Republic.

After his return to Venice, in September 1610, he drew up a relation of his embassy, of which no copy can be found in the archives there. In the edition, which appeared some years ago, of the final reports of the Venetian ambassadors respecting England (I had previously had them all in my hands, and had made extracts from them) a somewhat apocryphal form of the report is printed, on which Contarini himself, who had bought it in Rome, remarks, that it is not the true relation, but contains various things which he really had drawn up.

But it is impossible that it can be genuine. How could Contarini, in speaking of the oath which had been imposed, have used the expression 'they say that it contains the doctrine that no King can be deposed by the Pope'—una forma di giuramento, nella quale dicono, contenersine il re non possa esser deposto dal papa. That was the principal item in it, about which the whole dispute had arisen.

It appears to me that Contarini undoubtedly made his report, but then did not give it in. A detailed account of the contents of what he drew up exists, and probably comes from a copy. I obtained it from the Francesconi collection at Padua, and I am rejoiced at being able to cite it. It is connected with that state of English politics from which the Palatinate marriage proceeded, and which has had an incalculable influence on the course of events.

*Contenuto della Relatione dell' Illm^o S^e Francesco Contarini K^e, emb.
Estraord^o in Inghilterra 1610.*

Nel ritorno che fece il Sig^e Francesco Contarini K. dell' Ambasciata Estraord. d'Inghilterra dove la Republica l'inviò per giustificarsi con quel Re per il Libro, che la Maestà sua compose, e per il mezzo dell' Ambasciator Ressidente in Venetia a suo nome fece presentare in Colleggio, che come fù di Sua Serenità gratiosam^e ricevuto, et riposto nel Secreto, così per interesse di Religione fù proibito alle Stampe. Riferendo della Persona di Sua Maestà, della Serma. Regina, et Sign. Prencipi, del Governo, delle Forze, e Stato di quella Corona, della dispositione de Popoli, dell' intelligenze con Prencipe, della Religione, et finalmente degl' effetti, che hà partorito questa missione, disse in sostanza :

Che havvea ritrovato la Maestà del Re in stato di compita salute,

et come nell' aspetto la natura gl'hà dato forma regale, così nelle Doti dell Animo, che per quanto si puote comprendeere, et per quel di più, che ognuno riferisse corrisponde abundantemente al di fuori, et nella pratica delle Scienze eccede alla conditione d'ogni Principe : perciò è dalla Nobiltà amato, et da Popoli, che per altro lo riveriscono, ricoverebbe maggior ossequio, se imitando la Regina morta adorata nella memoria di quelle Genti oppresso si lasciasse veder in Publico ; attende à Studi, s'essercita nelle Caccie, abborrisce i Corsari, et il desiderio di Pace è naturale in Lui. Ha per Compagna della sua vita una Sorella del Re di Danimarca et come S. M. per le sue rare qualità teneramente l' ama, così in ogni occassione li presta benigno l'orecchio, et in molte cose la costituisce arbitra del voler suo. Inclina Ella assai alla nostra Religione, e volentieri, sebene di nascosto si trattiene con Cattolici, viene riverita da Popoli, et è in gran concetto della Nobiltà. Con questa tiene S Maestà tre Figlioli, due Maschi, et una femina. Il primo è il Principe di Vaglio d'anni diecisette spirito vivace, inclinato alla Guerra, e di grand' aspettatione, et il Re, che mal volentieri vede tanta vivacità, timidamente lo stima, e rimettendolo in quanto può non li permette molto seguito. Il secondo è il Duca di Yorch d'anni nove ; questo per l'extraord^a bellezza, et per l'affabilità della sua natura è le delitie del Padre, et l'allegrezza della Corte, dimostra inclinazione di servir la Republica. Sua Maestà ne gode, et nutre in Lui questo pensiero. Per terza è la Principessa Catharina (Elisabetta) di bellissima presenza che si disegna per moglie al Figliolo del March^e di Brandenburg, ovvero a quello del Conte Palatino.

Possiede S. M. l'Isola della Gran Bretagna, et come questa per l'adietro non fù mai soggetta ad un solo Potentato, mà divisa la Scotia dall' Inghilterra, e l'Inghilterra subdivisa alle volte sotto molti Capi, hebbero per l'ordinario contrapesate frà di loro le forze, et con una perpetua aversione d'animo impedita sempre l'unità del Regno ; questo rende dunque il presente Re formidabile e potentiss^{mo} libero dalle sollevationi dell' Irlanda, che fatta priva di ricorso in Scotia cessa al presente da tumulti, et l' autor d'essi il Conte di Tiron spaventato per l'assuntion di S. M., e da Clemente iix chiamato a gran promesse profugo dalla Patria vive in Roma con vana riuscita delle speranze, et tanto pentimento delle rissolutioni sue. Domina in oltre il Re l'Irlanda, et alcune altre Isole vicine alla Scotia, et attinenti ad essa. Hà pronta l'obedientia, et contraria la natura, et l'uso dell' union de Sudditi, poiche come ognuno lo conosce, e lo confessa suo Re, così frà se stessi Inglesi e Scocesi [antipatia naturale accresciuta dall' essercitio] vivono sempre discordi, et come S. M. procura con ogni studio d'unir li Loro animi volendo, che li figlioli di Donna In-

glese maritata in Persona Scocese, et per contrario fossero abilitati ad ogni grado d'onore, così difficilmente l'ottiene, poichè Inglesi si persuadono molto, e poco volentieri vedono esaltato alcun Scocese, da Loro non adnesso ne Carichi del Governo. Mà il Re che tiene contrariro fine, et che per natura ancora è inclinato alla Patria fà à Loro per interesse di stato quanto può, gli comparte le Cariche della sua Persona, et del Reggio Pallazzo, et nel Cons^o Reggio, che è di pocco momento due Scocesi si ritrovano, che tengono più per onore, et apparentia il Titolo, che per essercitio d'autorità il Voto; così rimette in parte la diversità delle inclinationi, et unisce in quanto può l'animo di Sudditi, vera fortezza del Regno.

Ha d'entrata un millione, et mezo d'oro ogn'anno; il terzo si consuma in spese della Corte, il restante in gusto di S. M., et ornamento della Corona. Il Regno al presente fatto un corpo solo ad voler d'un solo soggetto è libero d'ogni sospetto di forze esterne per esser circondato del Mare, che però ogni confin di Lui stà disarmato, et la sola fedeltà de Popoli à il pressidio delle Fortezze. Soli trecento Arcieri trattiene S. M. per la Guardia della Persona, de quali cento à vican da stano al continuo nella Rocca di Londra. Può tutta via in poco tempo radunar un Essercito di Soldati pratici, ne vi è Prencipe Cristiano più potente di Lui. Mantiene quatro Gallioni per la Giurisdizione di quei Mari. Hà la navigation delle Indie, et manda colà ogn' anno quatro Gallioni; l'utile di questa debole ne principij, col tempo sempre più s'avanza, et la comodità de Porti in quei Paesi nell' occasion di Guerra contra Spagnoli si renderia molto opportuna, però con il frequentarla procura S. M. d'impossessarsene. Hanno l'Inglesi la Navigation del Levante fatta in una Compagnia con mezzo million d'oro, et à Costantinopoli tengono un Loro Agente, al quale il Re da nome d'Ambasciatore, non s'ingerendo nel restante; navigano à cottaesta volta ogn'anno otto Galleoni, et de Mercanti Venetiani in Inghilterra, come con Patritij con pocco negotio. Il Governo è in mano de Parlamenti dove le cose importanti si trattano, et essi servono per freno al Re nell' alienar, et internar le cose del Regno, et è da sapersi, che S. M. diferisce quanto può al Co. di Salaberi, il quale si puol dire virtualmente Re e pur la Madre di questo Re dalla Regina morta per il consiglio del Padre del presente conte fù fatta morire. Sono nel Regno cinquecento Cattolici Religiosi, buona parte Frati, vestono con la Cappa, e vivono celatamente, hanno un Arciprete, et il precedente di quesso fù dismesso à Roma per havver giurato la formula del Giuramento al Re nel quale si diceva il Papa non esser Patron del temporale, e li fù creato il Successore. Questi sono frà se stessi discordi nutrendosi dell istesso cibo, et questo gli leva il credito, et il Re, che per altro li permeteria, et forse la libertà.

di coscienza nel Regno li perseguita per l'interesse che tengono nelle cose di stato, et per l'insidie, che tengono alla sua Vita, come s'è veduto nel Trattato della Polvere. Mantiene S. M. un ottima intelligenza con questa Ser^{re} Rep^{re}, et come perl' adietro in effetti si conobbe, così più volte la protestò à Dio d'esponer ad ogni pericolo il Regno, et la Vita contro chi si sia, per sua difera, nè voler mai guardar all' onesta della causa supponendola per la prudenza e bontà di questo Governo sempre giusta, il che diede grand ammiratione alla Corte. Con Cesare tiene pocco negotio, et il Conte Salaberi di ce essere questo Principe degno anzi di compassione, che di stima. Dalla Corona di Franza riceveva S. M. mentre era in Scotia una Compagnia di trecento lance, al presente per dècoro Principe, è tenuta dal [Carlo] fatto luogotenente d'esse il Co. di Lenos del Sangue Regale. Con questo Principe [Enrico IV] più per interesse di Stato che per natural dispositione s'intende bene. Li Stati di Paesi Bassi davano mede à S. M. mentre reggeva sola la Scotia otto milla Scudi di Stipendio, che hora fanno capitare alla Camera di Londra in tanti presenti. Con questi, che per il passato erano come Ribelli al suo Re abbandonati di protetione, al presente dichiarati Principi liberi mantiene buona intelligenza, et nelle differenze di Cleve, si mostra interessatissimo, non volendo, che quel Ducato capiti nella Casa d'Austria, et per la continua amicitia che tiene con li Principe Protestanti di Germania interessati in questi affari, et che lo stimano Propugnacolo contro li Principi Chisni, et di piu perche il re disegna Matrimonio della Principessa sua Figliola col Figlio del Marche di Brandenburg overo del Co. Palatino, quello principalmente, e questo per Parentella interessati nel sud^o negotio. Con la Corona di Spagna et con l'Arciduca Alberto nutre pocco buona intelligenza, si per li affari presenti, come perche quell' Altezza dà ricetta à Conspiratori della Persona di S. M. come successe di quelli nel Trattato della Polvere. Spargono Spagnoli grand oro nel Regno, et raccolgono buone intelligenze; sonno creduti li migliori Cattolici e nella Irlanda è più fermo questo concetto, dove credono, che la vera Fede in loro solamente si ritrovi. Nutre l'Amb^o loro questo concetto, poiche oltre molte altre demonstrationi esce ogni Venerdi fuori di Londra ad un Luogo dove si sepoliscono quelli Cattolici, che per insidie fatte al Re, overo per altri simili delitti si levano dal Mondo, et qui fa Orationi dicendo honorar li suoi meriti, e pregate per loro. Sua Santità la passerebbe meglio, se non fossero li rispetti della Religione, e li brutti termini, et insidie usate dalli Cattolici contro il Re. Clemente Ottavo dava al presente Re mentre era in Scotia Stipendio per valersene contro la Regina d'Inghilterra.—Finalmente (disse) che la speditione di questa Ambascieria ne tempi di tante agitationi, et sospensioni d'Animi per cause

di pocco rilievo, et non necessaie non hà piaciuto à molti Principi, poiche Spagnoli prendevano argomento dà ciò, che la Republica s'interessasse con suoi Nemici, et havvevano à male, che seben disenteressato fomentasse in apparenza la riputatione de contrarij Potentati à Loro molto danosa. Mà Francesi la sentirono peggio vedendo segni di tanta stuma verso altri Principi, si perche pretendono soli la prottatione della Republica, et vorriano viceversa quella segni d'estimatione ad ogn' altro Principe superiori, et perche pareva, che nelli moti passati col Papa havesse la Republica aggradito più l'offerte Inglesi, che gl' Offitij, et interpositioni di Franza et dà quelle più, che dà questa riconosciuto l'accomodamento, il che per tutta la Franza si è potuto chiaramente comprendere¹ Che del Libro non accettato, che in Franza dove pubblicamente si vende, et à Venetia resta con prohibition di Stampa disse S. M. non havver mai havuto intentione di pregiudicar alla Religione altrui, et che restava Sodisfatis^{ma} della maniera tenuta dalla Republica da Lui stimata, et amata oltre ogni Principe, ricevendo inoltre in grande onore la detta Ambasciera, la quale havveva maggiorm^{te} confermato l'animo di S. M. molto al servizio di questa Patria l'affetto de Grandi, che dissero L'Ambasciator Vlton (Wotton) nel presente negotio havver fatto troppo gran volo; et finí.

II.

THE PEACE OF SUSA, APRIL 1629.

Among the most important crises in the general history of the modern world must be reckoned, of course, the great turn in the tide of affairs which set in in the year 1629 to the advantage of Protestantism, or rather to the disadvantage of the house of Austria and Spain, which at that time was on the point of winning complete supremacy on the continent. The revolution was in itself more violent than is commonly known. Among other things one sees from authentic papers, which came to light a short time ago, that the French in the year 1628 meditated re-establishing Catholicism in Scotland, and that therewith the quite serious project was formed of attacking England at the same time (because otherwise nothing

¹ The spurious report has in place of the whole passage respecting Spain and France merely the remark, that the French 'protendendo di essere stati autori dell' accomodamento in Roma a di aver causa di ottima corrispondenze con V. Serta non videvano volentieri che si stringesse amicitia col re d'Inghilterra,'—which is all watered down so as to tell one nothing. Some notes which follow contain more valuable matter.

would be gained), and that with the combined forces of France and Spain¹. For some years past this alliance between France and Spain against England had been talked of.

However, at the end of 1628 and beginning of 1629 a reconciliation took place between France and England, by means of which the French had their hands set free to interpose in Italy. The complications which resulted from this ended later on in bringing the King of Sweden, thanks to French interference, to Germany.

In this great turn in the course of affairs the Venetians who, threatened on both sides, had the most pressing need of some security, took an important part. The Peace of Susa is really the work of the Venetian ambassadors then accredited in England and France, Aluise Contarini and Zorzo Zorzi, and more especially of the former than of the latter. Contarini negotiated first with Buckingham, and then, by his advice, with King Charles himself and the commissioners, to whose hands the latter entrusted the business. The articles were concerted by him and Zorzo Zorzi, who was in correspondence with Effiat and Richelieu, and were reduced to a form in which it was thought that the two powers would come to an agreement respecting them; these articles then served as a basis for the treaty, at the conclusion of which Zorzo Zorzi was present in person.

It is plain that the ambassadors would have accomplished nothing, if the good-will of the governments on both sides had not come to their assistance. Here very little indeed could be said about the power of their Republic or of the influence exercised by it. 'But,' said Contarini on one occasion, 'what could an ambassador accomplish, if he had not the support of the ministry with which he is negotiating?' Peace between the two powers was to the interest of both, and was the wish of both. The merit of the Venetians was simply this—to find out this state of things, and to remove the difficulties which lay in the way. The '*dispacci*' of the Venetian ambassadors begin to attract universal attention; much as their final '*Reports*.' They are a continuous journal of events, kept by men of penetration, who were near the mainsprings of action. The ambassadors were not always initiated into the secrets: but they had means, which were not at the command of others, of obtaining information; and in England, especially under the first two Stuarts, they had a political position, which gave them access to the King himself and conferred on them a sort of confidential character. I have availed myself of the information which they give, so far as it seemed to be in

¹ Hippeau; *Mémoires inédits du Comte Leveneur de Tillières*, 1863, p. 217.

point,—the first time (I believe) that this has been done in a continuous work. Much deserves to be published in extenso; and this will no doubt be done by the English government. I will here cite only one instance, in which the Venetians took a substantial part in determining the position of affairs in the world.

1. *Aluise Contarini al senato. Di Londra 20 Agosto 1628.*

. . . . Il mio Dispaccio ultimo contiene gli ufficij, che ho passati col Duca et Carleton intorno li maneggi di Spagna, dopo i quali Carleton med^{mo} mi disse, che il Duca (Buckingham) ne haveva discorso seco non senza riflesso, et egli coadiuvatili conforme i suoi ottimi sensi. Due giornate appresso m'arrivano doi dispacci dell'Ecc^{mo} Zorzi, dai quali havendo cavato in sostanza esservi qualche apprensione nei Francesi della flotta d'Inghilterra che veramente uscirà poderosissima con qualche mancat mento ancora, che si trova in quelle armate, con le considerationi prudentissime di quell' Ecc^a, che prima di ridursi al sangue fosse opportuno maneggiar la penna et l'ingegno per il negotio. Sopra questi fondamenti quantunque deboli, et in congiunture assai stravaganti non mi sono sgomentato di fabricare puntellati massime di quelle ragione che mi sono parse migliori et più forti non devo estendermi nei particolari perchè le aggiunte lettere, che scrivo in Francia danno loro intera informatione. La prima è scritta di concerto col Duca, che mi ha fatto andar a posta ad una delle sue case, et introdottomi per sale et stanze secrete, dove non era alcuno, essendo trattenuto ben quattro hore a disputar, resolver, et adomesticar il negotio sempre con l'assistenza di Carleton, che in questo fatto si è portato egregiamente.—Per facilitar il progresso del negotio ho risoluto ispedir il secretario Augustini come che sia informatissimo di queste facende et atto a ben servire l'Ecc^{mo} Zorzi massime in caso di trattarsi in Francia col Duca, conoscendo tutti quelli, che sono appresso di lui, i concetti et le massime et altri particolari che possono occorrer sopra il fatto, i quali sono tanti che con cento fogli non potrei indovinare. Al medesimo Augustini ordino di ispedir da Parigi il passato dispaccio in tutta diligenza a Vostra Serenità a fine che possi con suoi prudentissimi comandamenti dar vigor al maneggio, se Rocellesi non vogliono trattar senza assenso di questa Corona per non perder la sua protetione come hanno più volte dichiarato nei passati rotti maneggi, perchè qui se ne contentano se Francesi non vogliono trattar de proprj sudditi con Principi esteri, eccoli soddisfatti perchè il Re d'Inghilterra non pretende che di dar loro campo libero

sotto la protezione però delle sue armi. Per le altre cause d'una guerra il Duca non disente da un abboccamento che in due giorni terminerà tutto, ne più Francesi potranno escusarsi di non assister l'Italia con queste et con la guerra interna, perchè hanno il modo in mano di far la pace in un attimo; anzi hanno un' invito formale di assister l'Italia et la causa pubblica non abbracciando l'incontro se si spargerà molto sangue se la Rocella sarà soccorsa, o se non soccorsa se faranno altre intraprese non doveranno dolersi come ne anco se Inghilterra accorderà con Spagnuoli per il cui effetto lo Scaglia a Bruxelles va seco quel Porter che avvisai per passar in Spagna Geibier che altre volte fece le aperture col Pittor Rubens d'Anversa, et un Padre dominicano Irlandese stato in Spagna, di là a Bruxelles, et ultimamente venuto qui.

Carleton che in questo negotio si è molto affaticato anco per suo interesse, perchè cangiandosi la scena et le massime non aveva più nè parte nè stima mi disse, che il Duca preferirà sempre la pace di Francia a quella di Spagna poi che sia con onore, perchè la prima si può terminare in due giornate mentre l'Inghilterra non pretende alcuna cosa sopra la Francia, nè la Francia si affatica per guadagnar quello che è già suo; ma per l'altra vi sono tanti interessi, conseguenze et artefici, che non si può veder il fine così presto, et perchè con questa occasione mi sono avanzato a molta confidenza mi ha confessato esservi qualche incamminamento di negotio con la Spagna; ma ne suoi principj ancor teneri et deboli, che mi conferma nelle durezza avvisate dal canto di Spagnuoli, come pur per altra parte intendo, che l'ambasciator di Savoia ha promesso molto più in questo negotio di quello si trova negli effetti; ma però io non mi fido così facilmente. Mi soggiunse, che certamente la flotta si volgerebbe in aiuto del Re di Danimarca, quando più non fosse necessaria in Francia, et sarebbe un gran colpo per Austriaci, se questi doi Re uno in Alemagna l'altro in Italia si volgiessero in un medesimo tempo, non aspettati, senza intoppi o diversioni tra di loro.

2. *Al Contarini Lettera all' Ecc^{mo} Zorzi. (Ottobre 1628.)*

. Ottenuta l'audienza di S. M^{ta} ripigliando il concertato già col Duca procurai di tenermi sul medesimo sentiero. Mi rispose S. M^a quasi con le med^{me} parole contenute nell' aggiunta scrittura; la mi fece leggere dal Tesoriere, et dal Visconte Carleton soli Commissarj deputati meco per trattar di questo negotio. Sono due Sig^{ri} ben intentionati da quali spero ogni bene anche per loro proprio interesse perchè sono conosciuti del buon partito, il quale

sostenendosi si sosteniranno essi ancora, altrimenti caderanno; letta la scrittura mi fu permesso di prender nota dei punti essenziali, et io subito la estesi come intenderà, ben certo che se errassi in qualche parola, non fallo al sicuro nel senso. Fatta la debita ponderatione mi parvero i passi di S. M^{ta} un poco più ristretti, riservati e difficili, per avanzar terreno, mentre a tutto potere si sollecita la partenza della Flotta, et il negotio richiede tempo perchè contiene l'interesse di molti, et i Ministri della Repub^a non devono per desiderio troppo ardente di questo bene camminando in fretta scortarsi dei proprj riguardi di non offendere Francesi in vece di essere mediatori; replicai per ciò che quando pure s'inducessero Francesi a rilasciar la Roccella, il che sarebbe molto difficile, l'Inghilterra otterrà il suo intento, et la Francia resterà al disavvantaggio, per dubbio che nel trattato poi, il quale da all' hora indietro si principiasse, fossero richieste cose inconcessibili, onde tutto andasse in fumo, le spese per prender la Roccella gettate, la riputatione offesa, et l'Inghilterra con l'Armata vigorosa possa pur vogliersi ovunque volesse a danni di Francia; aggiinsi che per risolvere questa oppositione, et per meglio indur Francesi a contentarsene si poteva in un tempo medesimo procurar, che la pace fosse generale interna et esterna, et le forze di questi due Regni vigorose intatte per vogliersi al profitto del ben pubblico che ne sospira: per l'interna restava una difficoltà; et era che Ugonotti non voleva riceverla senza l'assenso d'Inghilterra per non perder la sua protezione, come era seguito nei trattati inconclusi dell' Alve e della Grange avvisatimi da Lei; a che per rimediare si poteva far loro intendere per qualche mezzo che ricevendo la pace l'Inghilterra non lo disapproverebbe, per la esterna poi che l'Ecc^{za} Vostra haverebbe supplito egregiamente; perchè quanto al Mare poteva rimettersi all' ultimo trattato tra il fu Re Giacomo et il Cristianissimo presente, nel che non conoscevo alcuna difficoltà; quanto alle prede seguite hinc inde o tutti resterebbono pari o pure si rimeterebbe l'affare a Deputati reciprochi, come pure le altre brighe inferiori; et quanto alla casa della Regina, la quale non haverà gran difficoltà hora che il Duca è morto; et forse la madre et la sorella causa d'ogni impedimento si ritireranno da loro; oltre che si crede da qui inanti la Regina haverà molta autorità, se saprà valersene, et se i Francesi vorranno dargliene il modo, et conoscer questo bene, et che tra tanto fosse una sospensione d'arme et si rimettesse la libertà del commercio, così avanzati in due maneggi interno ed esterno si sarebbon divertite le asprezze, il sangue et il dubbio dell' esito sempre dipendente in casi tali più dalla fortuna che dalla prudenza oltre che accordandosi in un tratto non si darebbe tempo al contrapunto

de Spagnoli et s'induirebbero meglio Francesi ad un trattato intero che spezzato. Non ebbi io timore d'avanzarmi a questi individui non per colpir, ma per scoprir Paese, et farmi piazza all' avvenire; onde le mie considerationi portate a Sua Maestà, et consultate due giorni mi fu risposto che in questo luogo mi si confermava l'ottima volontà verso la pace col Cristianissimo, et il desiderio che le forze di questi due Regni s'impiegassero reciprocamente, le une in Italia, le altre nell' Alemagna; che si lodava le propositioni mie di trattar tutto nel medesimo tempo; ma che due rispetti trattenevano di far per ora maggior passo: l'una che le mie aperture non erano per parte del Cristianissimo, ma semplici testimoni dell' affetto di lei et mio: onde non pareva che fosse con riputatione passar più oltre per adesso, mentre l'animo de' Francesi era tuttavia incerto, et quello di S. M^{tà} già molto amplamente dichiaratomi, l'altro che la strettezza del tempo al partir della flotta non permetteva il mover una macchina così grande con dubbio etiamdio, che rilasciandosi la briglia ad Ugonotti, o si scoraggiassero, o facendola loro pace restasse l'Inghilterra esclusa e burlata: Che però non ostante tutto questo quando il Christianissimo voglia mostrar affettione e sincerità verso il pubblico lasciando la Rocella, come unico testimonio di non voler il Massacro di Ugonotti, haverebbe S. M^{tà} oltre la dichiarazione fattami leggere inviato un suo gentil' uomo costì per far intender al Duca di Roan questa sua rissoluzione di pacificarsi, e con facoltà etiamdio di trattar la riconciliatione tra i due regni al qual effetto l'E. V. haverebbe potuto ottener et mandar subito un passaporto.

.....

3. *Lett^a scritta in Francia all' Ecc^{mo} Zorzi.*

..... Strinsi in modo Sua Maestà, che cavatosi il cappello, con calore mi disse: tutto è vero, ma il mio honore m'importa più; le mie armi sono per soccorrere la Rocella, non per trattare; vien detto che sia impossibile, ma io non lo credo; la nostra pace servirà a nulla, quando non sia principio di una buona guerra, la quale non si può far senza gli amici; et quanto a Danimarca non ha incontro di quell' avviso

La Regina invece di mandarmi la lettera promessa per la Regina madre, mi manda a dire in molta confidenza, che non vorrebbe disgustar il Re, interessandosi troppo avanti in questo negozio della casa con sue lettere; ma che mi pregava di supplire, attestando che contentissima rimaneva del servitio et della Corte che hora si trova, et che sommamente desidera, che questo non intorbidì il negozio principale; il quale terminato porterà in necessaria conseguenza seco tutte

le altre soddisfazioni facendomi aggiunger di haver scitto in tal maniera la volta passata; che tutto quello sarà portato da Ministri della Repubblica haverà intiera fede, et sarà favorito dalla Regina madre; questo mi conferma che niente si avanzerà nel punto predetto, che il Re sta risoluto; et che il parlame riesce di pregiudizio alla Regina medesima la quale per questo rispetto, conoscendo l'humore del Re non vuol retrocedere dal posto di autorità in che si avanza; può essere che anco non voglia metter in carta alcuna cosa per non pregiudicarsi acciò dopo fatta la pace ne richiedesse qualche soddisfazione; Francesi non gli rimproverino di essersi hora così contentata

4. *Lett^a all' Ecc^{mo} Zorzi 18 Novembre 1628.*

. Le cause mò, che mi fanno sollecitar il negotio a tutta briglia sono il sospetto di qualche maligno influxo spagnolo già pubblicandosi che il Cattolico darà ogni soddisfazione all' Inghilterra anche con qualche portione del Palatinato per impedir questa riunione con Francesi; li discorsi che si fanno su questa pace, la quale non essendo ancor conclusa resta soggetta alla censura, e tutti parlano conforme i loro affetti et passioni, chi approbandola, chi trovando et inventando ancora degli intoppi; anco il Conte d'Arondel rientrato nel Consiglio unito col Tesoriero, et in non poca autorità appresso il Re non dirò che ricusi la pace con la Francia perchè infatti sono stracchi della guerra, ma benchè faciliteranno anco quella con Spagna se n'haverranno il modo, essendo hereditarij delle massime del fu Re Giacomo. In somma tutte le circostanze richiedono prestezza; è prestessa pure mi vien soffiato nell' orecchie che usiamo per non dar tempo alle mercantie. A questo fine io travaglio con ogni spirito; ma il Re ritrovandosi al disotto e senza timore dell' inimico vittorioso non può con doppio dishonore et parlare et perdere; tocca al vincitore far qualche passo massime in questa congiuntura, che tanto quò importare agli interessi della Francia, dell' Italia, e del pubblico.

5. *Di Londra 2 Decembre 1628.*

. Il Tesoriere come sempre ho scritto non pensa che alla pace, gridata a piena bocca dai popoli o con Spagna o con Francia, o con tutti, rispetto al traffico, et richiesta delle presenti necessità del Re; hora che dubitando egli che Carlil non disamato dal Re, et con i concetti ardenti et generosi, che scrivo nelle lettere, facendo mercantia di queste paci non rompi l'ordimento de suoi fini vorrebbe prevenirlo

esistimando, che compisca all' autorità che gode, et alla carica, che tiene, la pace meglio che la guerra Il Re parlando con gli Amb^{ti} d'Olanda si è formalizzato come dopo un mese, e più della caduta della Rocella, s'intende delle intentioni de Francesi, quasi che vittoriosi non si cuino più d'alcuno, et è pieno di sospetto del Card^{le} particolarmente; il medesimo linguaggio ha tenuto meco ancora quando lo vidi, come intenderanno, et io per troncar queste male radici, piantate o sia sopra la risposta di Montegù con quelle altre considerationi, o sia per farsi piazza di honestà alle trattationi con Spagnoli, oltre l'haver subito espedito in Francia, oltre l'havermi servito delle lettere dell' Ecc^{mo} Zorzi in ziffre per confirmar in generale la buona volontà de Francesi et trattener il precipitio, mi sono anco servito delle ragioni . . .

6 *Lettera del Zorzi al Contarini. In Francia 20 Genn.*

. Quanto all' essentialissimo capitolo della Regina et sua Casa io credo d'haver servito a Francesi meglio di quello che essi med^{mi} potevano desiderare perchè tra il rifiuto in generale di tutto come sempre fece il Re et il pregiudizio di rimetter nella Regina Madre come il Cardinale haveva esteso, et era cosa impraticabile, ho fatto trovar buona la riforma che vedrà. Due parti ella contiene: una che il capitolato et articoli del matrimonio saranno di buona fede ristabiliti, l'altro più importante che per la casa et famiglia della Regina si tratterà con soddisfazione di una parte l'altra quello che per servizio di Lei sarà giudicato a proposito, di che non volevano, a modo che sia, far menzione ma fermarsi nella prima generalità. Così resta campo libero a Francesi di riattaccar i loro negoziati più o meno secondo le congiunture, et se ben i commissarj (inglesi) nell' accordarmelo mi dissero, che speravano, che la Francia non vorrebbe servirsene, che di sola apparenza senza sturbar il riposo del Re et il gusto degli Inglesi, nondimeno a noi non tocca di guardar queste rivolte, ma seguita la pace lasceremo l'effettuazione poi agli interessati, ben certi, che quando sia stabilita, queste piccole cose non la romperanno; quanto al resto della capitulatione non ho voluto, che cosa alcuna si vari ancorchè a molti passi pretendessero riforme, acciò tanto più Francesi restino contenti, come ne son sicuro, non sapendo come il Re sia venuto a capitar di nuovo per il matrimonio et casa della Regina, che per l'addietro così sodamente abboriva et era l'unico scoglio di questa navigazione. Accordate dunque la capitulatione mi dissero che speravano sarebbe anco ricevuta costì et perchè il mondo conoscesse che altra mira non havevano, che del ben pubblico verso il quale vedevano etiandio portata la Franza con cui l'Inghilterra tenerebbe

sempre mano, pregavano Sua M^{tà} a questo fine non per capitulatione, nè per participatione, ma in gratia di questa pace per cortesia, et per suo honore apresso il mondo che il C^{ist}ianissimo dessa la pace a suoi sudditi dentro il Regno, come unico fondamento di questo bene, che si desiderava al pubblico. Qui mi rammentorno che Francesi dubitavano che sua M^{tà} volesse tubarli il Regno dopo che pretendesse haver parte nei loro trattati, che volessero soprintendenza nei loro sudditi comprendendoli nella capitulatione, ma che hora tutti resterebbono chiani della sincerità delle sue intentioni, volte solo all' vantaggio del pubblico, et è certissimo che non vi è altro oggetto in questo, se non un poco di honore, dopo tante perdite, et un tantino di coscienza Calvinista, soggiogandomi, che seguendo o qualche perdon generale agli Ugonotti come tante volte Francesi hanno detto agli Ambasciatori di voler fare, o la pace secondo il progetto che il Cardinale ha mostrato agli Ambasciⁱ Olandesi, o in altra maniera, che meglio stimassero, V. E. potrà con il capitulato p^{te} piacendo costì stabilir la pace¹

III.

CATHOLIC FACTIONS IN ENGLAND.

Peace was concluded not only with France but with Spain. Under the influence of these two Powers the strength of Catholicism increased immensely.

From a report—Stato della religione catt^{ca} in Inghilterra dell' anno 1632 (Bibl. Barberini)—which was addressed to Pope Urban VIII, one sees that, not the King certainly, who was rather looked upon as neutral, but still the best officials were accounted as Catholics and friends of the Catholics. But even among these divisions broke out which are specially remarkable, because they involved Queen Henrietta in a misunderstanding with the ruling men in France. She would not exchange the confessor, to whom she was accustomed, for a Capuchin, whom Father Joseph proposed to her.

Il numero de Cattolici era maggiore di quello, che credevasi, e forse erano li più, e specialmente fra la nobiltà, ma non apparivano, perchè si tenevano segreti, e più sariano stati, se le discordie, delle quali parleremo appresso, non havessero tenuta indietro la conversione.

¹ The decision sent by Richelieu to Effiat, Feb. 8, 1629, has reference to these proposals; it placed the conclusion of the treaty beyond a doubt. Avenel, Richelieu iii. 228.

Quelli, che potevano mantenere nelle loro Case un sacerdote secolare, o regolare, ed ivi facevano segretamente celebrar messa, ed era tale la pietà loro, ed il rispetto verso gli ecclesiastici, che chi li teneva appresso di se, dava loro autorità grande nella sua Casa, la quale abusata da molti produceva alle volte gravi inconvenienti. Quelli, che non avevano modo d'intrattenere un sacerdote, andavano ai divini uffici all' oratorio della Regina, o a quelli dell' ambasciatori dei Principi Cattolici, e molti alla Chiesa de' Padri Cappuccini. I quali avevano in mezzo alla Città di Londra congiunto al Palazzo della Regina un Convento, ed un luogo, che già serviva per giuoco di palla, assegnato loro per edificarvi una Chiesa pubblica in esecuzione delle convenzioni matrimoniali della Maestà Sua. Erasi trascurata la fabbrica per le cagioni, che appresso si diranno, ma frattanto si officiava in una stanza convertita in Cappella pubblica. Per l'addietto i Cattolici all' uscire dall' Oratorio della Regina erano stati talvolta presi, e poi rilasciati, quando con pagare denari, e quando liberamente in grazia della regina, ma da qualche tempo non erano occorsi simili accidenti. Era stata grande emulazione fra Padri Cappuccini, ed in specie fra un tal Padre Leonardo, e li Padri dell' Oratorio sopra il Confessare la Regina. I Cappuccini a requisizione del Padre Giuseppe da Parigi erano favoritamente sostenuti dal Ré, e dal Cardinale Richelieu, onde si corse pericolo di amari disgusti, poichè la Regina parendole essere così costretta a lasciare il suo solito Confessore per un Cappuccino, delevasi grandemente delle continue istanze fatte dal Marchese di Fontanè ambasciatore di Francia a nome di Sua Maestà Cristianissima, e dall' altro lato in Francia si facevano querele, che ella stesse così inflessibile all' ufficj del fratello. La costanza della Regina veniva dall' affetto al suo Confessore antico, huomo di probità, ma freddo, e dalle persuasioni del Guarda sigillo di Francia valido assai con Sua Maestà, e favorevole a Padri dell' Oratorio, il quale continuamente scrivevale, che stesse salda, perchè la vincerebbe; e quanto in Francia facevasi al contrario, tutto era a contemplazione del Padre Giuseppe; ma che nel rimanente non premevasi di alterare la sua volontà. Quindi ne nacquero le differenze tra il Guardasigillo, ed il medesimo padre, le quali proruppero poi in altre acerbità. Questa disputa mantenutasi lungamente in piedi, e fomentata con eccessivo calore dal pre nominato Padre Leonardo, finalmente si terminò col ritorno di lui a Parigi, dopo che in Londra fù stimato bene di non coartar più la Regina. Tal contrasto in Inghilterra rovinò l'Ambasciatore Fontanè per essersi seco altamente irritata la medesima Regina, non potendo più soffrire le tante sue istanze.

IV.

THE ENGLISH COURT AND STATE IN THE YEAR 1634.

The same ambassador, who was so displeasing to the Queen on account of his pertinacity about her confessor, after his return to France prepared a report, in which he specially mentions the means by which the English court could be retained in its devotion to the French court, and be withdrawn from the influence of that of Spain. With a few strokes Fontenay sketches the three parties, Anglicans, Puritans and Catholics, their relations to the crown and to the two rival powers; we get to know all the leaders and the weak points where they might be assailed, above all, however, of what great importance it was to the French in gaining their ends to make use in time of the Queen, who was gradually gaining more and more influence over her husband.

*Relation donnée par M. de Fontenay au retour de son ambassade
d'Angleterre au mois de juin 1634.*

Il y a trois factions en Angleterre, celle des protestans, celle des puritains et celle des catholiques.

Les premiers sont d'esprit modéré, parcequ' ilz vivent en repos, et tous de l'opinion du prince, dans la cour et dans les conseils, duquel ilz ont tout le crédit.

Les puritains sont ennemys de l'autorité royale, factieux, mutins, puissans dans le parlement, où ilz s'opposent tousjours aux demandes et aux propositions de leur roy.

De la contention de ces deux, qui sont presque d'esgalle puissance, naist le soulagement et la tolérance des catholiques, qui, comme les plus foibles, ne font point de corps dans l'estat, et ne sont considérés que par les particuliers qui agissent en leur faveur.

Les principaux protestans qui tous dans le ministère de l'estat sont le gr. trésorier, l'archevesque de Cantorbery, le C^{te} d'Arrondel, le Vice-Roy d'Irlande, le C^{te} de Carlisle et le secret^r d'estat Wandibanck.

Tous ceux là sont apparemment d'accord entre eux et dépendent du Trésorier comme de leur chef, chacun d'eux a néanmoins ses passions particulières lesquelles il fait valoir sans heurter leur commun dessein.

Le Trésorier veut la paix et pour sa subsistance et par sa foiblesse, c'est pourquoy il demeurera neutre entre France et Espagne, sans se déclarer contre les uns ny contre les autres, quelqu' avantage qu'il y

peust recognoistre en Allemagne. Il est vray néantmoins qu'à la sollicitation de ceux du party d'Espagne, qui sont en grand nombre et qui l'approchent familièrement, il favorise en plusieurs choses les Espagnols au préjudice des autres; surtout il appréhende la despense, ne subsistant principalement auprès de son maistre que par son bon menage; c'est la raison pourquoy la France le doit conserver, parcequ'il ne peut avoir de successeur qui ne soit pire que luy, qui respecte et révere Mgr. le Cardinal, particulièrement obligé à luy des derniers tesmoignages qu'il luy a rendus de son affection.

Il luy reste tousjours un secret déplaisir de ce que Mr. de Chateaufort luy a fait demander permission de recevoir le présent de France après la conclusion de la paix, lequel on ne luy a point donné.

L'arch. de Cantorbery doit estre honoré par l'ambassadeur du roy d'autant que de luy dépendent les graces ou les persécutions que l'on fait aux catholiques, lesquels jusque icy il a tousjours bien traittez.

Quant aux Comtes d'Arrondel, Carlisle, Winworth, vice-roy d'Irlande, Cottinton et Wandibanck, l'intérêt les fait espagnolz, tirans plusieurs notables avantages du commerce et des passeports que le C^{te} d'Olivarès accorde aux marchands, qui négotient pour eux.

Carlisle, du quel la brigue est grande dans la cour, ne peut estre gaigné que par sa femme, laquelle gouverne aussy le député d'Irlande; ny elle que par Percy, son frère, qui affectionne la France, et luy par présens et gratifications. Quant à Cottinton, Arrondel et Wandibanck ilz n'agissent que comme il plaist au Trésorier, et ne peuvent estre maniez que par luy, des deux premiers estant ouvertement déclarez pour Espagne.

Outre ceux-là le marquis d'Hamilton mérite d'estre considéré, et pour sa qualité et pour son esprit qui le met en grande estime auprès de son maistre, et pour l'affection qu'il a de servir la France, ce qu'il peut et pourra encore plus utilement un jour.

Son intérêt est le payement d'une pension de douze mil livres accordée à ses prédécesseurs pour le remboursement du duché de Chastellerault.

Les puritains, les quels se voyent exclus de l'administration des affaires par le Trésorier, ont fait cabale auprès de la royne pour le ruyner par le moyen du C. d'Hollande.

Les principaux de ce party sont le C. de Warrewik, frère du C. d'Hollande, le C. de Bedford et, dans la cour, les Comtes de Pembrock et Hollande, Gorrin et plusieurs autres que Montaigny avait joints.

Il est certain que la royne bien conseillée et bien conduite auroit grand pouvoir sur l'esprit du roy son mary. Outre qu'il est passionnément amoureux d'elle, il a encore en admiration son esprit, et

luy désère en la plus part des choses où il est prévenu par elle, ce qui peut augmenter de jour en jour, à cause des maladies du Trésorier qui le tiennent esloigné de son maistre.

Hollande qui est foit nécessaire pourroit estre gaigné par une pension, mais si l'on le juge à propos, auparavant que de la luy offrir, il faut avec le temps luy donner confiance, et luy tesmoigner que l'on l'ayme, il sera extrêmement difficile à gaigner, à cause de l'amitié qu'il porte à Jars, et de l'espérance qu'il a tousjours en Chasteauneuf. Cela dépendra de l'adresse de l'am^{br} du roy de prendre son temps et d'avancer ou reculer selon qu'il jugera à propos, de peur de jeter cet esprit plus en défiance, et l'obliger à se déclarer au Trésorier et à Carlisle.

Généralement la nation angloise a la nostre en hayne, et luy porte envie, et au contraire respecte l'espagnole et la craint.

Le marchands, à cause de l'utilité qu'ilz tirent beaucoup plus grande du commerce d'Espagne que de celui de France.

Les pirates et les gens de mer pour la facilité qu'ilz ont de nous faire la guerre et de s'enrichir à nos despens.

Ceux qui gouvernent l'estat, à cause des pensions et des présens qu'il ne leur est point honteux d'accepter, leur roy leur en donnant l'exemple, duquel presque pas un de ses subjects n'approche sans luy donner mesme jusqu'à deux ou trois jacobus, qu'il reçoit agréablement aux estrennes.

Le protestans portent envie à nos prospérités, et appréhendent plus nos bons succès qu'ilz n'ont jamais fait la grandeur d'Espagne.

Les puritains nous veulent mal de ce que nous avons rangé leurs confrères, et se figurent que nous ferons le mesme partout où nous aurons pouvoir, et que nous ne fomentons les Suédois que pour les ruiner les derniers.

Des catholiques, qui ne reçoivent assistance que d'Espagne, croient aussy que la religion n'est que là.

Nous avons souffert que les Séminaires établis à Dieppe et à Rheims ayent esté transportés en Flandres, et nous ne leur faisons aucun bien.

Le plus habile d'entre eux est Tobie Mathew, homme d'esprit, actif et puissant, qui parle les langues facilement, s'introduit dans les cabinets, s'ingère de toutes sortes d'affaires, cognoist l'esprit de ceux qui gouvernent l'estat, et principalement celui du Trésorier, lequel il presse de telle sorte qu'il vient à bout de tout ce qu'il entreprend en faveur d'Espagne.

Le remède que l'on peut apporter à cette contrariété est de gaigner le roy d'Angleterre, par flateries, par déférences, et par tesmoignages d'estime.

Les ministres par présens et en favorissant les marchands qui seront recommandez de leur part, d'autant qu'ilz ont intérêt en leur négoce, et ne souffrant pas que le gens de justice qui réduisent tout en chicanne soient arbitres de toutes sortes de différens.

Tobie est homme sans intérêt particulier, qui ne travaille que pour l'honneur et pour sa passion qui est le soulagement et l'avancement des catholiques. Il s'offre de vouloir aymer et servir la France, pourveu qu'elle l'assiste en ce dessein.

Premièrement en s'entremettant autant qu'il se peut et qu'il se doit pour procurer le changement du serment d'Angleterre en celui d'Irlande, que le Pape approuve, parcequ'il ne concerne que la fidélité due au prince.

En établissant des Séminaires en France principalement de Jésuites, qui ne demandent qu'une pension de deux ou trois mil livres sur un bénéfice pour leur commencement.

En distribuant quelque argent aux généraux des trois ordres, séculiers, Jésuites et Bénédictins, pour les aumosnes, et à quelques particuliers moins engagés avec Espagne et capables de servir au desceu des généraux.

Parmi les séculiers il y a un nommé Laborne, vicaire de l'évesque de Calcedoine, qui est un homme dangereux et maling, lequel il faut retirer, s'il se peut.

Foister, parcequ'il est fidèle, affectionné, sincère et confident du trésorier, doit estre soigneusement conservé sur tous.

Après de la royne l'on peut faire estat, que la nourrice et Civel, son gendre, serviront fidèlement, le dernier avec beaucoup d'adresse et de hardiesse ; l'on lui a promis un brevet de douze cens livres de pension.

La puissance d'Angleterre ne doit pas estre considérée tant par celle du roy que par celle des particuliers.

Le revenu du prince, qui ne passe pas six millions de livres, a esté engagé de moitié par le D. de Bouquingham, tellement qu'il ne peut faire la guerre sans l'assistance du parlement, lequel n'a jamais accordé plus de cinq subsides qui se montent à quinze cent mil escus.

Il y a diverses compagnies de particuliers, qui entretiennent grand nombre de vaisseaux, avec lesquels ilz peuvent commodément endommager nos costes et piller nos marchands, meme, si le prince le tolère, se mettre au service et aux gages des Espagnols, qui ne peuvent tirer d'ailleurs de vaisseaux qui leur soient propres et ne se peuvent servir de ceux d'Espagne sans doubler la despence ; c'est ce que Nicolaldi, agent d'Espagne, tasche maintenant à pratiquer en Ang^{re}, et ce qui se peut faire par connivence et sans aucun traité.

Par la mesme tolérance il seroit à craindre que plusieurs Anglois

ne se jettassent aussy au service des Espagnols à leurs despens, tant ilz ont esté soigneux de menager les hommes, et de cultiver les esprits.

La cabale des Espagnols paroist assez aux affaires que les Anglois ont contre les Hollandois, qui ne peuvent (avoir) aucune raison d'eux.

La seule commodité que l'on pourroit tirer des Anglois contre les Espagnols, ce seroit qu'ilz s'accordassent avec les Hollandois delà la ligne pour la conquête des pays et la poursuite de la flotte, car les Espagnols faisant leur trafic avec des vaisseaux estrangers, et leurs costes estant esloignées de celles d'Ang^{le}, n'en peuvent pas recevoir grand dommage en l'Europe.

V.

RELATION OF CHARLES I TO THE COURT OF ROME.

CUNEO'S REPORTS.

The documents sent to England from the Roman archives are not nearly of such importance as was expected from the expense incurred in obtaining them; it has been suggested, that just the most important were omitted; but nevertheless they contain much that is of value, much that for the historical enquirer was a desideratum, more especially with reference to the seventeenth century.

One sees that the court of Rome never for a moment abandoned the hope of winning over the Stuarts to itself once more. Urban VIII wrote to James I, now growing an old man, in 1624, that it would be an unheard of thing if a King of Scotland, as he was, should depart from this world without the hope of having the portals of heaven opened to him by the key of St. Peter.—To the Prince of Wales he wrote at that time, saying that he had shed tears of joy over his declaration, that he would never do anything that would argue hostility to the Catholic Church—*te nihil facturum spondes, quod odium ullum testetur adversus religionem catholicam romanam*.—A strong expression! But he is not content with it; he invites him to share the heritage of fame in the Church, which the Kings of England and Scotland had ever enjoyed. In giving his consent to the marriage of Queen Henrietta he writes to her, that the example of ancient Queens had risen up before him, those by whose means the early English Kings had been converted to Christianity: no fame would be equal to hers, if she should lead back her husband to the arms of the Church.

When Cuneo, by birth a Scot, came to England in the year 1636 on a mission from the Pope, everybody said that he had been sent in order to receive the King into the bosom of the Church. How very far was this from being the case!

The real object of the negotiations was a modification, in accordance with Catholic notions of orthodoxy, of the oath of allegiance introduced by James I. Cuneo remained more than three years in London, from the summer of 1636 to the autumn of 1639; and he often had the most intimate intercourse with the King and Queen. Questions of religion and of religious politics, such as at that time moved the world, were discussed in their widest bearings. In the course of the narrative, text and notes, I have already given quotations, which contradict the frequently repeated supposition that Charles I had become a Catholic; I will now add something further, by means of which the circle of religious ideas, in which Charles I moved, is more closely defined. The reports are as interesting as they are remarkable, and deserve to be published in a more comprehensive form.

1. *Ex registro litterarum Georgii Cunei. Brit. Mus. 15389 Di*
Ampton dal Sr Giorgio Coneo al Cardinal Barberino il 16 di
Settembre 1636.

Domenica doppo il Consiglio parlai al Re nel Gabinetto della Regina. Dopo che io ebbi rappresentato alla lunga l'inveterato affetto di nostro Signore verso la Casa Reale di Sua Maestà, e il bene delli suoi Regni, l'assicurai che l'intenzione di Sua Santità era, che li suoi sudditi Cattolici fossero fedelissimi alla maestà sua senza altra dipendenza se non che quella, che dovevano a Sua B^{ne} come al loro Padre e Pastore spirituale. Il Re rispose che a questo egli non avrebbe mai ripugnato, ma che gli doleva di vedere alcuni Francesi, ed altri Spagnoli che non servivan ad altro che a nutrire dissensioni tra di loro, ed obligar lui ad assicurarsi maggiormente della loro fedeltà. Io dissi che questo anche dispiaceva a sua S^{ta} ed all' Emz^a V^{ia} e che non tralasciono di portar tutti quei rimedi che potevano, e che per questo forse la principata corrispondenza per mezzo della Regina dispiaceva grandemente ad altri Potentati o Stati della Christianità, quali sapevano quanto una perfetta unione della Gran Bretagna con la Sede apostolica poteva metter freno alle stravaganze di quelli, quali per loro capricci snervavano quelle forze della Christianità, che erano bastanti per rimpeare a Christo il perduto suo patrimonio dell' oriente. A queste parole il Re consente con commozione dicendo: Dio perdoni ai primi autori

della disunione. Io replicai, 'Sire, tanto maggiore sarà la gloria della Maestà V^{ia}, quando per suo mezzo si remediasse a tanto male.' Al che il Re non diede altra risposta ma passò a dirmi, quasi giustificandosi del sentimento mostrato contro l'Ambas^{ie} di Polonia: Io allora contai l'istanza fatta dall' Em^{za} V^{ia} per mezzo dell' Segretario di Polonia, in ordine alla medesima ambasciata dicendo che V^{ia} Em^{za} non giudicò tale ufficio in proposito, benchè desiderasse sommamente la conversione della Principessa, ma che se per altro la Principessa fosse condotta per tener compagnia alla Regina, come li fratelli erano tenuti a Sua Maestà allora Sua Altezza poteva essere informata della Fede Cattolica, lasciando però l'esito a Dio, senza il cui aiuto nessuno poteva esser Cattolico. Il Re lodò in ciò assai la prudenza e bontà di V^{ra} Em^{za}, ed io, Sire, quale sia l'integrità di Sua Santità, e del Card. Barberino V^{ia} Maestà può giudicarlo dalle loro azioni, poiche ne interesse, ne minaccie e continui fastidi sono stati bastanti a rimuoverli dal servizio commune della Christianità. Ma dell'affetto verso V^{ia} Maestà nessuno e meglio informato di me, al quale ha giovato più d'ogni altra considerazione, l'esser buon suddito alla Maestà V^{ia}, siccome all'incontro spero che non mi pregiudicherà appresso V^{ra} Maestà l'essere buon servitore loro. Il Re subito mi diede la mano dicendo: No, Giorgio, no assicuratevi di questo per sempre. Rappresentai poi a Sua Maestà tutto quello che ha detto al Sig^{ie} Amiltone per conto del Palatino mostrando che Sua Santità non poteva far di meno di non raccomandare l'interesse della Religione Cattolica. Il Re disse che di questo era capace, ma gli veniva scritto che il nunzio aveva detto all'Imperatore per parte di Sua Santità, che non poteva restituire il Palatinato senza andare all'Inferno. Io risposi, Sire, queste sono bugie, e malignità che trovano quelli, che da principio dissi alla Maestà V^{ra} esser nemici di questa corrispondenza. Io so quali sono gli ordini del Nunzio intorno a questo particolare. Vero è che Sua Santità desidera la conversione del Palatino non solo per interesse della Religione che appresso Sua B^{ne} è principalissima, ma anche per grandezza d'una Casa che a tempo di Ludovico Bavaro e per lo spazio, di tanti anni è stata fedelissima alla Sede Apostolica. Il Duca di Baviera è grande non solo per quello egli è, ma per avere un fratello Elettore ed il medesimo sarebbe del Palatino, quando la Casa fosse la Cattolica. Il Re gradì il tutto, ma con silenzio. Passo poi sua Maestà a dire che l'Agente di Sua Moglie a Roma avrebbe forse proposta una cosa quale era facile a Sua Santità, ed avrebbe causato buon sangue, ed era che se sua Santità non voleva approvare il Giuramento, almeno facesse in modo che li Cattolici si stimassero obbligati a pigliarlo. Io supplicai

Sua Maestà di contentar si che io parlassi in ciò come suddito fedelissimo di Sua Maestà, ma senza scordarmi della Religione Cattolica, nella quale ero nato, nutrito, e per la cui difesa ero pronto a morir mille volte. Dissi dunque: Il Giuramento, Sire, contiene cose quali da nessun Cattolico possono essere approvate senza naufragio della coscienza. Il Re m'interuppe interrogando se li Francesi erano Cattolici. Io risposi 'alcuni, sì, ed alcuni, no; la Sorbona disse egli, non è Cattolica?' Affermandolo io, il Re soggiunse e pure tiene che il Giuramento sia lecito. Io replicai, che temevo che Sua Maestà non fosse bene informata, dimandando però ad ogni contradizione perdono dell'ardire; affermai di aver inteso che alcuni Francesi dubitassero del potere del Papa intorno alla deposizione dei Principi, ma che quanto al Giuramento era tenuto da tutti illecito, e come tale era ributtato dal Cleo di Francia, e che molti l'avevano oppugnato. Il Re dimandò che cosa conteneva il Giuramento, se non che il Papa non poteva deporre un Principe. Io risposi che per non toccar tutti li capi mi soveniva, che dannava come eretica l'opinione contraria. Il Re mi dimandò se non mi pareva che fosse opinione cattiva il sottoporre l'autorità Regia ai capricci d'un uomo! Io dissi che nessun particolare poteva giurare alcuna opinione eretica che non fosse prima giudicata tale dalla Chiesa, e che quanto all'opinioni di Teologi(a?) si provavano con ragioni e non con giuramenti, e che quel giuramento era trovato da persone quali volessero seminar discordie perpetue tra Roma ed Inghilterra. Il Re disse che la sua intenzione era, che quel giuramento obbligassee tutti i suoi sudditi ad una fedele obediienza, senza levare al Papa l'autorità spirituale sopra li Cattolici Romani, e che si dava per discernere gli Anabaptisti ed altri eretici, nemici dell'autorità Regia. Io deplorai che la buona mente di sua Maestà fosse così malamente dichiarata in un Giuramento che pareva non per altro fine che d'intaccare l'autorità del Papa, e che quando Sua Maestà volesse pensare a quasivoglia obbligo di fedeltà temporale, senza mescolar cosa di Religione, troverebbe li Cattolici pronti a spargere il sangue in difesa dell'autorità Regia. Il Re rispose che il Giuramento era confermato dal Parlamento, e che io sapevo quanto sarebbe difficile convocare adesso un Parlamento e farlo mutare il Giuramento; accennò anche il pericolo che nascerebbe ai Cattolici da un Parlamento. Io dissi, 'Sire, noi temiamo V^{ra} Maestà sopra il Parlamento.' Egli rispose che era vero, ma che bisognava pensare alle difficoltà grandissime, e pertanto era più facile al Papa di compiacerlo e dare licenza alii Cattolici di pigliarlo, e a far qualche dimostrazione contro il Courtneo, il quale meritava d'essere impiccato, e che se il detto Courtneo fosse gastigato io non credessi già, che fosse per causa

di Religione, perchè era un fufante, quale sottoponeva il Re non solo al Papa, ma anche ai sudditi. Io dissi che aveva fatto malissimo, e che bisognava levar l'occasione di simili discorsi o scritture dall' una parte e l'altra col non dar più il Giuramento, perchè dandosi a Cattolici il Papa in nessuna maniera poteva dissimularlo senza mancare a se stesso. Il Re si riscaldò assai all' ultime parole dicendo, quando il Papa dichiarasse de fide che può deporre li Principi troverebbe tutti contrarii. Io risposi che al Papa non poteva mancare la promessa assistenza dello Spirito Santo, ma che questo non era il caso nostro. E che quanto al Courtneo lodai la sua clemenza per il passato supplicando per la continuazione. Passato un poco più, il Re m'interrogò perchè il Papa non avea fatto proibire il libro del Courtneo. Io risposi che tanto quello quanto la risposta meritava censura al mio giudizio. Che della mente di Sua Santità intorno a questo particolare non sapevo altro, ma che ero sicuro che a Sua B^{ne}, ed a V^{ra} Em^{za} dispiacevano le cose malfatte. Il passò a dire che il Papa poteva dannare il libro del Courtneo come scandaloso, e lasciar correre la risposta senza dannarla o approvarla. Io dissi, 'Sire, o tutte due, o nessuna, ma in questa materia non posso promettere a V^{ra} Maestà cosa alcuna, se non che supplicherò il Cardinal Barberini mio P^{oue} che non sia presa alcuna risoluzione nuova intorno al Giuramento, senza che V^{ra} Maestà sia avisato delle giuste ragioni che muoveranno Sua Santità a procedere.' Questo (discorso?) fu lunghissimo, ed il Re si turbò più volte alle mie risposte, nelle quali Dio non mi abbandonò, perchè se non m'inganno mai la lingua m' ha servito meglio, o temei grandemente di non avere offeso il Re grandemente. Ma non potendo fuggire il ragionamento cominciato, e seguitato da Sua Maestà mi bisognò dire la verità. Supplicai poi Sua Maestà ad aver per raccomandati li Cattolici quali non si querelavano tanto delle imposizioni che pagavano alla Camera Regia, quanto delle molestie che pativano dai Porsuivanti senza alcun commodo di Sua Maestà, anzi con grave scandalo e biasimo della sua clemenza. Il Re disse che li Porsuivanti erano Ministri della giustizia in Inghilterra, come li sbirri in Italia, e che pertanto non potevano esser levati. Io replicai che non ero tanto impertinente a supplicare che fossero levati, ma pareva giusto che non potessero molestar i Cattolici ad ogni loro capriccio, ma con ordine particolare, o mandato del Giudice. Al che il Re rispose che facendo così non sarebbe facile il frenare l'insolenza dei Cattolici, quali abusavano talvolta della clemenza Sua con grave scandalo degli altri sudditi, dicendo che non sapevano governarsi bene, e goder dell' esercizio privato della loro Religione, senza far atti pubblici per necessitarlo a gastigarli, e di questo contò diversi esempi

di Matrimoni, Batesimi, Testamenti, e cose simili, e che non contentandosi di sentir messa nella capella della Regina, si radunavano nel Cortile e nelle stanze del Palazzo senza proposito, ed in somma che pareva cercassero il proprio male, e che facevano il medesimo nelle Case degli ambasciatori. Io dissi che a Sua Stà avrebbe dispiaciuto che non corrispondessero alle grazie di Sua Maestà, dalla cui clemenza sperava qualche rimedio per conto delle violenze de Porsuivanti.

Il Re disse che veramente erano foifanti e che molestavano anche a proposito li Protestanti, al che io soggiunsi, questi hanno il rimedio della Giustizia, il Re rispose, il medesimo avranno li Cattolici. Io replicai, l'unico rimedio sarebbe che non fossero molestati senza mandato particolare del Giudice: ma di questo ed altro aviei trattato con li Ministri di Sua Maestà, quali però mi comandava la Maestà Sua. Ella mi nominò il Conte di Sterlino ed il Vendibanch. E perchè il Re aveva differita molto la cena, mi licenziai, ma con paura di non averlo offeso e disgustato per conto del Giuramento, ma poi la Regina mi ha detto assicurandomi, che ha preso ogni cosa in buona parte.

2. *Di Hampton le 7. Gennaro 1637.*

È vero quello che dice il Re ed il Vendibanch che dandosi un nuovo Giuramento non vi è pena per castigare quelli che lo ricuseranno, al che li Puritani ed altri si attaccheranno per ricusarlo giuridicamente. A questo rispondo, che pressupposto che retassimo d'accordo d'un Giuramento lecito per Cattolici, il Re in virtù della sua prerogativa può dispensare con li decreti del Parlamento, non volendo dunque altro che esser sicuro della fedeltà de cattolici, e trovando modo di poter essere senza il Giuramento ordinario, può ben dispensare in questo con chi vorrà abbracciare l'altro se però vi sarà qualche cattolico che ricuserà il Giuramento lecito, che non credo, non posso io consigliare che sia amministrato l'altro, per essere questo un cooperare al peccato, ma posso ben promettere che qualsivoglia sua disgrazia non sarà compatita.

Per conto de Puritani ed altri il Re resta al solito vigore delle leggi Parlamentarie tali quali sono, ed a questo proposito ha detto tanto quanto basta per far pensare ad un altro giuramento perchè non rimuovendo quella difficoltà del Parlamento era impossibile introdurre pratica di un nuovo Giuramento.

3. *Di Londra (dal Sig. Georgio Coneo) il 12. di marzo 1637.*

Col Re parlai ieri in Camera della Regina assai alla lunga, e Sua Maestà fra l'altre cose mi contò certi discorsi passati tra lei ed il Confessor del Rè di Sagna in materia di Religione, e del tutto Sua Maestà mostrò d'essere restata poco soddisfatta. Si ragionò poi dell' invocazione de' Santi, de Purgatorio, e dell' infallibilità della Chiesa e dopo d'aver rappresentato quello, che per allora Dio m'inspirò supplicai Sua Maestà a fare riflessione per amor di Christo, e considerare li danni che risultavano alla christianità dallo scisma, e disunione della Chiesa Romana. Il Re me lo confessò, ma insieme mi disse non so che della felicità e quiete de propri Regni. Io all' incontro rappresentai le divisioni interne, la riputazione, che mancava a Sua Maestà fuori e il pericolo a cui stava esposto co' Principi vicini, quali quando gli fosse tornato bene non avrebbero mancato di pigliare la preziosa maschera della Religione per offenderlo, e vedendo che pigliava il tutto in buona parte presi ardire di supplicare sua Maestà se desiderava che fosse levato lo scisma stimato tanto gran peccato da S^{to} Agostino, e tanto pregiudiziale alla gloria di Sua Maestà. Allora mi disse il Re, certo vorrei che fosse levato, ed a questo fine farci qualsivoglia penitenza, ma che la Chiesa Romana stava troppo altera e risoluta in certi cose, come in difendere il Concilio di Trento, io dissi che nel Concilio erano Canonì quali erano invariabili e Decreti intorno alla riforma de' costumi ed esortazione a cose non determinate e fide dalla Chiesa, ed intorno a questi poter esser discorsi, *utrum hic et nunc expediret metterli in esecuzione*, e per tanto supplicai Sua Maestà à deputare alcune persone moderate, e ben intenzionate all' unione, e che Sua Stà avrebbe fatto il medesimo e che allora Sua Maestà si sarebbe chiarita quanto sia Madre benigna la Chiesa Cattolica. Il Re mettendomi una mano in spallo, mi rispose; non è ancora tempo, le cose non sono ancora disposte, bisogna veder più avanti e non dir parola; finito questo ragionamento supplicai sua M^{tà} a finire almeno il negozio de' Porsuivanti, egli mi dimandò se vi era qualche querela di nuovo, io risposi, di non esser venuto à portar querele per infastidire sua M^{tà}, ma a supplicar per grazia e liberarsi dalla tirannide di quei perfanti. Del che avendomi data parola io lo significai subito alla Regina, e poi al Vendibanch per impegnar sua Maestà maggiormente.

VI.

RELATION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO THE
REBELLION IN SCOTLAND.

In the '*Nouvelles lettres du M^r le C^{te} d'Estrades*' there exist certain documents, from which it has been supposed that the origin of these relations can be inferred with certainty. On an instruction of Richelieu's respecting a mission of the Count to England (Nov 13, 1637) there follows a report of the latter (Nov 19), in which he speaks of a conversation which he had had with a Scottish preacher and a Scottish nobleman, Gordon, from which he had seen that Scotland was ready for a revolt. Thereupon Richelieu (Dec. 2, 1637) declares that he intends to send an ambassador to Scotland, in order to form a connexion with the persons mentioned; he concludes with a fierce menace against the King of England.

These letters (which exist also in collections of manuscripts) had appeared up to this time to be perfectly genuine, to myself no less than to others. As I became more intimately acquainted with the genuine documents of that year, I began to have serious doubts on the subject.

During a stay in Paris, I communicated these doubts to the editor of the *Mémoires de Richelieu*, M. Avenel, who was not a little astonished that among the collected documents in the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs no trace of the original was to be found. On further investigations in the Imperial Library he was induced to pronounce the letters genuine, on account of an '*Inventaire de M^r le C^{te} d'Estrades*,' by Clairambault, in which they are mentioned; he has included them in his great collection (V 885). I confess, however, that I am not fully convinced by this. For according to the title of the '*Inventaire*' there given, it was made from originals certainly, but at the same time from copies, which were already extant at that time; it is a catalogue, in which completeness was aimed at, but a critical enquiry as to genuineness was scarcely undertaken.

My objections against these letters have reference not to the external question of their preservation, but to their contents.

It is very astonishing, that in the instruction what is said about the influence which Madame de Chevreuse exercised over the Queen, to the disadvantage of the Cardinal, is quite in a tone which implies that she was present on the spot; whereas at that time the

lady was not in England at all. In a letter of Montague's, dated Jan 22/Feb. 1, 1638, it is said that she is expected every day: she did not arrive until somewhat later.

The chief point, however, is, that the proposals and their pretended carrying out into effect utterly fail to agree with existing relations, whether as regards persons or politics.

It is pretended that Estrades was commissioned to deliver a letter to the Queen, in which she is asked to give her support to certain proposals as to the neutrality of England—of which more hereafter—in return for which she is promised the good services of the Cardinal, this letter, however, he is to deliver only if he sees that the Queen will receive it favourably. The Queen is said to have replied, that the Cardinal was no friend of hers, and that she expected nothing from him; and thereupon Estrades is said to have determined not to deliver the letter.

This of itself is in the highest degree a strange proceeding, ill befitting personal intercourse between persons of the highest rank, and not like the Cardinal; it contrasts in the most astonishing way with the actual commissions, which Bellièvre received and executed at this very time.

In the instructions to Bellièvre, who actually did arrive during the very days in which Estrades professes to have come, it is said, that the Queen is very well disposed towards France, but that more must not be demanded of her than she herself thought would contribute towards a good understanding between the two crowns—'*il ne faut pas requérir d'elle, qu'elle agisse au delà de ce, qu'elle estime pouvoir contribuer au bien commun des deux couronnes.—L'ambassadeur la maintiendra dans ses bons sentimens*' Bellièvre was really commissioned by the Cardinal to deliver a letter to her; she received it with pleasure, and said to the ambassador as she walked with him to the window of the room, that she rejoiced at Richelieu's good feeling towards her, '*qu'elle étoit bien aise d'entendre que le sentiment de V. E^{ce} étoit de luy vouloir du bien;*' she added at the same time a request with respect to Jars, who was detained in prison in France.

This matter had already been mentioned in the correspondence. In his last letter to the Queen the Cardinal had made use of the following expression: '*je ne serai jamais satisfait, si je n'ay servy V. M^{te} actuellement en cette affaire comme en toutes autres.*' One sees that the good understanding was complete.

And it is at this moment that the Queen is said to have declared, that she knew that Richelieu was her enemy, and that she had nothing to expect from him. Impossible. • The pretended commission of Estrades is utterly irreconcilable with the actual one of Bellièvre.

The evasion, that we here have a secret mission, which was concealed from the actual ambassador, is at once proved to be untenable, because Estrades professes to have taken up his abode with Bellièvre, and to have been expressly told to communicate his instructions to him. That the Queen, at the very moment when she received a letter of Richelieu's from one hand, rejected a similar letter from an other, is utterly incredible; above all, that Richelieu should send her two letters at the same time by two different persons, is quite devoid of meaning.

Moreover, there can at that time have been no thought of negotiating for the neutrality of England, in case France and Holland together should seize a place in the Spanish Netherlands. According to Estrades, the Queen had promised, although with reluctance, to support this demand, but had then expressed regret that her endeavours had only extracted a refusal from her husband. King Charles himself is said to have declared, that in such a case he should be compelled to break with both powers, and send a fleet with 18,000 men to secure the fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands.

The actual relations, however, were altogether different. What was in question was, not the neutrality of England towards the belligerents, but the co-operation of Charles I with France and Holland against Spain, in consequence of a treaty agreed to shortly before, though not yet formally concluded, embracing Germany also. The King of England had promised to contribute thirty ships of war for this purpose, and the only question was what use was to be made of them.

A proposal of Father Joseph's is extant (Ruel. Feb. 7), according to which they were to help in an attack on the coast of the Netherlands or of Spain. '*Il faut que non seulement elle (cette flotte) soit employée pour la défense des estats des deux rois et pour empêcher le passage de Flandres en Espagne, mais aussi pour faire que toute cette flotte ou une partie d'icelle serve à attaquer les places dans la coste d'Espagne ou de Flandres, selon que le roi de la Gr. Bretagne sera requis par le commun avis des alliés, lesquels auront égard à la sûreté de ses costes.*'

From a letter of Bellièvre, dated March 10, it appears that King Charles agreed to this proposal. '*Le roi de la Gr. Bretagne demeure d'accord, qu'on ajoutera tout ce, qui sera estimé à propos à l'art. 5 de la ligue offensive sur l'employ de sa flotte; il approuve, que les places prises par les armes de la ligue seront gouvernés en la manière des bailliages communs entre les Suisses.*' That also was a French proposal.

How utterly opposed is all this to the contents of these letters! The question is not of a neutrality, which Charles I refused, but of a

co-operation, to which he consented. He appears not as an ally, but as an enemy of the Spaniards.

If nevertheless nothing came of it all, that was not owing to the King's want of will, but, as I have already remarked elsewhere, to the impossibility of coming to an understanding respecting the final ends and objects of the war. The aim of the King was directed towards regaining the Palatinate for the family of his brother-in-law. He would gladly have seen the Emperor and Empire on the other hand recover Pomerania and Loiraine from Swedes and French. But the French would not hear of it. In a missive of Richelieu's, dated Oct 23, 1638, we read—

Les Anglois, qui ne songent qu' à avoir leur compte, estiment juste la restitution de Lorraine et même celle de la Pomeranie, pourvû qu'on leur rende le palatinat ; nous nous mocquerons d'une telle proposition, et ainsi au lieu d'avoir gagné les Anglois par le traité (of 1637) nous la perdrons en effet, et ce d'autant plus surement que la maison d'Autriche temoignera pour les attner de son costé de ne faire aucune difficulté de rendre le palatinat pourvû que nous rendons la Lorraine. Je croy, que Mr. d'Avaux peut dire couvertement à Salvins, qu'il est tout prest d'entrei dans le traité proposé par les Anglois, pourvû qu'ainsi qu'ils veulent que le roi (de France) s'oblige à ne point faire la paix sans la restitution du palatinat, ils veulent aussi se joindre aux interests de la Suède et de la France qui requièrent la conservation de la Pomeranie et de la Lorraine à divers justes titres.

That was the great question between the moving powers of the world, about which however they could not come to an agreement. The aim of the English could be effected only by an understanding with Emperor and Empire; the aims of the Swedes and of the French only by continued war. The last period of the Thirty Years' War, the most terrible of all, was the result.

When then (to return to our main question) Estrades goes on to narrate, that Richelieu promised help to the King against the Scots, we must remark that in November 1637 the contest with them had not gone so far as to render help necessary, or as to allow expectations of any results from the offer. And seeing that all the rest is a forgery, we cannot consider this and the letter, in which Richelieu promises to send his almoner (Chambres) to Scotland, as genuine. A few weeks before, September 8, 1637, another Chambres, who also had a place in the household of the Cardinal, had gone to England and Scotland in order to conduct a levy of Scottish troops. His instructions are to be found in Avenel's collection (V. 847) Another

double-sided, though altogether different affair, which was still in the course of being carried out into effect

I think that we have now cleared the way for getting a view of the beginnings of Richelieu's connexion with the rebellious Scots, as it really came to pass.

I find the first notice of it in the letter of an English agent in France, named Augier, dated June 25, 1638, à propos of the news which had been spread respecting the strength of the Scots, and of their friends in England. Augier thinks that the exaggeration which this news contained originated with some of the French themselves: '*Pensants que si cette affaire venoit à être fomentée, ce seroit le moyen de procurer la liberté aux Catholiques Romains en Angleterre et de pescher en eau troublée.*'

The matter worked in much the same way in political circles also. When the English in the summer of 1638, instead of proceeding to the supulated attack on the Flemish coast, allowed several vessels laden with provisions and gunpowder to go to Dunkirk, the French, who had fixed their eyes on Dunkirk, were in a state of the greatest excitement. Bellièvre, who had an interview with Lord Scudamore on the subject, gave him to understand that England would not much longer be in a position to interfere in French affairs, 'in confident terms, as if they were assured that those (the Scots) would find out for us such work, as that England can hardly prejudice France; they knew well how the English went about to embroyle their affairs, but they knew how to hinder it.'

The first result of the movement in Scotland was a general feeling on the continent, that the power of England was thereby shattered, in its European position as well as internally, and that this might well be to the advantage of the French. The fragmentary statements in Avenel (1094) all have reference to this later period, the second half of the year 1638. The English were afraid that Richelieu had a hand in the matter, but they produce no proof of the fact.

In February 1639, Bellièvre states that the report of such an influence is spreading; he ascribes it to the creatures of the Spaniards, and strives with all his might to contradict it.

Within a month, however, he himself remarked, that it might soon come to this, that they would be obliged to avail themselves of the Scots. In an abstract from a letter in cipher, sent by him March 7, 1639, it is noted as his view, '*que les affaires de cela prennent un train, que le roi (de France) pourroit avoir besoin de fomenter la guerre d'Ecosse et mesme de menager les catholiques d'Angleterre qui pourroient former un parti.*'

If we ask, what put this idea into his head, the answer is, the sup-

position that the Queen was inclined to exert her influence in the interests of Spain. She wanted the return of her mother to France; she applied herself to the accomplishment of this end with the greatest enthusiasm, and took it amiss that it was refused her by the dominant party in France. In this matter her friends Jermyn, Montague, and Percy took a specially prominent and active part. Tillières, who knew the court, is positive that her relations with Jermyn, which had already given a certain amount of offence, were perfectly innocent. 'Je le dis,' he says, 'sans flatterie, mais avec vérité; elle les (ses amis) prit sans autre dessein, que de se servir de leur esprit pour son seul contentement'¹

These friends of hers were all-powerful in her household, and had already won an unmistakeable influence in England; closely united with those about the Queen-mother, they made her readmission into France their own cause. Jermyn went himself about it to France; but Bellièvre cautioned people against giving him a hearing. For if he returned with a favourable answer, he and his friends would completely govern the English court; it would be impossible to withdraw the Queen from his influence. Supposing that they did not attain their object, they would certainly cause England to separate from France, and bring it into union with Spain. That seemed, however, to be the Queen's intention in any case. In the early part of 1639 the ambassador designated the Queen an open enemy of France, that is, of the government dominant there at that time. 'Il faut songer nous défendre d'elle comme d'une personne très puissante en ce pays, qui fera contre nous tous ce, que ceux qui sont près d'elle et de la reine mère mal intentionnés contre la France lui suggéreront.' So great an influence did the disagreements which had arisen in the Bourbon family exercise on the great events of Europe.

After the Peace of Berwick, which was expected to stand, anxiety gained ground more and more, as the King still kept large forces under arms, and the ministry of the King, no less than the people about the Queen, were regarded as Spanish.

Now it was that Bellièvre advised in very explicit terms a union with the Scots. It is worth while to give his words:—

L'affaire d'Ecosse est apparemment accommodée; la reyne de la Gr. Br. est autant, qu'on en peut juger, ennemie de la France; la plus grande partie du conseil du roi de la Gr. Br. tire pension d'Espagne et y est fort affectonnée. Nous avons à craindre avec beaucoup de raison que le roi de la Gr. Br. ne se laisse à la fin porter à faire

¹ In Hippeau (199), who unfortunately does not know the value of these statements, and has broken off just where they might have disclosed a good deal more.

quelque chose contre nous, s'il n'a point d'affaires chez lui. Beaucoup d'Anglois, qui jusqu' ici par le respect qu'ils portoient à la reine d'Angl^e, n'osoient entreprendre de parler contre la France, y seroient conviez par la protection qu'elle leur donnera. Cela fait que j'estime nécessaire d'envoyer en Ecosse une ou deux personnes confidentes, qui persuadés que pour l'honneur de leur pays et le bien de leur religion ils ne doivent point laisser exécuter l'accord fait en termes généraux entre le r. d. l. Gr. Br, et ceux du covenant, qu'ils ne fassent bien expliquer en quoy consistent leurs privilèges, trouvent moyen à faire proposer par l'assemblée et le parlement des choses qui étant accordées bident l'Angleterre à un point, qu'elle ne puisse jamais être notre ennemie, sans avoir en même tems l'Ecosse sur les bras, ce qui se pourroit faire en renouvelant les anciennes alliances entre la France et l'Ecosse; faisant, que dans le conseil des affaires étrangères il y eut des Ecossois, au lieu que ce sont maintenant tous Anglois, qui fussent pour remonter s'il se faisoit quelque chose au préjudice de leurs alliés et en donner part au conseil du pays, et ainsy d'autres choses raisonnables que les Ecossois peuvent demander, sans qu'il paroisse que nous nous en soyons mêlés, qui apparemment les brouilleraient tout de nouveau avec les Anglois, s'ils les leurs refusent. J'ai déjà parlé à quelqu'uns de mes amis, ennemis des Anglois, personnes de qualité qui sont partis pour aller en Ecosse; mais cela ne suffit pas, il est nécessaire de donner cette affaire à déduire à une ou deux personnes d'esprit, auxquels on se puisse fier, tels que sont deux Ecossois qui sont en cette ville, les quels n'ont pas assez de bien pour faire le voyage à leurs dépenses. Si vous m'envoyez l'ordre de leur donner mil escus à chacun, je les ferois partir dans 15 jours, et suis trompé si cet argent ne se trouve bien employé; en tous cas ce sera peu de perte pour avoir hasardé et faire une chose importante à la France, au point que je crois qu'est cette-cy. Si l'on parle à aucun Ecossois sans exception, qui soit en France, de cette affaire, elle est ruinée et mon credit aussi.

The result of these suggestions I have traced out in the narrative, with as much completeness as was possible; there is no necessity for me to repeat myself.

It would be folly to deduce the course of affairs between England and Scotland from this interference on the part of France; but that it had great influence on the course of affairs is beyond a doubt.

VII.

RELATION OF FRANCE TO THE OPPOSITION IN ENGLAND.

1640, 1641.

The internal contradiction into which Charles I had fallen appeared most glaringly in this, that at the earnest solicitation of the French ambassador he allowed the Spanish fleet to be annihilated, while the same ambassador was inciting the Scots against him, in order to keep him occupied within his own dominions and prevent him from opposing the undertakings of the French against Spain.

One cannot wonder that Bellièvre should leave England in a kind of disfavour. At first no successor was appointed. All business, public and private, was conducted by a secretary, whom he left behind, called Montreuil, who for the most part addressed his letters to Bellièvre himself.

I will quote some of these, which illustrate the connexion between continental and English affairs.

16. Aoust 1640.

Je sais bien que les Ministres d'Espagne font appréhender à l'Angleterre les suites de cette grande victoire (prise d'Arras), qu'ils en parlent déjà comme d'un acheminement à la prise de St Omer et de Dunkerque, et que leurs discours gagnent créance auprès de plusieurs du conseil de ce Roy; il est vrai que s'ils peuvent envier les heureux succès des armes de sa Majesté, leurs affaires ne leur permettent pas d'en pouvoir arrester le cours, puisqu'ils attendent tous les jours les nouvelles de la marche des Ecossois en Angleterre et qu'ils n'ont presque point de moyens de l'empescher, n'ayant plus aucune ressource pour trouver de l'argent, après que Mr. Rhoo a essayé la semaine passée d'avoir deux millions de livres des vingt compagnies de métiers de la ville de Londres et qu'il en a été refusé, ainsi que Mr. Cotinton l'avoit été huit jours auparavant du Maire et des Echevins, quoyque Mr. Rhoo eut esté choisy comme une personne fort agréable à ce peuple et qu'il leur eut assuré que cet argent seroit employé seulement pour faire la paix et paier aux gens de guerre ce qui leur étoit deu en les congédiant.

6. *Septembre 1640.*

Je prendray donc, Monseigneur, la hardiesse de vous dire que les offres faites par le Roy d'Angleterre au Prince Palatin n'ont été proposées que pour ne pas témoigner ouvertement à toute l'Europe qu'il abandonne les intérêts de son neveu, ou pour l'aider en quelque façon, essayant que le bruit de ce traité avec la France porte l'Empereur à luy restituer une partie de ses états par la douceur, de peur d'être obligé par la force, de rendre à Mss. les états ce qu'il luy retient, si ce traité pour son rétablissement en ses états s'alloit conclure. Mais comme je ne reconnois point en ce Roy cette vertu héroïque qui porte les Princes à ses illustres actions dont leurs alliés ont tout le profit et dont ils ont toute la gloire, je ne m'imagine pas mesme qu'il pense seulement à aider le Prince Palatin de cette façon. Je croy plustost qu'il n'essaye qu'à donner par ce moyen de la jalousie à l'Espagne qui se porte avec beaucoup de froideur et qu'il ne propose de commencer quelque traité avec la France que pour eschiver celui qui est déjà commencé avec les ministres qu'a l'Espagne en cette cour.

4. *Octobre 1640.*

. . . . Quand ils publient (les Espagnols) que la France aide sous main l'Ecosse, par ce que leur malice n'en est pas si aisément connue. La Reine de la G. B. a témoigné plusieurs fois depuis peu de jours, qu'elle n'étoit pas fort éloignée de cette créance, et elle disoit encore cette semaine à une de ses femmes: on est bien aise maintenant en Fiance, on y rit du malheur de ce pais.

5. *Octobre 1640.*

Ainsy, Monseigneur, toutes choses se conduisent elles mesmes en ce pays à l'avantage de la France, et la bonne fortune qui accompagne les justes armes en Artois et en Piemont seconde encore les intentions en Angleterre, où non seulement ceux qui sont peu affectionnés à la cause commune ne sont pas en estat de nuire, mais où il semble qu'en appuiant les résolutions puritaines de ce Parlement on auroit peut-être moyen d'engager le Roi d'Angleterre contre sa volonté à prendre les intérêts de son neveu et porter la guerre en Allemagne.

Mr. Pym homme fort éloquent et grand érudit parmy le peuple, et qui est un de ceux qui parlèrent avec plus de hardiesse dans le dernier parlement, m'a fait dire que tous ceux qui estoient portés

pour le bien des affaires publiques avoient résolu de poursuivre avec ardeur les partisans d'Espagne et de rendre ce nom odieux à toute l'Angleterre : pour venir à bout d'un dessein si juste et si glorieux, ils désireroient avoir information de toutes les choses où l'Espagne a essayé de tromper ses voisins et particulièrement la France et l'Angleterre. C'est pourquoy, Monseigneur, si vous jugiés à propos de me faire des mémoires sur ce sujet, j'essaierois qu'ils ne me fussent pas envoyés inutilement, si l'on désiroit faire chasser les ministres de la R. M. Je croy qu'il y auroit jour à ce Parlement.

On commence les Elections de ceux qui doivent assister au Parlement, de la mesme sorte que l'on fit la dernière fois, c'est à dire par le choix des personnes que l'on croit moins portées à favoriser le Roy d'Angleterre—.

J'ay encore reconnu que ces peuples (Ecossois) sont de la nature de tous les autres, c'est à dire moins touchés de la gloire générale de leur pais que de leur intérêt particulier, de sorte qu'il semble qu'on les porteroit plus aisément à faire guerre à l'Espagne dans les Indes, où ils espéreroient plus profiter, qu'à la maison d'Autriche dans l'Allemagne, où il n'y a rien à gagner pour eux, veu mesme qu'ils sont puissants en vaisseaux et en hommes de mer, et que les particuliers fourniraient volontiers ce qui seroit nécessaire pour une semblable entreprise, dans laquelle ils espéreroient retirer avec usure ce qu'ils y auroient employé.

J'ay entretenu long temps le Sr. Pime dont je vous ay parlé par ma dernière. Il me doit tenir bien informé de tout qui se passera au Parlement, où il m'a témoigné qu'il seroit bien aise de servir en mesme temps son pais et la France dont il reconnoist que les interests sont unis. Il m'a prié d'écrire tant pour scavoir en quoy il le pouvoit faire comme pour estre instruit des principales rencontres où l'Espagne a essayé de tromper la France et l'Angleterre. Bien qu'il soit grand puritain et par conséquent personne qui ne peut estre suspecte, je ne laisseray pas d'user avec luy de toute la retenue que vous me ferés l'honneur de me prescrire.

29. *Novembre* 1640.

Quoique je me sois donné l'honneur de vous mander, qu'il y avoit peu d'apparence de pouvoir porter l'Angleterre à faire quelque chose pour les interests du Prince Palatin, et que je ne voie rien qui m'oblige encore à changer d'opinion, je ne laisserai pas toute fois d'insinuer dans les occasions ce que je crois les devoir exciter à cette entreprise ; le comte de Hollande y pourroit combiner. Je

crois que, quoy qui se soit passé autrefois et qu'il soit même encore aujourd'huy fort mal auprès du Roy d'Angleterre, il y a peu de personnes en cette cour de l'amitié desquelles la France doit faire état comme de la sienne. Il me dit il y a peu de jours, qu'il avoit un zèle tres particulier pour la France et qu'il désiroit que je l'employasse quand il se présenteroit occasion de la servir; je le vis hier et luy dis, qu'il étoit arrivé par quelque sorte de fatalité qu'au mesme temps qu'il me commandoit de m'adresser à luy en toutes les choses qui toucheroient les intérêts du Roy, on m'écrivait de France, qu'il étoit celuy qu'on croioit devoir contribuer d'avantage à l'union et l'étroite intelligence des deux couronnes, qu'on scauroit ce qu'il pouvoit faire près du Roy d'Angleterre et dans le Parlement, que le premier voyoit comme il luy avoit réussi de n'avoir pas suivy les conseils, et qu'il étoit le seul de tous les ministres du Roy d'Angleterre qui fût à l'épreuve de l'autre.

. Le comte d'Hollande a désiré depuis me parler pour m'avertir, qu'estant tombé avec le Roy sur le discours des affaires publiques et voyant que le Roy se plaignoit que la France méprisait l'Angleterre, il avoit jugé à propos de luy répondre, qu'il sembloit par ce que je luy avois tesmoigné depuis peu de jours qu'on ne désiroit rien tant du costé de France que d'entretenir une étroite union et parfaite amitié entre les deux couronnes, et qu'il s'étoit avancé jusques à luy dire, qu'il croioit que si Sa Majesté vouloit faire un dernier effort pour la restitution du P. P., la France y contribuera et l'assistera de toutes ses forces, à quoi ce roi avoit répondu qu'il espéroit estre bientôt en estat de le pouvoir faire, cependant qu'il avoit fort agréable ce qu'il luy disoit et qu'il seroit bien aise mesme qu'il me le tesmoignast; à quoy je fis response, que puisqu'il me parloit de cette entreprise je prendrois la hardiesse de luy représenter que (le roi d'Ang^{le}) n'en scauroit faire de plus utile, de plus glorieuse, et il semble de plus facile (?) que celle là, que les armes que l'Angleterre et l'Ecosse avoient levées pour (se combattre) se pourroient convertir contre leur commun ennemy et prévenir par ce moyen les désordres qui arrivent de nécessité au commencement depuis la paix.

17. Janvier 1641.

On eut l'entière confirmation de la revolte de Portugal. Les lettres ajoustent que la Castille est toute pleine de mécontentement et fort disposée à suivre l'exemple de la Catalogne et du Portugal. Le Roy de la G. B. a dit ces nouvelles à plusieurs personnes avec plaisir et semble ne se pas moins réjouir maintenant des pertes

de l'Espagne qu'il s'affligeoit cet été des victoires de la France. Toute l'Angleterre juge la chute de cette grande monarchie inévitable et considère avec révérence la bonne fortune des armes de Sa Majesté et l'heureuse et prudente conduite de Monseigneur le cardinal. Ainsy il n'y a plus de temps à perdre et Mr. de la Ferté Imbault ne peut venir trop promptement, si l'on veut faire quelque chose avec l'Angleterre, où le temps ne peut ce semble apporter une meilleure conjoncture pour traiter, soit qu'il accroisse ou qu'il diminue les félicités de la France, qui se doit peut estre défier également pour le sujet de la bonne et de la mauvaise fortune, puisque celleci donnera moins d'espérance et l'autre plus de crainte à ceux que se voudront allier d'ors en avant avec elle. Enfin, Monseigr, je croy que vous jugerés qu'il n'est point à propos de donner loisir à l'Angleterre de faire trop de réflexions sur les heureux succès qui accompagnent les justes entreprises de Sa Majesté, et qu'il y a toute sorte d'apparence qu'avant la fin de la prochaine campagne le Roy sera en état de donner de la crainte à ceux mesme qui ont (?) avantage de ses prospérités. Voilà la première raison qui me porte à désirer la venue de M^r l'Ambassadeur soit prompt; la seconde est pour dissiper par sa présence un bruit qui se repand par Londres, qu'il vient pour s'opposer aux intentions du Parlement et pour deffendre les Catholiques de l'oppression des Puritains, ce que ceux qui conseillent maintenant la Reine d'Angleterre font courir et elle mesme autorise, comme j'ay reconnu par quelques propos qu'elle tint il y a trois ou quatre jours à M^r de Majercie, médecin de leurs Majestés. Elle luy disoit qu'il couroit un bruit par la ville que c'estoit elle, la Reine, qui faisoit venir M^r de la Ferté Imbault; à quoy le dit Sr de Majercie répondit seulement qu'elle ne se devoit point mettre en peine de tels bruits. Aussy luy repliqua cette Princesse: Je ne m'en fasche point du tout, au contraire j'en suis bien aise et je désire qu'on le croie. Ainsy je montre par là le crédit que j'ay en France, j'en fais partir un ambassadeur qui représente le Roy mon frère et je veux bien qu'on sache que je puis faire venir toute la France pour me venger s'il est besoing. Cependant je ne sais pas qui luy donne ce conseil, mais il n'est pas meilleur que ceux qui luy ont été donnés auparavant, puisqu'il rend d'abord M^r de la Ferté Imbault suspect au Parlement et luy oste de cette façon le moyen de servir icy le Roy et elle mesme, s'il s'en présentoit occasion. J'ay essayé d'apporter à ce mal deux remèdes différens, l'un en représentant à M^r Germain le tort que la dite Reine se faisoit et prenant bien garde à luy parler en telle force qu'il ne peut tirer d'avantage de mes parolles, pour me mettre mal auprès de la Reine d'Angleterre ou auprès du

Parlement, disant à M^r le comte d'Hollande, au S^r Pime et à quelques autres du Parlement ce que vous m'avés commandé de leur due et en la forme que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me prescrire, de sorte que ce bruit ne fera aucune impression sur eux. Il en couit encore un d'une autre nature, que M^r la Ferté Imbault vient pour empescher le mariage d'Hollande, au quel cas il viendrait trop tard.

M^r le comte d'Hollande ne diminue rien du zèle qu'il m'a témoigné d'abord pour la Fiance; il a désiré scavoir par vostre moyen, si M^r le cardinal auroit agréable qu'il luy confirmast par écrit les assurances de son très humble service, et désire fort en avoir la permission, car c'est ainsy qu'il m'en a parlé, y ajoustant d'autres termes pleins d'honneur de civilité et de respect.

VIII.

FRENCH MISSIONS, 1642-1645.

In a letter from the Hague, dated July 3, 1642, Queen Henrietta Maria thanks her brother Louis XIII for his kindness in sending Greycy to her (in Mrs. Green 82). Nothing was known of this mission from other sources; it is worth while to make oneself acquainted with the substance of the characteristic conversation which then took place, as Greycy communicated it to the King on his return.

'Mémoire pour servir à la relation des conférences de M^r de Greycy avec la reine d'Angleterre.'

The Queen complains of the attitude of La Ferté: 'le peu d'assistance qu'elle avoit receu de M^r de la Ferté—la quelle pour petite qu'elle eut été, auroit été suffisante de rabattre l'orgueil du parlement—le S^r Ferté avoit commerce particulier avec le parlement mesme, avec personnes de la plus basse condition.'

Above all she endeavours to dissipate the unfavourable impression received by Cardinal Richelieu; she has never done anything that could be to the detriment of France; when anything of this kind has taken place, it has occurred before she had gained influence over her husband, 'pouvoir sur l'esprit du roy son mary, comme elle a à présent; ce qui n'est si non depuis la nécessité que le roi croit avoir d'elle à cause de celle, où sont reduites ses affaires.'

The cause of the hatred, which she experiences in England, she sees in her religion. The fact of herself and her husband being threatened with dethronement and death had led the Queen to that coalition

with the officers; 'd'accepter les offres, que la plus part des officiers qui étoit lors sui pied leur fient, la quelle conjunction ayant été découverte par le fils du Sr Goring ne leur servit qu'à mettre en peur les conjurés et augmenter contre la dite dame reyne la haine des parlementaires, en sorte, qu'il fut proposé en icelui de la faire poursuivre par les voyes ordinaires de la justice.'

Hence her wish to go to France; and, when that was not allowed her, the intention of going to Scotland; and since that also became impossible, the attempt against the five members: from taking refuge in a fortified place she was prevented by the precautions of Parliament. She determined above all things to leave England; 'en s'empurant que sa personne étoit préjudiciable au retablissement des affaires de son mari.'

She endeavoured to render assistance by remittances of money from Holland: she had already sent her husband 200,000*l*.

What had taken place at Hull she considers rather to be fortunate, for now the people in the North would rise. 'Le roi espère, que la noblesse de York et quelqu'un des communes d'Angleterre leveroient la masque pour luy.' She herself hoped to return to England; if that should prove impracticable, she begs her brother for a resting-place in France, where she hopes not to be a burden to him.

She promises the Cardinal to remain always the friend of France and the foe of Spain.

This last was the main thing which was required of her in France; her declaration made a very favourable impression upon those in power. Cardinal Richelieu assured her once more of his friendship; in agreement with him the King invited her to come to France, where she would find a good reception; her wants would be attended to, supposing that she could get nothing from England. She was really very much inclined to accept. For how difficult and even dangerous it would be to have to accompany the King in the field; what would happen, if he should chance to lose a battle; where could the poor women find a refuge then? In France on the other hand, she would be able to render excellent service; if she was willing to pledge herself to them, the government there would pledge itself to help her; and from the French power decisive support might be expected, either in coming to terms with Parliament or in some other way¹. She left the decision to her husband; he, however, remained of opinion that she had better come to England. However, that did not prevent the commencement of friendly relations. An old friend of the Queen's in Catholic affairs, Jaques Davy du Perron, appeared before her at the

¹ Her letter to Charles, in *Mrs. Green* 127.

Hague in the name of the King and of the Cardinal. He had proposals, which he did not venture to declare openly, which he could communicate only by word of mouth. No written account of these exists; but they probably had reference to the above-mentioned support in coming to terms with the Parliament, or in overthrowing it, at any rate to a closer understanding between the Queen and France.

Most inopportune for Henrietta Maria was the death of Cardinal Richelieu, just as he once more became her friend. People in Vienna were mistaken in supposing that she would never have gone to France while he was alive, for she positively hated him, and also in regretting his death, inasmuch as it would lead to an approximation between France and England, which people there thought in the highest degree perilous; but thus much is correct, that such an approximation, if not altogether new, was now taken up with greater enthusiasm. It was hoped that an offensive and defensive alliance might be concluded between the two governments. With this view, at the Queen's desire, Count Harcourt was sent to England. The intention, however, seems not to have been, as she understood it, to use force, if a reconciliation with Parliament should prove impossible, but what was aimed at above everything was the conclusion of the political alliance.

In the early part of 1643 we find Greyc again in London, where he formed a connexion with the leading members of Parliament, who appeared to be inclined to come to terms. Harcourt also followed after an interval. He, however, soon convinced himself that a reconciliation was highly improbable. '*Cette paix,*' he says on October 28, '*n'est pas si avancée que l'ont voulu figurer ceux qui s'en sont entemis par deçà. Et le S^r de Greyc commence bien à voir, qu'il n'a guères vu jusqu' ici, que par les yeux d'autrui.*'

He himself at once got into a very serious difficulty, for one of the confidants of Queen Henrietta, who accompanied him, and was on the way to her in order to deliver the letters with which he was charged, was recognised on the road, arrested, and deprived of his papers. So at any rate Harcourt himself relates ('*ayant voulu passer déguisé pour trouver la reine de Grand Bretagne, estant chargé des lettres de la reine*'). Among them was also a letter from Greyc, in which mention was made of the alliance between the two courts as already an accomplished fact, and at the same time of Harcourt's instructions, to go with the Parliament only so far as was agreeable to the English court. The difficulties of the negotiation were thus rendered forthwith insurmountable.

The course of the intrigues at the French court had also an influence on the matter. It was the time of the Importans, which gave a momentary superiority to the reaction against the ideas of Richelieu.

The mediators of an understanding with the Queen of England, such as Greycy, appeared to hang together with this party, Vendôme and Madame de Chevreuse. Harcourt calls the attention of Mazarin, whom they all regarded as an enemy, to this union. 'Votre Eminence,' says he, 'sçait les anciennes cabales en ce pays de ces personnes aussy bien que les nouvelles en France.' Harcourt soon lost all hope of accomplishing anything; he found himself, he says, among more thorns than he had anticipated; they did not exactly wound him; but nevertheless he expresses a wish to withdraw.

The wish was readily granted. Greycy remained there somewhat longer; but Mazarin is of opinion that he has committed the usual fault of becoming too intimate with the court and thus losing the confidence of the Parliament.

Altogether the matter assumed another form through the Scots entering into a close alliance with the English Parliament. From the instructions which Mazarin gave to the new ambassador, M^r de Sabran, in April 1644, one sees moreover that the political leanings of the Queen were again under the influence of great doubt and hesitation; she appeared once more to be depending upon Brussels, where Spanish predilections predominated.

Negotiations de M. de Sabran en Angleterre.

(Copy in the British Museum).

In the first audience, in which Mazarin laid before the new ambassador what he had to do,—to bring about an understanding between the King of England and the Parliament by means of French mediation, he did not conceal from him how difficult and at the same time how necessary the undertaking was; for now the alliance with the Scots seemed to threaten the destruction of the monarchy, seeing that the Parliament was in possession of the capital and of the navy, and that the court was hated by the people. (Cp. III. 189.)

In the instructions the precedents were accordingly recounted and the commission of the ambassador was thus specified in them; 'à d'appuyer les justes prétentions du roy de la Gr. Bretagne et le favoriser en tout pour retablir sa légitime autorité, sans pourtant paroître de vouloir élever la puissance si haut, que le roi deviendrait seigneur et monarque de l'Angleterre, où les loix faisant contrepoids à la trop grande puissance des rois doivent être maintenues en leur entier, pour apaiser les esprits et assoupir les troubles.'

Very much the same compromise, therefore, which Clarendon had in view; the ambassador is to learn the conditions of a union from the King, but at the same time is not to lose sight of the conditions

of the marriage-contract, or of the promises made in Rome in favour of the Catholics. What then was to be his attitude towards the Scots? The ambassador was to endeavour to induce them to effect their reconciliation with their King through France; for it was to the interests of France no less than of the Scots, that Scotland should not become dependent on England; '*faisant entendre que ceux entre eux, qui professent la religion des puritains, ont engagé leur couronne à une trop grande liaison et dépendence de l'Angleterre et qu' insensiblement cela les pourrait reduire à être province, leur faire connaitre, que le covenant ne peut leur faire que du mal.*'

A commission scarcely possible to execute;—to mediate between the two tendencies which divided the British people, in the religious sphere as well as in the political!

At first Sabran was not altogether without hope. It is worth our while to accompany his first steps; they throw a certain amount of light on the state of things inside the two parties, the royal army and the city.

Sabran saw the King after he had visited the Queen, who at that time was living at Exeter, and had just been confined; this was immediately after the small action near Cropredy, which had resulted in the success of the royalists. Waller mentions his being present on the 3rd of July, and states that he was charged with a message to the Parliament. The details we learn from his letter of July 12/22.

. 12/22. *Juillet* 1644.

Revenant de vers la reine à Oxford, j'appris que le Roi sur ce petit avantage qu'il avait eu par grand hasard, sui Waller, de lui prendre onze canons, avoit été conseillé, et l'avoit fait communiquer et agréer à ceux qui sont assemblés à Oxford, d'envoyer un hérault à M^{rs} de Londres pour leur faire entendre sa disposition à la paix, et de recevoir les Deputés. Je dis au Secretaire d'Etat le chevalier Nicolas, et à un Saigneur qui j'avois pratiqué, que ceux du Parlement ne souffriront jamais que le peuple fût averti par la bouche d'un hérault des bonnes intentions du Roi à la paix, que d'ailleurs sur un leger succès, ils diroient que Sa Maj^{te} pretendoit grand avantage pour fort peu de fortune; que le moyen plus propre pour menager son intention seroit, qu'il parut, que Sa Maj^{te} persuadée par les instances que je pouvois avoir fait de la part de la France de se porter à un accomodement, (en) avoit voulu mettre (?) entre mes mains et à ma conduite une declaration signée de sa main, pour leur être communiquée par les moyens les plus convenables, et que les témoignages puissent être rendus en France à la Reine de la force de son entremise; que quand la chose ne réussiroit pas, le Roi d'Angleterre n'en recevoit pas

l'affront, qu'il recevroit par un Herault si maltraité, outre que cette procedure rendoit toute proposition plus admissible. Ces M^{rs} d'Oxford goûtèrent ma proposition avec crainte qu'un Herault ne l'eut déjà portée à Londres. Ce subject me fit partir d'Oxford pour aller vers le Roi à l'armée, je l'ai rencontré si favorablement, qu'après lui avoir fait la révérence, et dit des nouvelles de la Reine et de mon passage vers le comte d'Essex, j'eus l'honneur de l'entretenir une heure et demi à cheval sans être interrompu de personne, je lui dis l'avis qu'on m'avoit donné de sa resolution approuvée de son conseil, d'envoyer un hérault à Londres, et lui dis tout ce que dessus, et ce que j'avois communiqué à ceux d'Oxford. Il approuva mon dessein en me témoignant qu'il en parleroit à son conseil, en dinant emmi (?) de la campagne au milieu.

Lors je me retirai, pour en parler à M^r Digby et lui fair reconnaître que le Roi y étoit disposé, à fin qu'il n'en changeât le dessein; il l'approuva, et m'en pria, me disant que personne n'avoit donné sujet de confiance et d'espoir à sa Majesté et à ses Ministres tel que moi, que cela seroit resolu le soir, et qu'il étoit d'avis que ce fût par une declaration signée de se Maj^{té} que j'essayasse de mettre la main à l'oeuvre. Ils s'assemblent l'après diner; et le soir, je suis le Roi à sa couchée; on me loge sous le même couvert du Prince de Galles, je vais voir souper le Roi, et sa Maj^{té} me dit le lendemain matin que pour ne tremper pas d'avantage dans l'incommodité je m'en allasse à Oxford, pour de là passer à Londres, et que le lendemain matin il m'enverroient les moyens de m'employer pour ses interêts selon mon desir, c'étoit pour en donner encore avis à ceux d'Oxford.

Le lendemain un gentilhomme de la part de M^r Digby m'apporte la déclaration du Roi accompagnée d'une lettrie de M^r Digby, dont je vous envoi la copie, où vous connaitrez l'assurance qu'il me donne en mots assez clairs que l'on n'aura pas désagréable que je me relache envers ces Seig^{rs}, c'est à dire que je les reconnoise enfin pour Parlement plutôt que de ne passer outre sans crainte d'être désavoué, je n'en abuserai pas.

Hitherto the great difficulty in the way of a negotiation had lain in the fact that the King would not at all recognise the Parliament as such, as is said in the instructions of Sabran; 'comme les uns n'ont peu consentir à un pourparler, qu'à préalable leur assemblée n'eut été reconnue légitime, le roi y a apprehendé tant de dommage qu'il ne l'a sceu accorder.' It was chiefly on this point that the mission of Harcourt had failed. It was therefore a success for Sabran and at the same time a great concession on the part of the King, that he entrusted Sabran with a formal message of peace 'to the Lords and Commons of Parliament assembled at Westminster.'

Hence it was determined in France also, but not without apprehension, and only after a considerable time and with the support of the Emperor's example, to recognise the Parliament as such, and that by means of a letter addressed in a way calculated to please, 'inscription telle, qu'elle peut être faite à un corps composé de divers membres.' Sabran could now hope to bring matters to a bonâ fide negotiation with France as mediator. He had brought with him letters to Pembroke, Northumberland, and Salisbury, and he resumed the old connexion with Lord Holland and Lady Carlisle.

In France it was now hoped with the help of these old supporters to get the offer of French mediation accepted: it was intended at the same time to form a third party; but it would have been far too weak for the purpose, even if it had come into existence. Sabran perceived altogether different tendencies of the most advanced kind,—declaration of a republic or dethroning of the King in favour of another member of the royal house, and an alliance with Spain, in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe.

These are ideas, which in one way or another were realised afterwards, and which deserve to be noticed as they first appeared. The raising of the Palatine house to the English throne was already contemplated. On the 1st of September 1644 Sabran writes;

Leur dessein en mon retardement est de me pouvoir repondre à mon avis, qu'ils ont envoieé au Roi de la G. B des articles, qu'ils espèrent que Sa Maj^{té} B. consentira, et de n'agréer ni refuser ouvertement notre entremise si sincère, qu'ils tiennent suspecte comme de personnes interessées avec leur parti, craignant néanmoins du ressentiment et du secours; et je vous puis assurer que si les Ecossois (par la crainte dont ils se sont rendu susceptibles, de devenir enfin province d'Angleterre, si le Gouvernement monarchique étoit changé, et par celle de perdre les grandes sommes qui leur sont dues) n'avoient protesté de vouloir un Roi, et encore le leur à cause du tige d'Ecosse, ce Parlement seroit allé à bride abattue à éteindre la Royauté—Dieu veuille rendre fausses mes propheties!—se faisant déjà appeller Etats du Royaume, et leur dessein est que le Roi de la G. B. refusant, comme il fera, ses propositions, de faire comprendre à l'Ecosse qu'étant resolu pour leur sûreté à la restriction de l'autorité des Rois pour l'avenir, il y a lieu par les loix et les exemples de changer de Roi, et pour éviter le ressentiment du sang Royal, transferer en un autre nom la Royauté; au quel cas le Prince Palatin y pourroit être induit, et que sous les conditions que l'on voudroit il pourroit accepter cette couronne, qui lui feroit recouvrer la sienne de Palatin, la quelle lui acquérant credit parmi

les Allemans, il seroit capable de faire un grand service à la Religion Protestante, et l'appuyer par tout, ou qu'il obtiendrait bien le dit Palatinat sans combat, par le consentement des Espagnols moyennant une alliance et une jonction contre la France, qui assureroit l'Angleterre contre ses ressentiments que le sang lui pourra donner, arrêteroit ses conquêtes sur l'Espagne, et rendroit la partie plus égale entre ces deux couronnes. Et ce qui me fait douter de ce dessein autant de la part du Palatin que de la leur néanmoins malaisé, c'est qu'il a pretexté son voyage à Londres sur les neccessités de sa Maison qui seroient bien réparées, mais avec peu d'honneur s'il étoit admis à cette Royauté, sa mère et lui n'ayant jamais été bien avec leur Maj^{tes} d'Angleterre. Ce dessein manquant ou que les Ecossois ne l'approuvant, qui seroit le plus pernicieux à la chrétienté, et très considerable à la France, ils ne doutent point de rendre susceptibles les Ecossois, de porter à la Royauté le petit Duc de Lancaster qu'ils tiennent, le quel est agé de quatre ans, qui étant du tige d'Ecosse, innocent des troubles et des contraventions aux loix de l'Etat, qu'ils prétendent avoir été commises par leur Maj^{tes} B., par le Prince de Galles, et par tout le parti du Roi de la Grande Bretagne, qu'ils déclarent criminel de l'Etat et de lèse Majesté, parcequ'ils servent Sa Maj^{te} B. contre le Parlement: sans aucun égard au droit de nature, et des gens, ils voudroient le déclarer légitime Roi par les loix et coutumes de l'Etat, par les nouveautés qu'ils recherchent au couronnement de leur Roi, et autres choses qui choquent le sens commun, et prétendent de former ce petit Roi à leur mode, et soumettre pour l'avenir la Royauté au Gouvernement d'un Parlement perpetuel.

Thus it was a deviation from the regular succession, although still within the circle of the reigning dynasty, that was taken into consideration as early as this. The Palatinate scheme was attributed at the time to the Vanes, father and son, who were most intimately connected with the court of the Queen of Bohemia.

In October 1644 Sabran was once more with King Charles, who made a most favourable impression on him in his camp. 'C'est le roi, à mon gré le plus pénible (pains-taking) le plus judicieux et le moins empressé dans si mauvaises affaires qui donne et dispose de tous les ordres jusqu'au moindre, qui ne signe jamais rien sans l'avoir lû, qui va autant à pied qu'à cheval à la tête de son armée.'

King Charles on his side was but little pleased at the overtures and designs of the French. In an autograph letter to his wife, who meanwhile had fled to France, he expresses the greatest ap-

prehensions respecting the policy of France. 'Although he (Mr. de Sabran) condemnes the rebels proceeding as much as any, yet he declares in his master's name a positive neutrality, so that either he complies not with his instructions or France is not so much our friend as we hope for. I rather think the latter, yet I doubt not but thy dexterity will cure that coolness of friendship.'

But while the King was displeased at the neutral bearing of Sabran, the latter by no means made great way with the Parliament or with the Scots on that account.

In November 1644 he held a conference with the Scottish deputies in London, in which he complains of the small success that he had had with his representations to Parliament. He stated that he was come to offer to King Charles and the Parliament the mediation of France; '*puisque le Roi de la G. B. ayant des restrictions en son autorité, et le parlement aussi ne pouvant avoir son entier éclat ni ses résolutions bien sûres sans la présence de Sa Majesté B., le retablisement des affaires et la sûreté du repos public dependoit de cette réunion des membres avec le chef*'—adding the following remarks:

Que je ne leur pouvais celer, que j'avais trouvé peu de disposition à la paix en ces Mess^{rs}, soit par la confiance trop grande en leur propres forces, et à la conjonction de l'Ecosse à leurs intérêts, soit (ce qui seroit bien plus étrange) par l'aversion à la personne du Roi d'Angleterre, et si je l'ose dire à la Royauté, trop visible en leur perseverance en des propositions qu'on lui prepare, toutes directement contraires à son autorité, et qui visent à un changement de la forme de l'Etat, que l'on avoit néanmoins peine de croire que l'Ecosse s'y peut jamais disposer, étant un Royaume ancien qui ne pourroit conserver son lustre, si l'Angleterre se portoit à une nouvelle face d'Etat et de gouvernement;—

Que je veux bien croire que le Roi d'Angleterre peut être tombé dans les manquemens que l'on dit, peut avoir contrevenu à la loi sous la quelle il est, et cherché, comme c'est la coutume, quelque avantage à son autorité qu'il a donné pouvoir au parlement de subsister, pendant que les affaires dont il est question seroient sur le tapis, que depuis voyant que son consentement étoit employé à la destruction de sa dignité et autorité, il avoit cru par sa retraite, et par sa déclaration au contraire arrêter le cours des decrets et subsistance du parlement; que le Parlement a raison de vouloir être reconnu, pour légitimement convoqué et continué, que Sa Maj^{te} B. n'ait pu retracter son consentement, qu'elle ait été sollicité par

des mauvais conseils de quitter le Parlement, qu'elle y doive revenir, qui est tout ce qui ce dit :—

Mais aussi le Parlement lui fait la guerre par tout, ferme les advenues à son propre desir, de pouvoir revenir, par des propositions ou articles si étranges, qu'il s'en trouvera peu de soutenables, ni qui puissent être pratiquées dans un pays accoutumé à la Royauté, et visent tous à une forme plus convenable à tout autre Gouvernement que à la Monarchie ;—que la guerre que fait le Roi de la G. B. n'est que par une nécessité de défense, toujours plus disposé à la paix et au repos de son état ; qu'il m'en avoit confié les particularités depuis quatre mois, que je n'avois jamais trouvé en M^{rs} du Parlement aucune disposition pour recevoir ce que j'avois à leur dire et laisser par écrit ; que l'on a voulu excuser l'impuissance de modérer des articles si rudes, sous prétexte qu'ils étoient concertés avec les Ecossois, et ne s'en pouvoient departir sans eux, que j'ai même rencontré des difficultés à me faire entendre de la part de leur Maj^{tes} pour leur offrir leur affection, et leur entremise à fin de leur s'il étoit possible quelque conférence

However, not only did he find no support among the Scots, but it was precisely from them that there came the most unwelcome request of all which ran directly counter to the ideas, on which the negotiations of the French were mainly based. Mazarin had hoped to wean the Scots from the Covenant ; it was precisely the Covenant which they on their side wished to introduce into England. Sabran finds that by such means Protestantism would gain infinitely in strength, especially through union with Geneva and the French Reformed Church, which, so far as he hears, is thinking of demanding the restoration of certain privileges at the approaching synod. In February 1645 Sabran spoke once more on the subject with the Scots.

Je leur dis, he says, que je ne voyais point d'avantage au Roi de la G. B. pour lui donner la volonté de consentir à l'unité de la Religion par l'expulsion des Evêques, puisqu'elle n'est pas même dans le Parlement et moins dans le peuple de Londres et des contrées ; toutes les réponses ont concourru que Sa Maj^{té} de la G. B. ayant consenti en Ecosse la forme de Religion, par l'échange des Evêques au presbytériat, la quelle si n'étoit point essentielle pour la foi l'étoit pour l'union et repos des deux Royaumes, Sa Maj^{té} de la G. B. ne la pouvant refuser, et qu'ils me pouvoient assurer, que le Roi d'Angl^{re} y consentant, toutes sortes des propositions seroient bientôt accommodées au gré de Sa Maj^{té}, sa dignité entière et ses révenues augmentées ; et comme j'ai répliqué que je ne doutais pas de leur desir,

mais un peu de leur puissance à ranger les esprits de la chambre basse, où le peuple avoit été mis en credit, ils me dirent que l'opposition aux choses raisonnables seroit avantageuse au Roi de la G. B. pour dire que l'Ecosse se declareroit entièrement pour lui en tel cas; et m'accompagnant le chancelier ajouta qu'il falloit rendre cette paix possible par ce moyen, et faire revenir la Reine avec plus de dignité et de contentement pour elle et sa dépendance, ce que je tiens pour une complaisance. Ce qui me persuade que le Roi de la G. B. s'y devra laisser emporter autant pour les intérêts particuliers, que publics à la dépouille des Evêques, et qu'il n'y aura sans cela succès au traité, ni suite de paix, et qu'avec cela, elle se peut faire — — Ce n'est à mon sens une chose légère, que le consentement que le Roi d'Angleterre pourra donner à la suppression des Evêques et autres Ecclesiastiques, il s'affaiblirait d'autorité, et la chambre haute du Parlement; les Ecossois et tous les Puritains de quelque pays qu'ils soient s'en orgueilliront.

Still the awkward demand was not to be got over, and in France people found themselves at last even induced to wish that it should be granted. The granting of it, however, required another mediation than that of Sabran; and after a little time those, to whom he had specially addressed himself, would listen to him no longer.

IX.

THE COUNSELS OF THE EARL OF HOLLAND.

Henry Rich, Earl of Holland, in all the changes of his relation to the King and Queen had ever remained thoroughly French. Above all he had held fast to Richelieu. A letter of the year 1642 is extant, in which he congratulates the Cardinal on the restoration of his health; 'de la santé en la quelle ce royaume et une grande partie du monde prennent tant d'intérêt, qu'il a paru contentement parmi nous dans la crainte, de la ruine et du danger.'

He was less able to come to an understanding with Sabran, who in accordance with his instructions opposed the Presbyterianism of the Scots.

Holland on the contrary was of the opinion, that union with the Scots at any price was the condition of maintaining the monarchy in England, and therefore was also for the interest of France.

He was the sworn foe of the Independents, and the closest ally of

the Scots, who alone could withstand them. He shared their excitement, when it was understood that the King had entered into certain relations with these sects, and above all that they obtained access even to Queen Henrietta Maria, who was once more staying in France, through one of her favourites. He and the Scots wished much rather that Bellièvre and especially Montereuil should again be sent to England, in order to restore a good understanding between the Scots and the crown of France.

It was with him accordingly that Montereuil, when he returned to England in the summer of 1646, entered into close union, and the latter communicated to the French court the views expressed by the Earl. In the letter of Montereuil of 12/22 August we read :—

Le zèle qu'il temoigne avoir pour l'accommodement des affaires d'Angleterre est si grand que je ne le puis croire tout à fait désintéressé. Et en effet soit que l'on considère la façon en la quelle il est icy auprès du Parlement dont il n'a pas seulement l'entrée, soit qu'on regarde le peu que les grands d'Angleterre peuvent espérer durant ce gouvernement populaire, il a de puissantes raisons de désirer que les choses se portent à un accommodement, et nous devons croire qu'il y travaillera de bon pied, particulièrement s'il croit que la France luy sache gré de ce qu'il fera et veuille contribuer pour le bien remettre auprès de leurs M^{tes} de la Grande Bretagne. Il est entré en fonds d'abord avec nous touchant l'accommodement et nous a dit qu'il le croyoit possible, pourvu que le Roy et la Reine de la G. B. le désirassent, qu'il y avoit encore un parti assez considérable dans le Parlement d'Angleterre qui leur étoit asseuré et qui se joignant aux Ecossois prévaudroit à celui des Indépendants qui vouloient entièrement effacer le nom de Roy d'Angleterre, que les affaires du Roy d'Angleterre alloient estre réduites à la dernière extrémité par les Indépendants et qu'après avoir prévalu aux gens sur le sujet de la publication des lettres du Roy d'Angleterre ils avoient disposé des séditieux aux lieux où la lecture s'en devoit faire avec ordre de porter le peuple à demander la déposition de leur Roy : que cependant Dieu avoit arrêté l'effet d'un dessein si dangereux, que ces mesmes Indépendants voyant que ni les Ecossois ni les bons Anglois ne désiroient point voir perdre le Roy d'Angleterre, et que ces premiers pensoient déjà à luy proposer des conditions de paix, ils avoient pris le temps que la plus part des seigneurs d'Angleterre estoient éloignés pour arrester que l'on dresserait quelques propositions, pour faire au Roy de la G. B. en la manière la plus désavantageuse pour luy qu'il seroit possible ; mais que tous les gens de bien du Parlement d'Angleterre étoient solus pour tenir la main à ce que son honneur et sa dignité

y fussent conservées ; que deux choses seroient principalement nécessaires, que le Roy d'Angleterre souffrit l'introduction de la religion d'Ecosse en Angleterre qui ostoit à la vérité le nom des Evesques, mais qui en laissoit toutefois encore quelque image que les Indépendants desiroient entièrement effacer, et que ce Prince voulut revenir à Londres entrer en son Parlement ; qu'il ne faisoit rien contre sa conscience au premier ny contre son honneur au second, puisqu'il savoit que l'abolition des Evesques ne pouvoit préjudicier à son salut, et que la conscience qu'il témoigneroit à ses sujets luy étoit toujours honorable, mais qu'il croyoit que de ces deux choses dépendoit sa conservation ; qu'on pouvoit toutefois aviser aux seuretez qu'il faudroit prendre pour son retour, à quoy les otages pourroient servir, mais plus que tout l'entremise de la France, que la présence du dit Roy en son Parlement donneroient courage à ses amis et affoiblirait ceux qui ne le sont pas, que c'étoient des remèdes fascheux à la vérité, mais qui se sont trouvés utiles à quelques uns des roys ses prédécesseurs. Ce sont, Monsieur, les principales choses que nous a dites Monseigneur le comte d'Hollande, qui m'ayant pris à part durant que Mr de Sabran saluoit M^{me} sa femme, m'a dit qu'il seroit bien aise que nous vissions en particulier et qu'il me diroit beaucoup de choses sur ce sujet. Je pris mon temps pour luy rendre vostre lettre et pour l'asseurer qu'on le regardoit en France comme la personne qui pouvoit contribuer au bien et au repos d'Angleterre : que j'avois ordre de luy dire qu'on suivroit ses sentimens pour y agir, que ce luy seroit une chose bien glorieuse que d'avoir contribué à une si bonne oeuvre et qui après le retablissement des choses le rendroit le premier homme d'Angleterre en dignité et en reputation, comme il l'étoit en vertu. Voilà tout ce que j'ay peu apprendre de luy quelques icy.

London 21/31. Aoust 1645.

J'ay vu Mr le comte d'Hollande ainsy qu'il m'avoit tesmoigné le désirer, il m'a fait un fort long discours et je croy encore très sincère sur l'Etat des affaires de ce pais qui se peut réduire à ceci : que l'Angleterre qui obéit au Parlement d'Angleterre est divisée en deux factions, celle des Indépendants et celle qu'ils appellent des Presbytériens, que ceux-cy s'unissent avec les Ecossois aussy bien pour ce qui regarde le gouvernement politique que pour ce qui touche celui de la religion, de sorte qu'ils désirent la conservation de leur Roy, en mettant toutefois de certaines bornes à son autorité qui sont dures en effet, mais qu'ils prétendent avoir été prescrites par les anciennes lois de leur pais et qu'ils veulent aussy l'établissement de la religion d'Ecosse en Angle-

terre et l'anéantissement des Evesques, en laissant certaines personnes dans leurs églises qui n'ayant ny le nom ny la dignité des Evesques en exercent toutefois en quelque sorte les fonctions. Que les Indépendants au contraire veuillent réduire les choses dans une si parfaite égalité que tous les ministres ayent une autorité semblable, et qu'ils n'ayent point à rendre compte de leurs actions ny de leur doctrine dans les synodes, de sorte que leur réforme s'éloigne bien d'avantage du gouvernement des églises Anglaises que celle des Ecossois ; que comme les assistances que l'Ecosse avoit donnée à l'Angleterre dans le commencement de ses divisions, avoit élevé le coeur aux Ecossois, et que les Anglois pouvoient aussy estre fâchés de devoir beaucoup à des peuples qui leur étoient inférieurs en étendue de terres et en richesses, on avoit vu naître entre eux des commencemens de jalousie ; que quelques grands (pour gagner crédit auprès des peuples et montrer qu'ils portoient les interests de l'Angleterre contre l'Ecosse) avoient essayé de rendre suspectes autant qu'ils avoient peu les intentions des Ecossois, et s'étoient opposés à toutes les choses qui étoient désirées de leur part, représentant sous main que les Ecossois ne se contentoient pas de vouloir avoir la principale direction des affaires civiles en Angleterre et le maniement de celles de la guerre, s'ils ne régloient leurs consciences et n'exerçoient un empire jusque sur leur religion. Que ces personnes formoient le party des Indépendants, qui ne voulant point admettre de supériorité dans l'Eglise, n'en désiroient point souffrir aussy en l'Etat, et pour se rendre plus agréables au peuple se portoient tout ouvertement à une anarchie, ce qui cependant que ce c'est contraire aux interests du Roy d'Angleterre, avoit été toutefois d'abord soutenu par le Roy mesme, ainsy qu'on avoit eu sujet de le croire : que cela me sembleroit peut estre étrange, mais que deux raisons y avoient obligé le dit Roy d'Angleterre, l'une la croyance qu'il avoit, que les introductions que les Indépendants vouloient faire dans les églises d'Angleterre estant vaines et le changement qu'ils prétendoient apporter dans le gouvernement politique étant impossible, cette faction se détruiroit d'elle mesme de sorte que l'on leur pouvoit laisser sans crainte la liberté de s'établir ; l'autre que cela pourroit causer quelque division non seulement entre l'Ecosse et l'Angleterre, mais encore entre les Anglois et les Anglois, ce qui ne pouvoit que contribuer à l'avantage des affaires du Roy d'Angleterre, qui pourroit profiter de ces divisions, en gagnant à soy un de ces partys, ou voyant l'un travailler à la ruine de l'autre : que pour ces raisons le Roy d'Angleterre avoit commencé à entretenir quelque correspondance avec ces Indépendants, mais que depuis ou pour ce qu'il les avoit trouvés entièrement contraires au bien de ses affaires ou par ce qu'il avoit reconnu que le party des presbytériens s'unissoit avec les Ecossois,

il leur avoit même fait quelques propositions, et cela avec tant d'éclat qu'il donnoit sujet de douter s'il avoit plus de désir ou de se les rendre amis ou de les rendre ennemis de ce Parlement d'Angleterre, de sorte que les Ecossois avoient eu besoin d'éclaircir le Parlement d'Angleterre de tout ce qui s'étoit passé avec le Roy : que ces dits Ecossois avoient sollicité depuis les Anglois de vouloir entendre à une bonne paix, ce qu'ils désiroient faire aussy de leur part : que les Indépendants pressés par leurs instances et craignant qu'ils n'y travaillassent sans eux avoient pris leur temps, durant que les plus . . . gens d'armes et les meilleurs serviteurs qui restoient au Roy d'Angleterre dans le parlement étoient à la campagne, pour résoudre qu'ils feroient des conditions de paix à leur Roy et pour en rendre la forme si dure et si désobligeante que la manière en la quelle elles seroient faites fût capable d'ôter à ce Prince le moyen de les accepter avec honneur : que les Ecossois à qui ce procédé n'avoit point été du tout agréable font présentement de fortes instances à ce que ces propositions pour la paix se fassent en une manière différente de ce que l'on a résolu, c'est à dire autrement que par votes ou billes du parlement, ce qui obligeroit le Roy à donner son contentement aux articles qui luy seroient proposés sans y oser changer aucune chose et empescherait qu'on peut traiter de la paix une autre fois, et que ceux du Parlement d'Angleterre qui suivent le party des Ecossois se devoient rendre tous à Londres présentement pour aider encore à que les choses passent pour leur Roy le plus doucement qu'il seroit possible ; que c'étoit là le véritable état où se trouvoient présentement les affaires d'Angleterre.

Et que l'on pouvoit s'asseurer que les Ecossois désiroient la paix, de sorte que le Roy d'Angleterre pouvoit seurement s'attacher à eux pour cela qu'ils pouvoient y être portés par l'affection qu'ils doivent avoir pour un Roy, né chez eux et qui a été Ecossois avant qu'il vint à la couronne d'Angleterre, mais qu'ils étoient obligés d'en user ainsy par des considérations plus puissantes sur des peuples que celles de leur honneur et de leur devoir, puisque les Ecossois ne peuvent durant la guerre rien tiier de ce qui leur est deu par les Anglois et qu'ils le recevront encore plus difficilement si le Parlement d'Angleterre demeure victorieux, puisqu'il est vray que les bienfaits reçus par les Etats sont aisement mis en oubly et bien souvent recompensés par les injures de sorte qu'il semble que toute chose doive porter les Ecossois à s'accommoder, à quoy peut encore contribuer le malheureux état où ils se trouvent en leur pays et l'appéhension qu'ils ont que les Anglois ne les préviennent et ne fassent leur condition bonne à leur préjudice. Cependant je ne puis m'empescher de vous dire que Mr. de Sabran me donne un peu de peine, il publie continuellement à toutes sortes de

personnes que je ne feray rien en Ecosse ; il peut dire vray, mais il se peut aussy passer de le dire.

Il me témoigne d'abord qu'il ne vouloit point se mesler de cette affaire ny voir les députés d'Ecosse, et quand j'ay été prest de les voir sans luy, il semble qu'il l'a trouvé mauvais, il n'a pas approuvé aussy que j'aie pris la chaire à bras chéz eux et toutefois il l'a demandée dans le Parlement d'Angleterre et l'a obtenue dans le comité avec beaucoup de satisfaction, ce qui m'a fait croire que je ne devois point faire de difficulté de la prendre et plutost encore parceque je l'avois moins demandée.

London 11/21. Septembre 1645.

J'ai fait connoistre au Comte d'Hollande, qu'on avoit fort bien reçu en France ce qu'il m'avoit dit et je luy ay donné autant de courage que j'ay peu d'arranger les Ecossois auprès des quels il peut beaucoup à un accommodement particulier, ce que je n'eusse jamais creu qu'un Anglois eût peu procurer, et cependant j'ay connu par expérience que cette inimitié que la plus grande partie des grands portent aux Indépendants et le désir qu'ils ont de les voir mal en leurs affaires prévaut en effet sur les considérations du bien et de l'avantage de leur pays. Je l'ay pressé ensuite de vouloir voir avec moy quel moyen il y aurait pour disposer les choses à la paix, l'assurant que la France qui connoit la bonne disposition qu'il y a et les bons offices qu'il veut faire pour cet effet aura un particulier soin de luy conserver tout ce qu'il peut attendre d'avantageux dans les changements des affaires. Il a donc commencé à me parler du retour du Roy d'Angleterre en son Parlement comme d'une chose qui eût terminé les affaires bien promptement, mais il est demeuré d'accord que le Roy n'étoit pas assez resolu pour entreprendre une chose de si grand hazard comme celle là et qu'on ne pouvoit donner des seuretés suffisantes, tant par ce qu'il n'y a point de sujets qui puissent entrer pour cautions d'un Roy, que pour ce que comme il faudroit que son arrivée icy fût imprévue de peur d'estre empeschée par les Indépendants, on n'auroit pas lieu de traiter des seuretés qui pourroient estre données. Outre que les affaires de ce Roy étant en bien meilleurs termes qu'il n'eût osé mesme espérer, il ne doit pas se mettre au hazard de se ruiner en un moment. Il est donc demeuré d'accord que ce moyen n'estoit pas presque praticable, mais il a tesmoigné qu'il trouvoit plus de jour à faire venir le Prince de Galles au Parlement d'Angleterre comme médiateur entre le Roy d'Angleterre et son peuple, luy que les Anglois devoient honorer comme celuy que Dieu avoit fait naistre pour estre un jour leur maistre et qui ne l'ayant point encore été

ne leur pouvoit estre encore odieux. Il sembloit donc qu'il n'inclinast assés à cet expédient, et il me dit mesme que ce n'estoit pas luy seul qui avoit cette pensée, mais beaucoup de ses amis à Londres, et beaucoup des serviteurs que ce Prince avoit près de lui, sur quoi je vous diay les mesmes choses que je luy ay lors représentées, que je trouvois en cecy de plus grands inconvéniens que dans la première proposition qu'il m'avoit faite, puisque pour ne point parler de la jalousie ordinaire que tous les rois ont avec assés de raison de leurs enfans et du danger qu'il y a qu'un jeune prince n'aime autant s'emparer d'un gouvernement que l'attendre quand il a une belle occasion, il n'y auroit point d'apparence que le Roy d'Angleterre mette son fils aîné entre les mains de ses ennemis, qui pourroient ou le retenir seulement, ce qui luy seroit fort sensible, ou s'en servir mesme à leur dessein en le faisant couronner, ce qui autoriseroit extrêmement leurs actions; de sorte que après avoir rejété ces deux moyens il m'a tesmoigné que la paix générale seroit donc très difficile à faire, puisque les Independants ne s'y porteroient jamais volontairement et arresteroient la proposition des articles qu'on veut dresser pour ce sujet ou les dresseroient en telle sorte que le Roy ne les pourroit jamais accepter avec honneur, et que leurs affaires allant assés bien et celles des Ecossois au contraire étant dans un état fort déplorable, ils se trouveroient toujours plus en état d'empescher les Ecossois et ceux de leur parti avec moins de pouvoir de leur résister, de sorte que la paix générale étoit comme une chose impossible et que le temps qu'on mettroit à la résoudre donneroit peut estre loisir aux Independants de faire telle chose qui la pourroit empescher pour jamais, comme si le Parlem^t d'Angleterre alloit declarer le Comte de Northumberland protecteur de ce Royaume et le Roy d'Angleterre incapable de regner. Ce que je juge toutefois assés éloigné quelque chose qui s'en dise icy, de sorte qu'il n'y a rien ce semble qui se puisse mieux faire maintenant qu'une paix particulière, qui estant une fois arrestée entre les Ecossois et les Anglois qui sont joints à eux, et cela par l'entremise de France, seroit enfin acceptée par les Independants de force ou volontairement, ce que j'ay trouvé estre le sentiment de quelques autres de son parti.

X.

MAZARIN'S DREAD OF AN ENGLISH REPUBLIC.

In the year 1646 the French arms were victorious even at sea and much more so on the continent; the leading minister, Cardinal Mazarin, conceived the idea of extending the boundaries of France

in all directions, especially over the Spanish Netherlands. Seeing that the superiority of the French was owing to the inaction forced upon the English government by internal disturbances, Mazarin thought that he need dread no opposition to his great scheme from that quarter, for in England the split was more violent than ever.

But there came in view the possibility, that the Independents might become complete masters of England and set up a republic there.

Both parties—the leading men in England who had French leanings, and the Scots—addressed themselves to France, in order by means of its support to induce King Charles to consent to the setting up of the Presbyterian form of Church constitution, as it had been defined by the Synod of Westminster.

This in itself was against Mazarin's ideas, for already this Presbyterian power seemed to him, as we know, to be strengthening Britain too much, since it included a complete union of Scotland with England; but he saw still greater danger in the setting up of a republican form of government.

It once more seemed opportune to send Bellièvre, President of the Parliament of Paris, who before had led the way to the first alliance with the Scotch, to England, in order to bring about an understanding between them and King Charles.

In the instructions which he received two points are prominent, the wish to avoid a republic and the precedents for negotiations with the Scots.

Instruction du Roy au Sieur de Bellièvre, Com^{re} de sa M^{te} en ses conseils et Président en sa Cour du Parlement de Paris, s'en allant son Ambassadeur extraordinaire en Angleterre.

I.

Il n'est pas besoin d'estendre icy fort en long les conséquences qui resulteroient de ce fatal mouvement de l'Angleterre, si elles n'estoient prévenues. Il est aisé de les pénétrer pour peu qu'on ayt de lumière dans les affaires de l'Estat et de connoissance des choses du monde.

La première est le passage qui se feroit d'une Monarchie en République, c'est à dire d'une forme de gouvernement qui ne donne point de jalousie à la France, à une autre forme qui luy pourroit estre très dommageable (comme il se monstera dans le cours de cette instruction). La seconde du mauvais exemple que reçoivent du soulèvement des Anglois et Escossois contre leur Roy les sujets des autres Princes, qui ont par conséquent interest à ne souffrir

point qu'un mal qui pourroit estre facilement limité aille jusqu'au bout de sa course et achève d'estre heureux. La troisième d'autant que la condition de la Religion Catholique ne pourroit qu'empirer en Angleterre par ce changement du gouvernement, où ceux qui l'auroient fait chercheroient une partie de leur justification dans la rigueur qu'ils apporteroient à l'en bannir entièrement et à ne l'y souffrir point mesme cachée, et (où) les Ministres Religionnaires qui ont tousjours plus de credit dans les Républiques que dans les Monarchies n'oublieroient rien pour la faire maltraiter dans ce Royaume là et pour y faire embrasser les interets de ceux qui sont de la mesme religion dans les Estats des autres Princes. La quatrième est l'intérêt inévitable que la France y doit prendre pour la considération de la Reyne d'Angleterre et de ses enfans, qui estant à leurs Majestés ce que tout le monde sçay, elles ne peuvent avec honneur souffrir de les voir despouiller de leur bien, de leur rang et de leurs prérogatives.

II.

Lorsque les Escossois envoyèrent le Chevalier Moray en France et l'adressèrent au Cardinal Mazarin pour luy représenter leurs sentiments en grand secret, à cause du danger qu'il tesmoignoit qu'en courroient tous les Escossois qui estoient à Londres si l'on y eust su qu'ils estoient en negotiation en France, il pria le dit Cardinal de faire trouver bon à la Reyne Regente d'accepter cette médiation comme celle qui pouvoit seule terminer une affaire de cette nature et qui pouvoit servir au Roy de la G. B. d'assurance valable pour l'exécution de ce qui lui seroit promis de la part des Escossois et à ceux cy de ce qui leur auroit esté promis par le dit Roy.

Et toutesfois non obstant cela, et bien qu'ils eussent promis au Roy de la G. B. qu'il trouveroit toute sorte de sureté dans leur armée, qu'il y seroit reçu avec honneur, qu'on n'y forceroit point sa conscience, et qu'en cas que le Parlement d'Angleterre luy voulust oster ses justes prérogatives ils se declareroient pour les lui assurer.

Bien qu'ils fussent demeurés d'accord que le Sr Ashburnham qui avoit accompagné le Roy en sa retraite seroit en seureté chez eux, et eussent promis au Sr de Montreuil qu'ils ne le livreroient point au Parlement d'Angleterre, que le Marquis de Montrose et Magdonal se retireroient en France, et qu'il seroit permis au susdit Roy d'y faire le dit Montrose son Ambassadeur, non obstant dis je des choses ainsy convenues et confirmées de dela au Sr de Montreuil

ils ont contraint le Roy de la G. B. d'abord qu'il a été parmy eux de faire rendre Newark à des conditions dures pour ceux qui estoient dedans.

Ils l'ont pressé aux choses qui concernoient sa Religion et de si mauvaise grace qu'ils n'eussent point fait autrement s'ils eussent en dessein de luy donner de l'aversion pour l'establissem^t de leur Presbytériat. Ils l'ont forcé d'envoyer des ordres à Montrose et à Magdonal de désarmer, et à la ville d'Oxford et aux autres places qu'il tenoit, de se rendre.

Ils ont fait publier une deffense à tous ceux qui l'ont servy contr'eux et le Parlem^t d'Angleterre d'approcher de sa cour à peine de la vie. Ils ont obligé le S^r Ashburnham de s'eschaper et prendre la fuite pour n'estre point livré entre les mains de ce Parlem^t.

Ils ont fait prendre par le Maire de Newcastle le S^r Hudson qui avoit servi de guide au Roy dans sa retraite et qui eust esté livré au Parlement d'Angleterre sans l'adresse du S^r de Montreuil qui trouva moyen de le faire évader.

Bref leurs Commis^{res} n'ont point voulu consentir à la retraite de Montrose et de Magdonal en France ny à la nomination du premier pour Ambassadeur.

Il resulte clairement de tout cela que les Escossois ont manqué à tout ce qu'ils ont promis, et au fondement sur le quel le Roy de la G. B. s'est mis entre leurs mains, et qu'ils n'ont eu d'autre visée que d'adjuster leurs interests à ses despens, aux despens de la loy jurée et de ce à quoy ils s'estoient engagés envers la France.

Sur cecy il est à remarquer qu'on ne peut rien monst^rer de positif par escrit du Conseil d'Escosse qui tesmoigne ce que le Chevalier Moray nous a proposé de sa part. Mais il se justifie assés que ça esté leur intention, par ce que le dit Chevalier de Moray a traité icy avec lettres de créance du dit Conseil, par l'envoy qui a esté fait à leur instance de Guillaume Moray auprès du Roy de la G. B., par les negotiations que le S^r de Montreuil a eues avec les Principaux de leurs Deputés de Londres, et par les promesses qu'ils luy ont fait de traiter le susdit Roy comme il a esté dit ci dessus.

Il est aussy à remarquer que quoy que pour donner plus à penser aux Escossois, s'ils continuent à traiter le Roy comme ils ont fait, et à manquer à ce que luy a esté promis par l'entremise de la France, il faille leur donner à entendre qu'elle s'en sent extrêmement offensée, et qu'elle repute à outrage qu'ils se sont servis de son credit auprès du Roy de la G. B. pour le tromper et pour le faire tomber dans les pièges qu'ils lui tendoient, qu'elle estoit obligée pour son honneur de faire connoistre au susdit Roy et à tout le monde que luy ayant

persuadé de bonne foy de se jeter entre leurs bras elle pieinoit part aux infractions qui luy ont esté faites.

Bien que dis je il falloit dire cela et le faire sonner haut pour obliger les Escossois à tenir ce qu'ils ont promis de peur de se mettre la France sur les bras, s'y est ce vray que nous ne nous sommes engagés en quoy que ce soit envers le Roy de la G. B. et que nous luy avons tousjours parlé de telle sorte qu'il ne peut nous reprocher de s'estre embarqué en quoy que ce soit sur nostre parole de quoy il ne peut douter. Puisque nous luy avons fait positivement scavoir par le moyen de la Reyne sa femme que nous n'oublirions rien pour tascher de le servir, que c'estoit à luy et à son conseil à examiner les assurances qu'il pouvoit prendre sur les promesses des Escossois, ce qui a esté représenté au Mylord Jermin en toutes les conferences qu'il a eues avec le Cardinal Mazarin avec lequel il a negocié de la part de la Reyne sa Maistresse sur ces affaires. De cela la ditte Reyne et le dit Mylord Jermin tombent d'accord, et il est encore certain qu'après que le S^t. de Montereuil fût arrivé en l'armée des Escossois et qu'il eust reconnu que ces gens là n'avaient point de bonne intention pour le Roy, ny de disposition à executer ce que leurs Deputés qui estoient à Londres avoient promis, il avoit nettement donné à entendre à Oxfort au Roy de la G. B. qui s'en est loué dans une lettre qu'il a escrite à la Reyne sa femme qui est icy, et le dit de Montereuil a une reconnaissance signée de sa main qu'il porte cela.

Il est à remarquer en troisième lieu que lorsque Moray vint en France on jugea à propos de conseiller le Roy de la G. B. par le moyen de la Reyne sa femme de donner satisfaction aux Escossois dans les points qu'il souhaitent, puisque ne pouvant espérer de cette Couronne dans la conjoncture présente les assistances nécessaires pour reduire ses sujets à l'obéissance et se restablir avec reputation il n'avoit point d'autre moyen que de les séparer et de gagner les uns pour combattre les autres avec avantage. Mais ce qu'on avoit jugé icy à ce temps là que ce seroit sur pour remettre les affaires du Roy s'il eust voulu croire et prendre resolution de satisfaire les Escossois pour les séparer des Parlementaires d'Ang^{re}, on n'a prévu que ne prenant que huit mois après cette resolution elle ne feroit nul ou fort peu d'effect.

C'est pourquoy on n'a pas jugé à propos depuis trois mois de luy conseiller ce à quoy il avoit resisté au commencement et lorsqu'il tenoit encore divers parts et plusieurs places considérables, qu'il avoit quelques provinces à sa devotion et que son armée ou celle du Prince de Galles son fils n'estoit pas moindre que de vingt mille bons soldats, outre celle de Montrose, qui n'ayant pas encore

receu l'eschec qu'elle receut depuis, donnoit une grande chaleur à ses affaires.

De sorte que s'il eust donné aux Escossois la satisfaction qu'ils insistoient et se fust rendu dans leur armée, l'engagement dans lequel ils estoient entrés par le moyen de la France, ne les eust pas seulement obligés d'exécuter ce qu'ils avoient promis, mais ils y eussent mesme esté portés par la crainte des forces du Roy qui estant unies ensemble eussent esté superieures aux leurs.

Maintenant qu'il est despoillé de tout, qu'il n'a pas un homme à sa devotion, ny un pouce de terre dont il puisse disposer, ce n'est pas merveille, s'il n'est auprès des Escossois qui sont plus jaloux de leurs avantages que de l'observation de leur parole, en la considération où il estoit en ce temps là. Et cela d'autant plus qu'ils reconnoissent bien que c'est la pure nécessité qui le contraint de venir chercher azile dans leur armée et qu'ils savent qu'il a esté refusé par le Parlement d'Angleterre sur toutes les propositions qu'il luy a faites, que ça a esté après avoir veu entièrement ruiner l'armée du Prince de Galles et investir de tous costés Oxfort où il ne pouvoit demeurer sans estre pris.

Cela n'empesche point qu'il ne faille se promettre davantage de l'inclination des Escossois vers le Roy, que de celle des Independants, et par consequent qu'il ne faille travailler avec plus de chaleur et de soin pour les séparer des autres et les ranger du costé du Roy, lequel s'il veut se resoudre, ainsi qu'on taschera de l'y disposer par les offices de la Reyne sa femme, à accorder aux Escossois ce qu'ils demandent, pour ce qui est du Presbiterat, ils nous font encore espérer qu'ils reprendront leur premier dessein de s'attacher aux interests du Roy, et de mettre biens et vie pour son service, suivant ce qu'ils avoient convenu avec nous par l'entremise de Moray, lequel escrit encore en cette conformité au Cardinal Mazarin du septiesme Juin.

Voicy la fin invariable de l'Ambassade du sieur de Bellièvre, et le centre où tous ses soins doivent aboutir. Il taschera de nourrir et fomentier de telle sorte la division des Independants avec les Presbiteriens et Escossois, qu'ils ne puissent jamais s'accorder et s'unir pour esteindre la Royauté et s'ériger en République.

C'est un mal qui ne pourroit recevoir de comparaison pour nous et il nous seroit bien moins dommageable que le Roy de la G. B. fust restably dans sa première autorité, bien que nous eussions certitude qu'il devroit estre nostre ennemy, que s'il se formoit une République de l'Angleterre et de l'Escosse dans l'incertitude si elle seroit amie ou ennemie de cette couronne.

Les raisons de cette différence sont fort aisées à comprendre.

Premièrement que le revenu du Roy est si limité qu'à grande peine

peut il suffire à sa despence ord^{re} et par conséquent s'il vouloit faire la guerre il la faudroit faire sans argent, ce qui est impossible ou il luy en faudroit lever sur ses sujets, à quoy il trouveroit une entière resistance ou il n'en obtiendrait que des très mediocres subventions.

De cela il ne faut point s'estonner pour ce que ces peuples là qui ont quelque droit de s'opposer en certaines choses aux sentiments et aux volontés du Prince, s'y opposent presque tousjours quand ce ne seroit mesme que pour exercer ce droit, de l'usage duquel ils sont extrêmement jaloux.

Au lieu que dans un Estat libre comme est une République, les levées d'argent estant volontaires et venant du consentement, et de la conspination de tous à un dessein résolu unanimement, ils le font sans murmure et sans repugnance, et aussy grand qu'il est besoin pour faire réussir ce dessein

Ajoutez à ce que dessus, combien cette nouvelle République se rendroit considérable et forte par l'alliance de celle de Hollande, qui ne manqueroit pas pour plusieurs raisons de se faire indissoluble, si ce n'est que l'Empire de la mer qui seroit entre leurs mains et par le quel elles auroient facilité de faire de la peine à ceux qu'elles voudroient tant à l'ancien qu'au nouveau monde, que la jalousie dis je de cet Empire qui a desja quelques racines parmy elles les divisast.

C'est pourquoy il doit faire jouer toutes sortes de machines et mettre en oeuvre toutes sortes de pièces, de douceur et de civilité, de présens et d'espérances, de craintes et de menaces, et employer toutes les amitiéz et habitudes qu'il a contractées en ce pays là, pour en destourner ce grand malheur.

Deuxième assurance donnée de la part des Deputéz de l'Escosse par le Colonel Moray, envoyée de Londres 16/26. Mars 1646.

Les Deputéz de l'Escosse m'ont autorisé pour asseurer la Reyne et Monseigneur le Cardinal, que si le Roy de la G. B. veut se retirer en l'armée des Escossois il y sera receu avec toutes sortes d'honneur et de sureté et y demeurera avec une entière sureté, comme aussy les Princes Robert et Maurice, le Secretaire Nicolas, et M^r Ashburnham, et les Escossois s'interposeront efficacement pour faire l'accommodement de tous ceux de son party avec le Parlement d'Angleterre à la reserve de trois ou quatre qui s'éloigneront pour quelque temps seulement, pourvu qu'auparavant que d'aller à la ditte armée: il plaise au Roy de la Gr. Br. escrire deux lettres, l'une au Parlem^t d'Angleterre et aux Deputéz d'Escosse à Londres, l'autre au Comité du Parlement d'Escosse, qui sont en Escosse, et en l'armée des Escossois, par lesquelles il déclare qu'il consent que les affaires ecclesiastiques soient establies en la manière desja prescrite par les Parlem^{ts} et assemblées

du Clergé des deux Royaumes et qu'il approuvera tout ce qu'ils feront à l'advenir touchant les dites affaires ecclesiastiques, consent que la Milice soit disposée en la manière qu'il a esté proposé par les Deputéz d'Escosse et d'Angleterre à Oxbrige pour sept ans entie les mains de ses Parlements, comme leurs Deputéz l'ont proposé à Oxbrige, et qu'il accorde les demandes de la ville de Londres présentées à sa ditte Majesté à Oxford avec promesse de tout ratifier et establir par actes de ses Parlements et de faire tout ce qui peut contribuer au bien des affaires ecclesiastiques et civiles par l'advis de ses Pailements, ce qui estant fait les Deputéz d'Escosse sont résolus de faire en sorte, que sa ditte Majesté seroit reçue en son Parlement et remis en sa dignité, grandeur et autorité. A Londres le 16/26. Mars 1646 signé Moray.

A M. le C^{te} de Brienne XXVI. Juillet 1646 à Londres par

Mr. d'Espeisses.

XI.

PARTICIPATION OF QUEEN HENRIETTA MARIA IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT NEWCASTLE.

In the year 1856 there came to light a collection of letters (saved almost by accident from a chaos of manuscripts, such as gets packed together at auctions), which were written in the year 1646 by Charles I to his Queen, and were published under the title 'Charles I in 1646.' I have heard the authenticity of these letters doubted. To the arguments, with which the learned editor, John Bruce, defends them, I may add, that a comparison of them with the French papers raises them beyond all doubt. I will cite only one example.

As is seen in the instructions to Bellièvre (p. 489) Montreuil referred to a letter of the King to his wife. Just such a letter exists in the collection; it is dated April 22; Montreuil, it says, 'hath carried himself on this business with perfect integrity.'

The King had been induced by the assurances of Montreuil to throw himself into the arms of the Scots, and was then utterly miserable at finding himself treated by them as a prisoner; he laid the blame, not on the negotiator in particular, but on the French in general, on whose word he had relied in taking this resolution. Should it come to the worst, he hoped that his wife, as her father's daughter, would do everything to win back for her son at some future day that which belonged to him.

Unfortunately only very little from the Queen's answers has been preserved; indeed from those of the first three quarters of the year

1646 as good as nothing. Her views, however, and her activity in this crisis, we learn from the political memoranda, which she had occasion to write in the difficult position of affairs, much better than from short letters. They are full of spirit, and throw much light on the matter.

Mémoire que la Reyne de G. B. a désiré estre joint à l'instruction donnée à Monsieur de Bellièvre allant Ambassadeur extraordinaire en Angleterre.

Il est proposé à Son Eminence que M^r le President de Bellièvre en son Ambassade en Angleterre ayant en premier lieu à travailler en un bon accommodement entre le Roy et le Parlement, toutesfois dans tels termes et avec de telles precautions que si un accord comode et durable ne se peut obtenir, sa Majesté de la G. B. ne se trouve depouillé de moyens de revenir avantageusement aux armes, ce qui consistera principalement en ces trois points : premièrement dans l'union de l'Escosse en elle mesme par une pleine conjonction du Marquis de Montrose et son party avec ceux entre les mains desquels le Roy a rendu sa personne : secondement dans la conservation de l'Irlande et conjonction d'icelle avec l'Escosse ainsy unie : troisièmement dans les soins qu'on doit avoir de ceux qui jusques icy ont fidellement adheré au Roy, les rendant assuréz de la fermeté de Sa Majesté en leur endroit et qu'elle ne voudroit jamais procurer son repos par le moindre soupçon d'avoir abandonné ses amis.

Sa Majesté se conservant tousjours inesbranlable dans ces trois points (esquels elle est engagée non seulement par les considerations de son salut en cas de rupture presentement ou à l'advenir, mais aussy par les devoirs de la justice et de l'honneur qui ne se devoient jamais prostituer) l'on pourra dans le reste plus librement s'accommoder aux presentes et pressantes necessitez de ses affaires.

Tous les traitté^s passéz entre le Roy et le Parlement se sont faits sur trois principaux articles, à savoir du Gouvern^t ecclesiastique, de la Milice et de l'Irlande, esquels ils pretendent que le Roy se doive entièrement soubzmettre à leurs volentéz, aux premiers par pretexte de conscience ou de sureté, au 3^e de leur interest necessaire pour se delivrier, par le sacrifice de ce malheureux Royaume là, de ces grosses debtes et engagements auxquels ils se sont plongéz par ces guerres.

Pour le premier le Roy s'est tousjours tenu jusques icy ferme dans la negative de ne point abandonner les Esvesques, mais à present il faut de necessitez (s'il est impossible de les conserver, et en ce cas que l'on soit asseuré que les Escossois se portent pour les interests du Roy au reste) que ce pas là se franchisse gaillardement, et que Sa Majesté

se déclare hautement pour le Presbitère Escossois comme estant le seul expedient qui luy puisse non seulement asseurer et affirmer les Escossois, mais aussy allumer la discorde entre les Presbiteiens et Independants Parlementaires.

Le second point qui est de la milice est celuy sur le quel la puissance Royale en Angl^{ie} est principalement fondée, comprenant iceluy terme tant les forces par mer que par terre, mais il est aussy vray que sur iceluy dépendent pareillement toutes les assurances que les Parlementaires peuvent avoir de leur impunité à l'advenir, c'est pourquoy il seroit bien juste de part et d'autre que le pouvoir de la milice fust pour quelque temps partagé egallement entre des confidens du Roy et du Pailem^t tant de la nation Escossoise que de l'Angloise, jusques à ce que par acte de pardon et amnestie generale, et par la fruition du repos de quelques années, tous les coupables eussent sujet de perdre leurs craintes et de prendre assurance que le Roy ne voudroit plus hazarder un nouvel embrouillement de ses affaires par des vengeancees injustes du passé, et c'est à cecy qu'il faut travailler puissamment qu'ils s'en contentent, mais s'il arrive que les Parlementaires n'y puissent pas estre induits par nulle diligence, mais qu'il faille de nécessité leur accorder quelque chose en ce point au dela de ce qui leur a esté offert au traitté d'Oxbridge, il se faut bien donner de garde que cela ne se fasse qu'avec de précautions et limitations telles que dans peu d'années ce droit inséparable de la Couronne revienne à son ancien et legitime canal. Et c'est icy le point auquel non seulement en ce qui est de la milice, mais en tout et par dessus tout on doit viser et travailler, à savoir que quoy que Sa Majesté accorde par ce traité en diminution de sa dignité présentement, pour s'accommoder aux extremités où il se voit reduit, que ce soit en sorte que la Couronne puisse conserver l'esperance de se remettre avec le temps dans les Royautéz et puissances qui luy sont essentielles, desquelles la plus importante et la plus inséparable est celle de faire assembler et cesser les Parlements. C'est pourquoy on doit sur toutes autres choses travailler à donner limites par ce traité à l'éternité de ce Parlement, icelle estant tout à fait incompatible avec la monarchie d'Angleterre. Pour cet effect il faut en premier lieu essayer s'il y aura moyen de casser ce Parlement présentement sur l'accord mesme, et si cela ne se peut obtenir au moins faut il arrester le temps pour l'expiration de cet acte par le quel il s'est rendu indissoluble sans le consentement des maisons, c'est à dire qu'après un certain nombre d'années bastantes à l'affermissement du repos public, il se rend terminable à la volonté du Roy, selon l'entienne et essentielle constitution du Royaume. Et Monsieur de Bellièvre est très particulièrement prié de s'imprimer efficacement en l'esprit l'importance de cette affaire, sans laquelle toutes conditions de

paix les plus avantageuses en apparence seront en effect destructives à la Royauté, la condition présente de ce Parlement perpetuel n'y laissant seulement que le nom et ombie d'un Roy sans autre pouvoir ny appenage, et c'est aussy une chose à la quelle le Parlement mesme ne scauioit resister, s'il y a la moindre sincerité dans leurs intentions, puisque le Roy est obligé par un acte de Parlement différent de celuy, par lequel celuycy est rendu indissoluble sans leur consentement propre, d'en faire assembler un de trois en trois années

Cette demande icy comme elle est absolument necessaire est aussy très propre pour la négociation et entremise des Escossois, puisque la mesme loy du Parlement triennal est establee en Escosse, sans qu'ils ayent jamais entrepris quoy qu'ils en eussent autant ou plus de pouvoir que les autres, de faire passer un acte si destructif à la Royauté que celuy du Parlem^t éternel, et comme cela a esté un très grand indice que leurs intentions n'ont pas esté tout à fait antimonarchiques, il est d'autant plus raisonnable qu'ils aillent pour le moins à la pareille avec le Parlem^t d'Angleterre dans les avantages de cet accord, et de surplus il est bien à considerer aux Escossois que le Parlem^t d'Angleterre estant tousjours sur pied et le leur par intervalles seulement, leur party au gouvernement sera par ce moyen bien inegal.

Pour ce qui est à l'Irlande il est vray que depuis peu le Roy de la G. B. dans ses dernières extrémitéz, ne prévoyant point ce qu'à cette heure il a fait et l'Irlande n'estant point alors dans ces termes où elle est à cette heure de soumission aux volentéz du Roy et ayant esté aussi bien mal conseillé, a fait offre au Parlem^t d'Angl^{re} de leur mettre l'Irlande entre leurs mains en cas qu'on tombat d'accord du reste. Mais quand on considère que les professions publiques et les actes du Parlement portent que pour ce qui est de l'Irlande ils ne se contenteront de moins que d'une extirpation totale de la nation et de la Religion Catholique en celle, il ne faudra guères dire pour faire voir qu'il sera bien indigne d'un Roy d'achepter la paix à un prix si cruel et si injuste : outre que l'incertitude de l'establissement et de la continuation d'icelle l'accuseroit de beaucoup d'imprudence de s'estre ainsy privé de sa plus forte ressource, en cas qu'on eust à revenir aux armes. Cette consideration de la conservation de l'Irlande et de la ratification de la paix en ce Royaume là est fondée non seulement sur les interests du Roy, mais aussy des Escossois et de la France mesme. L'Escosse reconnoissant bien que quelque accommodement que pour le présent se puisse faire avec le Parlement en toute apparence l'affaire doibt en fin aboutir en guerre, ne seroit pas bien sage de se laisser despouiller d'un si puissant appuy, que la conjunction d'Irlande, outre qu'on pourra puter aux Escossois des interests bien profitables dans le North d'Irlande, où ils ont desjà si bonne prise, et

pour cet effect il seroit bien necessaire que les commissaires d'Escosse despeschassent au plustost leurs ordres à leur partie qui est en Irlande, d'entamer le traitté avec le Marquis d'Ormond le viceroy, puisque il y aura moyen (ceux cy se soubsmettant à la paix qui y est conclue) de le faire réüssir bien fort à leur avantage, et pour ce qui est des interets particuliers de la France, il est bien aisé à juger si la paix d'Irlande ne se ratiffie, entre quelles mains il faut naturellement qu'elle se jette.

Dans ce traitté pour un accommodement par l'entremise de France il y pourra avoir plusieurs occurrences dans lesquelles il faut que Monsieur l'Ambassadeur se gouverne selon sa prudence et selon les occasions, sans que l'on puisse douter des règles au précédent, de sorte qu'il suffit de son estendu cy dessus sur les principaux points, sur lesquels il se faut roidir tant par la negative de la part du Roy, que pour ce qu'on doit rechercher du party contraire.

Reste les expedients pour faire réüssir cet accommodement ou ce venant à failler pour revenir à la guerre le plus avantageusement que l'on pourra. Le point le plus important de tous à ces deux fins et qui y est absolument necessaire, est que l'on fasse hautement entendre à toutes les parties, qu'en cas que la France ne réüssisse en son entremise pour l'accommodement sur ces termes, qu'elle se déclarera ouvertement pour le Roy dans la conjunction avec l'Escosse.

En second lieu il faudra faire application bien adroite aux personnes principales des deux maisons, et s'informant de leurs interets et ambitions particulières, tascher à les gagner par les alleures les plus propres.

En troisième lieu c'est un point bien important de faire savoir aux principaux de ceux qui se sont depuis quelque tems revoltéz du party du Roy, qu'ils n'ayent pas à se croire irremissibles auprès de luy, ainsy au contraire que Sa Majesté entend qu'ils y ont esté forcéz par extremitez où ils se voyent reduits, hors de leur puissance de le servir, et que sa Majesté ne fait point de doutte, qu'ils ne retiennent les mesmes affections pour son service, et qu'ils ne se fassent paroistre, quand les occasions se présenteront.

En quatrième lieu s'il faut revenir aux armes l'on doit bien prendre garde qu'on n'en fasse une querelle nationale entre les Anglois et les Escossois; si cela estoit il y auroit danger qu'une animosité nationale ne les emporte par dessus le pretendu zèle spirituel, qui sans cela devroit en toute apparence ranger un party bien considérable des Parlementaires à scavoir les Presbitériens du costé des Escossois. Et sur ce sujet d'esviter une querelle nationale il sera necessaire de presser les Escossois au point de donner retraite entr'eux au party du Roy et n'estre pas si scrupuleux, que de peur d'apporter de l'em-

peschement à un traité en quoy il n'y a pas d'apparence que l'on réussisse, de se priver d'un si grand appuy, en cas qu'il faille venir aux armes, comme leur pourroit estre le party du Roy lequel rebutté une fois ne se pourra peutestre plus recouvir, mais au contraire il y aura danger qu'ils ne se mettent dans le party Parlementaire comme engagés dans une guerre nationale, puis qu'ils voyent ainsy rejeter aux Escossois les assistances des amis mesme du Roy par ce qu'ils ne sont pas de leur nation.

En cinquième lieu puis qu'en cas de la guerre c'est au North d'Angleterre où après l'Ecosse et l'Irlande il faut espérer les plus fortes ressources d'armées, et les Escossois s'estant rendus assez mal aimés en ce pays là, il faudroit au plustost travailler avec ceux qu'ils fissent venir en ce pays là des personnes les plus puissantes aux affections de ce peuple pour guérir les aversions et moyenner leur conjonction allègre et cordiale pour le service de Sa Majesté. Ils sont le Marquis de Newcastle, le Mylord Widrington et Sir Marmaduck Langdale.

Enfin sur toutes choses on doit travailler à conformer les Escossois dans leur entière dépendance sur la France, en ce qui est de la conduite de cette affaire et dans l'assurance qu'eux se tenant fermes aux interests du Roy, la France s'engagera tant auprès de Sa Majé que du Parlem^t à leur procurer toute sorte de satisfaction en ce qui est de leur debtes et arrerages, et tous les avantages à quoy ils puissent legitimem^t prétendre, et que la France s'est engagée au Roy de la G. B., à la Reyne et au Prince de Galles, de se déclarer entièrement pour leurs interests dans les termes icy contenus.

Reste une précaution generale qui est tiès particulièrement recommandée à la vigilance de Mr l'Ambassadeur, à scavoir que quoy le Roy ayt à accorder ou aux Escossois ou Parlement sur l'accommodement soit en l'affaire des Esvesques ou de la Milice ou quoy que ce soit, que Sa Majé ne s'engage à nulle offre qu'il ne voye devant luy le traité arresté, pour ne leur donner encore l'avantage dont ils se sont souvent servis, que de se prévaloir de ses offres à son préjudice sans autre effect du traité.

Les conditions précédentes ayant esté proposées à son Eminence sur la supposition que les Escossois eussent à se tenir fermes aux interests du Roy de la G. B. selon leurs promesses à la France, il s'entend que Monsieur l'Ambassadeur ayt à se gouverner selon celles en ce cas là seulem^t. Mais s'il arrive que les Escossois au lieu de se conformer à leurs engagements se portent du costé du Parlement et se veulent prévaloir de la personne du Roy à luy faire sousmettre à leurs volontéz par force ou par manque de liberté de faire entendre les siennes à ses fidelles serviteurs, ou à recevoir leurs amis, il est proposé à son Eminence que Monsieur l'Ambassadeur ait à changer

tout à fait de procedures et qu'après avoir tasché autant que le temps le pourra permettre à les remettre à leur devoir par les voyes les plus attrayantes, celles là ne réussissant point, qu'il ayt à protester hautement contre la foy violée des Escossois et à leur déclarer que l'entremise de la France et son attachement aux interets des Escossois n'ont esté fondéz que sur la foy de leur adhérence aux interets legitimes de Sa Majesté de la G B , et que comme sur ce pied là la France se seroit et sera tousjours portée à leur procurer toute la satisfaction et tous les avantages auxquels ils puissent légitimement prétendre, comme dans la pacification de l'Escosse mesme, dans la conjunction de l'Irlande avec elle et moyennation de quelques interets bien considérables pour eux en ce Royaume, dans leur pleine satisfaction en ce qui est de leur debtes et arrerages dans la part qu'au préalable ils ont passionnement prétendu, en la Milice d'Angleterre pour un temps convenable, et finalement dans l'establissement du Presbitériat contre tous les efforts des Independants.—Qu'au contraire à cette heure la France se trouve obligée de considérer la personne du Roy de la G. B entre leurs mains comme privée de son franc arbitre, et que Monsieur le Prince de Galles s'estant jetté aux bras et protection de la France, elle se trouve engagée d'obvier aux préjudices qu'ils veulent forcer le Roy de se faire, par la personne de son fils, et pour cet effect qu'ils attendent qu'elle se déclarera avec le Prince de Galles pour les Independants et qu'elle moyennera la conjunction de l'Irlande et aussy du party du Roy en Angleterre avec eux, et de plus pour continuer l'embrouillement de l'Escosse en elle mesme qu'elle s'employera au soustien de Montrose et à toute chose qui puisse garantir la monarchie d'Angleterre des dangereux effects de leur perfidie. Et il s'entend que M^r l'Ambassadeur n'ayt pas seulement à faire connaitre aux Escossois cette resolution de la France comme par menace, mais aussy qu'il en vienne à l'effect, et en fasse les applications necessaires tant aux Independants qu'au party du Roy à l'Irlande et à Montrose mesme. Cela estant fait, et les Independants une fois engagéz, il semble que Monsieur l'Ambassadeur ait à se gouverner pour ce qui doit estre accordé par le Roy ou par M^r le Prince en son nom ou demandé de leur part par les mesmes considérations qui ont esté proposées dans les instructions précédentes sans autre changement d'importance, que celle de la déclaration pour l'Independance au lieu du Presbitère. Sur tout quoyqu' advienne ou d'un costé ou d'autre il ne faut jamais lascher le pied en ce qui est de l'Irlande et ne consentir jamais à aucun accommodement qu'elle n'y soit comprise et la paix en celle ratifiée, et Monsieur l'Ambassadeur est prié avec instance de se bien imprimer en l'esprit cette maxime, qu'il ne se doit jamais promettre aucune apparence d'accommodement dans les affaires d'An-

gleterie salutaire pour le Roy, que la discorde entre les Independants d'un costé et les Escossois et Presbitériens de l'autre ne soient portés jusques aux armes, et que lors la France, l'Irlande et le party du Roy en Angleterre se jettent du costé du plus faible.

S'il arrive que l'affaire se doive conduire par le moyen des Escossois et Presbitériens il semble selon l'apparence que les personnes les plus propres à estre cajollées et employées par Monsieur l'Ambassadeur soient le Comte d'Essex, le Comte de Warwick, le Comte de Manchester et le Comte d'Hollande, dans la Chambre haute, et dans la basse M. Hollice et les bourgeois deputéz de la ville de Londres. Et s'il est par les Independants, qu'il se faille appliquer principalement au Comte de Northumberland et Mylord Say dans la Chambre haute, et dans la basse à St John, Vaine le jeune et à Cromwell, comme à celui qui est le plus puissant dans les armées. Pour Fairfax on ne sayt pas bien sa complexion, mais de cecy il faut que la prudence de Monsieur l'Ambassadeur tire ses lumières les plus certaines sur le lieu. Car l'on n'est pas assez savant icy, pour luy en donner des règles bien assurées.

I know no document, in which the different possibilities which emerged into view in the then position of affairs,—war or a compromise, the very various conditions of the latter, alliance either with the Presbyterians or with the Independents, but always under the mediation of France,—can be more clearly distinguished than in this *mémoire* of the Queen's.

Bellièvre arrived in London towards the end of July 1646, still with the hope of coming forward as a mediator. But he learnt that Parliament had determined to allow no mediation of any kind whatever, not even if all the princes in Christendom should unite for the purpose. Nothing more remained for him but to go at once to the King at Newcastle, who himself had no wish that he should remain long in London, and received him most gladly.

Just at that moment definite proposals from the English Parliament had reached Charles I. Bellièvre was inclined to advise their being accepted, thinking that the King could of course retract some other time. His statements were laid before the Queen and commented on by her. Mazarin acceded to her remarks in everything, and instructed the ambassador accordingly.

Lettre de Mr le Cardinal à Fontainebleau 6. Aoust 1646.

M. Pour response à la vostre que le St d'Expeisses m'a apportée, je vous diray que comme j'ay creu estre obligé de la communiquer à la Reyne d'Angleterre, je crois aussy l'estre de vous donner part de

ses sentiments sur ce sujet et des inconveniens et difficultéz qu'elle trouve aux Vostres.

Sur ce que vous estimez que les propositions qui doivent estre présentées au Roy son mary ne luy apporteroient point d'obligation de signer le convenant, elle est très persuadée que les Escossois ne partiront jamais de ce point, que le Roy signe le dit convenant et qu'il n'oblige tout le Royaume de faire le mesme. Or vous savez que sans ces Messieurs il n'y a point de salut pour ce Prince ny de ressource pour ses affaires, et par conséquent qu'il faut viser autant qu'il se pourra à leur donner satisfaction comme à un moyen inévitable pour parvenir à la fin qu'on s'est proposée.

Sur ce que vous représentez que l'acceptation de ces propositions faite par le Roy ôtera la perpétuité du Parlement, le quel une fois séparé il luy sera aisé de regagner son autorité ne pouvant recevoir de l'opposition pour cela que de la part du Parlement qui ne sera plus et qui tire après soy des inconveniens pour n'estre pas souhaitté des peuples, à cela elle respond qu'il n'y a rien dans ces propositions qui tend à la rupture du Parlement et qu'il n'y a point d'apparence que ceux qui le composent consentissent à la suppression d'une chose de la quelle depend la subsistance de leur auctorité et de leur grandeur, et l'impunité mesme de ce qu'ils ont fait dont ils pourroient estre recherchéz avec le temps s'ils se trouvoient une fois séparéz.

Elle insiste sur un autre point de vostre lettre par lequel vous asseurez que les affaires du Roy sont reduites à une telle extremité que s'il refuse les propositions qui luy doivent estre présentées elles sont entièrement ruinées et sans qu'il y aye aucune espérance de ressource. Au lieu que s'il les accepte il y a pour le moins cela de bon dans ce malheur que lorsque le Parlement sera séparé le Roy ne tiendra que ce qu'il voudra de ce qu'il aura promis et pourra recouvrir avec le temps sa première autorité et l'avoir mesme plus grande.

Quant à ce second point elle met et avec beaucoup de raison en considération qu'aussitost que le Roy aura signé ces propositions il ne sera pas moins lié que si elles estoient confirmées par un acte du Parlement, outre qu'on l'obligera de les jurer solennellement et de promettre par serment de les accomplir avec ponctualité, de sorte qu'elle ne voit pas comme quoy ny luy ny ses successeurs puissent jamais y contrevenir sans attirer l'opposition de tous ses sujets qui croiront avoir un juste titre de deffendre ce qui leur a esté si solennellement accordé et qui pourront faire voir que ce qu'on leur impute maintenant estre une usurpation de puissance sera devenu par là un droit légitime.

On pourroit repartir en faveur de vostre opinion que si le Roy avoit la force à la main, il pourroit alleguer pour justifier la contraven-

tion qu'il feroit aux choses qu'il auroit promises, le manquement de liberté en laquelle il estoit lorsqu'il les avoit promises, ce qui rendoit invalide tout ce qu'il avoit fait en cet estat là, et que si cette raison avoit lieu pour une simple promesse, elle n'en avoit pas moins pour des choses jurées solennellement, puisque le mesme deffault s'y trouvoit qui est le manquement de liberté. Mais sans interposer icy mon jugement, je vous diray que par ces propositions les Parlementaires ont si bien pourvus à bider le Roy et à empescher qu'il ne leur soit jamais superieur en puissance, que vraisemblablement il n'y auroit rien à l'advenir à craindre pour eux de ce costé là.

Elle ne croit pas que les affaires du Roy son mary soient reduites en un estat si déplorable qu'elles le doivent obliger à accepter les susdites propositions, puisqu'il y a espérance qu'on pourroit gagner en sa faveur les Escossois qui ont sur pied des forces si considérables, tant s'en faut qu'il soit croyable que si le Roy refuse de signer les susdites propositions ils voulussent se joindre aux Anglois, dans les resolutions violentes que vous remarquez qu'ils ont prises contre luy, après les assurances qu'ils ont données à la France du contraire lors qu'il s'est jetté entre leurs bras.

Et quand mesme cela seroit, elle estime qu'il y auroit moins de hazard de laisser opposer un cadet à son père et au droit des deux frères aînés, que si par une loy passée par les formes les plus solennelles le Roy se despouilloit de sa puissance et revestissoit le Parlement d'Angleterre, et en tous cas. Et je suis bien de cet advis qu'il vaudroit mieux attendre toutes les violences que le Parlement pourroit commettre, mesme celle de passer à deposseder le Roy, que non pas que luy mesme consentit qu'on ne luy laissast que le nom et la figure de Roy qu'on ne manqueroit pas de luy oster peu de temps après.

Le resultat de tout cecy, et dont elle a désiré qu'on vous envoyast l'ordre, est que vous ne travailléz point à porter le Roy à accepter les propositions qu'on luy devoit présenter, mais au contraire que vous taschiez adroittement de l'en divertir; que pour luy donner cœur de le faire vous l'assuriez que la France ne l'abandonnera point et que vous estes certain que les Escossois se déclareront en sa faveur, en cas que par le refus de ces propositions il soit nécessité de tenter derechef contre le Parlement la fortune de la guerre, que pour les y obliger de costé il ne doit point faire difficulté de leur accorder ce qu'ils prétendent touchant le Presbitériat, et que pour ne les degouter point, il ne faudra pas qu'il rejette les causes de ce refus sur les affaires de la religion, mais bien sur l'article de la milice qu'ils ont ajusté avec plusieurs autres aux propositions au dela de ce qu'on avoit désiré de luy par le traité d'Oxbridge.

XII.

SCHEME FOR THE ABDICATION OF CHARLES I.

The letters of Henrietta Maria to her husband in the later months of 1646 (already known from Clarendon's State-papers) have more of an official than of a confidential character ; they are the expression of the views formed and decisions come to in Paris ; from the correspondence of Mazarin it appears that their contents were sometimes first communicated to the French government For instance, Nov. 12, 1646 :— ' elle luy escrit, comme le Mylord Jermin m'a dit de sa part, dans les termes les plus pressants, qu'elle a peu trouver, pour le faire resoudre à la concession du presbyterat.' That is manifestly the letter, which appears in the collection under the date of Nov. 13, in which the Queen calls upon her husband to make no concessions beyond 'le gouvernement presbyteriall dans le quel je crois vous devez contenter les Escossois, pourvu qu'ils se veulent joindre avec vous pour une bonne paix ou pour la guerre.' The ambassador Bellièvre was commissioned to labour with all possible energy for this end.

The King, as we know, had already received similar advice some time before ; it is, however, the greatest moral act of his life, that he determined not to yield to it. If anything whatever was a living force in him, it was his belief in the dogmas and rights of the English Church, and in the superiority of her ritual

The opposition, in which he found himself to his wife and France, led him to the thought that it would be better to abdicate and leave the crown to his son and wife. I have noticed the matter only very briefly, because it made little impression and was looked upon as scarcely a serious intention : still it is well worth while to devote to it a somewhat closer attention. It does not appear in the letters to the Queen, for it was thought better to inform her of it through Jermin. This had been the advice of Culpepper and Ashburnham. It appears, however, unmistakeably in the correspondence of the embassy.

M^r de Bellhèvre à M^r le C^{te} Brienne à Newcastle. 12. Nov. 1646.

La depesche que fait aujourd'huy le Roy de la G. B. porte commandement à M^r Jermin de proposer à la Reyne sa femme et à M^r le Cardinal de remettre des à present ses Royaumes entre les mains du Prince de Wales, s'il est jugé que ses affaires en puissent recevoir quelque avantage. Je ne vous ferais pas sans préface une proposi-

tion de cette nature, si elle devoit avoir quelque suite et si celui qui l'a fait avoit dessein de l'exécuter. Il y a près de quinze jours qu'il m'en parla ; la première ainsy que d'une chose à la quelle il pensoit serieusement, mais comme je ne jugeai pas qu'il deust demeurer longtemps dans ces sentiments, je n'estimais pas aussy qu'il fust nécessaire de vous en écrire autant que j'eusse pénétré les raisons qui le portoiént à prendre une resolution que je jugeois devoir demeurer sans effect. J'estime qu'il en est arrivé ainsy que je me l'estois imaginé. Mais bien que le Roy de la G. B. ayt esloigné par raison une pensée que sa melancolie luy avoit donné, il luy a semblé qu'il ne luy seroit pas inutile de la proposer et qu'elle luy serviroit pour se delivrer des instances que luy fait la Reyne sa femme touchans l'establissement du Presbitère, luy faisant voir qu'il l'estime si fort contre sa conscience, qu'il est prêt de renoncer à ses Royaumes plutost que de l'accorder. Et outre qu'il juge que la Reyne de la G. B. ne voudrait pas acheter à si haut prix le repos des Estats du Roy son mary, il croit encore que par là l'on pourra connoistre que le seul Presbitère n'engageroit plus aujourd'hui toute l'Ecosse à prendre son party contre l'Angleterre. Je croy que vous jugerez que ce sont ses sentiments quand vous vous serez donné la peine de voir ce qui suit, que j'ay escrit en sa présence, ne voulant pas fier à ma memoire une chose de cette qualité, que je ne connois pas bien nettement.

Le Roy de la G. B. pour refuser le Presbitère oppose premièrement sa conscience, qu'il dit n'y avoir peu estre portée par toutes les raisons dont on s'est servy cy devant et ensuite ; il a toujours soustenu que par raison de l'Estat il ne le devoit non plus faire, et comme il n'y a point de considération humaine qui le puisse obliger à faire ce qu'il croit que la religion luy defend, aussy veut il donner aux deux Reynes et remettre au jugement de M^r le Cardinal tout ce qu'il peut regarder ses interets civils. Pour cet effect le dit Roy veut bien, si la conscience du Prince de Wales peut souffrir l'establissement qu'ont désiré les Ecossois, le charger du soin des affaires avec titre ou sans titre du Roy ainsy qu'il sera trouvé plus à propos, et qu'ensuite l'on traite avec les Ecossois des conditions qu'ils desirent pour s'engager à restablir la Monarchie dans l'Angleterre, que si dans ce traité l'on reconnoist non seulement que la concession du Presbitère ne les engagera pas, mais aussy que le Presbitère et la Monarchie ne peuvent pas comparoir ensemble, le dit Roy ne doute point comme chose certaine par connoissance qu'il a de l'affection de la Reyne de la G. B. et du respect du Prince, qu'ayant reconnu que ses sentiments sont veritables, ils ne se serviront point de cecy pour le tenir exus du gouvernement.

Je ne prétends pas justifier que cette proposition soit bien intelligible ny mesme qu'elle ne contienne point de contradiction mais seu-

lement par une véritable exposition des termes dont il s'est servy, vous laisser juger de la pensée du dit Roy, que vous pourrez encore mieux connoistre lorsque vous saurez qu'après luy avoir lu ce que j'avois escrit en sa présence, il voulust que j'y ajustasse ;

Et par cecy les deux Reynes et M^r le Cardinal verront que quoy que l'on accorde aux Escossois, ce que l'on jugera leur devoir satisfaire, ils ne s'engageront point pour cela à servir le Roy de la G. B. dans le restablissement de la Monarchie.

On peut voir par là qu'il craint d'estre pressé par la Reyne de la G. B. de donner satisfaction aux Escossois, et qu'il croit que le temps peut produire telles choses, que sans leur avoir accordé les conditions qu'ils demandent il pourroit espérer de se voir restably, et comme il attribue à l'auctonté de la France et au soin que j'ay pris de ses affaires le retardement qui a esté jusques icy apporté aux resolutions qui sembloient avoir esté déjà prises contre luy et devoir estre promptement executées lorsque je suis arrivé en ce Royaume, il se persuade que j'aurai le mesme pouvoir a l'advenir ; outre que le temps, qu'il croit que je luy aie gagné, ne me servira pas en pouvoir obtenir encoie d'autre, je n'estime pas qu'il soit de son service de luy en faire espérer davantage. Il ne donne cependant aucun ordie à ses affaires, et les ennemis de sa personne et de la Royauté s'establissent, ils accoustiment les peuples à estre gouvernés par les ordonnances du Parlement ; et ils leur font perdre insensiblement et l'usage et le nom de Roy ; de sorte que s'il ne se resoud promptement à se mettre en campagne soit à la teste du party que nous luy avons formé ou bien de se retirer dans les montagnes, ainsy que par la lettre du quinze du passé je me suis donné l'honneur de vous dire qu'il pouvoit faire, où plus de vingt mille bons soldats luy tendent les bras, il les perdra comme il a fait l'Irlande.

Lettre de M^r le Cardinal, 10. Dec. 1646.

Par Heron.

On vous renvoye le courrier que vous nous avez depeschéz par lequel la Reine d'Angleterre escrit au long ses sentiments au Roy son mary sur toutes les affaires qui sont sur le tapis, qui consistent principalement à se tenir ferme aux points contenus dans votre instruction, si ce n'est que la response que le dit Roy a mandé icy estre sur le point d'envoyer à Londres l'ayt déjà esté, car en ce cas il faudra attendre quel succès auront produit les facilitéz que le Roy apporte sur divers points.

La proposition que le Roy a fait de mettre la Royauté en la personne de M^r le Prince de Wales est un effet de la passion pour sa

famille et du regret qu'il auroit que l'on peust dire que faute d'avoir facilité le point du Presbiteriat tout se fust perdu ; mais comme je ne la vois pas practicable et que d'ailleurs je suis de vostre sentiment, je crois qu'il faut d'autant plus l'en dissuader que la Reyne et le Prince de Wales, qui ont esté infiniment surpris de la bonté de sa Majesté, ne peuvent seulement souffrir qu'on parle d'une chose semblable.

Je vous prie d'avoir l'esprit en repos sur la confiance du dit Roy, car je connois bien par les lettres que sa Majesté escrit icy qu'il l'a toute entière en vous, et que les satisfactions qu'a la Reyne de la G. B. du soin que vous prenez pour tout ce qui regarde le bien de leurs affaires sont au point que vous pouvez souhaitter. Il y a quelqu'un qui croit que la principale raison de la dureté des Escossois, qui correspondent si mal à tout ce que le Roy de la G. B. a fait jusques icy pour les obliger, procèdent du doute qu'ils ont des effects des promesses de la France, de sorte que c'est à quoy vous avez à travailler plus efficacem^t et mesme de leur en offrir positivement toutes les assurances qu'il pourront desirer de vous par escrit, moyennant que de leur costé ils s'engagent aux choses que portent vos instructions.

Mémoire du Roy de la G. B. à Monsieur de Bellièvre.

10. Jan. 1647/31. Dec. 1646.

Escrit de la main du Roy de la G. B.

Que la question touchant la Religion n'est pas entre les deux gouvernements Episcopalle et Presbiterien, mais c'est un entier changement de la doctrine, qui sous la pietention de reformation, ne tend à autre chose, que la ruine du pouvoir monarchical, et à cet effect les Escossois s'attachent fermement au Covenant, n'ayant jamais tesmoigné depuis mon arrivé en leur armée aucune intention de me servir, si non à des conditions ruineuses à la Royauté, faisant cas de ma personne seulement pour mieux faire leur marché.—

Qu'à cette heure il est fort évident que si j'eusse donné le Presbiteriat comme on m'a demandé, j'eusse aussy bien ruiné mes couronnes que ma conscience et au moins mon honneur en rompant ma parole. Demonstrés aux deux Reynes qu'il est nécessaire pour ma preservation qu'elles declarent estre satisfaittes avec mes offres et ne voudront pas que je fisse davantage, mesme si j'avois envie : comme aussy de prendre connoissance que je suis maintenant prisonnier, et quand je serais mené à Homby ou quelque autre lieu contre mon gré ce seroit seulement changer de prison et non pas de condition, et sur cela de faire quelque declaration.

Que ma cause est celle de tous les monarches de la chrestienté

aussy bien que la mienne; c'est pourquoy de haster la paix generale Ce qui est de mon assistance, les particuleis nous sont si bien commis que je n'en diray rien, seulement que je ne manque pas d'esperance pour ma restitution sachant les divisions entre les rebelles mesme et la grande quantité des honnettes gens qui se declareront pour moy quand l'occasion se presentera.

Lettre de M^r de Bellièvre C. R. à M^r le C^{te} de Brienne.

12. Janv. 1647 à Newcastle par Heron.

Je vous fais savoir que je pourrais bien lundy prochain partir de cette ville pour prendre le chemin de Londres, puisque les resolutions du Parlement d'Escosse et celle où je trouve le Roy de la G. B. me font voir les affaires dans le point auquel mes ordies portent de me retirer d'icy. Les Escossois font depuis trois jours une garde si exacte pour empescher que leur Roy ne leur eschappe, et ont tellement augmenté celle qu'ils luy avoient donnée cy-devant, que l'on peut dire qu'il est maintenant prisonier; leurs Comités et leur Parlement déclarent qu'ils le veulent livrer aux Anglois. L'armée des Independants s'approche pour le recevoir. L'intention du dit Roy est de se retirer d'icy. Soit qu'il l'exécute soit que l'on le surprenne se voulant sauver ou que les Escossois le livrent, comme ils ont resolu, je ne me dois point trouver en cette cour.

XIII.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM AND TO HOLMBY.

The Scots had at last determined to give up the King to the English, and towards the end of January 1647 he was conducted to Holmby. But here negotiations for an understanding were recommenced and with even more prospect of success, for the party which for the moment was predominant in the English Parliament had the greatest interest in being able to make use of the King's authority against the Independents, and that was possible only if they came to an understanding with him.

And under the altered circumstances the French also were in favour of this.

Poor King ! in the struggle between Presbyterians and Independents, between French and Spaniards, his authority was now regarded only as a weapon, of which those who took him to their side hoped to avail themselves against their enemies

The French now preferred the English Parliament to the Scottish

nation. With the latter no understanding was possible; from the midst of the former, however, a proposal was now broached, which made an understanding appear to be still possible. The leaders of the Presbyterians, Holland, Warwick, Manchester, and Northumberland, who had once more joined them, sent in propositions, which the King might adopt as his own and thus bring them before the Parliament. According to them he was to allow the introduction of the Presbyterian form of Church constitution for three years, to give up the exercise of the military power to the Parliament for ten years, to declare the Irish to be rebels, and to confirm the appointments made under the Great Seal by Parliament. In order to give full force to all these concessions, he was moreover to appear before the Parliament in person.

These suggestions were first communicated to the French ambassador, who was still in Newcastle. On the 8th of February, 1647, he sent them to his court with the remark, that half a year previously he would have been opposed to them, now he was in favour of them, especially as he entertained a hope that the King might be able to return to London. In this way the monarchy might still be maintained; 'les Independants ne veulent point de roy et croient avoir jetté les fondations de leur republique imaginée par le projet de traité qu'ils ont avec l'ambassadeur d'Espagne. Les ministres d'Espagne,' he adds on the 14th of February, 'ne font pas de difficulté de precher, qu'à toutes occasions l'Espagne temoignera au roi de la Gr. Br. son ressentiment de ce, qu'en 1639 il laissa brusler par les Hollandais dans sa rade et à la vue de son armée les gallions d'Espagne.'

This double motive, to maintain the monarchy and to neutralise the influence of the Spaniards, had its full effect on the French court, which put itself in communication with the Queen and through the ambassador with the King, on the subject. The steadfastness of the King in the Anglican faith had once more to encounter a violent storm.

1. *Lettre de M^r le C^{te} Brienne à M^r de Bellièvre.*

16. Fevr. 1647. *Par Royer.*

Elle (V^{re} lettre) ne fut point lue en plein conseil parce qu'il fut jugé qu'il falloit tenir secret ce que vous aviez mandé, mais elle fut participée à Monsieur le Duc d'Orléans et à M^r le Prince qui ont esté du sentiment de sa Majesté, que celui qui est prisonnier peut promettre sans se croire obligé de l'exécution et qu'il est de la prudence des Princes de prendre leur party selon que la necessité

les oblige ou que leur puissance leur en donne le moyen, et bien que les conditions proposées n'assurent pas que le Roy d'Angleterre soit restablî qu'en autorité apparente, si est ce qu'il est jugé qu'il est plus expedient de tenter cette voye que de se commettre à la dernière ruine, et qu'il y a plus de lieu d'espérer de restablir l'autorité estant sur le trosne que de la prison y pouvoir monter; aussy ne craignons nous point de faire mesme de conseiller à la Reyne d'Angleterre de porter le Roy son seigneur à ce qui est proposé par quelques particuliers sous l'esperance qu'ils auront asséz de credit pour disposer le Parlement à ce qu'ils promettent et que n'y reussissant pas ils s'engagent au moins à le servir.

On m'a dit que la Reyne a peine de conseiller au Roy son seigneur de se conformer à ce qu'on desire de luy, mais que, les articles expliquéz, il pourroit bien avoir lieu d'y entendre et sans que les Parlementaires y acquiescent, elle dit que le Roy ne le doit pas ny elle l'y porter. L'on desire du dit Roy quatre choses: l'une qu'il autorise la religion des Presbyteriens pour trois ans, l'autre qu'il continue tout ce qui a esté fait sous le grand sceau de l'Angleterre qui a esté establi par le Parlement, la troisième que la milice demeure sous leur direction pendant dix ans, et en dernier lieu que la guerre se fasse aux Irois declaréz rebelles. La Reyne voudroit qu'il fust adjouté au premier des dits articles, que le Roy conservera pour soy et sa famille l'exercice de sa religion qu'il a toujours professé; que le second fust expliqué et que le Roy dise qu'il ne s'engage à rien qui luy fust entièrement prejudiciable, par ce qu'il ne sait pas ce qui a esté passé sous le grand sceaux et il ne fera pas de difficulté de consentir l'amnestie des choses passées, pourvu qu'elle fust generale, ny l'exécution de ce qui regarde les avantages et les suretés des particuliers; sur la troisième sa Majesté s'arreste et insiste que les dix ans expiréz la milice revienne en la disposition du Roy et que cela soit dès à present declaré; quant au dernier qui luy fait beaucoup de peine par ce qu'elle pert un royaume en y acquiescant, si est ce qu'elle estime que le Roy ne doit pas faire difficulté de consentir ce qu'il a autresfois promis, c'est en ce sens qu'ils luy escrivent et aussy selon que m'a dit Jermyn, lequel desireroit que ceux aux instances desquels vous avez escrit s'engageassent à faire consentir au Parlement les conditions cy dessus exprimées.

2. *M^r de Bellèvre à M^r le C^{te} de Brienne.* 22. Fevr. 1647.

J'ai employé toute la journée à voir s'il y a quelque chose à faire suivant les intentions de la Reyne de la Gr. Br. Non seulement je ne vois point d'esperance, d'obtenir ce qu'elle demande, mais

aussi je trouve que ceux qui promettoient de servir sont aujourd'hui bien refroidis : ils ne s'y engageoient qu'au cas que le Roy de la Gr. Br. leur donnast moyen de le faire arrivant à Homby, et par les lettres que Mr Jermin escrit icy à tous ses correspondants ils savent qu'il n'y a plus de lieu de l'espérer. Tous les jours les ennemis du Roy de la Gr. Br. trouvent des occasions de luy faire perdre credit dans l'esprit des peuples et de leur persuader qu'il est le seul ennemi de la paix du Royaume. Il fut lu avanthier dans le Parlement une lettre d'un de ceux qui est près du Roy de la Gr. Br. frère d'un des plus grands ennemis qu'il ayt dans le Parlement, Sir Henry Mildemey, qui mande que le dit Roy luy a dit qu'il est resolu de ne rien faire pour donner la paix au Royaume, et qu'il est certain qu'ayant patience six mois tous se brouilleront en sorte que les affaires se feront sans qu'il s'en mesle. L'on a fait voir ces jours passés un billet de la main du dit Roy escrit depuis deux mois à une personne de qualité qui la servy, qu'il eust à se tenir avec ses amis et qu'il trouveroit qu'il y a encore bon nombre de gens de bien en Angleterre. Tout cela fait croire que le dit Roy ne veut point la paix qui est neantmoins le seul but de ceux qui s'offrent d'entier dans ses interests.

3. *Lettre de Mr de Bellèvre au Roy de la Gr. Br. 26/16. Febr.*

1647/1646.

L'on ne me donne pas le temps d'écrire à V. M. une longue lettre ny le moyen de luy envoyer de plus que ce billet. Je crois qu'il est de service de V. M. que vous fassiez entendre aux commissaires du Parlement qui sont à Homby que vous voulez envoyer dans peu un message au Parlement sans dire précisément le temps que vous le voulez envoyer. Cela fera que le Parlement ne vous enverra pas si tost des messages dont on parle, qui estant refusés par V. M. peuvent avoir des suites facheuses. L'on se contentera que vous donniés le Presbytère pour trois ans avec quelques autres propositions, sur quoy vous aurez dans peu de jours les avis de la Reyne de la Gr. Br. sans lesquels je ne crois pas que V. M. veuille envoyer aucun message. Ceux qui ont tousjours icy professé de vous vouloir servir sont les seuls qui le peuvent faire aujourd'hui, et pour y parvenir ils ont dessein de vous faire venir au plus tôt à Londres prendre vostre place dans le Parlement. Ils ne doutent point qu'ils y reussiront, pourvu que V. M. veuille faire de sa part ce qui luy peut procurer un tel avantage, en l'estat que sont les affaires. Je ne vois pas que personne puisse servir V. M., si elle demeure à Homby et il y a apparence que tous les partis conspireront

à le servir, si elle peut venir à Londres, ou je demeurerai tant que j'espereray l'honneur de l'y revoir ou de l'y servir. I P. S. V M. pouria donner la réponse dont elle voudra m'honorer au mesme qui luy rendra ce billet, vous ferez deux reponses s'il vous plaist, l'une que je pourray montrer à ceux qui savent que je vous écris, l'autre par laquelle V. M. me fera savoir au viay ce qu'il luy plaist faire ou ce qu'elle juge que je puisse faire pour son service, et que les deux lettres ne fassent qu'un paquet comme s'il n'y avoit qu'une lettre.

4. *Lettre de M^r le Cardinal.* 1. Mars 1647.

Mylord Jermyn m'ayant dit hier au soir qu'il avoit déjà mandé de dela que le Roy d'Angleterre se porteroit à accorder les quatre chefs qui estoient contenus à la proposition que vous m'envoyastes, pourvu que le Comte de Northumberland promit par le moyen de Madame sa Sœur à la Reyne d'Angleterre, d'estre pour le Roy en cas que le Parlement ne fist de son costé ce qu'il devoit après avoir reçu satisfaction sur les dits quatre chefs, il me semble qu'en y travaillant à bon escient il ne seroit pas impossible d'engager le dit Comte de Northumberland à ce que dessus.

One sees how very earnestly the French court wished for this compromise; even in the part which the Queen took it found much to criticise, for she always had the fairest hopes and yet did not do enough to realise them. On the one hand it was thought that she would not be very pleased to see her husband come over the sea to France; on the other hand it gave offence, that the English should be led to suppose, that France would still decide on war with the Parliament, whereas under existing circumstances such a war was not to be thought of. Bellièvre was so disgusted that he asked for his recall, which, however, was refused, because this would have been to give up the field to the Spaniards, who had sent an ambassador to England. When Mazarin's correspondence is published, a thing which is very much indeed to be desired, these political complications will again come to light. I introduce no more than that which immediately concerns King Charles I.

5. *Lettre du Roy de la G. B. à M^r de Bellièvre.*

4. Mars 1647/22. Fevr. 1646.

Homby le 22. Februrier. Je vous remercie bien fort de ce que vous m'avez donné le moyen pour vous escrire, car j'aurois aussy le contentement d'avoir communication avec la Reyne de la Gr. Br. (vous priant d'envoyer à elle ce qui est cy dedans) et tous mes amis, ce

qu'autrement je n'ay su faue estant gardé icy avec grande sevérité, quoy qu'avec assez de ceremonie. Les commissaires deffendent à tout le monde de me donner des lettres ou d'en recevoir de moy sans leur approbation, et personne n'ose me voir sans congé, et tous mes serviteurs sont deffendus de m'approcher qui m'ont suivy en cette guerre, comme aussy tous ceux qui ont poité les armes pour moy, sur quoy je leur ay declaré que je ne veux respondre à aucune proposition du Parlement d'Angleterre devant que je serai en liberté (à quoy par la grace de Dieu je me tiendrai ferme). C'est pourquoy je ne vous puis faire aucune autre response, que quand je serai une personne libre je tascheray de donner tout le contentement à mon Parlement que je puis faire en honneur et conscience, mais quand vous expliquerez particulièrement qu'est ce que c'est qu'il faut que je fasse pour me procurer un tel avantage de quoy vous parlez, je vous respondray en particulier, comme vostre bien bon amy le Roy de la Gr. Br. Je vous prie faites moi savoir ce qui se passe en France et Irlande, car sans vous j'ay les yeux et les oreilles bouchéz, et ne croyez pas tout ce que ceux de Londres vous disent.

6. *Lettre du Roy de la Gr. Br. à Mr de Bellhèvre.*

16/6. *Mars* 1647.

Homby le 6. Mars. Quoy que jamais prisonnier fust gardé plus sevérement que moy, neantmoins j'espère que j'aurai le bonheur, que vous recevrez cecy, qui est principalement pour vous prier de m'escrire le plus souvent que vous pourrez et par ce moyen de me faire savoir des nouvelles de la Reyne de la Gr. Br. et tous mes amis. Aussy il faut que je vous dise librement que je ne vois rien par le comportement de ces commissaires que ruine à ma personne, si je ne puis être delivré hors de leurs mains, mais surtout pour l'honneur de Dieu n'entreprienez pas de me faire quitter ces résolutions que vous savez que j'ai pris par la grace de Dieu. Je suis résolu plustost de perir que d'en estre séparé avec ma conscience et mon honeur, et en effet je crois que c'est le plus probable aussy bien que le meilleur moyen pour restablir vôte bien bon amy le Roy de la Gr. Br. Envoyez cet autre billet à la Reyne de la G. B.

7. *Lettre du Roy de la Gr. Br. à Mr de Bellhèvre.*

19/9. *Avril* 1647.

Homby le 9. d'Avril. Vous m'avez beaucoup obligé en m'envoyant les lettres de la Reyne de la Gr. Br., et je suis fort satisfait des conseils qu'elle m'a donnés, vous assurant que je feray bon tout ce qu'elle vous a promis par la lettre du Jermyn, pourvu que vous me donnez

les assurances de quoy la ditte lettre de Jermyn en fait mention. Autrement vous m'excuserez si (comme je vous ay ci-devant mandé) je ne donne aucune response particulière au Parlement d'Angleterre jusques à ce que je sois en liberté, car il est plus que raisonnable d'estre bien assuré d'un grand avantage pour excuser la lascheté de faire aucune concession dans l'estat où je suis. C'est pourquoy je vous prie de me faire entendre (au plustost) ce que je puis attendre de ce Mylords avec qui vous traitez en cas que je ferai la response que vous m'avez désiré de faire, car selon cela assurément je me régleray. Soyez assuréz que je ne croiray rien de vous que par vous, estant aussy fort necessaire que vous fassiez la mesme justice à vostre bien bon amy Roy de la Gr. Br.

Faites moi savoir les nouvelles d'Irlande, et je vous prie, respondes moi promptement à cette lettre.

Cette autre lettre est à la Reyne de la Gr. Br.

8. *Lettre du Roy de la Gr. Br. à Mr de Bellière.*

25/15. Avril 1647.

Homby le 15. Avril. J'ai commandé le Colonel Bamfeld de vous monstrer et expliquer la lettre que je luy ay escrite, de peur que je ne vous fasse pas si bien entendre mes resolutions en François, vous priant de me faire response ou par vous mesme ou par luy au plustost de ce que je puis attendre de ces Messieurs de Londres en cas que je fisse ma response selon que la Reyne de la Gr. Br. vous a mandé. Je ne puis pas vous envoyer la cire d'Espagne qui estoit sur vostre paquet, à cause que je l'ay bruslée devant que d'avoir deschiffé vostre lettre, mais je crois qu'il y avoit beau jeu, je vous remercie pour vostre chiffre, et m'en servay comme vous m'avez dit et non pas autrement. — — —

9. *Lettre de Mr de Bellière au Roy de la Gr. Br.*

4. May/24. Avril 1647.

A Londres le 24. Avril. Ce billet n'est que pour faire savoir à V. M. que j'ay reçu le Sien du 15, au quel je n'ay rien à respondre, puisque par cette mesme voye vous serez informé exactement de l'estat pnt des affaires. Digby n'est point encore en France, comme l'on avoit cru : ce ne sont que ses gens qui y sont arrivéz.

10. *Advis au Roy de la Gr. Br.*

Escrit par le Colonel Bamfeld, 24. Avril.

Si le Roy fait une response par la quelle il dise qu'il accorde telle et telle des propositions, ce consentement qu'il donne fait que c'est

une loy qui a autant de force que si il la faisoit dans le Parlement, et pour cela il faut qu'il dise par sa response, non qu'il accorde, mais qu'estant à Londres dans son Parlement il veut accorder telle et telle chose, affin de nécessiter le Parlement de le faire venir icy, qui doit estre tout son but : s'il y peut estre, il y a apparence que ses affaires iront fort bien. — —

11. *Lettre de M^r de Bellière au Roy de la Gr. Br.*

14/4. May, 1647

A Londres le quatriesme May. Je n'ai point de response aux dernières lettres que je me suis donné l'honneur d'escrire à V. M. ces 14 et 24 du mois passé, je jugeray par ce qu'il vous plaira me mander sur celle du 14 si je suis si heureux que pouvoir servir en quelque chose à V. M. en ce pays. Suivant cela je resoudray mon retour en France, ou mon demeurer icy. En quelque lieu que je sois V. M. y aura un très passionné serviteur. Vous recevrez une lettre avec celle qui vous informera de l'estat des affaires. Je vois si peu de certitude à tout ce que l'on peut mander que je supplie V. M. de trouver bon qu'estant icy estrangier je m'abstienne de vous en escrire aucunes choses tant que vous les pourrez savoir par une autre voye. Les Presbyteriens et les Escossois sont en jalousie de moy, ils croient avoir descouvert que j'ay travaillé autant que j'ay pu principalement dans ces derniers temps, près les Independants pour vostre service. Ils vous ont envoyé Killegré sans m'en donner advis comme ils avoient coustume de faire.

12. *Lettre du Roy de la Gr. Br. a M^r de Bellière.*

30/20. May 1647.

Holmbie le vingtiesme de May. J'espère que vous prendrez en bon part que je vous parle librement. J'ai peur que ces Messieurs du Parlement d'Angleterre se moquent de vostre bonté, car nos commissaires icy se vantent estrangement et quoy je ne crois rien de ce qu'ils disent, toutes fois excusez moy de vous dire que je vois par vos lettres que vous les avez un peu trop flattés. Car au lieu de soutenir mes resolutions, ils vous ont induit de me proposer cela que vous deviez savoir par mes discours à Newcastle, que je ne veux pas faire pour aucune persuasion ou menace. En un mot vous voyez par mon message au Parlement tout ce que je puis faire, et croyez moy que la constance est la meilleure rhétorique pour ces gens, car il n'y a telle chose que la bonté naturelle parmy eux, et à cette heur c'est le temps pour mes amis de tesmoigner ce qu'ils veulent faire pour moy, car il y a encore

moyen (par la grace de Dieu) de faire quelque chose de bon pour vostre bien bon amy le Roy de la G. B.

13. *Lettre de M^r de Bellièvre au Roy de la Gr. Br.*

8. *Juin 29. May 1647.*

A Londres le 29. May Il est important pour le service de V. M. que je luy responde avec liberté à la lettre du 20. de ce mois dont il luy a plu m'honorer. Je vois que c'est une response à celle que je luy escrives le 14. du mois passé en response à la Sienné du 9, dans laquelle V. M. me demandoit que je luy fisse savoir ce qu'elle pouvoit attendre de ces Messieurs qui avoient fait envoyer en France un projet de la response, qu'ils desirant, à quatre des plus importantes propositions, et vous me faisiez l'honneur d'adjouster que V. M. se régleroit sur ce que je luy en manderois. Mon devoir ainsy que mon inclination m'oblige d'escrire au vray à V. M. les termes auxquels ils m'en parloient, dont je crois m'estre expliqué en sorte que je ne puis comprendre sur quoy V. M. a pu concevoir que je les luy proposasse comme mon opinion, vu les termes auxquels je luy en escrivois, et ce que je luy mandois dans la mesme lettre touchant Homby et les Independants, comme aussy l'instance que je faisois à V. M. de me faire savoir quelle conduite Elle jugeroit à propos que je tinsse pour la servir dans ses intentions. Attendant la response j'ai fait près de tous les partis ce que la connoissance, que j'ay des intentions et des interets de V. M., m'a fait juger estre à faire pour son service, et ce n'est point vanité, il est necessaire que je le dise icy : j'ay la satisfaction de n'y avoir rien oublié. Ce n'est point par ma faute que les choses ne réussissent pas encore à l'avantage de V. M., si cependant l'on a supposé que j'ai dit ou fait autrement je m'estonne qu'elle l'ait voulu croire. Elle m'a demandé qu'elle ne croiroit rien de moy que par moy, outre que mon séjour de six mois près de Sa personne à Newcastle n'auroit pas produit l'effect que je souhaite, s'il ne luy a pas fait connoistre, que je ne suis pas capable d'estre persuadé de telles choses, ny de manquer à faire ce qu'il faut, et que personne n'est plust véritablement que moy dans les interets de V. M. Ceux qui luy ont voulu faire croire le contraire ne la servent pas bien et peut estre ont intention d'empescher que V. M. prenne créance en toutes les veritez qu'espere luy dire quelque jour son très humble et très obeissant serviteur Bellièvre.

14. *Lettre de M^r de Bellièvre au Roy de la Gr. Br.*

12/2. *Juin 1647.*

A Londres le 2. Juin. Si les Presbyteriens se servent de mon chiffre pour faire savoir quelque chose à V. M., je la supplie de ne

pas croire pour cela que je suis devenu Presbyterien ; je demeure dans mes maximes que V. M. connoist assez, j'eusse bien voulu avant qu'escrue cette lettre avoir appris par le retour de Bamfeild quelles sont les intentions de V. M. Mais de crainte qu'en l'attendant les Presbyteriens ne s'accordent avec les Independants, j'escris cecy à V. M. dans l'opinion que j'ay, que l'esperance qu'ils auront que V. M. pourra prendre une résolution telle qu'ils desirent les empescheia quelques jours de conclure avec les dits Independants, dont on les presse bien fort et à quoy je crains que beaucoup d'eux n'ayent trop de disposition, quoy qu'ils puissent connoistre que cet accord, en l'estat que sont les choses, les soubsmet absolument aux Independants. Cette consideration a fait que je n'ay pas eu d'avoir à refuser d'escire en cette occasion à V. M. à la prière des plus autorisés des Presbyteriens de la Maison Basse, des Escossois qui sont icy, des Comtes de Warwick et d'Hollande, des Comtesses de Devonshire et de Carlisle, que dans la passion qu'ils disent avoir pour le service de V. M. ils la conjurent de faire tout ce qui sera en vous pour esviter de tomber dans les mains de l'armée. Ils croient que le seul moyen que vous en avez est de vous eschapper d'Homby et de vous en venir à Londres, où ils disent avoir assurance des principaux de la ville, qu'elle vous desire et qu'elle vous veut servir. Ils prétendroient que vous vinssiez en diligence à Londres, que vous descendissiez chez le maire, le matin pendant que le Parlement est assis, et qu'ausistost vous allassiez au Parlement accompagné du dit maire et de toute la ville, où après avoir dit quelques parolles qui expliquassent la passion qu'a V. M. pour le bien du royaume, l'honneur du Parlement et l'avantage de la ville, ils ne douttent point que V. M. se pourroit retirer à Withall avec grand contentement de la ville et du Parlement aussi. Cependant ils ne me proposent point d'expedient pour tirer V. M. d'Homby, ny pour la conduire à Londres : ils me disent que V. M. saura mieux en trouver les moyens qu'il ne les luy peuvent donner. Ils ne me donnent point aussi assurance que les choses réussiront en la manière qu'ils proposent, sinon qu'ils le croient ainsi et que toutes les connoissances qu'ils ont de l'estat des affaires et des dispositions des personnes leur font juger, que si V. M. estoit icy toutes choses se passeront à vostre advantage. Cependant en une affaire incertaine et très perilleuse comme est cellecy je ne donnerois point conseil à V. M. Je suis obligé de luy dire que les Independants sont maintenant bien fiers, et que de ceux d'entre les dits Independants qui me parloient cydevant, comme ayant dessein de faire quelque chose pour le service de V. M., maintenant ou ils changent de langage ou ils ne me parlent plus, et je crains que leur prospérité ne leur fasse reprendre leurs anciennes maximes destructives de toute

royauté desquelles il y avoit apparence qu'ils se vouloient détacher ces mois passéz, lorsqu'ils estoient en mauvaise fortune. Quand les Maisons auront demain voté sui les lettres de l'armée, nous saurons plus de choses qu'il ne s'en peut encore savoir et j'espère me donner l'honneur de les escrire à V. M. laquelle je supplie de ne laisser voir à qui que ce soit ce que je luy escriis

15. *Bellièvre à M^r le Comte de Brienne.*

17. *Juin 1647.*

Le Roy de la Gr. Br. et les commiss^{tes} du Parlement qui estoient près de luy furent enlevez d'Homby vendredy dernier et conduits en la maison d'un gentilhomme près de Cambridge par cinq cent ou six cent chevaux de l'armée commandez par un cornett, que le général a escrit au Parlement n'avoir point eu ordre de ce faire et dont néanmoins on l'accuse, sur ce qu'il dit l'avou fait pour empescher l'exécution d'un dessein formé de faire venir le dit Roy à Londres sans la participation du Parlement. Les particularitéz de ce qui s'est passé en cette affaire vous seront dites par le Comte Dumferlin Escossois gentilhomme de la chambre du lit qui va trouver la Reyne de la Gr. Br. de la part du Roy son mary, il a puis icy des instructions des Escossois et des Presbyteriens Anglois pour disposer la Reyne de la Gr. Br., à faire aller le Prince de Galles en Escosse, pour avec toutes les forces de ce royaume là — — — se joindie aux Presbyteriens, que les principaux assurent se devoir tous declarer pour les interests du dit Roy. Je n'estime pas que les promesses que l'on fait en cette rencontre à la Reyne de la Gr. Br. la puissent porter à se desaisir aisement d'un gage si precieux que luy est le Prince de Galles, mais comme elle connoist sans doute que le moyen d'empescher que les Presbyteriens ne s'accordent avec les Independants qui seroit la ruine du Roy de la Gr. Br. est de donner des espérances aux Presbyteriens qui leur soustiennent le courage et les engagent à s'opposer aux Independants et à leur armée, elle ne manquera pas à leur dire toutes les choses qui les pourront commettre les uns contre les autres et mesme leur faire espérer, que les Escossois estant entréz en Angleterre et joints aux forces des Presbyteriens, elle fera que le Prince de Galles ira se mettre à leur teste. Il luy est très important et il ne l'est pas peu à la France, de maintenir la division entre ces deux partis. Les Escossois nous y servent de tout leur pouvoir, ils connoissent bien qu'il faut qu'ils renoncent à toutes les pretentions qu'ils ont eu en Angleterre, si le party des Independants prévaut. Ce n'est pas comme cy-devant nous avions à les combattre quand il nous a fallu empescher la ruine du party independant qui eust establi l'autorité du presbyterien à un

si haut point qu'il n'eust plus considéré son Roy. Il se peut dire en ce lieu que contribuant ce que nous pouvons au bien des affaires de la Maison Royale d'Angleterre je ne voye pas que l'on nous en sache le gré que nous nous en devions promettre. Tout le party royal est fort mal intentionné pour la France, tous les serviteurs du Roy et de la Reyne de la Gr. Br. s'en declarent, et il n'y a pas un d'eux ny de leurs amis qui ne prenne le party d'Espagne.

XIV.

SPEECH OF CROMWELL. APRIL 13, 1657.

It is well known that Cromwell, when he was once asked to publish a speech which he had delivered the day before, replied that he did not remember four words of it. He spoke, without notes, on the impulse of the moment; if his speeches were ever published, it was the doing of one or other of the literary friends about him. They were edited some time after their delivery, and might owe their theological character, the sermon-like tone which pervades them, in a great measure to the editors.

Different versions of them are extant, and these have now been blended together in the collections lately published.

Masterpieces of oratory they are not. They seldom advance in a straight line; they wander about in all sorts of digressions, and the more fully they are reported the less intelligible they are; heterogeneous recollections, inserted afterwards, appear to have got mixed up with notes made at the time. Other portions have been omitted. The actual drift of the speaker seems seldom to have been grasped by the scribe, and not always by the editor.

This is especially the case with the speeches delivered during the deliberations about assuming the title of King. In the principal speech, to which what follows refers, Carlyle, who took it from Somers' Tracts, finds the greatest obscurity, a perpetual hesitation between Yes and No. It was a very welcome discovery therefore, when I lighted upon another version in the British Museum, which, though in a shorter form, leaves no doubt as to Cromwell's meaning.

The only thing to be well remembered is, that the parliamentary committee had represented the assumption of the title as a matter of necessity, if the laws were to be observed; for the title was so interwoven with the law, that the law itself would become of doubtful validity if the title ceased to exist. One then understands that Cromwell above all things denied this necessity; he sees in the

assumption of the title nothing more than a good way out of a difficulty, a convenience, by no means a necessity. It had been argued, that the word King designates an office, and that the chief magistrate had been known to every one under this title. Cromwell's view is, that this must have had a beginning somewhere; the legal fiction, that it had been brought about by the legislative power, gives him grounds for maintaining that it could be changed by the same power. And experience had already shewn that the laws could be carried out even if the chief magistrate had another title; the thing had been done under himself by the learned judges. In this way also the obscure passage, which causes Carlyle so much difficulty, is explained; — 'there were more proceeds of justice and freedom in that time, than in double the time of Queen Elizabeth, King James, or the late king,' i.e. more cases in which justice was allowed full and free scope, without interference of the supreme power, than under the monarchy. Another name for the supreme power, therefore, could be united with the law, or could be inserted into it.

His conclusion is this;—if the title of King derives its origin from the legislative power, then that power can alter it; experience proves that the laws can work without the title; objective reasons therefore for the assumption of the title do not exist. The question then becomes subjective and personal. These personal considerations Cromwell traverses no less convincingly. He says, that the triumph of the cause is due mainly to the men of religious enthusiasm, and that these cannot endure the title; God Himself, in a contest of twelve years, has pronounced against the name and title, as against him who bore it; man must not restore what God has destroyed.

Can anything be more plain?

With regard to the other version of the speech, one may suppose that it was purposely made of more doubtful meaning than the speech itself was understood to be by those who heard it; but in this form it could be laid before Parliament, which would not surrender the hope of gaining influence over the Protector by this means.

Gentlemen !

It is very hard taske for me to give any accompt of my selfe, it is a buisines very comprehensive in some sense: your Parliament hath been pleased to make it soe. I confesse I reckon it a very hard worke to answer the things you have soe ably aserted, on the behalfe of this papyr. I hope you expect not that I should answeere all the things that have beene said, the mayne thinge spoken or grounded taken from ancient constitutions and settlements by the law of which I could never

well skill, and therefore aske pardon of what I shall transgresse, being my ignorance of them, in any answere to you. Your arguments sute well upon the law, and carry with them a great deale of necessitie and conclusion. For the arguments grounded upon necessitye, I have noe roome to answere, for what must be, must be, there fore I reckon much of my buisnes to lye in arguments of another nature. It was said that Kingshippe was not a title but an office, soe interwoven with the fundamentall lawes of this Nation, as if they could not be exercised without it; partly as I may soe say, upon a supposed ignorance of the Law, the Law it knows no other title, nor any other name or office, in the powers of it, it is made certayne, neither can the Law tell when it keeps within compasse, nor when it exceeds, and the people love what they know, and it would not be safe to intrude upon that name they cannot understand. It is said also the people hath beene alwayes by their Representatives unwilling to change. It is said also, that it is the securitie of the cheife Magistrat to secure all under him. I cannot take upon mee to refell those arguments, they are stronge and rationall; but if I shall be able to make an answere to you, I must not grant that they are necessary conclusions, but take them only as arguments, that have much of conveniency and probability towards concluding, for if an expedient may be found they are not necessary, and if not necessary, they could hang upon conveniency, and if soe, I have libertie to speake, or else to conclude: give me leave to speake why they are not soe absolute and interwoven in the Law, but that the Law possible may bee to the Justice and satisfaction of the people, and to answere all its ends, as well without as with it: though Kinge bee a name of office that runs through the Law, yet it is not the name, but from that it signifies, it is a name or office playnly imploying the supreame Authority, the signification goeth to the thinge, and not to the name. Whereas it is objected, this name is fixed and knowne, happily it hath beene a name fixed, and so it may be unfixed. And certainly it is in the right of the Legislative power to alter the name; it is their right, they may retracte or change, there is no necessity, expediency in the one or in the other. I had rather have any name from the Parliament, than a name without it, though this be a name that runs through the Law, yet it hath its originall somewhere, and it was by consent, and if soe, then all the arguments from the Law are upon the account of conveniency. There are very many enforcements that cary on the thinge, I could uge many onely from experience, and knowne to you all in effect of it, and that is although no Parliament declaration, that the supreame Authority goeing under another name hath be imployed with as first under Custodes Libertatis Angliae. and that since I have had the exercise of the place I am in, I can say almost universall obedience

hath be given to both, the first of these haveing a name of an invisible thinge, yet the very name was received under which the Law was exercised, and that by the able Learned Judges of the Nation, and I dare say that in exercise of law under that name there were more proceeds of justice and freedom in that tyme, than in double the years of Queene Eliz. Kinge James, or the late kinge; therefore it is not a title so interwoven with the law, that makes the law have its passage as we knowe, and that another name may rune through the Law with as free a passage as this, and if this be soe, other things may fall under a more indifferent consideration. And I shall arive at some issue to answer for my selfe in this great matter. All this while I have not returned any thing against the Parliament. But really the Parliament's desires, herein to have the title, have cutt with me, and doth cutt with relation to those things I hinted to you the other day. I doe not contend for any name or any thinge for my selfe, the Lord is my witness in this matter, I in all things wayt under the disposition of the providence of God; this name I now have, I tooke not upon me as hopeing to doe any great good, but having a desire to prevent Evill; I should also thinke any name better than mine, or any person fitter than I am to manage any such busines; I should thinke when you are settling the peace of this Nation, the mayne thinge that hathe a consistency with it should be pursued, and I should be willing to serve therein though not as a Kinge but as a Constable to keepe the Peace of the Nation. If I may advise, and I wish I may be helpfull to follow peace, I know there is noe necessity of this thinge, for my part I cannot say; I know my calling and should be glad to be made an instrument of the peace and settlement of the Nation. When I was Captain of a troupe of horse, I did certaynely perceive that those that was under the King were Gentlemen, yonger sonnes, men of courage and spiritt, and those that were in our army were tappsters and serving men, and such like, and I had a thought in my heart which I communicated to Coll. Hampdon, a man of honour, and that was this, that that spiritt, that must contend and prevaile against these men, must be a spiritt above them. (Which is Godlines.) And I have used my endeavour therein, and from that tyme to the ende of the Warre I was never beaten, and for this sake it much sways with me in my conscience that they are such men that will not be beaten downe with a carnall spiritte I cannot thinke that God would blesse me, if I should justly (unjustly) and without cause greive them; those that will be greived without a cause, I should be a slave to comply with them; the mayntayning of that interest God will blesse. I knowe generally good men cannot swallow this title; though it be no part of their duty to withstand your vote, yet tendernesse ought to be exercised towards them, who have, and will serve you. I must

begge it at your hands not to sticke tow hard upon this matter. I may say as Abigall to David, it will be no greife of heart to you, to comply with them; I will not say any thinge for my selfe, I am not scrupled about names, yet I must tell you, the providence of God, that I have seene, hath layd aside title, I say the providence of God, not by sudden passion, but by issue of great deliberation. After 12 years civill warres, if God hath eradicated that family with its issue, he hath de facto turned the title also, God hath stroke out both the family, both name and thinge, by an act of the Long Parliament. I would only allude to that of Jude, we are to hate the garments spotted with the flesh, we should not sett up that which providence hath destroyed; this hath an awe upon my spirit. I must confesse, tymes are fickell, and unsettled; I would not have you loose any helpe in order to settlement. I cannot with conveniency to my selfe, and in order to safty, say any more, but leave it.

Endorsed in another hand. 'The L^d Protector's speeche of the title of King. Apr. 1657.' And in a considerably later hand: 'Bought of M^r G. Pauls Landlady.'

XV.

FIRST PROCEEDINGS OF THE RESTORATION-GOVERNMENT.

I have mentioned the plans for restoring the monarchy to its old full powers, which were broached on the return of Charles II. In comparison with them it will be interesting to cast a glance at the actual deliberations, which took place in the Council of the King. Of comprehensive schemes, as for a full and complete restoration, there is no mention; but one learns the chief points, which presented themselves immediately to the new government in the conduct of business. One of the chief of these is undoubtedly the repression of pronounced opponents, the regicides and their supporters (search was made for the man who executed the sentence of death on Charles I), the Anabaptists, especially those called Fanatics. But the most zealous attention was also paid to the Bill of Indemnity, for which the people were very anxious. Another thing for consideration was the critical state of the King's finances; he had come back deeply in debt, and was now endeavouring to extricate himself by a smaller expenditure, e.g. upon the army. Or again, relations to foreign powers are taken into consideration; as also the first arrangements for the government of Scotland and Ireland, in accordance with the proposals of the Royalists which had come from both countries; and the preliminaries to the coronation. So far as I know,

nothing of the kind has as yet been made public. But the minutes of Secretary Nicholas, which are preserved in the Record Office, were very hard to decipher; and he speaks sometimes in his own person. Without the help of Mr. Bruce and Mr. Hamilton, the excellent connoisseurs of the style of writing peculiar to this period, it would have been impossible for me to give any quotations from these minutes.

Registers of the Council Board.

13. June 1660.

Ordered that the Duke of Yorke's troope of horse in Flanders to be drawne into Dunkerke, and order is to be taken that the committee of the army to provide for payment of them.

The examinations sent out of Ireland make it appear that Sir Hard. Waller was very violent to have the king executed. All his examinations are to be delivered over to Mr. Attorney to prepare a charge upon it and to present the same to the Lords, who may add Sir Hard. Waller to the number of those that are to die for it.

The excise money is all paid to Alderman Blackwell and not into the Exchequer but the Alderman is accountable in the Exchequer for all those moneyes.

That some of the members of this Board move the House of Commons concerning money for payment of the garrison of Dunkirk.

That there are commissioners from Ireland and they may be here at the Board his Majesty present, and here heard in what they shall say concerning the state of the affairs of Ireland, and then his Majesty may if he find it fit appoint a committee.

14. June. Council Board.

Lord General Montague to be sworne a Privy Councillor.

The Brewers' petition is recommended to the Board by the King.

To read the draught of a proclamation prepared for recalling of commanders at sea.

Concerning the charge sent to Mr. Attorney General about the prisoners, which charge to be sent to the Lords, vide the order of the Board for this.

Concerning recalling of Sir Geo. Askue and his English officers and others he carried over with him. This to be further considered another day.

Noel's account upon the ferme of excise and customes to be referred to the Lord chief Baron to call some Auditors to him and to examine this account and order the state of his books.

15. *June.*

Major Butler a commissioner at Oxford and one that sate on several highe Courts of justice, agent for Sir H. Vane, is now upon the lief guard, which desires to have him committed.

The King thinks not fit to have any clause to exempt himself or family from paying excise.

The two secretaries Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper and Mr. Anslo or any two of them are to repara to the Tower and to examine Mr. Cooke and any other of the prisoners there and to call to us any of the king's learned counsel to our assistance.

Concerning judges for the courts of justice in Westminster Hall they are to be advised with by the Lord Chancellor, whether it be necessary that the sergeants that are to be made judges be called anew by his Majesty's writs, the former writs to them that were called being not legall.

The estimate of the debt that lyes on the king now is three millions and the growing charge is proportionate. The establishments for the army about 7 or 800,000 per annum by estimate, the charge doth exceed the income of the revenue at least a million per annum and the future charge being so far greater than the income, it will lye on his Majesty if not reduced.

Monday 18. Junii 1660.

(present) The King, Lord Chancellor, Lord Steward, Lord General, Earl of Southampton, both secretaries.

To meet every Monday's and Thursday's morning in Lord Chancellor's chamber at 10 o'clock.

Lord Chancellor

Lord Steward

Lord General

Earl of Southampton

Lord Culpepper

2 Secretaries

} The king will recollect himself concerning the getting of money.

I am to give a list of those Anabaptists to Lord General, signifying his Majesty's pleasure that Lord General take order, that the said persons being dangerous men may be so secured as they may do no harme.

A list of the new gardes to be brought in by the king, who to consider to put them into order.

Tuesday 19. Junii 1660.

Whether Willis, Whitlock, Earl Bedford, Earl Suffolk shall order pardons; whether I shall send to apprehend St Johns.

Chas^s Wheeler to be forbidden the Court. Col. Rogers a dangerous
 Sir Charles Herbert to attend Lord Steward to consider how the
 king's house may be settled in a more frugall way

Letters to the king of France and king of Spain to give notice
 of his Majestie being established on his throne, and the letter from
 the king.

Monday 25. Junii 1660.

That if the Scots will here undertake, that if a parliament be called
 that a course may be taken by it to settle the government in the old
 way, whereby the king's regall rights shall be restored then to admit
 of it. If the Scots will undertake to raise money to pay the army there
 then it shall.

And it may be a significance, if they of Amsterdam will lend the
 king 3 or 400,000 and it shall be paid out of the monies that shall be
 given the king by parliament.

Monday 1. July 1660.

Lord Generall to see the militia how it's settled and to get a list
 of all the officers thereto belonging and to enquire what affectiones the
 commanders are

27. Junii 1660. Council Board.

The king to write his letters to the English ministers in Scotland,
 letter by the king, to continue those taxes till further order, and that
 his Majesty will take all the care he may to settle the kingdome and
 affairs there.

Monr Bourdeaux was sent there to them that murdered the king's
 father and has noe credentials, and that since there was an inclination
 for restoring the king that he endeavoured to hinder his Majesty's
 accession. That no doubt he did come here before the king's coming
 over to write letters to them in France and that the sending of creden-
 tials is an affront to the king.

29. Junii 1660.

The French ambassador has £8000 of the king's pictures and . . .

4. July 1660.

Concerning Spanish shippes and goods taken before the king's re-
 storation from the Spaniards, the money that is of the proceede
 of their ships and goods is by the advocate to be required to be brought
 into the Admiralty Court, and of Sir H. de Vir whether in Flanders he
 doe proceede to adjudge prize such ships as have been taken since the
 king's restoration.

Concerning the Admiralty.

The Lords approve of what was agreed upon by the Duke of York and committee of the Admiralty for the government, they like the four officers of the navy and the 3 commissioners (viz. Lord Berkley, Sir Wm Pen and Mr. Peter Pett) and the several salaries to be allowed them as the said committee have agreed unto, which is to be paid out of the 3^d per pound formerly taken by the Treasurer of the navy, to whom £2000 per annum is to be allowed.

The king has told the commissioners of Ireland that he will suddenly appoint a chief governor and a council for Ireland and fill the courts of Justice there with Judges.

Concerning the petition of Dublin That the king is graciously inclined to grant their request, when the government shall be settled his Majesty will give such order for renewing their charter as shall be fit, to take notice of their fidelity and good affections.

7. July 1660.

It's recommended to the king to write his letters to the States of Zealand to release the said ship the Experience.

That the king will be pleased to be here the next council day. I am to put the king in mind to settle some thing in order to the government of Ireland and that some of the commissioners may return home to let those in Ireland see what is done here.

11. July 1660.

To inquire of Sir William Compton concerning such arms and munition bought and exported out of the city into diverse parts of the country.

Lieutenant of the Tower is to be sworn and all the prisoners to be delivered over to him by indenture, by some of the Privy Council.

Colonel Hacker is committed to the Tower close prisoner by the king's command at the council Board, he confesses that he did read the name of him that executed the late king but hath forgot his name.

12. July 1660.

Concerning the government of Guernesey, that it shall be put into a man's hand that has an estate and that he shall reside there in person, it being a place of trust.

Concerning expediting the Act of indemnity, because it will give much satisfaction to all sorte of people.

Whether the king shall give audience to the Ambassador of Por-

tugal, it may be done without prejudice to the king's alliance with Spain.

20. *July* 1660.

Orders that all magistrates and officers in all corporations take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy.

That the circuit for Assizes to be deferred for some tyme. Left to the Lord Chancellor to speak of this with the judges and to advise to what tyme the circuit shall be put off.

Concerning the expediting of the Act of indemnity in the House of Lords. Resolved as the opinion of this Board. That the king be pleased so come to the Lords' House to incline them to expedite the Act of indemnity, being his Majesty holds himself tyed in honor to have it passed. Resolved that the king and Lords meete every evening at 6 o'clock at this Board to acquaint his Majesty how the Bill proceedes in the house, and the other Bills concerning the tonnage and poundage and the other things that concerne his Majestie's interest.

25. *July* 1660.

The king declares that he has made choice of the Lord Robertes to be deputy of Ireland and has app[ointed him].

1. *Aug.* 1660.

There is owing now to the navy and its dependents £670,000 and for the present the navy expends £7000 per weeke without taking off any parte of the charge, and is only a charge that doth necessarily cost £7000 per weeke. £94,000 would pay off 20 ships and lessen very much the weekly charge.

Concerning the garrison of Dunkirk. That the governor of Dunkirk write to his officers to collect the contributions as they were wont to doe, and if the governor can find an expedient to improve the trade there he shall doe, what he propose for to effect it, and that he pursue the old wayes for collecting the contribution for the garrison.

29. *Aug.* 1660.

Petition and certificate of the sheriff of the county of Merioneth concerning the insolvency of phanatics in those parts and that they would not admit any into their congregation but such as would sweare against ministry and magistracy. Referred to the Judges of the sessions to examine the said misdemeanours and to proceede against those that shall be found guilty of the said misdemeanours according to law.

The supply of the garrison of Carlisle is referred to the Lord General.

7. *Sepbr.* 1660.

Concerning the disbanding the army.

To consider whether it be prudence to disband all the army in a fortnight and to leave soe many discontented persons (who may be troublesome and hold perfect intelligence one with another) to act and noe means to withstand them.

That the army in Scotland may not be held fit to be soe soone disbanded before the factions and animosities there are better disposed.

That the Navy is a double charge of that the army is. And the king is now at £40,000 a month charge for the navy; every man in the ships one with another stands the king in £3 a month, and there being 12,000 seamen comes to £36,000 a month, and the wear and tear comes to 15s. a man a month, which comes to £4000.

It's justly to be doubted that the pollmoney will not amount to what may be sufficient for payment of the army.

The instructions are that all the army shall be disbanded, except only the Duke of Yorke's and Duke of Gloucester's regiments and the two regiments belonging to the Lord General.

£12,000 will discharge 30 shippes and ease the king of £14,000 a month.

To move at a conference of both houses, that either the pollmoney to be disposed of to discharge some of the army and some of the navy or else that the House of Commons will provide money to discharge the navy.

7. *Sepbr.* 1660. *post meridiem.*

The prisoners' petitions are to be considered of at the next council on Tuesday, if these shall be set at liberty, that may cause some new disorder.

To speake with the Earl of St. Albans to write his lordship's letters to Count de Brienne concerning the children, Mr. Sands and his brother now in France, that he may be permitted to come over.

To write to the Judges to examine the truth of his letter.

14. *September* 1660.

The prisoners not to be released till a part of the army be disbanded.

To prepare letters or warrants to Deputy Lieutenants named in Staffordshire and Shropshire to serch for and seize on any arms that have been embezzled out of those magazines and have been disposed of to private use.

To be disbanded all the Generall officers, except Duke Albemarle and my Lord Mulgrave. Sandowne Castle. Coll. R. Norton's regiment of foote.

Major General Morgan's regiment of horse except the one troop. Col Hues regiment of foote, Capt. Davies and Capt. Mason companies of foote.

To speeke to the Knight Marshal to cause the streetes to be cleansed before Scotland yard.

19. *Septbr. 1660.*

Whaley and Goffe are newly come over and were in Kent. A proclamation to issue for apprehending of them and prohibiting any to harbour either of them and £100 reward to those that shall apprehend them.

Mrs Lenthall referred to Mr. Attorney and Mr. Sollicitor to examine the books and to give such directions to prosecution of her books as there shall be cause.

21. *Septbr. 1660. Concerning the excise.*

The weekly receipt of the excise is £5000 and somewhat more it comes to now, but it hath come to £8000 a weeke.

There is order given by the parliament for payment of £1200 a week, which is duly paid. That the proclamation concerning the excise be expedited.

26. *Septbr. 1660.*

Concerning a Sheriiff of Norwich, who refused to take the usuall oath of the Sheriff of that city, ordered that he choose another and leave him to be fined and proceeded against according to lawe.

Order to the Lord Lieutenant of Somerset to seize the armes now in Mr. Wm. Strode's hands.

Committee appointed to consider of preparations for the king's coronation to meete Satterday after noone.

1. *October 1660. Concerning the Coronation.*

Letters missive to all the nobilities and other great States of the Land.

Letters to them that were to receive the order of knight of the Bath.

Writts to Sheriffs to give proclamation that all that hold land to the value of £40 per annum.

The day before the coronation the king createth such nobility.

To know wether the king will goe to his coronation from the Tower or from what other place, if he go from the Tower then

he is to create the noblemen and knights of the Bath, that place was used by former kings, till King James. King James came from the Charter house insteede of the Tower and King Charles of Withehall

12/22. *October 1660*

Concerning the Earl Montrath's letter touching M. Madde: a minister at Dublin.

Scot, Scroope, Cary, Jones and Clement are all condemned this day: Harrison to be executed to morrow.

Madde said that he had lived happily these last 20 yeares.

To take care to suppress preaching and to secure those that are seditious and to unveil those that should have any scruples, to forbid them to forbear to preach or to commit any seditious preachers, to proceed according to the laws of the land and especially to suppress seditious preaching; to thank them for their care.

17/27 *October 1660.*

Concerning Mr Wm. Heningham, he confessed himself guilty and the jury found him so, for that he sate there the day the king was sentenced to death, only he did not sign the warrant.

Heningham is to have judgement on Friday and Hulet to be reprieved a fortnight

Denmark.

That the king of Denmark do by the Treaty agree, that the king and his subjects may have the same advantageous articles that he offered or gave to the Hollanders. Holland had an abatement of toll and the interest of the money lent to Denmark.

19/29. *October 1660.*

Commissioners to treat with the Hamburg agent

Dr. Mason, Dr. Walker, Dr. Turner, Sir Richard Foorde, Mr. Jeffery, Northleigh and Thomas Tite or any 4.

24. *October 1660.*

The petition of the Merchants trading to Jamaica, concerning their shipp taken by the Spaniards carried into Galicia. The copy of the petition to be delivered to the Spanish Ambassador and the letter written to the king's resident in Spain complaining of this, and sending a copy of the letter to demand restitution of their ship and goods.

The Habeas Corpus for Mr. Pogers to be committed for that he being well versed in his Majesty's council beyond sea did hold a treasonable correspondence with his Majesty's enemies as a spy during the time of his Majesty's residence in foreign parts.

14. *Novembris* 1660.

Sir William Dudley to be sheriff of Northamptonshire in place of M^r. Stafford.

3. *Novembris* 1660.

To know whether his Majesty will have the crowne that represents king Edward's crown so be with 4 or 8 barrs.

To know of the king whom he will appoint to represent the Dukes of Normandy and of Aquitaine.

5. *December* 1660.

The petition of some commanders of the city to have power to lay an assesment for the militia. That this business has been already considered in the Commons' House and rejected or not thought fit to be granted.

To speak au Roy how Mr. Henry Bennet shall carry himself to Don Alonso and how to the Duke of Aren who would write to the king if it might be agreeable to his Majesty.

Wariant for a grant of the place of havener of Plymouth and the Duchy of Cornwall to Sir William Maurice and William his son for life upon the surrender of M^r. Richard Indes.

5. *December* 1660.

Concerning the Earl Monrath's letter touching the great extremity they are in Ireland how to pay the army.

Vide the statute of muster, vide statute concerning arms and trayned soldiers tempore Philip & Ma^y. 4^o & 5^o Philip & Queen Ma^y cap. 3^o.

I delivered the Lord Newport's complaint against Sir John Corbet and Sir Cornwall for neglecting being summoned to appear or find a troopp.

12 *December* 1660.

The king will have 24 Footemen, more.

14. *December* 1660.

Letter to the Lord Newport to give thanks to him that wrote to him and to give him order to have an eye upon those Quakers that they may be made to observe the lawes and government. That his officers endeavour to remove their armes and to put them into the garrison.

Hall saith that Major White shewed him a roll in parchment with a line drawn in the midst with names on both sides of it. That he said he had 2060 horse and 3000 foote which he could have

reddy on 24 howers warning, that White did enter this examinant's name in the roll.

Who these 3 persons are that were with him and where that parchment roll is that he shewed and into which he entered Hall's name.

Concerning Lord Marquis Antrim. That the Lord Chancellor give order to send over such testimonies as there is in Ireland against his lordship.

8. Feb. 1660/1.

The king leaves it to the Archbishop of Canterbury to appoint what bishop shall preach at the coronation.

The king to appoint who shall be constable and marshal.

Commission to the Earl Marshal and Lord Chamberlain of the Household to see the ceremony performed.

The knights to begin on Thursday and Friday. The place Westminster. The king to give the knights their dinner in Court of Requests. The number of knights of the Bath to be above 50.

Signification to be given to the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London to be ready at the coronation.

Commission for the proclamation of pardon that is to be proclaimed by the Lord Cha. on the stage presently before the king is crowned.

All liveries are by the king cut off.

